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This thesis seeks to understand the role of audit in managing the performance of the 
NHS in Scotland and the impact which the relationship between performance and 
audit has upon key actors, including NHS organisations and national audit bodies.  It 
is informed by Michael Power’s Audit Society (1999) and associated works, which 
present audit as a collection of ideas which shape how society defines control, 
accountability and transparency.  The premise of this doctoral research is that the age 
of performance assessment in the NHS is evidence of Power’s Audit Society in 
action.   
A longitudinal analysis of annual Overview Reports produced by Audit Scotland, 
which symbolise the national audit body’s identity relative to the NHS, explores the 
impact which the performance assessment regime had upon the evolution of the 
national audit body and demonstrates the capacity of a national audit body to forge 
its own role in performance assessment and in doing so shift its identity from 
traditional external auditor to authoritative commentator on performance.   
A recent performance crisis in a Scottish NHS board is the subject of a case study 
which explores the role of audit when significant gaming is uncovered in a 
previously high-trust system.  This case demonstrates how the ritual appeal of audit 
can be mobilised by the government to restore public confidence in reported 
improvements in performance across the whole NHS.    
The organisational impact of audit on performance management is explored through 
an observation-based case study set in a Scottish NHS board, which traces 
interactions between the main actors in audit and performance networks.   
These analyses show how audit can permeate the performance assessment of NHS 
bodies, at both the national and organisational level, even where it is not given a 
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Glossary of terms 
Annual health 
check 
National performance management system for the NHS in 
England from 2005 to 2009.  Replaced by the periodic 
review. 
 
Audit Commission Statutory corporation responsible for appointing auditors to a 
range of public bodies in England, including NHS 
organisations and local authorities.  The Department for 
Communities and Local Government announced in August 
2010 that new arrangements will be put in place to secure the 
audit of local bodies in England and the Commission will 
ultimately be disbanded.   
 
Audit Scotland Independent public body responsible for assisting the Auditor 
General for Scotland in discharging her statutory functions to 
audit the financial statements and economy, efficiency and 




Crown appointment responsible for the audit of most 
devolved public bodies in Scotland, with the exception of 
local authorities.  The Auditor General is independent of 





Non-departmental body in the UK Government with 
responsibility for the regulation and inspection of health care 
and adult social care services in England.  Formed in 2009, 







Non-departmental body in the UK Government with 
responsibility for assessing NHS performance.  Created in 
2001 and replaced by the Healthcare Commission in 2004. 
Department of 
Health 
Department of the UK Government with responsibility for 
the NHS and formulation of health policy in England.   
 
  
HEAT National performance management system for NHSScotland 
from 2006 to present.  Recognises four dimensions of 
performance – Health improvement, Efficiency and 
governance; Access to services; and Treatment appropriate to 







Non-departmental body in the UK Government with 
responsibility for driving improvement in health care services 
in England.  Formally known as the Commission for 
Healthcare Audit and Inspection.  Replaced the Commission 
for Health Improvement in 2004 and was succeeded by the 





– Scotland  
 
National performance management system for NHSScotland 




– England  
 
National performance management system for NHS 
organisations in England from 1999 to 2000.  Replaced by 
the star ratings system. 
Periodic review National performance management system for the NHS in 





Department of the devolved Scottish Executive with 
responsibility for NHSScotland and formulation of health 
policy from 1999.  Became Scottish Government Health 







Directorates of the devolved Scottish Government 
responsible for NHSScotland and the formulation of health 
policy.  Succeeded the Scottish Executive Health Department 
following internal restructuring in 2007.  Renamed Scottish 
Government Health and Social Care Directorates (SGHSCD) 
in late 2010.   
 
Scottish Office Department of the UK Government from 1885 to 1999 with 
responsibility for a wide range of functions pertaining to 
Scotland, including health.  Following creation of the 
Scottish Parliament, the functions formerly carried out by the 
Scottish Office were transferred to the Scottish Executive 
(now Government) and the Scotland Office.   
 
Star ratings National performance management system for the NHS in 




















This doctoral research studies the role of audit in managing the performance of the 
National Health Service (NHS) in Scotland during the three terms of the New Labour 
Government, which ran from May 1997 to May 2010.   
During this period, NHS organisations in England were held to account by Ministers 
and officials through a multiplicity of centrally imposed performance targets and 
measurement regimes, including the notorious ‘star ratings’ system.  Such regimes 
were designed to make visible the activities and functions carried out by NHS 
organisations and to align organisational actions to political priorities, such as 
reducing waiting times.   
Meanwhile, the creation of the Scottish Parliament brought about the devolution of 
policy control and management of the NHS to Scotland.  Scotland subsequently 
pursued a distinct approach to health policy which prioritises collaboration and 
collectivism over managerialism (Kerr and Feeley, 2007).  This has a profound 
impact on the way in which NHSScotland
1
 has implemented performance assessment 
and on the role which audit has played in supporting performance assessment, 
although these divergences from the English approach have received relatively little 
attention in the academic literature.   
These audit and performance management reforms are explored in the present study 
through the lens of Michael Power’s works The Audit Explosion (1994a) and The 
Audit Society (1999)
2
 and the associated literature.   
Once a process reserved to providing assurance over the content of financial 
statements, audit has ‘exploded’ into new domains, including clinical practice, 
education, the environment and intellectual property (Power, 1994a:1).  People are 
increasingly subject to the demands of audit in their everyday lives; they are required 
to ‘tick boxes’ to demonstrate compliance with systems and controls.  Power (1999) 
argues that audit is not just a technical practice, but a normative idea which shapes 
                                                          
1
 The NHS in Scotland has been collectively known as “NHSScotland” since devolution, emphasising 
the rhetoric of reunifying a national service which had been fragmented by market reforms.   
2
 The Audit Society was first published in 1997, with a paperback edition published in 1999.  All page 
references in this paper are to the 1999 edition. 
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society’s views of what constitutes control, accountability and transparency.  This 
can give rise to dysfunctional effects, including the displacement of core 
organisational activities.   
The premise of this research is that the age of performance assessment in the NHS is 
evidence of Power’s Audit Society in action.  This research will explore the impact of 
the softer approach to performance assessment adopted by the NHS in Scotland, 
compared to the strongly managerial approach adopted by the NHS in England, and 
the associated implications for the Audit Society.   
 
1.2 Research outline 
1.2.1 Aims and objectives 
This research project aims to understand how different approaches to performance 
assessment and associated audit mechanisms impact upon key actors at all levels of 
the NHS in Scotland, including policy formation, strategic and operational 
management and the official response to a performance crisis.  
1.2.2 Contribution 
The unique contribution of this study lies in providing a deeper understanding of the 
less-managerial Scottish approach to NHS performance assessment and the 
implications this has for the Audit Society.   
Differences are expected in the extent to which the effects of Power’s Audit Society 
are visible in the performance assessment frameworks in the NHS in Scotland and 
England.  This provides an opportunity to not only understand the effects of these 
different approaches but to attempt to refine current theoretical understanding of the 
conditions which give rise to The Audit Society.  This responds to criticism that 
Power’s work is firmly located in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, saturated in New Public 
Management
3
, limiting its universal relevance (Pentland, 2000; Power, 2005). 
                                                          
3
 New Public Management is used here to refer to the shift towards governments using managerial 
techniques to deliver public services, a phenomenon particularly evident in the UK, New Zealand, 
Australia, Canada and Sweden – see Hood, 1991; 1995. 
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This project also responds to calls for research on the effects of the Audit Society 
upon auditees, particularly evidence of game-playing and dysfunctional behaviour, to 
determine the effects of making agents accountable in terms of auditable 
performance measurement systems (Power, 2000a:115; 2003a:199).   
Existing comparative studies of performance management in the post-devolution 
NHS favour quantitative analysis of aggregate performance data (Propper et al., 
2008; Bevan and Hamblin, 2009; Connolly, Bevan and Mays, 2010).  There is a lack 
of studies which consider behavioural and organisational consequences of different 
approaches to managing the performance of NHS organisations and which consider 
the impact of audit mechanisms.  The present study aims to address this gap in the 
literature. 
1.2.3 Research questions 
This study will answer the following research questions: 
1. How are audit mechanisms manifest in the performance measurement 
regimes in the National Health Service in England and Scotland? 
2. What is the effect on the national audit body when there is no formal role for 
audit within the NHS performance assessment framework?  
3. How do key actors in the governance and management of the National Health 
Service respond to performance measurement and audit mechanisms, and 




1.3 Structure of this thesis 
Chapter 2: Research context introduces the setting for the current research, 
including the policy environment, the impact of devolution on Scottish public 
services and the public audit framework, and the governance framework and 
operational structure of NHSScotland.   
Chapter 3: Theoretical framework: Power’s Audit Society sets out the body of 
theoretical work underpinning this thesis.  It explores Power’s key arguments and the 
response they generated in the literature.   
Chapter 4: Research design and methods summarises the research design and 
methods employed in this study, and the underlying research strategy.   
The following four chapters present the results of empirical studies of the role of 
audit in managing the performance of the NHS in Scotland.   
Chapter 5: Performance management in the NHS in England and Scotland (1997 
to 2010) presents a comparative study of performance management reforms in the 
NHS in Scotland and England from 1997 to 2010 based on detailed analysis of 
official policy and guidance documents produced over the period.  This chapter 
highlights key differences in the performance management approaches taken in 
Scotland and England and provides a detailed narrative on the policy environment.   
Chapter 6: The evolution of Audit Scotland’s role in performance managing 
NHSScotland traces the transformation of the identities of the Auditor General and 
the national audit body in the first 10 years following creation of the Scottish 
Parliament.  It presents the findings of a longitudinal analysis of Audit Scotland NHS 
overview reports, which symbolise the national audit body’s identity in relation to 
the NHS performance assessment regime in Scotland.   
Chapter 7: Audit in times of performance crisis – NHS Lothian waiting time 
management presents a case study of the official response to a performance crisis in 
waiting time management.  It explores the impact which the discovery of significant 
gaming has on the role of audit in performance management.   
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Chapter 8: Observing performance, audit and organisational life in NHSScotland 
presents a case study based on observation of key governance committees in a 
Scottish NHS board.  It traces interactions between the main actors in organisational 
audit and performance management networks to build an understanding of the impact 
of the performance assessment framework.   
Chapter 9: Discussion draws out key themes and findings from the four preceding 
empirical studies and explores these in the context of the existing literature on the 
Audit Society presented in Chapter 3.   
Chapter 10: Conclusion summarises key findings of this thesis and the contribution 






















This chapter introduces the setting for the current research, including the policy 
environment, the impact of devolution on Scottish public services and the public 
audit framework, and the governance framework and operational structure of 
NHSScotland.   
 
2.2 The National Health Service 
2.2.1 Background 
The National Health Service (NHS) was established in the United Kingdom in 1948 
and endures as a model of universal healthcare provision.  The organisational form 
and political priorities of the NHS have shifted during its 65-year history, but these 
reforms have been guided by three enduring principles (Greener, 2009:16).  
Healthcare is provided free at the point of delivery on the basis of need, not ability to 
pay.  Healthcare is universally provided, with no regard to gender, ethnicity, age or 
disability.  Healthcare is comprehensive – all conditions are treated. 
The NHS is a highly complex organisation, encompassing diverse stakeholders 
including strong professional groups with their own distinctive objectives (Greener, 
2009).  It delivers a wide variety of services, ranging from public health and 
preventative programmes to the delivery of primary and acute care.   
The NHS is funded through general taxation raised by central government and 
government ministers are accountable to Parliament and the public for the 
performance of the NHS.  The balance of power between central government and the 
various agencies responsible for delivering frontline patient care has shifted over 
time, but remains a source of tension (Klein, 1982).  Governments of the day have 
introduced various policy mechanisms in an attempt to resolve this tension, famously 
including the “internal market” (Department of Health, 1989).   
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2.2.2 New Labour health policy (1997 to 2010) 
The New Labour Government elected in 1997 rejected the market rhetoric which had 
dominated both health policy and the management of relationships between central 
government and frontline NHS organisations.   
Performance measures and targets replaced price as the prevailing currency of the 
NHS.  This target-driven ethos was applied across all public services, not just the 
NHS; over 300 headline targets were introduced across all Whitehall departments in 
1998 (Hood, 2006:515).  Ten of these targets were applied to the Department of 
Health, and these in turn became 300 lower level targets applied to organisations 
charged with delivering health care (ibid.). 
Performance assessment regimes were designed to make visible the activities and 
functions carried out by these organisations and to align organisational actions to 
political priorities, such as reducing waiting times.  
The NHS was already familiar with performance measurement technologies, which 
had been used extensively to support the functioning of the internal market 
(Humphrey, Miller and Smith, 1998).  The use of standards and measures of 
performance is a doctrinal component of new public management (NPM), and so the 
adoption of these technologies by the NHS was symptomatic of a wider trend 
towards the quantification of goals, targets and indicators of success (Hood, 1991).  
However, the extent and significance of performance assessment shifted under New 
Labour.   
The star ratings system in operation from 2001 to 2006 was the most notorious and 
extreme scheme introduced by the New Labour Government to manage the post-
internal market NHS.  This system ‘named and shamed’ poorly performing trusts and 
relied upon a framework of rewards and sanctions to align the outcomes of NHS 
organisations to central policy objectives (Bevan, 2006:68).  The impact of the star 
ratings system has been the subject of extensive research activity.  Various studies 
uncovered significant gaming of achievement of measures which undermined the 
veracity of reported improvements in performance (for example, Bevan and Hood, 
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2006), while others highlighted the burden which the system placed on NHS staff to 
deliver good results (for example, Mannion et al., 2005).   
Performance management was the dominant mode of governance throughout the 
three terms of the New Labour Government, although the form and content of 
performance management schemes evolved over the 13 year period.  This evolution 
is analysed in detail in Chapter 5.   
Much of the existing literature on performance management of the NHS in the early 
21
st
 century has considered the New Labour reforms in isolation, without recognising 
that the NHS in other parts of the United Kingdom pursued an alternative path.  The 
creation of the Scottish Parliament in 1999 enabled the development of a distinctly 
Scottish approach to the management of the NHS, which is considered further in the 
next section.   
 
2.3 Devolution and the Scottish NHS 
2.3.1 Devolution 
The New Labour manifesto for the 1997 general election campaign included a 
commitment to hold referenda soon after the election to enable the people of 
Scotland and Wales to vote on proposals to devolve powers from Westminster to 
new democratic institutions (Labour Party, 1997).   
The Scottish electorate voted in favour of the creation of a Scottish Parliament in 
September 1997
4
.  The proposed devolution settlement included full legislative and 
administrative responsibility for the National Health Service in Scotland (The 
Scottish Office, 1997a).   
The UK Parliament subsequently passed the Scotland Act 1998, which created the 
institutions of the devolved Scottish administration, including the Scottish Parliament 
                                                          
4
 The referendum asked the Scottish electorate two questions: whether there should be a Scottish 
Parliament and whether that Parliament should have tax-raising powers.  74.3% of voters were in 
favour of the creation of a Scottish Parliament (60.4% turnout) while 63.5% of voters agreed that the 
Parliament should have tax-raising powers (source: 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/help/17029.aspx accessed on 30 April 2012). 
14 
 
and the Scottish Executive.  The first elections to the Scottish Parliament were held 
in May 1999, with the first meeting of the new Scottish Parliament taking place later 
that month.  The Parliament assumed legislative powers in July 1999, following the 
opening of the Parliament by Her Majesty The Queen.   
The Scottish NHS was historically administratively autonomous from that of the rest 
of the United Kingdom; the Scottish Office, not the Department of Health, was the 
UK Government department with responsibility for operation of the NHS in 
Scotland.  The former department was nevertheless bound by the overarching policy 
framework set by the latter.  The Secretary of State for Scotland was a member of the 
Cabinet of the United Kingdom Government so shared collective responsibility for 
policy and decisions taken by the Cabinet.  These elements constrained the ability of 
the Scottish Office to adopt a significantly different approach to healthcare policy in 
Scotland than that adopted by the Department of Health (Woods, 2004).   
The new Scottish Parliament provided an opportunity for Scottish public services, 
including the NHS, to take a divergent approach to the emerging UK tradition of 
managerialism exemplified by the Thatcher administration but perpetuated, albeit 
with the sharp edges blunted, by the New Labour government (Greer, 2004; 
Blackman et al., 2006).   
2.3.2 Scottish health policy 
The different political and managerial philosophies underlying the operation of the 
NHS in Scotland found a voice post-devolution as the Scottish Parliament adopted its 
own health policy, including a distinctive interpretation of the performance 
management regimes favoured in England.   
The party political environment in Scotland creates an expectation that devolved 
Scottish policies may diverge from the rest of the UK: there is a bias towards left-of-
centre parties in the party system and a strong nationalist voter base, which combine 
to create political pressure to create distinctively Scottish policies (Greer, 2005:504-
5).   
However, the health policy environment in Scotland is also significantly different 
from the rest of the United Kingdom.  Clinical professionals have traditionally had 
15 
 
greater influence over the development of health policy in Scotland which creates an 
environment which gives precedence to values of professionalism, integration, 
partnership and collectivism (Hazell and Jervis, 1998; Nottingham, 2000; Spry, 
2002; Greer, 2004; Greer, 2005; Kerr and Feeley, 2007).  This is facilitated to a large 
degree by the smaller scale of the NHS in Scotland, which serves a population 
around one-tenth of the size of England.   
This sets an expectation that Scottish health policy, including the approach taken to 
performance management, will be less managerial than its English counterpart.  This 
proposition is explored in Chapter 5, which presents a comparative study of 
performance management reforms in the NHS in Scotland and England from 1997 to 
2010 based on detailed analysis of official policy and guidance documents produced 
over the period.   
Early performance measurement frameworks adopted by NHSScotland were 
underpinned by collaboration and relied upon professional values to incentivise 
performance improvements (Farrar et al., 2004; Bevan and Hamblin, 2009), although 
the approach would become more managerial over time.  This evolution is analysed 
in Chapter 5.   
The Scottish Executive was also under pressure to demonstrate that a Scottish 
approach to health policy was delivering improvements at least equal to those 
evident in other parts of the UK (Nottingham, 2000).  A number of quantitative-
based studies have attempted to compare the relative performance of the NHS across 
the UK (Alvarez-Rosete et al., 2005; Propper et al., 2008; Bevan and Hamblin, 2009; 
Connolly, Bevan and Mays, 2010).  Such studies generally present evidence that the 
English NHS has delivered greater improvements, although fail to address the 
inherent methodological bias of defining performance in narrow measurable terms.   
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2.3.3 Structure of NHSScotland 
Scotland visibly rejected the use of market mechanisms to deliver healthcare in 
abolishing the purchaser / provider split of the internal market and replacing it with 
an integrated framework based around a geographic structure (Greer, 2005).   
The Scottish Office started the process in Designed to Care (1997c), merging 
provider Trusts, before the Scottish Executive (2000) announced that a single 
‘unified’ NHS Board would be created in each of Scotland’s 15 Health Board areas.  
These unified Boards would replace the separate board structures of Trusts and 
regional Health Boards, although Trusts remained as operating entities.  The policy 
emphasised collaboration rather than competition as the new unified Boards were 
responsible for the efficient, effective and accountable governance of the NHS in the 
local area (Scottish Executive Health Department, 2001).  The main functions of the 
new Boards included strategy development, resource allocation and performance 
management (ibid.).   
The remaining Trusts were eventually dissolved to create a single operating and 
accountability structure within each NHS Board area (Scottish Executive, 2003).  
The previous Trust structure ensured a separation of strategic and operational 
functions and the government sought to retain this through the creation of operating 
divisions with their own management teams responsible for delivering frontline 
healthcare services.  These divisions are accountable to the unified board, which has 
overall responsibility for the local healthcare system.   
The structural reforms were accompanied by a broadening of the membership of 
governing boards.  The number of board members was increased and more 
stakeholder groups were represented on the board, including staff-side, local 
authorities and clinical representatives.  Clinical management roles were also 
formalised, with nursing and medical directors added to the executive membership of 
the board.   
Unified NHS Boards remain responsible for both the delivery and strategic 
management of local healthcare services, including protection and improvement of 




The growth of NHS performance assessment also created opportunities for audit 
bodies to expand and develop their roles, either through an explicit role in the control 
process or through reviewing and reporting on the conduct of these measures.  Like 
performance measurement, the growth of audit is closely associated with NPM 
which demands that central bureaucracies devolve power and autonomy to operating 
units while retaining control and accountability for these units (Hood, 1991; 1995).  
Audit can play a key role in supporting this accountability relationship (Power, 
1994a).   
The New Labour Government expanded the remit of the Audit Commission through 
policies such as Best Value and verification of performance targets.  The Audit 
Commission successfully lobbied for new responsibilities, cultivating relationships 
with power brokers, which arguably compromises the political neutrality 
constitutionally required of public audit bodies (Bowerman et al., 2003; Campbell-
Smith, 2008).   
2.4.1 Audit and NHSScotland 
Prior to devolution, responsibility for public audit in Scotland was shared by the 
National Audit Office in Scotland and the Accounts Commission (Midwinter and 
McGarvey, 2001:843).  The former body was responsible for the audit of the 
Scotland Office, while the latter body had responsibility for local government and 
NHS bodies. 
The role of the Auditor General for Scotland was established by the Scotland Act 
1998 and the functions held by the Auditor General were defined in the Public 
Finance and Accountability (Scotland) Act 2000.  The 2000 Act also established 
Audit Scotland as the national audit body which would carry out work on behalf of 
the Auditor General.  These statutory provisions prescribe high level, predominantly 
technical, roles in relation to the audit of financial statements, examinations of the 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which public bodies use their resources, 
and reporting findings of these examinations to the Scottish Parliament. 
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The Auditor General nominally reports to the Scottish Parliament and all reports, 
including NHS overview reports, are considered by the Public Audit Committee
5
.  
The Auditor General is routinely invited to attend public meetings in order to brief 
Committee members on his or her findings.  The Committee may choose to note the 
findings of the report or may request further action, including requiring further 
evidence from the audited body or convening an inquiry.
6
 
The Audit Scotland Code of Audit Practice, first published 2001 and revised in 2006 
and 2011, sets out the operational framework for the conduct of public audit in 
Scotland.  The Code summarises the key principles which auditors of devolved 
public bodies must adhere to in the performance of their duties, as well as the 
responsibilities falling to those auditors. 
The Auditor General for Scotland has a statutory duty to appoint external auditors to 
devolved Scottish central government, NHS and further education bodies.
7
  While 
Audit Scotland is appointed to conduct the majority of these audits, around one-third 
of these are effectively outsourced to private audit firms, including three Big 4 
firms.
8
  Audit appointments are made on a five-year cycle.   
Robert Black, a former local authority chief executive with no formal qualifications 
in public finance or accountancy, held the role of Auditor General for Scotland from 
creation of the post in 2000 until his retirement in July 2012.  He was succeeded by 
Caroline Gardner, his former deputy, a career auditor and professional accountant.   
The role of Audit Scotland in relation to the performance of NHSScotland is 
explored in Chapter 6. 
 
                                                          
5
 Known as the Audit Committee until 11 December 2008. 
6
 Information taken from the Public Audit Committee web pages on the Scottish Parliament internet 
site at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/CurrentCommittees/29860.aspx 
(accessed on 14 November 2011). 
7
 Under section 21(4) of the Public Finance and Accountability (Scotland) Act 2000, asp 1 
8
 Audit Scotland publishes current audit appointments on its website at http://www.audit-




This chapter has provided a brief overview of the policy and operational setting for 
this study.  Chapter 5 presents a more detailed narrative of key policy developments 
in relation to the performance management of the NHS in England and Scotland 
between 1997 and 2010, while Chapter 6 explores the shifting identity of Audit 
Scotland in relation to NHSScotland performance networks over the same period.   
The theoretical framework which supports this study will be developed in the 











Theoretical framework:  











This chapter sets out the body of theoretical work underpinning this thesis, centred 
on Power’s Audit Society (1999).  This seminal work was instrumental in 
transforming audit as a research subject from a narrow technical domain to a 
sociological phenomenon which has influenced the construction of accountability in 
public discourse.   
It begins by exploring the key arguments of Power’s Audit Explosion (1994a) and 
Audit Society (1999) before considering the wider academic literature, with a 
particular focus upon the role of the national audit body in the Audit Society.   
 
3.2 Introduction 
3.2.1 Michael Power and the Audit Society 
Michael Power has made a significant contribution to the development of a 
sociological perspective within the auditing literature through his works on The Audit 
Explosion (1994a) and The Audit Society (1999).  Academic works in the field of 
auditing have traditionally focused on the technical demands of audit practice.  
Power looks beyond this “silo” of financial auditing to the proliferation of a powerful 
idea with its origins in the world of accounting; he looks beyond the technical 
practice to the “aspirational” elements of audit as a broader assurance-giving 
function (Power, 2000a:112).  These essentially critical ideas provoke much debate 
about the social nature, merits and impacts of auditing (Humphrey and Owen, 
2000:48; Pentland, 2000:307).   
Audit, traditionally a practice applied only to financial statements, has ‘exploded’ 
into new domains in recent years, including medicine, education, the environment 
and intellectual property (Power, 1994a:1).  In public services, this has largely 
coincided with the advance of New Public Management (“NPM”) (Hood: 1991; 
1995).  Indeed, an “audit mentality” has been presented as central to the practice of 
NPM (Lapsley, 2008:89).   
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Power (2000a:112-3) identifies the advent of NPM as one of three key drivers of the 
audit society; the other two being public demand for greater transparency and 
accountability, with expectations set by private sector corporate governance reforms, 
and a shift in regulatory style, including a new focus on quality assurance.   
While the precise shape of audit is specific to each context in which it operates, there 
are “systematic similarities and overlapping issues” (Power, 1998:23) which demand 
further study and critical appraisal. 
The broader appeal of Power’s work, and in particular its adoption by academic 
fields far beyond traditional accounting research, can perhaps be attributed to its 
resonance with readers working in professional domains and in receipt of public 
services.   
“[Power] has captured a widespread, but rather latent, sense of unease with 
the rise of monitoring and regulation and a resulting decline in trust”  
(Humphrey and Owen, 2000:31).   
This resonance transforms an academic text on auditing to a meaningful and 
provocative study of trends in accountability.   
3.2.2 From “Audit Explosion” to “Audit Society” 
In The Audit Explosion, Power seeks to understand why ‘audit’ has become so 
prominent in public policy (1994a:1).  His key concern is the qualitative shift which 
accompanies the quantitative explosion of financial auditing philosophies and 
techniques into new domains (1994a:2-3).  Power seeks to understand how and why 
audit has established itself as the dominant model of control and accountability, with 
an almost unshakeable position in public policy (1994a:7-8).   
Power advances eight arguments to show how audit as an idea has spread through 
society, with implications for trust, governance, control systems and transparency. 
The Audit Society (1999) refines the arguments made in The Audit Explosion and 
explores how audit as an idea has embedded itself in public policy discourse.   
25 
 
By applying Rose and Miller’s (1992:181-4) distinction between ‘programmes’ and 
‘technologies’ of government, Power (1999:6-8) separates the concept of auditing as 
an intellectual design for governance from the individual techniques, tools and 
practices which are deployed to operationalise this design.  These latter technologies 
are the traditional focus of auditing research, but, by isolating the “programmatic” 
qualities of audit, Power elevates and expands auditing research into a new 
normative sphere.  These normative features underlie the meaning of auditing 
practice and allow the abstract idea of auditing to attach itself to different goals such 
as accountability, control and transparency.   
 
3.3 The ritual appeal of audit 
The fundamental purpose of an external audit is to provide an opinion on the truth 
and fairness of a set of financial statements following an independent examination of 
the books and records of the company. 
However, despite the programmatic rise of audit in society, Power (1999) argues that 
the original practice of financial statements audit benefits from a certain mystique; 
neither the audit process nor the assurance it generates is transparent to purported 
beneficiaries.   
Detailed audit findings are communicated to management and those charged with the 
governance of an organisation (such as non-executive directors or elected members) 
but withheld from a wider audience, often even in public services (Bowerman et al., 
2000:86).  Auditors become the arbiters of what stakeholders and the wider public 
need to know about the financial systems and practices of an organisation.  This 
reveals an inherent tension over the primary function of audit: is it a management 
control technique or a mechanism to discharge public accountability? 
The intrinsic value of the financial statements audit to shareholders, lenders and other 
company stakeholders is the credibility bestowed on the company by a clean audit 
opinion.   
26 
 
“The purpose of an audit is to enhance the degree of confidence of intended 
users in the financial statements.  This is achieved by the expression of an 
opinion by the auditor on whether the financial statements are prepared, in all 
material respects, in accordance with an applicable financial reporting 
framework.” 
(Financial Reporting Council, 2009) 
The audit opinion holds a symbolic value which is not directly related to the actual 
audit procedures which underlie the opinion itself.   
Financial markets are complicit in this myth, relying on audit in a ritual sense to 
provide investors and others with reliable information virtually without challenge or 
question (Malsch and Gendron, 2009).   
It is not possible to quantify the assurance provided by audit, or indeed to precisely 
define the nature of that assurance; it is essentially a judgement-based practice 
(Power, 1999:28) with a socially constructed knowledge base (Power, 1996).  Thus, 
the “abiding paradox of the audit society…: the expansion of auditing and its 
assumption of new roles is conditioned by its failure and by an essential obscurity in 
what it can deliver” (Power, 1999:31). 
The audit process is characterised by rituals and institutionalised actions with a 
rhetorical value which may actually exceed their technical value (Pentland, 1993; 
Van Maanen and Pentland, 1994).   
The audit process is underpinned by the exercise of professional judgement in 
conditions of considerable uncertainty; a process which is far more qualitative than 
the rationalised account of audit as an objective scientific practice but which 
“requires ritual procedures to transform indeterminacy into institutionalized order” 
(Power, 2003b:385).   
Even outwardly technical processes, such as tax auditing, are products of judgement, 
negotiation with the auditee and practical considerations, such as the need to 
complete an audit within defined resource boundaries (Pentland and Carlile, 1996). 
The apparent obscurity underlying the nature and value of audit is compounded by 
the lack of independent evaluation of audit practices themselves.  There is no 
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systematic evidence to support the efficacy of audit as an accountability mechanism 
yet it has enduring appeal to regulators and government (Power, 2000a:114).  This 
lack of reflexivity inhibited recognition or exploration of the potential negative 
effects of expanding audit processes (Power, 2003a:194), but is also a symptom of 
the dominance of audit as an institutional mechanism of accountability, possibly to 
the extent that the two terms start to be used interchangeably.  It then becomes 
virtually impossible to propose alternative mechanisms to audit (Power, 1993). 
In spite of this inherent obscurity, new programmes for enhanced governance and 
control have continued to develop accountability mechanisms based on the principles 
of financial statements audit.  Audit practice has a ritualistic appeal, driven in part by 
its promise of credibility and legitimation, which appears to dominate the desire for 
substantive and transparent assurance mechanisms. 
Auditors have also been portrayed as sacrificial victims when the functioning of 
capital markets is threatened by scandal or crisis (Guénin-Paracini and Gendron, 
2010).  Auditors can survive the blame levied at them for corporate crises, as the 
process of self-sacrifice is part of a more elaborate ritual which sees the legitimacy 
offered by the audit process as instrumental in the return to order (ibid.)  The 
legitimacy offered by audit can thus protect it from serious external challenge.   
3.3.1 Audit and the production of comfort 
Pentland (1993) undertook an interpretative ethnographic study of auditors at work to 
illustrate that a number of ‘comfort-producing’ rituals are carried out at the micro 
level of an audit engagement in order to produce assurance over the financial 
statements at the macro level.  Carrington and Catasús (2007) import concepts of 
comfort theory from academic nursing studies in order to understand how auditors 
perceive the production of comfort through a series of interviews with audit seniors.   
Financial statement audit reports have become “quality labels” (Power, 1999:125) 
with a symbolic value which exceeds their intrinsic value.  Audit reports create an 
impression of transparency without revealing anything of substance about the audited 
organisation.   
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Standardised audit opinions communicate more about the respective responsibilities 
of auditor and auditee than they do about internal control weaknesses or financial 
reporting errors identified in the course of an audit.  Audit opinions are devised to 
produce comfort, with qualified opinions given only in exceptional or extreme 
circumstances, but the reader has no way to determine where on a notional scale of 
auditor assurance any particular unqualified opinion lies.   
Management letters, containing more specific findings on financial management and 
the control environment within the auditee organisation, are produced by external 
auditors.  These letters are internal documents produced for the eyes of the auditee 
organisation only, making them tools of managerial accountability rather than 
democratic accountability, as might be expected, for example, in a public sector 
context (Hollingsworth et al., 1998:98-9), or shareholder accountability to the owners 
of a company.   
However, Power argues that “where audit arrangements emphasize the production of 
comfort, this reflects an institutional need for auditing not to be too ‘successful’ in 
finding problems and in producing discomfort by reporting these problems” (Power, 
1999:126).   
The more embedded the role of audit as a producer of comfort becomes, the less 
valid the claim that audit is a tool which discharges accountability: “audit expresses 
the promise of accountability and visibility to… stakeholders.  But this promise is at 
best ambiguous: the fact of being audited deters public curiosity and inquiry and the 
users of audits are often just a mythical reference point within expert discourses” 
(Power, 1999:127).   
Performance auditing of public services challenges this view.  More recent 
manifestations of audit processes, such as value for money audits, produce longer 
narrative reports which tend to be more adversarial in tone and content (Power, 
1999:126).  These discursive reports on performance can be the subject of 
parliamentary scrutiny, typically through a parliamentary audit committee where 
both auditor and auditee may be called to give evidence on the reported findings 
(Jones, 1993:199).   
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Justesen and Skaerbaek (2005) further highlight the heterogeneity of reports 
produced by practices bearing the label of audit and the effects these have on 
auditees and the wider users of audit reports.   
In contrast to Pentland’s (1993) study of financial statements audit (1993), Justesen 
and Skaerbaek (2005, 2010) find that the critical nature of value for money audit 
reports can generate discomfort among auditees who feel under pressure to visibly 
react to critical findings.  Criticism is considered a virtually inevitable outcome of 
the performance audit process which differs in objective from financial statements 
audit (Justesen and Skaerbaek, 2005:323).  The former is designed to identify 
opportunities for improvement, rather than to verify financial statements produced by 
the auditee.  The authors show that the auditor is not the only influential actor 
making a case for change; other actors including politicians and the media interpret 
audit findings and so intensify demands for change (Justesen and Skaerbaek, 
2010:341).   
3.3.2 Legitimacy 
The programmatic appeal of audit has become so great that it is seen to confer 
legitimacy on audited processes or bodies: Power (2000a:117) argues that “being 
audited per se is a badge of legitimacy”.  This is illustrated by the birth of ‘clinical 
audit’, whereby a set of ad hoc assessments of clinical results was transformed into a 
legitimate practice within the new sphere of healthcare management when it was 
labelled as an ‘audit’ (Power, 2000b:130). 
The capacity of audit to bestow legitimacy on a process is demonstrated in an 
empirical study of the introduction of audit into the Financial Times business school 
ranking system (Free, Salterio and Shearer, 2009).  The audit process generated 
legitimacy at two levels, which the authors label “affirmatory” and “derived” 
legitimacy.  In this case, the business schools (the auditees) valued the “affirmatory” 
legitimacy which resulted from holding all participants in the ranking system to the 
same audit requirements.  The ranking system itself benefited from a secondary form 
of “derived” legitimacy as it could now demonstrate that the underlying data was 
subject to audit procedures and thus differentiate itself from competing ranking 
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systems which did not invoke any form of independent verification (ibid: pp. 131 & 
137).   
Legitimacy is conferred on the ranking system even though only a selection of the 
constituent measures are within the scope of the audit, and only a sample of business 
schools submissions are audited each year.  Similarly the application of the ranking 
algorithm is not subject to audit.   
“...it is the social belief in the potency of audit that effectively converts it into 
a competitive or discursive resource to be deployed by information 
providers.” 
(Free, Salterio and Shearer, 2009:137) 
Free, Salterio and Shearer show that the nature of assurance provided by the audit 
process is not transparent.  They find that the outcome of the audit process is as much 
a product of negotiation and dialogue between auditor and auditee as a product of 
objective technical practices.  And so we return to the premise that the ritual appeal 
of audit exceeds its technical value.   
McGivern and Ferlie (2007) applied Power’s ideas to interview data gathered for a 
study of the implementation of formal appraisal of medical consultants within the 
NHS.  At the time of the study, NHS Trusts were subject to a range of performance 
targets, one of which was to ensure that a percentage of its consultants received a 
formal performance appraisal each year.  The target measured the occurrence of the 
appraisal; it did not consider the substance or the effectiveness of the appraisal.  As a 
result, the appraisal was not valued by the medical profession as a means of career 
development or professional education, but was regarded as an event which had to 
take place to meet a target.  The appraisal became a ‘tick-box’ exercise which did not 
interact with clinical reality.   
By meeting the minimum requirements of the target, the medical profession could 
mobilise this audit-inspired mechanism to secure legitimacy without embracing the 
substance of the appraisal: “legitimacy provided through the impression of audit was 
more important than professional development” (ibid, 2007:1380). 
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The conceptual ambiguity of audit, discussed in the following section, supports its 
emerging role in legitimating organisational activities.  If audit is a legitimacy 
bestowing device, then surely it has the greatest impact as such a device when it is 
able to harness and exploit ambiguity. 
3.3.3 Exploiting the ambiguity of audit 
Audit is an ambiguous term in popular usage: the badge of ‘audit’ is applied to many 
different types of verificatory activity (Power, 1994a:4).  ‘Audit’ can “symbolise a 
cluster of values: independent validation, efficiency, rationality, visibility... and the 
promise of control” (Power, 1994a:13-14).  Power (1999:5) identifies only one 
essential ingredient which needs to be present for a verificatory practice to take the 
name ‘audit’: a relationship of accountability.   
Audit can perhaps be more easily defined according to what it is not, rather than 
what it is.  It can be distinguished from similar assurance-giving practices such as 
inspection.  Audit “takes the management system as its primary object whereas 
[inspection] focuses more on the substantive conduct of the inspectee” (Power, 
1999:130).  Furthermore, inspectors can impose sanctions on organisations or 
escalate inspection findings to a higher level of the regulatory framework.  This 
contrasts with the quietly coercive power of audit which wields the threat of 
publication of a negative opinion on organisational activities.   
However, Power (1999:130) observes growing convergence between the two 
practices, in line with the shift towards managerial and external models of control, 
with inspection assuming more of the features traditionally associated with audit.   
Instead of tying his arguments to a restrictive definition of ‘audit’, perhaps closer to 
one found in financial statement auditing textbooks, Power exploits this inherent 
ambiguity in support of his account of the programmatic dimensions of auditing.  
The fluidity of the definition of ‘audit’ is fundamental to its ritualistic appeal. 
Other commentators have attempted to construct a definition of ‘audit’ which 
supports the audit society thesis.   
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Pentland (2000:309) proposes a two-dimensional definition encompassing the 
technological and programmatic elements of audit.  These dimensions are loosely 
coupled so can diffuse at different rates; the development of the rhetoric 
(programmatic qualities) of the audit society could be more advanced than the 
technical practice of auditing.  Pentland thus supports Power’s thesis that the popular 
idea of, and support for, audit is based on an idea which exceeds its current technical 
capabilities. 
Lindeberg (2007) analyses auditing textbooks in search of an identity for ‘audit’ as 
distinct from evaluation.  He identifies a continuum which stretches between the 
extremes of financial statement audit and programme evaluation (2007:346-8).  
There are limitations to Lindeberg’s analysis, including a US-bias in the textbooks 
which he sampled, which impact upon the relevance of his findings.  Furthermore, 
textbooks themselves present idealised views of the audit world, so could form part 
of the audit society myth, and not provide an independent source of technical 
knowledge (2007:347).  These limitations do not, however, detract from Lindeberg’s 
message that further work is required to understand the relationship between the 
audit society and the proliferation of other evaluative practices. 
Critics argue that this “confusion” over the definition of audit exposes a fundamental 
weakness in Power’s arguments (Humphrey and Owen, 2000:40-42): how can it be 
accepted that audit is such a powerful influence in shaping control and accountability 
within society if there is no consensus on what audit even is? 
Power references both practices labelled audit, which bear closer resemblance to 
data-gathering exercises than the traditional financial statement audit model, as well 
as practices which bear other names but which are conceptually or practically similar 
to the financial statement audit model (Humphrey and Owen, 2000).  In the absence 
of a definition of ‘audit’, the audit society risks being reduced to an argument about 
the dispersion of a word, not a concept (Lindeberg, 2007:337).  
These critics do not consider that the ambiguity of audit may in fact be the key to its 
power and influence. 
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The flexible definition of ‘audit’ makes the boundaries surrounding the audit 
profession permeable and enables auditors to claim professional jurisdiction in 
virtually all operational fields (Pentland, 2000:308).  This permeability is itself 
enabled by the auditor’s expert knowledge of control systems and processes; this 
knowledge has the capacity to outweigh traditional knowledge or to overcome 
content-based boundaries which control entry to different professions (ibid.).   
Auditors have defined themselves as experts on the design and operation of generic 
and transportable systems, which they can sell to new markets and settings: the 
vagueness of audit enables the ‘explosion’ of auditing into new domains (Power, 
1994a:13-14; 1999:6).   
The idea of ‘audit’ persists in policy discourse even if use of the word has declined: 
“while the word ‘audit’ may have decreased in importance, the demand for 
monitoring has not” (Power, 2000a:113).  The vagueness of audit can be “observed 
and analysed” and the legitimacy bestowed by being audited, even in the absence of 
a precise definition of audit, provides further evidence of its dominance and 
programmatic appeal (Power, 2000a:116).  By wearing the badge of audit, 
assessment practices gain credibility as tools of accountability even if the constituent 
activities are unstructured or ad hoc. 
Furthermore, the labelling of an activity as ‘audit’ changes the identity of that 
activity, regardless of its underlying substance or constituent technologies.  ‘Audit’ 
carries a set of expectations which influence how others view the activity (Power, 
2008:399).   
While the audit society thesis could be refined to reconcile the ambiguity of ‘audit’ 
to its dominance in policy discourse, the absence of a definition of audit does not 
disprove the existence of Power’s audit society.  Indeed, this ambiguity is a primary 
source of the legitimacy bestowed upon organisations by audit practices, and lies at 




3.4 Making management auditable 
Perhaps the most important conceptual argument advanced by Power in The Audit 
Explosion and The Audit Society is that “audit actively constructs the contexts in 
which it operates” (1994a:7).   
The dominance of audit over competing verificatory and assurance practices lies in 
its ability to make practices ‘auditable’ (Power, 1996; 1999) and to construct 
“concepts of performance in its own image” (Humphrey and Owen, 2000:36).  
Complex organisations are rendered auditable “by virtue of abstracting from their 
first-order performance objectives and focusing on the management system for 
defining and monitoring performance” (Power, 2003a:189), with that system 
imported from both financial auditing and quality assurance practices.   
The interaction between the auditor, auditee and official knowledge is combined in 
an official process of ‘rendering auditable’ (Power, 1999:69-70).  Ethnographic 
studies have found that auditors react to and influence the environment in which their 
work is situated, and this process is characterised by a reflexive understanding of the 
audit process (Radcliffe, 1999). 
This challenges the traditional view of audit as an activity independent of financial 
reporting (Mautz and Sharaf, 1961).  In the financial audit model, the audited 
organisation produces its own annual accounts (the public representation of that 
year’s financial performance) which are then subject to independent examination by 
a third party auditor.  The auditor applies technical procedures in order to determine 
the truth and fairness of that representation with reference to mandated standards of 
financial reporting (Power, 1996:290). 
On closer inspection, even financial statements audit is not a purely objective 
practice, as recognised at Section 3.3 above.   
Power offers an alternative social constructivist account of the audit process, drawing 
on two principle themes – “the negotiation of audit knowledge and the creation of 
auditable environments” (1996:295).  This alternative view posits that audit creates 
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processes and conditions within organisations which make them conducive to the 
application of audit technologies, and thus facilitate audit. 
Audit gives precedence to what can be “described in managerial language or 
analysed in terms of an organizational model” (Strathern, 1997:311, emphasis 
removed).  It rejects as ineffective those systems which cannot be described or 
analysed as such, without considering what other outcomes that alternative system 
delivers or purpose it serves.  Auditors define the social order which they expect 
auditees to conform to by subjecting organisations and systems to prescriptive 
analysis.  In effect, there is a “conflation of management with performance” 
(Strathern, 1997:318).   
Strathern (2000:311-2) offers an anthropological explanation to reach the same 
conclusion.  She expounds that auditors inevitably produce a ‘second order’ 
description of an organisation or process; they are not active participants in the 
delivery of an organisation’s core purpose and so always provide an outsider view 
from a distance.  Strathern compares the role of the auditor to a social anthropologist 
in the field, making intangibles visible through the practice of observation.  But these 
second-order observations can become institutionalised and accepted as part of the 
reality of the audited organisation (ibid, 313).  In so doing, audit can obscure the less 
observable elements of organisational life and diminish their importance; key 
professional skills, such as experience and judgement, and organisational culture and 
values can become marginalised even though these qualities often hold organisations 
together.   
In focusing on what it makes visible (in Power’s language, “auditable”), audit 
processes can obscure the true functioning of an organisation and create a situation 
where “the rhetoric of transparency appears to conceal that very process of 
concealment” (Strathern, 2000:315).  Strathern thus argues that the organisation is 
less transparent once it has been made auditable.   
3.4.1 Measurement 
Auditability is not an absolute concept: it is often “a product of consensus about the 
nature and detail of evidence required by those whom the audit is intended to serve” 
36 
 
(Power, 1996:298, emphasis in original).  What is accepted as auditable will differ 
between situations, for auditability is itself a negotiated outcome rather than an 
objective science.  Nevertheless, measurability is a necessary precondition for 
auditability (Power, 1996:299). 
The practice of measurement is based on a range of variables and assumptions.  The 
fact of measurability alone is insufficient for a practice or process to be auditable; the 
basis of that measurement must also be trusted, as must those experts or others who 
perform the measurement.  Using the example of brand valuations, Power (1996:306-
8) shows how auditability can be achieved when a form of measurement becomes 
widely regarded by stakeholders as reasonable.  They may reach this conclusion 
through scientific analysis, or simply a desire to believe in the soundness of the 
measurement by “constructing networks of trust which can be proceduralized” 
(Power, 1996:309). 
Strathern identifies links between educational practice and the birth of accountability, 
and audit as an instrument of that accountability.  She suggests that audit practices 
have their roots in educational examinations and the desire to objectively assess 
human abilities by externally verifiable means.  However, this act of measurement 
became part of a drive for improvement through the setting of targets (Strathern, 
1997:307).   
Self-assessment checklists and ‘good practice guidance’, often produced for the 
public sector by national audit bodies, provide further examples of ways by which 
public services are reduced to measurable criteria and thus rendered auditable 
(Bowerman et al., 2000:83). 
3.4.2 Impact on the auditee 
The literature inspired by Power’s work provides empirical evidence that the auditee 
is subjected to “profound transformation” in order to produce an auditable self 
(Power, 2003a:191). 
Vikkelso’s (2007) study of electronic patient records finds that practices and 
practitioners can be transformed by attempts to make organisations auditable.  The 
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purpose of an electronic patient records system changed during the period of its 
implementation.  While the system was originally intended to improve 
communication and cooperation in patient care, it evolved to become an “instrument 
of performance auditing” (ibid, 277).  The delivery of healthcare was actively 
redefined through standardisation and codification as managerial logic was imposed 
upon clinical practice.  Concerns for the patient experience were displaced by the 
quest for auditability through quantification of clinical practices and indeed the 
processes and interactions at play in developing the new system ultimately became 
more significant than the impact of implementing the final system. 
Skaerbaek and Thorbjornsen (2007) analyse the relationships between a new 
performance measurement system in the Danish Defence Force (“DDF”), the officers 
of the DDF and the identities of those officers.  The authors trace the development of 
a shared identity by following the interactions within a network of DDF officers, 
auditors, government officials and the new performance measurement system.   
DDF officers believed that the new system was implemented as a direct result of 
recommendations made by the National Audit Office of Denmark (“NAOD”), which 
reported that existing systems were not fit for purpose.  The NAOD then assumed a 
more active role in introducing change by announcing the creation of a group to 
monitor the development of the new system by the DDF. 
The officers made the DDF auditable by creating a new identity for the organisation 
as “Denmark’s largest education provider”.  The officers were unable to define 
measurable objectives or outcomes for their traditional military functions, so re-
defined themselves as providers of a service with quantifiable outputs, namely fully-
trained, battle-ready soldiers.  The Danish National Audit Office was active in the 
network which created this new identity for the DDF.  This study provides empirical 
evidence to support Power’s view that audits are not neutral processes: auditors 
promote new definitions of organisational performance and quality (1994a:25) in 
order to make organisations auditable.   
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3.4.3 Making professions auditable 
Many judgement-based professions have been transformed by the imposition of audit 
ideology in recent years.   
Jones (1993) considers the “profound impact” of increasing managerialism, and 
associated introduction of value for money audit, on the criminal justice system.  The 
performance of criminal justice services is not easily quantified and the drivers of 
performance can be difficult to establish, for example the relationship between crime 
rates and policing.  Jones observed a shift in decision-making power away from 
professionals towards accountants, increased parliamentary scrutiny, weakening local 
autonomy and distinctiveness, and re-definition of the priorities of the justice system 
to render the system measurable (Jones, 1993:199-200).   
A professional jurisdiction was transformed by attempts to define performance in a 
manner conducive with the philosophy of value for money auditing – criminal justice 
was rendered ‘auditable’ before Power’s published work coined the term.    
Social work, too, has been “made auditable”, with an auditable framework imposed 
upon a profession which has a weak knowledge base.  A profession underpinned by 
judgement-based decisions is less well-equipped to compete with the rationality 
apparently promised by audit practices, than a profession with its roots in science or 
hard knowledge (Power, 2003a:193; Llewellyn, 1996).  Displacement effects 
emerged; social workers started to prioritise the achievement of government targets 
without considering whether they delivered substantive improvements for service 
users (Munro, 2004:1086-7).  Such behaviour was detrimental to social workers 
themselves; the defensive behaviour encouraged by the audit society permeates the 
mindset of the practitioners, generating in a blame culture and low staff morale.  This 
culminated in the exit of many practitioners from the profession (Munro, 2004:1089-
91).   
Other commentators argue that these professional domains have not had audit 
technologies imposed on them under the influence of financial auditors.  Instead, 
these professionals have chosen to adopt and develop these technologies in their own 
context (Humphrey and Owen, 2000:41), sometimes in pursuit of a commitment to 
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improve the quality of service provision.  Indeed, many professions considered audit 
to offer new opportunities for continuing learning and development rather than a 
threat to their professional autonomy.   
Power (1998:28-9) counters that the early organic manifestations of audit in 
professional domains were soon captured by external demands for managerial 
autonomy, particularly where the auditing practice was in its infancy.  There is the 
potential for audit to instigate a shift in the balance of power away from professional 
judgement and in favour of routinized practices which, through the audit process, 
become synonymous with best practice and good performance.  The capacity for 
audit to undermine professional autonomy in this way increases as audit moves from 
being a local to a national practice and often becomes embedded in professional 
accreditation processes (Power, 1998:32). 
3.4.4 Systems and controls 
Another important element of making an organisation auditable is the imperative to 
make performance visible to external parties through distilling activities into systems 
and controls which can be externally verified (Power, 1996:303).  This is considered 
in greater detail in the following section.   
 
3.5 Control of control: systems over substance 
As audit technologies have developed over the last century, audit has increasingly 
become a second order control over the primary internal control systems installed 
and operated by audited organisations (Power, 1999:82).  A characteristic of the 
audit society is the “focus on the quality of… systems rather than the quality of the 
product or service itself as specified in standards” (Power, 1999:84, emphasis in 
original).   
Auditable systems and controls become ends in themselves, rather than means to 
further the achievement of service outcomes.  That is, they exist to be audited rather 
than to support core organizational activities or objectives.  Furthermore, this 
reversion to auditable systems can help to explain the portability of audit and its 
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spread through society beyond its origins in financial accounting.  Such systems 
neutralise organisational complexities, creating a simplistic reality conducive to the 
application of audit technologies (Humphrey and Owen, 2000:35).   
For example, environmental and quality audits tend to focus on the systems which 
organisations install to monitor environmental performance and quality rather than 
the actual environmental impact of their activities.  The development of ‘Best Value’ 
in Scottish local government focused upon the systems and processes which local 
authorities put in place in order to demonstrate that they consider ‘Best Value’ in 
decision-making (Sheffield and Bowerman, 1999), rather than focusing upon 
whether authorities actually provide ‘Best Value’ services.   
Corporate governance reforms introduced in response to corporate crises and scandal 
have focused on strengthening internal control processes and externalising these 
processes through public reporting on their existence and operation.  This regulatory 
trend emerged in the ‘Cadbury Code’ of 1992 (Power, 1999:54-57) but continues to 
be prominent in subsequent corporate governance reforms, including the most recent 
iteration of The UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council, 
2012) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the US regulatory response to the Enron collapse.   
Organisational performance comes to be defined in terms of control systems, rather 
than outcomes or quality (Power, 1994a:15-16).  Auditors no longer audit the 
practices and operations of auditee organisations, but focus instead on the systems 
which underlie these operations.  This creates a risk that auditees develop a 
compliance mentality and prioritise systems which can be audited ahead of working 
to achieve the substantive goals of the organisation (Power, 1994a:16). 
The systems-focus serves a dual purpose: it facilitates audit, but also makes it more 
remote from operational realities (Power, 1999:60).  Auditors certify non-financial 
information based upon reviews of the systems which collect the underlying data – 
they do not verify the actual data (Bowerman, 1995).  Audit practices are simplified 
and standardised.  Control systems permeate the language of audit and come to be 
equated with good performance.   
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Auditors also gain power and influence from the growing reliance upon control 
systems; the ability to reduce any organisational or professional field to auditable 
control systems enables auditors to transfer their skills to any setting.  This is 
supported by the ambiguity of audit and the fluidity which is pivotal to its influence.   
As discussed above at Section 3.4.3, audit technologies have been exploited to open 
up professional decisions to scrutiny from outwith the profession, inviting interest 
from policy-makers among others (Jones, 1993).   
The introduction of the Teaching Quality Assessment and Research Assessment 
Exercise exposed the UK higher education sector to audit.  The means by which 
students were taught were awarded greater weightings in the assessment 
methodology “than the outcome in terms of students’ knowledge” (Strathern, 
1997:309).  Strathern posits that the extension of such an approach into student 
assessment would award marks to candidates for “bringing their pencils into the 
exam” (ibid.). 
The presumption that auditors can apply their methods in new fields is not without 
challenge.  A knowledge gap separates professional experts from those who observe 
them (Tsoukas, 1997:834).  Professional judgement is the product of detailed 
knowledge which cannot be captured by simplistic representations, such as 
performance indicators.  This information asymmetry makes it virtually impossible 
for an outside observer to fully understand an expert system, despite representations 
of that system which may be publicly visible and apparently auditable. 
The idea that auditors can provide assurance over the operation of virtually any 
organisation by reviewing its internal control systems creates a situation of 
compound auditing.  Controls are introduced above organisational control systems so 
the auditors themselves become subject to a further layer of audit.  This “threatens an 
infinite regress to the n
th
 auditor as further layers of regulatory influence are created” 
(Power, 2000a:117).  There is a need for further research to document and explain 
these increasing layers of accountability (ibid) and the impact of expanding internal 
control systems on organisational behaviour and outcomes. 
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Much like the term ‘audit’, Power contends that the concept of ‘internal control’ is 
vague in practice and Maijoor (2000) finds that this is also the case for internal 
control research.  Maijoor finds that although there has been an ‘internal control 
explosion’, there is a lack of research findings which investigate the benefits to 
organisations of installing internal control systems or reporting on the effectiveness 
of internal control systems.  This mirrors concerns expressed in the literature as to 
the lack of evaluation of audit mechanisms themselves.   
 
3.6 Auditing public services 
3.6.1 The Audit Society and New Public Management 
“New public management” (“NPM”) demands that power and autonomy are 
devolved away from central bureaucracies to operating units, but at the same time 
those at the centre cannot relinquish control, and ultimately accountability, for these 
units (Hood, 1991; 1995).  Audit provides a potential solution to ease these tensions, 
helping central government to shift its emphasis to supervising the delivery of public 
services, as opposed to actual delivery of those services (Power, 1994a:12-13).   
It is important to recognise the wider context in which the audit society has come 
into existence and its role in ‘hollowing out’ the state (Rhodes, 1994) as a key 
manifestation of the managerial accountability demanded by NPM. 
Power (1994a; 2005) argues that three demand-side factors were the essential drivers 
of the explosion, all of which were intertwined with the rise of NPM: political 
demands for greater accountability, fiscal constraint and the problematizing of 
efficiency and quality of services as performance accountability. 
3.6.2 Differentiating public services audit 
Public services audit differs considerably in scope and objectives from traditional 
financial statements audit, which is designed to deliver assurance to shareholders and 
has no wider public interest objective despite the wide range of users of audited 
financial statements.  The theoretical and institutional arrangements underlying 
public services audit must differ significantly from those established around the audit 
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of private company financial statements if public sector audit is to succeed in its 
primary function of discharging public accountability (English, 2003). 
Performance auditing, or value for money auditing, has emerged as a distinct activity 
of public services audit in the second half of the 20
th
 century.  This is arguably a 
more subjective endeavour than traditional financial statements auditing, requiring 
auditors to deliver an opinion on the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of public 
service delivery.   
Performance audit has been described as “of considerable political and democratic 
significance.  It is practised by powerful, independent institutions and is presented as 
a mode of investigation aimed at establishing whether, at what cost, and to what 
degree the policies, programmes, and projects of governance are working” (Pollitt 
and Summa, 1999:2).  The relationship between performance auditing and the audit 
society is considered later in this section.   
3.6.3 National audit bodies 
“The audit explosion refers to the transformation of existing, and the emergence of 
new, formal institutions for monitoring” (Power, 2003a:188).  National audit bodies 
are “the most conspicuous actors” (ibid) in the public service field and so there is a 
reasonable expectation that their role and activities will have been transformed by the 
audit explosion.  New organisations concerned with inspecting and evaluating non-
financial performance should also be visible if Power’s proposition is to be supported 
empirically.   
According to Power (1999:46), reforms of national audit arrangements in the UK in 
the early 1980s, including the creation of the National Audit Office and the Audit 
Commission, were instrumental in raising the profile of managerial accountability 
over that of more traditional political forms of accountability.  Central to this is the 
principle of the policy neutrality of these bodies, which concern themselves primarily 
with the management systems which support policy development and delivery.  The 
audit process is designed to be structurally independent of the policy-making 




The status or legitimacy of national audit bodies is rarely challenged (Power, 1999).  
For example, “the [National Audit Office of Denmark] reports… are regularly being 
quoted by the press without critical debate about the reports themselves” Skaerbaek 
(2009:976).   
Some exceptions are present in the literature, such as Funnell’s (1998) account of the 
introduction of efficiency audit in Australia, where the executive government 
demonstrated increasing hostility towards the Auditor General’s reaction to 
legislative changes.  The current literature leaves open the question whether national 
audit bodies can truly fulfil their functions if they are not open to the same climate of 
scrutiny and challenge they create around audited organisations.  Such a climate is 
however likely to build public trust in audit processes and bodies and this will be 
considered further at Section 3.8.   
3.6.4 Independence as a powerful tool for public service auditors 
National audit bodies play a key constitutional role in holding government to 
account.  This demands that they provide an objective assessment of financial 
statements and wider financial, and on occasion operational, performance 
(Hollingsworth et al., 1998:80-1).  National audit bodies are expected to be 
structurally independent of both the legislature and executive, and independent of 
political influences including the policy making process (ibid.).   
Auditors promote the myth that they do not make policy in order to secure their 
legitimacy as independent of government and management (Gendron et al., 
2007:127).  Bowerman et al (2000:91) lead examples of UK audit bodies becoming 
more willing to question government policy. 
The increasing influence exerted by national audit bodies in rendering public bodies, 
and indeed policies, auditable could constitute a threat to their independence, 
particularly as their remit expands beyond core financial issues.  This is evident in 
recommendations made by these bodies which effectively promote “a system of 
management as if it was the one-best way” (Gendron et al., 2001:304).  
Recommendations of this type challenge the traditional role of state auditors to 
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uphold sound financial control systems and regularity of public expenditure. They 
begin to shape the policy agenda and managerial framework of public services.   
Empirical research by Gendron et al. (2001) finds support for these claims in the 
evolution of public reporting by the Office of the Auditor General of Alberta 
between 1979 and 1997.  During this period, the role of the Office evolved from 
traditional state auditor to proponent of a performance accountability framework 
rooted in the ideology of New Public Management.  The Office’s written reports 
bore some characteristics of management consultancy, leading the authors to 
question the effect this has had on the independence of the Office. 
The greater the modernizing role of national audit bodies in developing 
accountability and management tools, the harder it is for them to sustain their 
independence, both in substantive and presentational terms, of the executive and 
agencies they are constitutionally required to hold to account (Christensen and 
Skaerbaek, 2007:127).   
The legitimacy of national audit bodies is secured in part by their independence from 
executive government, underpinned by legislative or constitutional provisions and by 
maintaining a public image of impartiality.  In Westminster systems of government, 
this constitutional independence is the very foundation of parliament’s ability to hold 
the financial affairs of executive governments to account (Funnell, 1994:179).  Any 
apparent criticism or threat to the independence of the Auditor General or equivalent 
could be construed as an attack on the system of democratic accountability which it 
supports.  Public audit can derive credibility, or even invincibility, through its 
association with fundamental democratic principles.  This association also leaves the 
executive government with little choice but to recognise the value of public audit, at 
least in a symbolic sense.  This is reminiscent of the way in which financial analysts 
mobilise audited financial statements to bestow credibility on their own work 
(Malsch and Gendron, 2009).   
3.6.5 Making public services auditable 
Public sector audit institutions are particularly active in shaping the performance 
measurement systems which facilitate audit (Power, 2000a:115).  In England, the 
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Audit Commission has become an “agent of change by promoting the systems which 
make auditing possible” (ibid, 116).   
Day and Klein (1987) suggest that political processes do not themselves generate 
clear objectives against which effectiveness can be judged.  The absence of pre-
defined objectives forces the auditor first to define and operationalise measures of 
performance before it can begin to audit efficiency and effectiveness.  Definitions of 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the auditee organisation are constructed around 
the audit process; they are not already defined so they cannot merely be verified by 
the auditor.   
Lindeberg (2007:341) highlights the lack of predefined criteria for performance 
auditing, which necessitates the construction of appropriate criteria for each 
individual audit.  As the auditor inevitably dominates this construction process, they 
define ‘performance’ in terms of audit, despite the appearance of political neutrality 
which is imbued in NPM technologies (Everett, 2003:99).  The performance of 
public bodies is thus made “auditable”. 
Similarly, Lapsley and Pong (2000) found that value for money auditors are not 
neutral agents but positively shape the definition of ‘best practice’ in public service 
provision: “public service auditors are not passive agents, but active pursuers of 
efficiency gains in service provision” (ibid., 562). 
Gendron et al. (2007) find support for this claim as they examine how government 
auditors gain recognition as ‘experts’ in guiding and implementing NPM reforms.  
Through case study research of state audit in a Canadian province, the authors find 
that auditors make space for themselves by undermining the legitimacy of 
competing, usually professional, pools of expertise (Power, 2005:329).  State 
auditors achieve this, for example, through repeatedly making recommendations that 
public service organisations should implement performance indicators despite the 
consistent rejection by the government of previous, identical, recommendations on 
the basis that existing mechanisms already served to discharge public accountability 
for the effectiveness of public services   
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Although public servants were initially sceptical about managerial reforms and the 
ability of auditors to fulfil the new functions in relation to performance, the auditors 
eventually succeeded in constructing expertise by basing their new local performance 
standards on established practices imported from other jurisdictions.  The ability to 
tap into an international peer network set the Albertan auditors apart from other 
professional groups competing in the same space to establish expertise in 
performance measurement, giving auditors the ‘holy grail’ of legitimacy to support 
their propositions.   
State auditors sustained their claims to legitimacy by undermining competing sources 
of expertise and by emphasising the credibility bestowed on the audit process by its 
independence from the programmes under review.  This was cemented by 
establishing an ‘indirect’ assessment model, whereby performance was defined and 
measured by programme managers, with the resulting process then subject to audit 
review, exploiting the portability of audit technologies.  Public servants recognised 
the auditors as a source of expertise and support when they sought to implement 
performance management systems. 
Chisholm and Shaw (2004) undertake a Foucauldian analysis to demonstrate that the 
bodies which regulate the New Zealand outdoor activities industry gained power and 
legitimacy by introducing accreditation and audit procedures in response to public 
concerns over the safety of these activities.  They suggest that regulatory 
organisations could benefit from the introduction of such procedures in real terms, 
through organisational growth, and in a more abstract sense by establishing 
themselves as experts on public safety issues within the outdoors industry (ibid, 320). 
In the United Kingdom, the National Audit Office fashioned itself as an advisor on 
financial management to its audited bodies.  It even fulfilled the role of consultant to 
central government in the introduction of resource accounting and made 
recommendations on the future of the public finance initiative (PFI) to a government-
commissioned review (Bowerman et al., 2003:7). 
Audits of specific public sector projects exhibit similar characteristics, such as the 
introduction of a new accounting system by the Danish Defence Forces (“DDF”).  
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The National Audit Office of Denmark played an active role in the development of 
the system.  This left the auditor open to accusations that it had become a 
modernizing consultant, a long way from the traditional role of the independent 
auditor to report on the implementation of the system (Skaerbaek, 2009).   
However, in this case study the national audit body successfully ‘manoeuvres’ 
between two roles; modernizer and independent auditor.  The auditor achieved this 
position by recruiting powerful allies within a network, including statutory 
provisions and influential figures within the audited body, to confer legitimacy on 
pronouncements made by the auditor and to make the DDF auditable.  Thus, “the 
auditor’s manoeuvrability appears to be conditioned by the situations and the 
unexpected events that they face” (Skaerbaek, 2009:985). 
The international literature does not present a universal account of the national audit 
body as modernizer and key agent of change in embedding of managerial 
accountability in public services (Funnell, 1998; Gendron et al., 2001).  Pallot (2003) 
recognises the role played by the New Zealand Audit Office in making non-financial 
performance auditable through defining criteria for audits of such performance.  
However, the New Zealand Audit Office proved to be a source of challenge to the 
managerial reforms advocated by the Treasury.  Any role which the Audit Office 
played in facilitating and legitimating these reforms must be considered in 
conjunction with the willingness of successive Auditor-Generals to raise concerns 
about the erosion of public or democratic accountability.   
Pallot’s work demonstrates that the audit society may not be a phenomenon which is 
universally internationally recognisable and that there remains scope to refine 
empirical understanding of Power’s arguments. 
It is not always clear whether auditors create this modernizing or enhanced role for 
themselves; changes in the scope and content of public sector audit practices are 
often introduced as part of a wider programme of government reform (Lapsley and 
Lonsdale, 2010:87).  That is not to downplay the shrewdness of national audit bodies 
in identifying and capitalising on opportunities to enhance their role (Wilkins and 
Lonsdale, 2007).  But it is clear that the growth and influence of NPM technologies 
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has contributed to an environment in which the influence of national audit bodies can 
increase significantly.   
 
3.7 Extremes of audit failure: decoupling, colonization and displacement of 
organisational objectives 
Power (1999) describes two opposite extremes of audit failure which may be present 
in the audit society: decoupling of audit from organisational processes and the 
colonization of organisational life by audit values.  The worst extreme of audit 
failure occurs when organisational objectives and core activities are entirely 
displaced by audit structures; the functioning of the core organisation is undermined 
by the dominance of audit.   
Decoupling and colonization represent ‘ideal types’ in that neither is likely to be 
present in a pure form in any organisation.  Power asserts that these concepts must be 
explored primarily at the empirical, not theoretical, level.  Subsequent empirical 
studies have found that these concepts must be studied together and not in isolation 
in order to capture the complexity of potential organisational responses to audit 
technologies (Arnaboldi and Lapsley, 2008:45). 
3.7.1 Decoupling 
Decoupling refers to the situation where management systems become 
‘institutionalised routines’ which operate independently of primary organisational 
activities.  Auditable systems become compartmentalised into their own sub-
organisations, divorced from substantive organisational processes, which may also be 
used to represent the organisation to the outside world (Power, 1994a:28-9).   
The primary aim of these new systems or practices is often to facilitate audit or 
regulatory control, and not to improve the underlying practice or furtherance of 
substantive organisational purpose or objectives.  By installing such systems, 
organisations attempt to maintain external legitimacy through institutionalised 
images of assurance (Power, 1996).   
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External audit and assessment can be mobilised ceremonially in order to “deflect 
questioning of organisational conduct” (Power, 1999:96) but the processes are 
remote from the very organisational practices over which they are intended to 
provide assurance. 
Power draws on the classic neo-institutionalist works of Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
who describe how organisations build systems, with more symbolic than substantive 
properties, to act as a buffer against unwanted external influences, in this case 
external audit.  Internal audit departments and audit committees are examples of 
ceremonial devices created by organisations to demonstrate that they are fulfilling 
audit obligations (Power, 1999:96). 
In a study of the implementation of Best Value audit in Scottish local government, 
Arnaboldi and Lapsley (2008) identified organisational buffers to audit, including the 
creation of teams responsible for coordinating the organisational response to Best 
Value. They found limited evidence of a so-called “tick box mentality”, where 
managers did the minimum required to satisfy audit requirements, but did not 
actually embed the supporting changes into the operations of the local authority.  
Based on the lack of evidence of legitimation and decoupling practices within the 
case study sites, the authors tentatively suggest that the Meyer and Rowan analysis 
does not hold in the context of public services long-exposed to NPM technologies 
but that further research is necessary to explore this. 
McGivern and Ferlie (2007:1380) found that medical consultants embraced the 
terminology and process of formal appraisal as a legitimating device, but did not 
embrace the substance of appraisal as their actual behaviour and clinical practices 
were unchanged by either the appraisal process itself or the resulting findings. 
3.7.2 Colonization 
Laughlin (1991: 218) describes colonization as “a second order change… [which] is 
seemingly forced upon the organisation” (emphasis in original).  Laughlin draws on 
the work of Habermas to describe a situation where a deliberate change is made to 
one part of an organisation, often as a result of an external disturbance such as a 
government policy, which has a greater reach than originally intended.  This can 
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bring about a more fundamental change in the overall workings and culture of the 
organisation.  Organisational actors, who did not choose the new direction, are faced 
with a situation where they either accept the new environment or exit the 
organisation (Laughlin, 1991:218-220).   
Power (1999) suggests that colonization can occur where organisations are made 
auditable.  It represents an instance of audit failure and occurs when audit practices 
and values “spill over” from their intended purpose and come to permeate 
organisational practices and culture.  This could in turn have a detrimental impact on 
organisational performance.   
This is the opposite extreme from decoupling: every aspect of colonized 
organisations comes to be dominated by audit values, whereas the operations of 
decoupled organisations are barely influenced by independent audit processes. 
Colonization is a characteristic which the Audit Society shares with NPM.  NPM 
itself seeks to colonize public sector professionals and render their performance more 
publicly accountable by removing their discretion and minimising professional 
judgement.   
Everett (2003) demonstrates how value for money audit techniques were colonized 
by economic and market ideals which cast serious doubt on the political and 
ideological neutrality of such techniques.  Through the audit process, these ideals are 
likely to permeate the operations of the auditee.   
Only in rare instances will an entire organisation be colonized.  Organisations which 
are populated by strong professional identities are less likely to be susceptible to 
audit’s colonizing abilities.  This complements the finding that professions with hard 
knowledge bases are less likely to be rendered auditable (Power, 2003a:193; 
Llewellyn, 1996).  In such organisations, attempted colonization through audit 
techniques and values is likely to engender resistance and even conflict.  The original 
purpose of both audit and the organisation is subverted, creating dysfunctional 
outcomes (Power, 1999:97-8). 
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Arnaboldi and Lapsley’s (2008) study of Best Value audit in Scottish local 
authorities found that Scottish Ministers attempted to colonize local government 
managers when they introduced the concept of Best Value into public policy.  
However, the policy failed to transform the culture within local authorities.  The 
auditors also sought to change management culture through their work, but likewise 
did not succeed.  Local authority managers interviewed in the study commonly 
exhibited “resistance and apprehension” (Arnaboldi and Lapsley, 2008:44) and failed 
to buy-in to the management philosophies of continuous improvement underpinning 
the Best Value regime.  There was thus evidence of partial or localised colonization 
only in the case study sites.   
An earlier study by Lapsley and Pong (2000) found that value for money audit 
techniques had permeated the everyday life of public service managers and auditors 
despite the evidence of implementation difficulties and disconnect between 
conceptual aims and practical application, leaving it to academics and other 
commentators to problematize and criticise value for money auditing. 
Skaerbaek’s research on the introduction of a new accounting system by the Danish 
Defence Force (DDF) highlights that a new performance management system and 
associated managerial devices shaped the professional identities of DDF officers.  
These devices included the demarcation of military and administrative units, the 
creation of system ‘super users’ and making use of the system an inherent part of 
senior officers duties thereby embedding it in career progression (Skaerbaek and 
Thorbjornsen, 2007:258-260).   
Two groups of officers emerged: those who embraced the new system, either for its 
own intrinsic purpose or because they recognised it as a necessary part of career 
advancement including career opportunities outwith the DDF (which the authors 
discuss in the theoretical context of hybridization of professionals), and those who 
remained sceptical of its benefits and the associated changes it brought to their 
traditional roles.  Although the former group came to outnumber the latter, the 
existence of a group of officers who resisted the new identities left open the potential 
for future destabilization of the system. 
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3.7.3 Displacement of core organisational objectives 
A third instance of audit failure arises when its dysfunctional effects outweigh its 
stated intention and so actually undermine the performance of the audited 
organisation: “the language of indicators takes over the language of service” 
(Strathern, 2000:314). 
Examples of this dysfunction include: “declining organizational trust…; elaborate 
and wasteful games of compliance which distract professional attention…; excessive 
concern with representations of individual and collective performance…; defensive 
strategies and blamism…; and lower employee morale” (Power, 2005:335). 
Educational researchers also draw on Power’s work to critique the expansion of 
performance audit techniques at all levels of the education system (Strathern, 2000).  
Elliott (2002) offers a personal view of the impact of value for money audit 
techniques on the teaching profession, highlighting the dysfunctions which can arise 
when short-term output measures are imposed on professional practice which is 
judgement-based and focused on longer term outcomes through the development of 
pupils.  He was particularly concerned that the development of the teaching 
profession could be stifled in a dynamic social world. 
Arnaboldi and Lapsley (2008) find that managers often believe that they spend more 
time making themselves auditable than doing their jobs.  This is prima facie evidence 
of displacement and demonstrates the effects of an increasing audit burden on 
auditees, as identified by Bowerman et al. (2000:88-90).  Managers’ attention and 





“The audit society is not simply a distrusting society; rather, it reflects a 
tendency not to trust trust.  This means a systematic tendency towards 
uncritical trust in the efficacy of audit processes, a trust which results in 
the absence of evaluation of the audit process itself…  In the audit 
society, institutionalized trust, which differs from the trust in ordinary 
individuals, is bestowed on the auditor and is displaced from other 
organizational locations”  
(Power, 1999:136-7) 
The rise of audit can displace trust; members of the public place their trust in 
auditors, rather than professionals at the frontline of service delivery (Power, 1994:1) 
or, in the extreme case, trust is removed one step further to abstract control systems 
(Power, 1994:16).  The public trusts an organisation or service because an audit has 
been performed without being aware of the audit process or the nature of the 
assurance provided by the audit report (Power, 1994:20). 
A paradox begins to emerge.  One of the accepted rationales for the practice of 
financial statements audit is that it provides assurance to the owners of companies 
that managers charged with running the business and generating a return on the 
investments of those shareholders are upholding their fiduciary duties (Power, 
1999:16-17).  Audit supports the trust which shareholders have in those managing 
their investment and maintains order in financial markets. 
“Auditors judge and attest to the validity of corporate financial 
statements, which contain a stylized interpretation of the fiscal health of a 
corporation.  Accountants construct these interpretations, but auditors 
reassure the public and other interested parties that the interpretations 
are trustworthy.” 
(Pentland, 1993:606) 
It follows that “in order to generate trust in financial statements, audit practice must 
generate trust in itself” (Power, 2003b:380).  Thus the audit society suggests that 
rather than restoring trust in management, the audit itself, rather than managers, 
becomes the object of the owner’s trust.   
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3.8.1 Fallacy of placing trust in audit 
Audit is a trusted practice despite there being an enduring ambiguity over what audit 
delivers.  Power (1999:137) questions the extent to which it is appropriate to place 
trust in a practice which perpetuates an expectations gap against what it actually 
delivers.  Is trust placed in what audit actually provides or in the unrealistic 
expectation of the outcome of the audit process? 
Financial analysts rely, on paper at least, on audited financial statements to generate 
input data for their analysis; the inherent stamp of trustworthiness conferred on the 
financial statements by an unqualified audit opinion by extension provides assurance 
over the trustworthiness of their analysis based on this financial data.  The 
trustworthiness conferred on their own work by audit creates incentives for financial 
analysts to promote the assurance provided by financial auditors through public 
pronouncements, such as references on publicity materials including websites 
(Malsch and Gendron, 2009).   
However, interview research conducted by Malsch and Gendron (ibid.) found 
evidence of a conflicting reality; the apparently objective quantitative data was not 
the primary basis of analysts’ recommendations.  These recommendations were in 
fact judgement-based and drawn in the main from confidence in the management 
team drawn from judgements formed from face-to-face meetings.  Thus despite the 
popular myth, analysts place primary trust in company managers, not auditors or 
audited financial statements.  To expose trust in auditing as mythical would be to risk 
destabilising the social order of the market and expose financial analysts to 
unwelcome scrutiny, as well as expose the lack of scientific rigour underlying their 
own advice.  Audit provides a protective shield for financial analysts; this creates an 
incentive for analysts to promote public trust in audit, even when analysts themselves 
place little trust in the audit process.   
Harrison and Smith (2004) distinguish between confidence and trust in order to 
demonstrate how modernization of public services favours the certainty offered by 
measurement and systematisation over the uncertainty that characterises a 
relationship of trust between public service providers and users.  They draw 
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examples from New Labour healthcare reforms of the late 1990s and early 2000s to 
demonstrate that a ‘modern’ NHS driven by clinical governance has marginalised 
trust in public service delivery by giving precedence to measurable outputs and 
control systems.  These management tools inspire confidence because service users 
know that compliance can be enforced.  Healthcare reforms make room for trust at a 
micro-level only, between individual healthcare professionals and their patients. 
Some form of account giving will always be required to underpin a relationship of 
trust.  According to Power (1999:138), “the problem is that the audit society eclipses 
this meta-auditing.  In place of reflection on the need for auditable account giving, 
there are increasingly formalized rituals of accounting and verification.  And this 
means that trust in auditing may be risky.”   
Lapsley and Lonsdale (2010:91-2) suggest that audit can play an important role in 
brokering public trust in government and other agencies which deliver services.  But 
in order to effectively fulfil such a role, auditors must look to improve the 
effectiveness of their own practices (ibid).   
The corollary of this proposition must be the potential damage to public trust caused 
by critical audit findings, particularly performance audits of public services, or 
selective accounts of audit findings in the popular media (Justesen and Skaerbaek, 
2005:340-1).  The latter source is likely to be the more potent; very few citizens will 
read performance or value-for-money audits first-hand and rely on media reports as 
the primary source of news of audit findings.  Thus, trust can even be displaced by 
third party reports of audit activity.   
3.8.2 Impact of erosion of trust on professions 
O’Neill (2002) describes a paradoxical culture of mistrust which she attributes to the 
prevalence of managerial forms of accountability, including audit techniques and 
performance targets.  She argues that the perverse incentives created by the culture of 
central control and compliance-driven accountability mechanisms are evident to the 
public and these create suspicion and mistrust that public organisations are not 
focused on their primary substantive aims, instead distracted by games of 
presentation and compliance.  After all, O’Neill points out, the public are still more 
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than willing to make use of services provided by the same doctors, teachers and so 
on whom they are claimed to no longer trust.  This is not a universally accepted 
proposition: managerial models of accountability, which prioritise systems and 
quantitative forms of account-giving, have also been argued to undermine public 
trust in medical professionals (Checkland et al., 2004).   
Tools of managerial accountability ostensibly intended to secure and broker trust 
actually engender suspicion of, and ultimately mistrust in, those organisations 
responsible for providing public services. 
Thus the public continue to trust professionals, but not the organisations that employ 
those professionals to provide services.   
The proliferation of information on an expert system, which is intended to improve 
the transparency of that system, can damage trust in professional judgement.  This 
information requires interpretation, which is beyond the competency of the lay 
observer who has not completed the necessary professional training.  The observer’s 
interpretations will almost inevitably conflict with the professional interpretation 
(Tsoukas, 1997:835), and so the attempt at lay interpretation only further obscures 
what it purported to make transparent.  A full account cannot be given by a lay 
observer, regardless of how auditable the underlying practice is made. 
The relationship between audit and trust thus remains problematic and opportunities 
remain for further exploratory empirical analysis.   
 
3.9 Response to Power: criticism and development 
Power invites further debate on the arguments which he presents in the Audit 
Explosion and The Audit Society (1999:143-4).  The majority of the ensuing 
contributions to the academic literature support Power’s core arguments and 
sentiments, but offer refinements and pose further challenges to strengthen the 
theoretical and empirical foundations of Power’s work (for example, Humphrey and 
Owen, 2000; Bowerman et al., 2000; Pentland, 2000). 
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Maltby (2008) is among the most direct critics of the audit society thesis and her 
counter-arguments will be considered in greater detail in the following sub-section.  
She claims that anyone who disagrees with Power is open to “charges of gullibility 
and addiction” (2008:11), yet she does not provide a convincing counter-argument to 
refute these charges or indeed substantiate their original existence.   
3.9.1 No such thing as ‘audit society’? 
Maltby (2008) leads three primary arguments, as identified by Power (2008), in order 
to make her claim that Power’s audit society is a fiction: the absence of a definition 
of ‘audit’ in Power’s works; the audit society lacks an empirical base; and Power 
overlooks the democratic value of audit to members of the public.   
The first argument is considered in detail above at Section 3.3.3, as other 
commentators have also suggested the failure to define ‘audit’ undermines Power’s 
work.  This earlier discussion concluded that these other commentators failed to 
consider that the ambiguity of ‘audit’ as a programmatic, rather than technical, 
concept may be the source of its influence.   
Power responds to Maltby’s charge that the audit society is without an empirical base 
by re-framing the question.  While he concedes that the work is not underpinned by a 
systematic analysis of empirical data as demanded by traditional research 
methodologies, Power (2008:401) suggests that such an analysis would not have 
been appropriate support for what is essentially a theory-building endeavour, but an 
attempt to address bigger questions about the growing dominance of the audit idea.   
Maltby (2008:16) accuses Power of sympathising with those public servants and 
others who resist the imposition of accountability upon their traditional practices.  
However, Power actually rejects a return to the days of untouchable professional 
privilege (1994a:33) and favours efforts to increase the transparency of public 
services and the visibility of those who deliver them (2000a:116).   
Power argues that the negative consequences of audit call into question its value as 
an instrument of accountability, not that accountability itself is undesirable.  Power 
even tentatively advances some possible design features of a more positive system of 
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auditing (Power, 2003a:195-9) which could be more effective in the discharge of 
accountability than the illusory accountability created by the prevailing audit 
framework.   
Power could perhaps have been more convincing in affirming this position, as other 
commentators also criticise the Audit Society for failing to sufficiently challenge the 
role of public sector managers (Humphrey and Owen, 2000:47).  There is thus scope 
for future research to explore the role of public sector managers in the discharge of 
accountability and in particular how they perceive their role in that process.  
It is noteworthy that Maltby’s paper is based on the first incarnation of the audit 
society which appeared as a short essay (Power, 1994b), not the more comprehensive 
set of arguments contained in his later work, despite the publication of her counter-
argument coming a decade after the publication of Power’s latter work.  
Many of Maltby’s claims read like a philosophical or political disagreement with 
Power, are somewhat shrill in tone and lack the support of empirical evidence or an 
alternative theoretical framework.  Maltby uses provocative language in an attempt 
to discredit Power’s work.  This is particularly evident in the concluding sentences of 
her article: 
“The Audit Society and its progeny, Power’s own papers and the wails of 
unhappy academics and doctors and civil servants, are ultimately not a protest 
about the creation of an iron cage [Power, 2003a:200] round society.  They 
are a stifled chorus of fury at being made accountable.”  
(Maltby, 2008:16) 
Maltby’s use of provocative language and emotionally-laden statements
9
 creates the 
appearance of an impassioned counter-position to Power’s Audit Society and perhaps 
at first sight disguises the absence of well-developed substantive arguments based on 
a systematic understanding of Power’s work.   
However, the lack of reasoned analysis ultimately results in a failure of Maltby’s 
article to present a convincing counter-argument to disprove the existence of the 
                                                          
9
 See also Power (2008:402): “[Maltby’s] is a style which actually prevents her from directly 
addressing the proposition in the title of her essay, and results in an extended sneer...  In the end, the 
only “chorus of fury” I can find, not at all stifled, is in the tone and language of Maltby’s essay itself.” 
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audit society which enables Power (2008) to rebut her claims in a four-page reply.  
The Audit Society survives Maltby’s attack and remains substantively unchallenged 
by the academic literature. 
3.9.2 Financial audit is losing influence? 
In contrast to Power’s picture of a profession in the ascendant capturing new markets 
and expanding rapidly, other commentators lead evidence that financial auditors 
were actually being forced to defend their position (Bowerman et al., 2000:85).  
Audit fees reduced in the 1990s and some professional firms rebranded audit as 
‘assurance’ services (Humphrey and Owen, 2000:40).  The balance of power 
between auditors and managers is shifting in favour of the latter with auditors under 
increasing pressure to satisfy the demands of their clients in a competitive market 
(ibid, 43).  Commentators argue that there is no clear upward trajectory of audit 
influence; its influence has fluctuated (Maltby, 2008:12-13) and may not have 
ultimately increased (Hood et al., 2004). 
Power accepts this criticism.  He maintains that financial auditing has had a 
significant influence on the evolution of the audit society, but it “has probably been 
overstated in previous work as the source of the audit explosion” (2003a:188, 
emphasis in original).  For example, the focus on auditable systems probably has its 
origins in quality assurance practices rather than financial auditing (2003a:189). 
It may be useful here to distinguish between the private and public sectors and in 
particular to note the corporate scandals and (perceived or real) associated audit 
‘failures’ which dominated the popular debate on the role of audit in the private 
sector in the 1990s.  Auditors continued to be allocated blame in the investigation of 
high profile corporate failures in the early 21
st
 century (Fusaro and Miller, 2002; 
Blyth, 2003), often because of a perception that auditors should have been able to 
prevent the deviant corporate behaviour which led to the failure (Guénin-Paracini 
and Gendron, 2010).  Although significant reforms to the auditing profession emerge 
in response to such crises (Sikka and Willmott, 1995), the fundamental functions of 
audit survive these crises because the legitimacy provided by the audit process 
underpins the effectiveness of the prevailing economic order.   
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Organisational scandals on this scale have largely been absent from the UK public 
sector and very rarely have audit bodies been held to have greater responsibility for 
organisational or service failings than management.  There is potential scope for 
auditors to have greater influence in the public, than in the private, sector.   
3.9.3 The role of the accounting profession 
When Power returns to consider the causes of the audit explosion, he concedes that 
he may have over-emphasised the importance of the demand-side factors which 
created the audit explosion (2003a:191-2).  In doing so, he neglected the supply-side 
factors, primarily the existence of professional groups, mainly accountants, willing 
and able to redefine themselves to serve the demands of NPM (Humphrey and Owen, 
2000:40).  Public sector professionals were empowered by NPM, along with private 
sector consultants (Power, 2005:329).   
It would be equally overly simplistic to explain the audit explosion and society only 
in terms of auditors conspiring to advance their status.  Even auditors are 
increasingly subject to the discipline of auditing, and they are not willing auditees 
(Power, 2000a:114).  Humphrey and Owen (2000:40) consider this a weak 
explanation of why the audit society is not wholly driven by auditing professionals, 
noting that at the time of writing audit revenues were of decreasing significance for 
large accounting firms and the ‘audit’ function was commonly rebranded as an 
‘assurance’ function.   
The larger context in which both sets of comments were made is significant; these 
were made in a pre-Enron era, before confidence in the financial statement audit 
function of large firms was shaken by apparent complicity in irregular accounting 
practices and the alleged destruction of audit evidence (Fusaro and Miller, 
2002:124).  At that time, large firms often viewed audit services as a gateway to 
securing more profitable non-audit services from a company, so the margin 
generated on the audit fee could be sacrificed in exchange for larger margins on tax 
and consultancy services. 
Thus, the assertion by Humphrey and Owen (2000) that financial audit appeared to 
be in decline, rather than ascendency, as the audit society emerged is based on a 
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simplistic view of the potential influence of financial statements audit and the 
business model operated by large accounting firms at that time. 
The stronger argument advanced by Humphrey and Owen (2000:40-1) is that audit-
style verification is permeating many professions, such that the role of many 
professionals has expanded to include the conduct of non-financial audits, including 
teaching.  Humphrey and Owen suggest that the proliferation of non-financial audit 
is the key driver of the audit explosion, not at the behest of financial auditors seeking 
to extend their power and influence beyond the traditional base, but because other 
professions have been attracted to the potential benefits of external verification.    
Power has been criticised for failing to hold auditors to account for allowing the 
audit society to develop (Humphrey and Owen, 2000:47).  The accounting profession 
has not recognised, or at least publicly admitted the existence of, the negative 
consequences of the audit explosion which it helped to perpetuate.  Power later 
contemplates whether there is scope to build reflexivity into the audit process 
(2005:340).  Self-awareness amongst auditors could help to make the ‘externalities’ 
of audit visible, and auditors could start to assume some accountability for the 
damage which they inflict on trust and transparency in public service delivery.  
3.9.4 The performance measurement society? 
An alternative interpretation of the drive to make performance auditable is offered by 
Humphrey and Owen (2000) and Bowerman et al. (2000) – they contend that Power 
documented the creation of a ‘performance measurement society’, not an audit 
society. 
Management, and particularly New Public Management (NPM), is the main driver of 
the ‘performance measurement society’ (Humphrey and Owen, 2000:43).  NPM 
demands that performance is made measurable.  While performance measures may 
be subject to audit, they were neither designed primarily to be audited, nor in 
response to demands for external audit (Bowerman et al., 2000:78; Humphrey and 
Owen, 2000:43).  The alternative proposition can be summarised thus: society 
demands that performance is made measurable, not auditable.   
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The focus of the academic debate thus shifts: “the task is the more straightforward 
one of explaining why organisations are so measurement oriented rather than why 
organisations are making themselves auditable but are not audited in any traditional 
sense of the word” (Humphrey and Owen, 2000:43).  The quest for measurable 
performance is considered a more dominant force for change than audit.  Changes in 
audit practice and techniques are one side-effect of this quest for measurement, rather 
than the driver (Bowerman et al., 2000:80).  The ‘performance measurement society’ 
is not concerned with external verification and the role of independent bodies in 
discharging accountability. 
Bowerman, Humphrey and Owen (2003) present two examples from the UK public 
sector to illustrate their argument: public service agreements and the introduction of 
resource accounting.   
The UK government introduced public service agreements in 1998 to formalise the 
accountability relationship between ‘spending departments’ and HM Treasury, which 
had overall responsibility for government finances (Gay, 2005).  Although these 
agreements were underpinned by measurable performance targets to formalise 
relationships between HM Treasury and the spending departments, the achievement 
of these targets was not subject to audit.  Thus, argue Bowerman, Humphrey and 
Owen, the imperative was measurement of performance, not audit of the reported 
results.   
Full adoption of resource accounting by the UK government would have seen the 
inclusion of performance reports, Bowerman, Humphrey and Owen (2003) argue, in 
the statutory accounts of government departments.  Such a move could have brought 
performance reports within the scope of the external audit of those accounts.  
However, the government defined resource accounts to exclude performance reports 
(ibid.).  They argue that resource accounting sought to make the performance of 
government departments measurable, and indeed auditable, but they were not in fact 
audited. 
Advocates of the ‘performance measurement society’ fail to recognise the distinction 
between being audited and being made auditable.  It is less important in terms of the 
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effects of the audit society whether performance or underlying systems are actually 
audited than that they were constructed to be audited, i.e. made auditable.  The 
fundamental question is one of intention – the performance measurement systems 
may have been designed to facilitate audit, or other means of external verification, 
rather than merely to be measured for its own sake (Power, 2000a:115).  After all, 
the act of measurement itself is less important than how measures are defined, 
interpreted, made visible and utilised to further policy agendas. 
The introduction of most performance measures in public services has been 
accompanied by mechanisms to verify the process of measuring performance, 
usually carried out by an independent body often created solely for that purpose.  The 
act of measurement only gains legitimacy as an apparently neutral practice, and 
fulfils its aim as a mechanism of control and accountability, through the additional 
process of external verification (Power, 2004; Free, Salterio and Shearer, 2009). 
The ‘performance measurement society’ also fails to explain the transformation of 
governance style to one characterised by audit and the “transfers of institutional 
power to audit bodies who decide on a wide range of issues and who, by definition, 
overstep their purely auditing jurisdiction to become de facto policy makers” (Power, 
2005:335).  While the ‘performance measurement society’ does describe the 
quantitative dimension of the audit explosion, it is incapable of capturing the 
qualitative shift which permeated society and changed the language of regulation and 
oversight. 
Furthermore, claims for the ‘performance measurement society’ appear not to have 
found popular support, or generated a debate, in the subsequent literature.  Power’s 
‘audit society’ by contrast resonates with commentators outside the realm of 
accounting and auditing academia.  While this may be related to the general negative 
stereotyping of auditors by non-accountants (Humphrey and Owen, 2000:43), it does 
substantiate Power’s “hunch” that something systematic about auditing, as opposed 




3.10 Reflections and concluding remarks 
This chapter has explored the existing literature on the audit society, including 
Power’s original work and subsequent refinements, commentary and empirical 
works.  This body of work presents a comprehensive account of how audit has 
become a social force with an influence extending beyond the realm of financial 
accounting.   
The following chapters will use this theoretical framework to ground empirical 
studies of the influence of audit in the development of the NHS in Scotland 
following devolution and the creation of the Scottish Parliament in 1999.  These 
studies will show how audit has a ritual appeal to politicians and those responsible 
for the delivery of public services, which has a profound effect on those at the 
frontline of service delivery and the public image of those bodies. 
The next chapter provides an overview of the research design and methods which 






















This chapter summarises the research design and methods employed in this study, 
and the underlying research strategy.   
 
4.2 Research strategy 
4.2.1 Qualitative accounting and auditing research 
Academic accounting research has tended to follow a positivist tradition, using 
quantitative methods and focusing on technical accounting practice (Burchell et al., 
1980).  Behavioural research in accounting traditionally relied upon psychological 
theories to gain insight into individual behaviours with little evidence that 
researchers considered the role of accounting in society more generally (Hopwood, 
1978). 
Research interests expanded into the organisational aspects of accounting during the 
1970s (Hopwood, 1978).  This interest was complemented by organisational studies 
researchers who considered the sociological roles of accounting information systems 
(Burchell et al., 1980; Miller, 1994), paving the way for the development of 
accounting as a social and institutional practice and drawing on social theory in order 
to understand the role of accounting in a wider context, including how it is mobilised 
by organisational and social actors. 
Accounting researchers’ concerns with the organisational dimensions of accounting 
practice broadened into the wider social environment in which accounting operates, 
recognising that accounting technologies are shaped by and, in turn, contribute to the 
construction of organisational and social reality (Hopwood, 1983).  While the 
positivist and technical traditions continue to constitute the ‘mainstream’ in 
accounting research, particularly in the United States, there has been a steady growth 
in what has been termed ‘alternative’ accounting research which takes a more 
contextual approach in order to understand the organisational and social roles served 
by accounting (Baxter and Chua, 2003; Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992; 2008). 
The introduction of qualitative research in auditing occurred at a slower pace.  
Research continued to focus on the technical practice of auditing, with little 
70 
 
consideration of the context in which auditing operates or the impact of auditing on 
auditees (Power, 2003a; Humphrey, 2008).  
Michael Power’s body of work recognises that audit has become a social force with 
an influence which extends beyond the realm of financial accounting.  As well as 
contributing a theoretical framework on the development of the audit society, Power 
also established a tradition of qualitative research on the social context and impact of 
auditing practices.  The present study locates itself within that tradition, offering a 
qualitative perspective on the role of audit in relation to performance management of 
the NHS.   
Criticisms of qualitative accounting research 
Qualitative accounting research is often criticised as ‘story telling’ so it is important 
to ensure that such empirical research is supported by a sound theoretical framework 
and that the aims of the study extend beyond ‘understanding’ a situation or process 
(Ahrens and Chapman, 2006).   The present study is informed by, and seeks to 
develop, the theoretical contribution made by The Audit Society. 
There is an inherent risk of bias and subjectivity in presentation and interpretation of 
qualitative data (Stake, 1995:41).  The qualitative researcher must respond to this 
challenge and employ alternative disciplinary controls to protect the validity of the 
findings.   
A further criticism levelled at qualitative research is that it is not bound by the 
rigours of statistical analysis and the well-established tests for determining the 
validity of analysis.  However, it is inappropriate to use the language of quantitative 
research to evaluate a qualitative research design (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994).  The epistemological assumptions underlying the two approaches 
conflict; in particular, quantitative researchers believe in an absolute, objective 
reality whereas qualitative research allows for multiple realities and interpretations.   
Lincoln and Guba (ibid.) thus propose alternative criteria for assessing qualitative 
research: trustworthiness and authenticity.   
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4.2.2 Actor-network theory 
The interest in importing sociological theories into qualitative accounting research 
continued with the emergence of papers influenced by or explicitly adopting actor-
network theory (ANT) as a theoretical framework.  Justesen and Mouritsen (2011) 
argue that the advent of ANT studies enhanced the sociological understanding of 
accounting by bestowing a performative role upon accounting technologies; 
accounting was no longer explained as an effect of other sociological phenomena but 
could become an actor in its own right with influence on the construction and 
development of organisational reality.   
Although ANT is increasingly used as a theoretical framework in qualitative 
accounting research (Baxter and Chua, 2003; Chua, 1995; Justesen and Mouritsen, 
2011), the present study draws on ANT as research strategy (Lowe, 2001).   
“ANT is ontologically relativist in that it allows that the world may be 
organized in many different ways, but also empirically realist in that it finds 
no insurmountable difficulty in producing descriptions of organizational 
processes.”  
(Lee and Hassard, 1999:392, emphasis in original) 
Used in this way ANT provides the tools to analyse associations between actors and 
to create knowledge through the production of detailed accounts of actor-networks.  
This is consistent with Latour’s view that ANT is “about how to study things, or 
rather how not to study them” (2005:142, emphasis in original).    
ANT is a constructivist approach, although not a ‘social constructivist’ approach as 
Latour makes clear in Reassembling the Social (2005:91-2, emphasis in original): 
“When we say that a fact is constructed, we simply mean that we account for 
the solid objective reality by mobilizing various entities whose assemblage 
could fail; ‘social constructivism’ means, on the other hand, that we replace 
what this reality is made of with some other stuff, the social in which it is 
‘really’ built.” 




“the aim is to show, at quite a detailed empirical level, how accounting 
practices and technologies partake in construction processes and how 
multiple, and sometimes surprising, effects are generated as a consequence.” 
ANT seeks to assemble the active components of the social world and allow actors 
the space to express themselves (Latour, 2005:142). This makes it especially useful 
for considering the dynamics of a complex process (Skaerbaek and Thorbjornsen, 
2007:245-6) and in particular to demonstrate how public sector organisations make 
themselves auditable (Skaerbaek and Thorbjornsen, 2007; Vikkelso, 2007).   
Actor-network theory allows social scientists to look beyond the actions of humans 
by defining ‘actor’ in broader terms on the basis that humans are limited by their 
social skills, when in fact there are many more types of association present in the 
world (Latour, 2005:69).  An object becomes an actor when it makes a detectable 
difference to the action taken by another agent; the object must leave a trace on 
human actors.  Once an object participates in human action, it becomes an actor.  It is 
the job of the researcher to identify these objects in a network and to find a way to 
“make them talk” (Latour, 2005:79, emphasis in original).   
ANT enriches the present research by bringing into focus the role of non-human 
actors, such as policy documents and performance measurement systems, in shaping 
the behaviour of human actors charged with implementing these systems. 
ANT is a commonly-used research strategy in health organisational research.  The 
creep of managerialism into health care in the United Kingdom in recent decades has 
diluted the previous polarity of doctors versus managers and seen an increase in the 
number of stakeholders involved in the delivery of health care.  This shift in 
emphasis from a “binary relationship” to a network of professional groups with 
overlapping jurisdictions and interests creates a fruitful study ground for actor-
network theory with its interest in the fluid associations between actors (Dent, 2003). 
ANT principles and ideas underpin this study: ANT enables the present research to 
consider the influence which inanimate objects, such as audit reports and 
performance measures, have upon actions at all levels of the NHS from the political 
sphere down to individual organisations.  It also allows the researcher to access a 
wider range of associations between groups of actors within the NHS, which is a 
setting populated with multiple stakeholder groups (Greener, 2009).   
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4.3 Research design 
4.3.1 Research outline 
The research questions will be answered through a multi-level qualitative study 
which first considers how the Scottish approach to NHS performance assessment 
differs from its English counterpart through a longitudinal comparative analysis of 
key policy and guidance documents.  This initial comparative study will create a 
baseline to highlight the key differences between the performance assessment 
approaches adopted in England and Scotland and show how these approaches 
evolved.   
The focus of the study then shifts to consider the Scottish case in greater depth.  The 
impact which the Scottish approach to NHS performance assessment has upon Audit 
Scotland, the national audit body, is explored through a longitudinal analysis of its 
annual NHS overview reports.  Two specific cases are then explored in greater detail: 
the official response to a performance crisis in NHS Lothian’s waiting times 
management and non-participant observation of key governance committees within a 
Scottish NHS board.   
Section 4.4 summarises the methods adopted for each study, before Section 4.5 
appraises the existing literature on the use of these methods.   
4.3.2 Multi-level design 
In order to fully understand management reforms in the NHS, it is essential to 
consider multiple levels: centralised policy formulation and overall control, strategic 
management responsibility for local healthcare services, and operational delivery of 
frontline healthcare services.  Decisions taken by organisational actors are influenced 
by the prevailing policy and accountability arrangements promulgated by the central 
body.  Research designs which fail to give full consideration to this relationship will 
gain only a partial insight into their subject and risk misinterpretation of the data 
collected by excluding consideration of relevant influences.  Furthermore, documents 
can constitute the foundations of practical behaviour and decision-making so it is 
necessary to first understand these before embarking on research into behaviour and 




This design incorporates research at each level of the NHS: it analyses documents 
which underpin policy formulation and governance and observes documentary and 
physical interactions between key actors charged with strategic management and 
responsibility for delivery of frontline services (see Table 4.1 below).   
Table 4.1: Mapping of research design to research questions 
Research questions Response Methods 
1. How are audit mechanisms 
manifest in the performance 
measurement regimes in the 
National Health Service in 
England and Scotland? 
Comparative longitudinal 
analysis (1997-2010) of key 
policy and guidance 
documents setting out 
performance assessment 
policy and practice 
 Documentary 
analysis 
2. What is the effect on the 
national audit body when there 
is no formal role for audit 
within the NHS performance 
assessment framework?  
Longitudinal analysis of 
‘NHS overview’ reports 
produced annually by Audit 
Scotland, representing the 
national audit body’s 




3. How do key actors in the 
governance and management 
of the National Health Service 
respond to performance 
measurement and audit 
mechanisms, and which actors 
exert greatest influence over 
the response? 
Case study of official 
response to a performance 





Observation of three 
governance committees at a 









This multi-level design is not intended to ‘triangulate’ data sources or methods as 
advocated by Denzin (1978) to validate findings, but rather identifies and applies 
methods most appropriate to the research questions in order to present the best 
quality research evidence. 
4.3.3 Comparison 
Devolution of legislative and administrative powers within the United Kingdom 
constitutes a ‘natural experiment’ (Propper et al., 2008; Connolly, Bevan and Mays, 
2010) in healthcare policy which presents research opportunities to consider how 
different policy and managerial approaches impact on organisations which were 
previously part of the same system. 
The preceding discussion at Section 2.3 shows that there was limited scope for 
divergence in the approach taken to NHS policy and management across the United 
Kingdom prior to devolution.  The creation of the Scottish Parliament provided an 
opportunity for Scotland to pursue a distinctive approach to the NHS which rejected 
the managerial ideology which permeated the NHS in England (Greer, 2004).   
Comparison is fundamental to social science as all understanding is relative 
(Bechhofer and Paterson, 2000).  The present study attempts to understand 
developments in the Scottish NHS in the context of parallel developments in 
England, recognising that it is necessary “to consider devolved policy-making within 
the context of the nation-state” (Keating and McEwen, 2005:420).  The comparative 
approach will promote a more thorough understanding of the Scottish NHS as it 
highlights the degree of contrast with other dominant approaches (Bryman, 2008:58).   
4.3.4 Timeframe 
The backdrop for this study is the era of governance of the English NHS by 
performance management and measurement, which characterised the health policy of 
the New Labour Government.  This research is therefore set against the three terms 
during which the New Labour Government was in power in the UK Parliament, from 
May 1997 to May 2010.  The two longitudinal analyses, of key policy and guidance 
documents and of NHS overview reports produced by Audit Scotland, are structured 
within this time period.   
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The organisational case study is set in the recent present; the period of observation 
spanned September and October 2011.  The performance crisis in waiting time 
management at NHS Lothian unfolded during the course of this study, and was 
analysed in real time by the researcher from its inception in October 2011 through to 
the culmination of the official response in May 2012 when the national audit body 
announces that it will conduct an external review of waiting time management in 
NHSScotland.   
4.3.5 Analytical framework 
The approach to documentary analysis adopted in this study follows Prior’s view that 
documents are not inert data but “fields, frames and networks of action” (2003:2).  
As such, documents should be considered as actors within social or organisational 
life, with an independent existence (Prior, 2003:168).   
Following the approach advocated by Prior (2003), documents are analysed as active 
participants in the performance assessment and audit process by considering not only 
the content of the document but also what is referenced in the document, the context 
in which the document is situated and how the document comes to be an actor in a 
wider network.  This approach is also influenced by Latour’s account of ANT (1987; 
1991; 2005) which recognises non-human objects, such as documents, as actors in a 
network.   
This study attempts to consider three factors in the analysis of documents: the 
process and circumstances of their manufacture; how they function in specific 
circumstances, including how they are used by the reader; and the content of the 
documents (Prior, 2003).   
Documents and notes from observation sessions are coded thematically, to search for 
correspondence and pattern within data (Stake, 1995:78).  This qualitative approach 
draws on Boje’s (2001) work on intertextuality in organisational research, which 
rejects the idea that a pre-defined conceptual grid can be imposed in advance of 
analysis.  Instead, it advocates the identification of key themes in the course of data 
collection and analysis.  This guards against unnecessary restriction of research 
findings (Prior, 2003:22).   
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All four studies attempt to present a rich account of interactions within performance 
management activities.   
 
4.4 Overview of empirical studies 
This study comprises four empirical studies; this section provides a summary of the 
research design and methods underpinning each of these studies.   
4.4.1 Longitudinal analysis of national policy and guidance documents 
Chapter 5: Performance management in the NHS in England and Scotland (1997 to 
2010) presents a detailed longitudinal analysis of national policy and guidance 
documents relevant to performance management of the NHS in England and 
Scotland from 1997 to 2010 to provide a baseline assessment of the performance 
management and structures in NHSScotland, relative to developments in England. 
This study analyses key national policy and guidance documents to uncover the 
‘official account’ of developments in performance management and audit at the 
macro level to provide a baseline assessment of the key differences in the respective 
approaches adopted by the NHS in England and Scotland.  The timeframe for the 
documentary analysis is aligned to the three terms of the New Labour Government, 
as explained at Section 4.3.4 above.   
Selection of documents 
A purposive sample of policy, guidance and audit documents is selected for analysis.  
Documents include key policy White Papers which relate to the NHS system as a 
whole, performance assessment guidance for the NHS published by central 
government and publications from national audit bodies and quasi-audit bodies.   
Original copies of policy and guidance documents were sourced via official websites, 
including the Department of Health and the Scottish Government websites, and the 
University Library.  This provides assurance over the authenticity of the documents 
studied.   
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4.4.2 Longitudinal analysis of Audit Scotland NHS overview reports 
Chapter 6: The evolution of Audit Scotland’s role in performance managing 
NHSScotland presents a longitudinal analysis of annual overview reports of the NHS 
in Scotland which traces the development of Audit Scotland’s position in the 
financial and performance management networks of NHSScotland.  The overview 
reports were selected as the basis for the study because they are the most public 
statements which Audit Scotland makes on its audit activity in NHSScotland and 
they provide a snapshot of Audit Scotland’s role in relation to NHS performance.   
The timeframe for this analysis mirrors that adopted for the longitudinal analysis of 
policy documents.  It runs from the creation of the new audit body for devolved 
public services through to 2010 and so encompasses eleven financial years from 
1999/2000 to 2009/10.   
Original copies of reports were sourced through the Audit Scotland website.   
4.4.3 Case study of the official response to a performance crisis in waiting time 
management 
Chapter 7: Audit in times of performance crisis – NHS Lothian waiting time 
management presents a case study of the official response to a performance crisis, 
including recourse to audit technologies.   
The researcher analysed these events as they unfolded in real-time, from October 
2011, when the scandal was made public by a newspaper report, to May 2012, when 
Audit Scotland announces that it will perform a national review of waiting time 
management.  The analysis considers the official response to the crisis as embodied 
by media reports; written parliamentary questions tabled by Members of the Scottish 
Parliament and answers provided by Scottish Ministers; the Official Report of 
statements and debates on the issue in the Scottish Parliament; primary audit and 
management reports; and NHS Lothian board papers and minutes of public board 
meetings at which waiting time management was discussed.   
Selection of documents 
The LexisNexis online database of UK newspapers was used to source relevant 
articles for analysis.  Searches were conducted for articles including the keyword 
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“NHS Lothian” from 23 October 2011, which is the date of the initial newspaper 
report which made the performance crisis public, up to July 2012.  Later searches 
also included the keywords “waiting time management” to ensure coverage of stories 
which related to the wider crisis in waiting time management in NHSScotland.  The 
researcher manually reviewed search results to identify articles which related to the 
specific performance crisis. 
Similar searches were conducted on the Scottish Parliament website to identify 
parliamentary questions and answers and Parliamentary statements and debates 
which pertained to the waiting time crisis.  The public archive of NHS Lothian board 
papers on the NHS Lothian website was used to access papers of meetings at which 
the performance crisis was discussed.   
The media articles, Parliamentary material and NHS Lothian board papers 
highlighted other key documents of interest, such as primary review reports which 
were then accessed from the websites of NHS Lothian, the Scottish Government or 
the Scottish Parliament.  These initial materials were collated to produce a timeline 
of key events and interactions, which were cross-referenced to identify linkages and 
any potential gaps in the analysis.   
4.4.4 Organisational case study 
Chapter 8: Observing performance, audit and organisational life in NHSScotland 
presents an organisational case study based on non-participant observation of key 
governance and management committees within a Scottish NHS board.   
The researcher gained access to four meetings of three key governance and 
management committees within a Scottish NHS board.  There is further discussion of 
the case study setting and the committees observed at Section 8.1.  The researcher’s 
status as non-participant observer allowed direct access to interactions between 
committee members and other attendees at these meetings to develop an 
understanding of how key organisational actors approach audit and performance 
issues.   
The case study combines non-participant observation of committee meetings with 
analysis of key documents produced or considered by the committee, including 
papers tabled and the minutes of meetings under observation. 
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Selection of committees 
Committees can be representative of bodies of expertise within a field or 
organisation (Lapsley and Pong, 2000) and thus provide a focal point for research 
interest.  The researcher requested access to two main categories of committee: the 
audit committee and an operational management meeting at which performance 
issues are considered. 
The audit committee, a mandatory sub-committee of NHS Boards (Scottish 
Executive Health Department, 2001), is the main focus of audit activities within 
NHS organisations.  Committee members are thus uniquely placed to offer insights 
into how audit issues are handled by each organisation. 
The operational management committee was selected in order to fully understand 
how audit impacts upon the operations of NHS organisations.  Such committees 
typically comprise managers responsible for the delivery of health care services as 
well as the achievement of corporate objectives, including performance targets. 
Method of observation 
The researcher was provided with committee terms of reference, details of committee 
membership and copies of the agenda and meeting papers.  This facilitated the 
preparation of observation grids in advance of each meeting.  A standard grid format 
was used for each meeting, which included individual boxes to record observations 
of each committee member and meeting attendee.  A separate grid was produced and 
completed for each agenda item.  The researcher also made process notes and 
recorded general observations during each meeting. 
Inspired by Latour’s (2005) concept of maintaining different ‘research notebooks’ 
while in the field, the researcher supplemented observations made in meetings with a 
record of her reflections on the observed session immediately following each 
meeting.  This is a similar method to that adopted by Parker (2007) in complete 
member researcher case studies of the operation of the governance boards of not-for-
profit organisations.   
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4.5 Research methods 
4.5.1 Documentary analysis 
Few research methods texts specifically address documentary based research (Prior, 
2003:3).  The use of documents in the present study is informed by Prior’s view that 
documents are not inert carriers of data but active “fields, frames and networks of 
action” (2003:2).   
As such, documents are not mere ‘darts’ or inert carriers of information (Brown and 
Duguid, 1996), but should be considered as actors within social or organisational life, 
with an independent existence (Prior, 2003:168).  Such an epistemological stance is 
consistent with, and a demonstration of the use of, actor-network theory as an 
overarching research strategy to shape the present study; recognising documents as 
actors in the social world. 
Documents as actors 
Documents do not just appear organically – they are conceived by human actors and 
are products of their views, experiences and values (Prior, 2003:31).  They can 
construct a particular social reality, an official record manufactured by an actor or a 
range of actors (Atkinson and Coffey, 2004).  This documentary reality is not a 
representation of some separate social world but actively constitutes or even 
‘performs’ that same world (Prior, 2003). 
Furthermore, documents can exert as great an influence on human actors as human 
actors can upon documents (Prior, 2003:3), potentially to the extent that the very 
existence of a document can generate human action (ibid, p. 20).  Prior (2003:14) 
refers to the “Frankenstein-like quality of documents”, that is their capacity to act 
independently of their human creator(s). 
Latour demonstrates how the actual use of a document can differ from the intention 
of the author(s) of that document. 
“The strength of the statement thus depends in part on what is written on the 
sign, and in part on what each listener does with the inscription.  A thousand 





These factors have implications for how social scientists should analyse documents 
in the course of qualitative research, looking beyond the content of the documents to 
consider how social actors use the document, how the text becomes active in a 
network, who uses the report to legitimate their viewpoint, editorial decisions about 
what to include or not include in the document and how a document becomes 
important in a network (Prior, 2003:66). 
Policy documents encapsulate government rhetoric and direction at a defined point in 
time, consistent with Freeman’s view that “government is a text-based medium” 
(2006:52).   
Organisational documents  
The minutes and papers of the committees provide insights into how each committee 
understands its collective identity and how it presents issues to other parts of the 
organisation.  Meeting documentation are important sources of evidence as they can 
shape relationships within a committee network (Spira, 1999:242).   
Administrative records are shaped by the political and organisational context in 
which they are produced and researchers should be sensitive to this.  In a health 
services setting, this may not be an overtly party political agenda but could involve 
resistance to policy imposed by government, bid for increased funding, protecting 
managers and others from personal attack, or trying to shift blame for publicly 
unpopular decisions.   
4.5.2 Case studies 
Case studies allow the researcher to examine, refine and substantiate meaning in a 
bid to “thoroughly understand” the subject of the case (Stake, 1995:9).  A case study 
provides a forum to “seek out and present multiple perspectives of activities and 
issues” (Stake, 1995:134) so is appropriate for a study which is informed by the ANT 
view that we should follow the traces left by networks of actors.  This ANT-inspired 
approach provides an opportunity to look inside the black box of an organisation to 
understand how actions are related: “inspecting various connections, and… 
examining their stability or fragility as the case may be” (Czarniawska, 2004:106). 
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Case studies are often criticised for providing insufficient basis to generalise 
findings.  Generalisability is usually considered in terms of statistically robust 
models, particularly in positivist research.  Other models have been suggested in the 
accounting literature including “contextual generalization rhetoric” and “constructive 
generalization rhetoric” (Lukka and Kasanen, 1995).  However, the necessity of 
generalisation as a research objective is open to question and is linked to the basis of 
selection of cases (Blaikie, 2000:222-4).   
The primary objective of a case study is to understand a specific case, not to generate 
or confirm hypotheses relating to the whole population (Stake, 1995; Blaikie, 
2000:222-4).   Each case exists in its own context and the researcher should bring out 
the characteristics, differentiating what is unique to that case from what is potentially 
universal, to provide the reader with sufficient understanding to evaluate the 
conclusions drawn on the case. 
The case studies presented in this thesis seek to provide a deep understanding of two 
particular contexts in which performance and audit interact: within the official 
response to a performance crisis and within an NHS board.  They do not seek to 
provide a basis for generalisation.   
4.5.3 Non-participant observation of committee meetings 
Non-participant observation of committee meetings provides an insight into the 
interactions between committee members.  It contributes to a wider understanding of 
how key actors consider audit and performance issues.  It has been used in health 
services research to gain access to interactions between different groups of 
stakeholders, including general practitioners (Fischbacher and Francis, 1998). 
Researchers often find access to committee meetings limited and therefore the 
majority of existing studies on the operation of key governance committees in both 
the private and public sectors rely on publicly available data or interviews with 
committee members.  The processes which underpin the work of committees, 
including the audit committee, are under-researched (Gendron et al., 2004:154; 
Turley and Zaman, 2007:767). 
Very few studies of governance committees are based on observation of committee 
meetings, with even case studies based entirely upon in-depth interviews with 
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committee members and executive or senior managers who attend committee 
meetings (for example, Gendron and Bédard, 2006; Turley and Zaman, 2007).  
Access to audit committee meetings is often restricted, particularly by private 
companies, and so creates a barrier to pursuing observation, an otherwise relevant 
and potentially first-choice research method (Gendron and Bédard, 2006).  For 
example, Spira (1999:235) was unable to secure access to observe audit committee 
meetings on grounds of confidentiality. 
Parker (2007) conducted two longitudinal case studies of the governance processes 
of the boards of two not-for-profit organisations on which he served as non-executive 
director.  He describes his study as “one of the very few observational studies of 
internal boardroom process and behaviour presently available in the management 
research literature internationally” (Parker, 2007:923).   
A key distinction between the present research study and the existing literature on the 
operation of governance committees lies in the object of study – the present study 
views such committees as forums which provide an insight into the inner workings of 
organisations, bringing together actors with specific expertise into an observable 
space, whereas other studies view these committees as the research object.   
Existing studies designed to explore the effectiveness of audit committees have 
found that some of the most significant influence which these committees can have 
upon an organisation are embedded in informal relationships and interactions (Turley 
and Zaman, 2007; Magrane and Malthus, 2010), but this does not undermine the 
research design of the present study.  While Magrane and Malthus’s study is 
designed to understand the operation of the audit committee within a New Zealand 
district health board, the present study is less concerned with the audit committee as 
an actor in itself than with the audit committee meeting as a network of actors (see 
also Spira, 1999) with an interest in audit and performance issues within the case 
study organisations.    
Having gained access to a committee meeting, the researcher has to be alive to the 
potential for the behaviour of committee members to be influenced by the presence 
of the researcher as well as the potential for the ‘true’ interactions which actually 
influence decision-making occurring behind the scenes through informal interactions 
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outwith the formal meeting (Lapsley, 2004).  The membership of committees 
selected for observation in the present study comprised senior management and non-
executive board members so such suspicions were unlikely to arise.  As these were 
formal, routine meetings at senior level at which it is not uncommon to have external 
observers or attendees present, for example to present papers on specific items, the 
risk that committee members’ behaviour would be influenced by the presence of the 





This Chapter has summarised the research design and methods which support the 
present study.  The next four Chapters present the results of four empirical studies of 
the role of audit in managing the performance of the NHS.   
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 Such observation bias is often referred to as the “Hawthorne Effect” in reference to the experiments 
carried out by Elton Mayo at the Hawthorne Works factory owned by Western Electronics (Chicago, 
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This chapter analyses a series of policy and guidance documents relevant to 
performance management of the NHS in England and Scotland during the period 
1997 to 2010.   
As outlined in Chapter 4: Research Design and Methods, this analysis is informed 
by Prior’s view of documents as active “fields, frames and networks of action” 
(2003:2).  The analytical approach is also influenced by Latour’s account of ANT 
(1991, 2005) which recognises non-human objects, such as documents, as actors in a 
network.  Thus a qualitative approach has been adopted in analysing the documents, 
drawing on Boje’s work on intertextuality in organizational research (2001).  This 
approach rejects the idea that a pre-defined conceptual grid can be imposed in 
advance of analysis and instead identifies key themes in the course of data collection 
and analysis. 
The analysis focuses on the broad policy context, evidence of managerialism and in 
particular developments in performance management, public audit and associated 
accountability mechanisms. 
Findings from the analysis are presented in four thematic periods:   
1. A ‘new’ NHS: modernity versus renewal (1997-2000); 
2. Time for action: widening divergences (2000-03); 
3. Taking stock (2003-06); and 
4. Consolidation and convergence (2007-10). 
Each section opens with a brief introduction to key policy developments in the NHS 
in Scotland and England during that period.  The following analysis then explores 
key points of divergence in the performance assessment approaches adopted in 




5.2 A ‘new’ NHS: modernity versus renewal (1997-2000) 
5.2.1 Policy context 
Tony Blair’s New Labour Government swept to power in 1997 on a manifesto which 
promised to “save and modernise the NHS” (Klein, 2006:187) following 18 years of 
Conservative Government in the United Kingdom.  There was a popular perception 
that the NHS suffered from years of under-investment under the preceding Thatcher 
and Major Governments (1979-97), resulting in lengthy waits for hospital treatment, 
an aging NHS estate and low staff morale.  The ‘internal market’ was introduced by 
the Thatcher Government in an attempt to improve efficiency in the use of NHS 
resources through market discipline, including competition (Department of Health, 
1989).   
The New NHS: Modern, Dependable (Department of Health, 1997) was the first 
health policy white paper issued by the New Labour Government.  Published in 
December 1997, it explained how the Government planned to deliver its manifesto 
commitments and introduced a ‘third way’ of governance into the NHS which 
rejected the internal market in favour of a performance-based governance 
framework.  The foreword to The New NHS was made by the Prime Minister, not the 
Secretary of State for Health, illustrating that healthcare reform was central to the 
government’s overall policy agenda. 
Just one day later
11
, the Scottish Office published Designed to Care. Renewing the 
National Health Service in Scotland (1997c), a sister white paper setting out planned 
reforms for the NHS in Scotland. 
It is important to note that Scottish politics and public services were in a period of 
transition when Designed to Care was published.  The Scottish electorate had voted 
in favour of the creation of a Scottish Parliament in September 1997.  A little over a 
week after publication of Designed to Care, the Scotland Bill would be introduced to 
Parliament to begin the process of translating the referendum vote into a new 
constitutional settlement.
12
  The proposed devolution settlement included full 
                                                          
11
 The New NHS was published by the Department of Health on 8 December 1997 while Designed to 
Care was published by the Scottish Office on 9 December 1997. 
12
 The Scotland Bill was introduced to the United Kingdom Parliament on 17 December 1997. 
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legislative and administrative responsibility for the National Health Service in 
Scotland (The Scottish Office, 1997a).   
So while it was not unusual for The Scottish Office to publish its own interpretation 
of UK health policy documents prior to 1997, any variation in approach was 
marginal (Woods, 2004).  As the first health white paper published by The Scottish 
Office after the devolution settlement had been approved by the people of Scotland, 
Designed to Care was the first real opportunity for the Scottish Office to present 
health policy which diverged substantively from that of the United Kingdom 
government.  The referendum result provided an initial mandate for a Scottish 
solution to the challenges of delivering healthcare, although the Secretary of State for 
Scotland remained bound by principles of collective decision making as a member of 
the United Kingdom Government. 
This is explicitly recognised in Designed to Care: 
“There have always been differences in the way the NHS is organised in the 
different parts of the UK to take account of different needs.  But sometimes 
changes have been made in Scotland to reflect changes in England rather than 
in response to specifically Scottish needs.  The NHS will continue to provide 
a common service throughout the United Kingdom, but the advent of the 
Scottish Parliament will mean a Scottish NHS more finely tuned and more 
rapidly responsive to Scottish needs.”  
(Scottish Office, 1997c:2, emphasis added) 
5.2.2 Presentation of the 1997 White Papers 
The titles of the White Papers signal the different policy directions favoured by the 
Department of Health and the Scottish Office.  The New NHS: Modern, Dependable 
sets the scene for a change in direction or a departure from what has gone before.  
Designed to Care. Renewing the National Health Service in Scotland puts patients at 
the forefront through the reference to ‘care’, while ‘renewal’ implies a more 
incremental approach to change through giving fresh life to an existing institution. 
There are significant differences in the presentation of the two 1997 White Papers.  
The New NHS is the visually more appealing document, adopting a uniform colour 
scheme, with colour photographs and text boxes punctuating the body of the text to 
highlight key concepts, developments or milestones.  ‘Key themes’ are presented in 
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bullet point format at the beginning of each chapter.  Each chapter has a sub-title 
composed in management jargon and superfluous to the chapter heading.  For 
example, the sub-title for Chapter 5 Primary Care Groups is ‘going with the grain’ 
and for Chapter 8 Measuring Progress is ‘better every year’.   
Designed to Care adopts a more traditional format, with a simple presentation of text 
and no graphics other than an organisational chart.  The white paper is structured in 
sections with functional titles and without the jargon or sub-titles which populate its 
Department of Health counterpart.  The cover of the Scottish White Paper contains 
photographs of four interactions between healthcare professionals and patients, 
supporting the vision of the White Paper that the NHS should offer patients “the 
treatment they need, where they want it, when they want it” (Scottish Office, 1997b).   
This presentational review of the two documents reinforces the divergence in policy 
direction: the presentation of The New NHS strives to encapsulate modernity, while 
the functional presentation of Designed to Care supports the emphasis on 
regeneration of a previously successful service.   
5.2.3 Content of the 1997 White Papers 
The White Papers are linked by a statement from the then Prime Minister Tony Blair, 
which serves as the Foreword to The New NHS and the Preface to Designed to Care.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly given that both White Papers were issued by the UK 
Government, the statement is virtually identical in the two documents save for:  
 inserting the actual monetary values for budget increases for the NHS in 
England and Scotland in the five months since the Government took office 
and savings which will be delivered by a reduction in transaction costs; 
 “more money for breast cancer and children’s services” promised by The New 
NHS becomes “more money is going into improving family doctor and 
hospital services” in Designed to Care and likewise “a nurse-led helpline to 
provide advice round the clock” becomes “a nurse-led help line to provide 
local information round the clock”
13
; and 
                                                          
13
 Emphasis added 
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 inserting “in Scotland” after some references to the NHS in Designed to 
Care. 
The replication of the Prime Ministerial statement creates the appearance of a unified 
policy stance.  This is challenged by a review of the Foreword to Designed to Care 
provided by Donald Dewar, then Secretary of State for Scotland. 
Dewar’s Foreword focuses on the practical implications of the policy proposals, in 
contrast to the rhetoric which characterises the Prime Minister’s Preface.  Where the 
Prime Minister introduces the concepts of modernisation and efficiency, the 
Secretary of State invokes the language of restoration, cooperation and effectiveness.  
Unlike Blair
14
, Dewar does not make personal promises but adopts the more 
traditional language of government and honours manifesto commitments. 
Modernisation would become a key theme of New Labour policy (Addicott, 2008), 
but the proposals set out in The New NHS do not seek to fundamentally alter the 
operation of the NHS.  Once the presentational gloss is stripped away, the White 
Paper adopts a practical and incremental approach to reform, emphasising that “what 
counts is what works” (Department of Health, 1997:11).  This is echoed by the 
Scottish Office in Designed to Care: “there will be no ‘big bang’: we want to build 
on what we have” (Scottish Office, 1997c:11).   
The key policy development is the proclaimed rejection of the Conservative 
Government’s internal market, which the new Government perceives to be unfair and 
fragmentary.  They offer an alternative, which is not a return to a command and 
control culture,
15
 but the adoption of a ‘third way’ “based on partnership and driven 
by performance” (Department of Health, 1997:10).   
This last phrase recurs throughout The New NHS.  It is not replicated in Designed to 
Care but partnership is a motif which runs through the Scottish document, often in a 
more basic and personal sense.  For example, there are repeated references to 
‘teamwork’.  The ‘third way’ label is not referenced in Designed to Care and so the 
                                                          
14
 For example, Blair’s foreword to the White Papers includes the line “in my contract with the people 
of Britain I promised that we would rebuild the NHS”. 
15
 There is no consensus that a ‘command and control’ system has ever existed within the NHS (see 
Klein, 2006:206)  
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divergences between the Department of Health and Scottish Office White Papers 
become more apparent. 
The White Papers are united by their rejection of the internal market, but the 
Department of Health and the Scottish Office offer different structural replacements.  
The NHS in England maintains a clear distinction between planning and purchasing 
healthcare on one hand, and providing it on the other (Department of Health, 
1997:12), although the price competition which characterised the internal market is 
replaced by a contractual model of governance, underpinned by performance 
measures.  Designed to Care, by contrast, heralds the return to geographic-based 
provision of health services in Scotland.  The number of Acute Trusts which existed 
in the single market will be reduced to strengthen clinical networks and reduce 
transaction costs, with an expectation that there should ultimately be a single Acute 
Trust in each of the 15 Health Board areas (Scottish Office, 1997c:21).   
Performance assessment 
Both White Papers propose the adoption of a six-dimensional performance 
assessment framework (see Table 5.1 below).  These dimensions combine to define 
performance more broadly than the internal market model of governance, which 
emphasised financial performance and activity measures over clinical effectiveness 
and outcomes.   
Table 5.1: Multi-dimensional performance frameworks proposed in ‘The New NHS’ 
and ‘Designed to Care’ 
England: The New NHS Scotland: Designed to Care 
1. Health improvement 1. Clinical effectiveness of services 
2. Fair access 2. Quality of services 
3. Effective delivery of appropriate 
healthcare 
3. Efficiency of services 
4. Efficiency 4. Access to services 
5. Patient / carer experience 5. Inequalities in health 
6. Health outcomes of NHS care 6. Appropriateness of services 
Sources: Department of Health (1997:64); Scottish Office (1997c:28) 
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Different dimensions of performance are selected for the respective frameworks in 
England and Scotland.  Both frameworks make reference to efficiency, access, 
effectiveness and appropriateness, but the same substantive dimensions are given 
different names.  A stronger clinical focus is evident in the Scottish framework, 
which makes explicit reference to ‘clinical effectiveness’ and ‘quality’, although both 
are implied in the English model.  The English model is more overtly managerial – 
one dimension of performance not replicated in Scotland is ‘patient / carer 
experience’ which introduces a customer perspective to healthcare in keeping with 
the NPM ideology (Hood, 1991; 1995).   
This comparison of the dimensions included within each framework strengthens the 
emerging idea that the English definition of NHS performance is more management-
focused than its Scottish counterpart, which prioritises clinical effectiveness and 
patient care.  It could also be argued that semantic differences are being introduced 
merely for their own sake, an example of the Scottish Office seeking to distinguish 
the Scottish NHS from the rest of the UK.  The English Performance Assessment 
Framework nevertheless identified its focus as improving outcomes for patients 
(NHS Executive, 1999:7).   
The NHS Executive (1998) subsequently launched a consultation on developing a 
national framework for NHS performance, which proposed a set of 37 high level 
performance indicators across the six dimensions of performance.  The final 
Performance Assessment Framework included 41 indicators, with the number of 
health improvement indicators doubled following the consultation period (NHS 
Executive, 1999).  Meanwhile, there was not yet a formal Performance Assessment 
Framework in NHSScotland and annual planning guidance for the NHS asked 
Boards to develop plans to deliver national strategic aims and clinical priorities, with 
no reference to performance indicators (Scottish Office Department of Health, 1998).   
Performance measurement in The New NHS is set in a managerial context, supported 




“There will be clear incentives available to help NHS Trusts succeed.  They 
will be backed by a tough approach to performance management to drive 
improvements in quality and efficiency.” 
(Department of Health, 1997:44, emphasis added) 
Performance measures underpin contractual relationships at every interface between 
tiers of the accountability hierarchy, from Trusts through Primary Care Groups and 
Health Authorities to the Regional Offices of the NHS Executive (Department of 
Health, 1997:67; NHS Executive, 1999:13-14).  Performance targets replace price 
competition between providers as the primary driver of resource allocation and 
source of discipline, but they are also intended to reduce unnecessary variations in 
performance across the country and improve overall standards of performance.   
The New NHS outlines actions which may be taken against Trusts which do not 
perform satisfactorily.  A scale of intervention is introduced, ranging from 
investigation by the NHS Executive Regional Offices to removal of the Trust Board 
by the Secretary of State for Health (Department of Health, 1997:49).  The 
consequences of under-performance are clear and provide evidence of a continuing 
thread of managerial accountability despite the rejection of the internal market. There 
is an emerging tension between setting a tough performance framework for Trusts 
and a desire to empower Trusts to take full responsibility for planning resources to 
best deliver patient care. 
In Designed to Care, performance measures are framed as a mechanism for 
discharging accountability to the general public and are not intended to support 
accountability between organisational layers of the NHS (Scottish Office, 1997c:13) 
and for driving improved efficiency and effectiveness of health services through 
benchmarking (Scottish Office, 1997c:28).   
Designed to Care does not give performance measures a strong managerial purpose; 
unlike The New NHS, there are no efforts to build sanctions or incentives into the 
performance framework.  The primary aim of data collection is to improve patient 
care, not to provide management information. 
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“[Accurate management] information should be a by-product of information 
collected for patient care purposes, and the NHS should be relieved of the 
need to supply variations on the same data to its many different users.” 
(Scottish Office, 1997c:5) 
This is a strong indication that clinical drivers will triumph over managerialism in the 
post-internal market Scottish NHS.  The primary role of management is to support 
the clinical process, not to determine or control it. 
This divergence in approach is consistent with Greer’s (2004) view that the Scottish 
NHS is characterised by a stronger and more concentrated clinical power base, which 
equips medical practitioners in Scotland with stronger defences against managerial 
reforms than those at the disposal of their English counterparts. 
Both Scottish and English Trusts are expected to publish performance data annually, 
but the means and purpose of publication differ. 
“NHS Trusts will be expected to publish annually details of their performance 
explicitly reflecting the six new dimensions of performance.” 
(Department of Health, 1997:53) 
“Trusts will also be required to publish a range of specified clinical 
performance indicators which will be aggregated on an annual basis as part of 
the Annual Report of NHS Scotland.” 
(Scottish Office, 1997c:13) 
There are two key distinctions between the two approaches.  First, the English Trusts 
must publish results across all six dimensions of performance whereas Scottish 
Trusts need only publish clinical performance indicators, implicitly giving clinical 
performance precedence over managerial performance.  Second, aggregate 
performance data will be published for the whole of the NHS in Scotland which 
emphasises the national unity of the Scottish NHS.  This is consistent with the 
argument that performance measurement is used as a driver of overall improvement 
rather than a basis for transacting or a means to distinguish between providers 
competing to deliver the same services. 
Independent verification 
The New NHS announces the creation of the Commission for Health Improvement – 
an arm’s length body to provide independent assurance over clinical quality of NHS 
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services (Department of Health, 1997:59).  No equivalent body is created in 
Scotland, where the Clinical Resource and Audit Group will continue to support the 
delivery of clinical audit within Trusts
16
 but is not given an expanded role in 
verifying Trust performance.   
The creation of the Commission for Health Improvement establishes the idea that 
independent assessment of a Trust’s presentation of quality is required to render that 
presentation credible and legitimate (Power, 1999; Free, Salterio and Shearer, 2009).  
By implication, Trusts cannot be trusted to install measurement and reporting 
systems without the threat of a third party to check up on them.  The public is invited 
to place its trust primarily in the new Commission, rather than in the Trusts which 
deliver patient care (Power, 1994a). 
One of the Commission’s main roles is to verify that Trusts’ clinical governance 
systems are operating effectively.  The Commission’s role is not to provide assurance 
over clinical quality but over the existence and operation of systems designed to 
deliver clinical quality.  This is a direct replication of the financial audit model, 
which gives precedence to the testing of internal control systems over substantive 
results (Power, 1999:82).  The Commission can therefore be regarded as a quasi-
audit body, despite having no financial remit.   
The systematisation of clinical practice is, inadvertently or otherwise, creating an 
environment, and conditions, in which clinical decision making can be opened up to 
external scrutiny (Power, 1999; Humphrey and Owen, 2000:35).  Managers can 
understand and relate to control systems without possessing clinical or medical 
expertise.   
The remit of the Commission for Health Improvement extends beyond provision of 
an assurance function.  The Commission is also required to support local clinical 
developments, “offer targeted support on request to local organisations facing 
specific clinical problems” (Department of Health, 1997:59) and even intervene
17
 in 
                                                          
16
 The equivalent role in England is to be undertaken by the newly created National Institute for 
Clinical Excellence (NICE). 
17
 The Commission can only intervene under the direction of the Secretary of State for Health or by 
invitation from Primary Care Groups, Health Authorities and NHS Trusts. 
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serious or persistent clinical issues (ibid.).  This echoes the trend for national audit 
bodies to extend their role from an independent assurance function to a provider of 
consultancy services, offering advice and sharing expertise with public bodies 
(Gendron et al., 2007; Skaerbaek, 2009).  The next chapter will analyse the changing 
role of Audit Scotland, the national audit body responsible for devolved Scottish 
public services.   
Clinical governance 
The creation of the Commission is part of a wider trend to promote ‘clinical 
governance’ (Scally and Donaldson, 1998; Goodman, 1998) whereby managerial 
disciplines, including internal control systems, are introduced to clinical practice to 
improve effectiveness through standardisation and systematisation.   
Clinical governance essentially remodels clinical accountability in the image of the 
traditional model of financial accountability.  This remodelling is more explicit in 
The New NHS which elaborates a more detailed framework of clinical governance 
than Designed to Care.  An executive lead will be appointed to report on clinical 
governance and table monthly and annual performance reports to the board of 
English Trusts.  Clinical governance arrangements must also be detailed in English 
Trust annual accounts, a document which traditionally conveys purely financial 
information and somewhat remote from clinical governance (Department of Health, 
1997:53).   
In Scotland, clinical governance builds on existing professional practices, including 
established evaluation mechanisms such as clinical audit. 
“The intention is to build on existing patterns of professional self-regulation 
and corporate governance principles, but offer a framework for extending this 
more systematically into the local clinical community…” 
(Scottish Office, 1997c:18) 
The distinctive Scottish approach is reinforced by the stated intention to impose a 
statutory duty on Trusts to deliver quality care, supplementing existing duties on 
Trusts which emanate from managerial and financial conceptions of accountability.   
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“Trust Chief Executives will carry ultimate accountability for the quality of 
care provided by their Trust, in the same way as they are already accountable 
for their Trust’s proper use of resources.” 
(Scottish Office, 1997c:17) 
Scottish NHS Chief Executives are expected to evidence compliance with the new 
statutory duty through implementing and maintaining clinical governance systems 
and controls. 
5.2.4 Summary and reflections 
The first period of analysis is characterised by incremental reforms to create a ‘new’ 
form of governance for the NHS to replace the internal market.  Performance 
measures are established as central to the new governance framework for the English 
NHS, replacing price as the currency underpinning the NHS system and supported by 
incentives and sanctions to motivate good performance.  Scotland seeks to 
distinguish itself from the UK Government proposals, particularly the more 
managerial aspects of proposed reforms.  Performance assessment is seen as a 
mechanism to promote improvement in patient care and to discharge accountability 
to the public, not as a management tool.   
An arm’s length body, the Commission for Health Improvement, is created in 
England to provide independent assurance of clinical quality.  This is a practical 
example of the audit society idea that independent assessment is required to bestow 
legitimacy and credibility on a system or organisation, in this case on the results of 
NHS Trusts (Power, 1999; Free, Salterio and Shearer, 2009).  The new body will 
also verify clinical governance systems; it is not charged with directly assuring 
quality but with assuring the systems and controls which Trusts put in place to 
safeguard quality (Power, 1994a; 1999).   
 
5.3 Time for action: widening divergences (2000-2003) 
5.3.1 Policy context 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer announced a significant increase in NHS resources 
in his Budget Statement on 21 March 2000: 
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“Since its creation, National Health Service spending has risen by an average 
3.3 per cent a year above inflation. Under the last Government, it rose by 2.9 
per cent. 
“We have decided that in the years from now until 2004 the NHS will grow 
by twice as much – by 6.1 per cent a year over and above inflation; by far the 




The Prime Minister subsequently commissioned Sir Derek Wanless, former chief 
executive of National Westminster Bank, to conduct an in-depth review of NHS 
resources.  The Chancellor of the Exchequer accepted the recommendation of the 
Wanless Report (Wanless, 2002) and announced annual real terms increases in the 
NHS budget of 7.4% for five years from 2002/03
19
.  The New Labour Government 
had demonstrated a commitment to provide the NHS with sufficient funding to 
provide high quality services, and the next Health White Papers would detail the 
improvements which the Government expected this investment to deliver.   
The NHS Plan – a plan for investment, a plan for reform (Department of Health, 
2000a) was published in July 2000 by Alan Milburn, the second Secretary of State 
for Health of the New Labour Government
20
.  The NHS Plan was reportedly 
personally drafted by the Secretary of State, in close discussion with the Prime 
Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Klein, 2006:215).  It is unusual for a 
Minister to be the primary author of a White Paper – civil servants would normally 
draft the White Paper before submission to Ministers for editing and approval.  The 
direct authorship of this White Paper places it at the heart of government policy.   
Delivering the NHS Plan: next steps on investment, next steps on reform (Department 
of Health, 2002) introduced two significant policy developments: greater use of the 
private and voluntary sectors to increase NHS capacity, particularly for elective 
surgical procedures; and the introduction of “patient choice”, with patients and their 
                                                          
18
 HC Deb 21 March 2000 at Columns 871-2.  Hansard accessed online at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmhansrd/vo000321/debtext/00321-
06.htm#00321-06_spmin1 (23 August 2013) 
19
 HC Deb 17 April 2002 at Column 589.  Hansard accessed online at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo020417/debtext/20417-
04.htm#20417-04_spmin1 (23 August 2013) 
20
 Alan Milburn succeeded Frank Dobson MP as Secretary of State for Health in October 1999. 
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GPs able to choose where the patient will receive treatment, including an option to be 
treated in a private hospital.  So while the “internal market” had been publicly 
rejected by New Labour, market-based reforms continued to be evident in NHS 
policy development.   
This develops and expands the reforms set out in The NHS Plan.  By this time, the 
New Labour Government had entered its second term of office following a general 
election in June 2001, although Alan Milburn remained as Secretary of State for 
Health.  
Meanwhile, Our National Health: A plan for action, a plan for change (Scottish 
Executive, 2000), the first Health White Paper of the newly-formed Scottish 
Executive, was published in December 2000.  Although the Labour party won the 
largest number of seats in the first election to the Scottish Parliament in May 1999, 
they fell short of an overall majority and so entered a coalition with the Liberal 
Democrat party in order to form an administration.
21
  The Scottish Executive was 
freed from the formal constraints of collective decision making which previously 
applied to the Secretary of State for Scotland as a UK Government Cabinet member.  
However, the same political party effectively controlled both the Westminster and 
Scottish Parliaments, setting an expectation that the policies of each administration 
would be broadly aligned within an overarching ideological framework. 
All three documents are blueprints for action, developing earlier proposals into more 
detailed implementation plans.  The Foreword to Our National Health from then 
First Minister of Scotland, Henry McLeish, emphasises that this is not another policy 
paper but a practical document:  
                                                          
21
 The Labour Party won 56 of the 129 seats in the Scottish Parliament elections in May 1999.  They 
entered a coalition with the Liberal Democrat party, which won 17 seats, to form the Scottish 
Executive for the four-year session of the first Parliament which had a working majority of 8 
members.  The remaining seats were won by the Scottish National Party (35), the Conservative party 
(18), the Green party (1) and the Scottish Socialist Party (1), with one independent MSP returned.  
Source: House of Commons Library Research Paper 99/50, 8 September 1999, “Scottish Parliament 
Elections: 6 May 1999”, available online at 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons/lib/research/rp99/rp99-050.pdf (accessed on 4 May 
2012).   
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“it aims to bring these policies to life… to make them happen… its emphasis 
is to translate policy into tangible, practical measures which will deliver 
results”  
(Scottish Executive, 2000:3).   
Similar points are made in the Introduction by then Minister for Health and 
Community Care, Susan Deacon:  
“The challenge is to translate policy into practice…  This Plan signals a shift 
from the development of policy to the delivery of change.”  
(Scottish Executive, 2000:5) 
5.3.2 Presentation of the 2000 White Papers 
As with the 1997 White Papers, a high-level comparison of the presentation of the 
2000 White Papers provides an insight into the different approaches to NHS reform 
adopted in Scotland and England. 
The full titles of the White Papers follow the same basic structure (The NHS Plan: a 
plan for investment, a plan for reform and Our National Health: a plan for action, a 
plan for change), giving the appearance of unity between two administrations led by 
the same political party.   
However, the adoption of different vocabulary provides evidence of a stronger 
managerial focus in England than in Scotland, which favours a communitarian 
approach.  The prosaic and impersonal NHS Plan presents itself as a no-nonsense 
management document, whereas the collective Our National Health promotes shared 
ownership of both the document and its proposals.  ‘Investment’ and ‘reform’ also 
have bolder connotations than their cousins ‘action’ and ‘change’. 
Partnership is one of the five key challenges which the Prime Minister sets for the 
NHS in return for the investment of significant additional resources over the life of 
the Parliament (Department of Health, 2000a:2).  However, ‘partnership’ pervades 
the Scottish document with the rhetoric embodied in a more tangible and 
communitarian tone than the English counterpart document.   
For example, the Introduction by the Minister for Health and Community Care 
emphasises that “it’s your NHS” (Scottish Executive, 2000:6, emphasis added), “we 
must work together to build a national effort to improve health” (Scottish Executive, 
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2000:6-7, emphasis added) and “at the heart of our approach is partnership.  
Everyone has a right, and a responsibility, to join together in a national effort for 
improvement and change” (Scottish Executive, 2000:7, emphasis added). 
While slickly presented, The NHS Plan is functional in appearance.  It does not 
contain any graphics and it adopts the format of a traditional business report.  The 
White Paper includes an executive summary, clearly demarcated sections and 
numbered paragraphs.  Our National Health, by contrast, is populated with 
photographs of everyday people in everyday situations.  Even the photographs of the 
First Minister and Minister for Health and Community Care accompanying the 
Foreword and Introduction are ‘action shots’ showing them interacting with children 
in an educational and healthcare setting respectively.  This provides a visual 
representation of the collective ethos heralded by the inclusion of ‘our’ in the title of 
the Scottish White Paper. 
The two White Papers make different use of illustrative examples: The NHS Plan 
favours short organisational case studies of 6-13 lines of text highlighting good 
practice, whereas Our National Health not only contains organisational examples but 
is littered with short quotes from patients and staff giving their views and 
experiences of the health service (see Table 5.2 below).  The Scottish Executive 
document gives precedence to ‘real-life’ cases.   
Table 5.2: Count of organisational examples and patient / staff quotes included in 
substantive chapters of ‘The NHS Plan’ and ‘Our National Health’ 
 The NHS Plan Our National Health 
Organisational examples 8 16 
Quotes from patients and staff 0 25 
Sources: Department of Health (2000a), Scottish Executive (2000) 
These presentational differences not only embody different policy styles, but also 
imply differences in the intended audiences of the documents.  The Scottish White 
Paper is more accessible to the general public,
22
 while the design of the English 
document is likely to appeal more to NHS professionals than patients.   
                                                          
22
 “[This Plan] is addressed directly to communities and patients” (Scottish Executive, 2000:9) 
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It is beyond the scope of the present research to consider who actually read or made 
use of these respective documents.  However, it is important to recognise the 
symbolism.  The English document is presented in a similar fashion to a corporate 
document and so indicative of a managerial policy approach.  The Scottish document 
has a less formal style, reflecting the key message that the public, professionals and 
politicians will work together to improve the NHS.   
5.3.3 Making the case for change 
Mandate and support for change 
The preface to The NHS Plan sets out core principles to underpin both the policy 
proposals within the White Paper and their implementation.  These 10 principles 
recognise the traditional values underlying the NHS as well as the need for 
modernisation to reflect social changes and medical advances. 
The final principle makes an indirect reference to performance management: “The 
NHS will respect the confidentiality of individual patients and provide open access to 
information about services, treatment and performance” (Department of Health, 
2000a:5, emphasis added).  This shows that the provision of performance 
information is a key strand of NHS policy in England.   
There are 25 signatories to the preface, including the heads of the Royal Colleges, 
trade union and other staff-side bodies, the Local Government Association and a 
number of large voluntary organisations which play a significant role in the NHS, 
including Macmillan Cancer Relief and Diabetes UK.   
The preface thus has a symbolic role in demonstrating support for the proposed 
reforms from a diverse range of influential stakeholders.  This provides a mandate 
for change and depicts the reforms as the product of consensus reached with the 
professions, as opposed to reforms imposed upon an unwilling NHS by the 
Government of the day (Klein, 2006; Greener, 2009).   
Wider support for the planned reforms is evidenced through references to a public 
consultation exercise carried out with NHS staff and patients (Department of Health, 
2000a:25-26).  The White Paper thus creates an impression of consensus and wide 
support for the proposed reforms.   
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While the Scottish document, Our National Health, does not contain a declaration 
signed by professional bodies, the First Minister’s foreword states that the White 
Paper “reflects a widespread consensus for improvement and change” (Scottish 
Executive, 2000:3).  The results of a MORI quantitative survey of the public’s views 
and experiences of the NHS are summarised in an Annex to the White Paper and the 
main body of the paper repeatedly refers to meetings which Ministers held with 
patients and staff to listen first hand to their views and experiences of the NHS 
(Scottish Executive, 2000:9).   
Perhaps there is less need to openly demonstrate agreement with professional bodies 
in Scotland, where the medical profession in particular has a long history of 
influence over health policy (Nottingham, 2000; Spry, 2002) so their approval is 
implicit.   
The very creation of the Scottish Parliament is cited by the First Minister as 
providing a mandate for the pursuit of a distinctly Scottish health policy: 
“We now have the chance to address Scotland’s needs with greater 
determination and focus than ever before, and to do so in a way that is truly 
open and accountable to the Scottish people.” 
(Scottish Executive, 2000:3) 
This sets an expectation of more significant policy divergence between the 2000 
White Papers than was evident between their 1997 counterparts, despite the same 
political party constituting, or effectively controlling, the executive branch of 
government in both Westminster and Holyrood. 
Funding change 
As with The New NHS (Department of Health, 1997), the 2000 Department of Health 
White Paper contains a foreword by the Prime Minister.  Blair again makes 
statements in the first person which demonstrate both a personal political 
commitment to the NHS reforms and the importance of health policy to the 
Government’s wider policy agenda.  More importantly, the Foreword sets the latest 
policy reforms in the context of the unprecedented increase in NHS funding 
announced by the Government in March 2000 and goes so far as to impose terms on 
the NHS for provision of this increased funding: 
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“In March... we offered the nation and those in the NHS a deal.  We would 
spend this money if, but only if, we also changed the chronic system failures 
of the NHS.  Money had to be accompanied by modernisation, investment, by 
reform.  For the first time in decades we had to stop debating resources, and 
start debating how we used them to best effect.” 
(Department of Health, 2000a:8-9, emphasis added) 
The New Labour Government effectively upped the ante for the NHS in England to 
implement change – the increased funding for the NHS legitimated demands for 
significant performance improvements and the introduction of more challenging 
reforms.  By couching the increase in funding as a key moment in the life of the 
NHS, the Government exerts additional pressure on staff and stakeholders to 
embrace the proposed changes.   
The presentation of a ‘deal’ to the NHS is symptomatic of a managerial approach to 
healthcare.  It seeks to evoke a contractual arrangement between the Government and 
the NHS which is in keeping with the principles of New Public Management (Hood, 
1991; 1995).   
That is not to suggest that the objectives of the reforms were managerial – there is a 
clear commitment to improving health care and health outcomes in The NHS Plan.  It 
is, however, of interest that the Government selected managerial tools and methods 
to achieve improvements in the delivery of healthcare.   
In contrast to the offer of a ‘deal’ from a remote government to the people, Our 
National Health recognises the increased investment made in the NHS by the new 
Scottish Executive
23
 and the need to “spend better and to ensure that investment is 
matched by reform” (Scottish Executive, 2000:6).  The Scottish Executive does not 
use contractual language to strike a bargain with the NHS.  The emphasis is on 
government, NHS staff and the public working together to improve the health 
service, rather than government providing additional cash subject to NHS staff 
delivering reforms and improved results.   
                                                          
23
 Under the established funding mechanism for devolved services, the Scottish administration budget 
received a population-based share of increases to the Department of Health budget.  The Scottish 
Parliament and Executive were not bound to apply this increase to the NHS and have full discretion 
over allocation of the overall grant funding accruing under the funding agreement.   
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This distinction is important in characterising the different approaches to 
performance measurement taken in England and Scotland which become clear later 
in the White Papers.   
The case for change 
Having made clear that the NHS must change, The NHS Plan builds the case as to 
why that change is required.  It identifies five ‘underlying problems’ which the NHS 
must address, including “a lack of national standards” and “over-centralisation” 
(Department of Health, 2000a:27-28).  The tension inherent in designing a 
performance and accountability framework which balances national control with 
local autonomy is again evident in The NHS Plan.   
These five underlying problems are transformed into nine “profound and historic 
weaknesses” in Delivering the NHS Plan, including “weak or perverse incentives 
that inhibit performance” and “weak local and national accountability” (Department 
of Health, 2002:11).   
The absence of national standards for care is cited as the primary reason why 
standards of care and access to services vary widely across the country.  The New 
Labour Government contends that this situation has arisen “because the 1948 
settlement left [the NHS] with inadequate means to drive up performance” 
(Department of Health, 2000a:27).   
It is important to note that the stated absence of formal national standards does not 
mean there were no standards of care or service prior to The NHS Plan: doctors, 
nurses and other healthcare professionals had, and continue to have, professional 
duties for delivering patient care.  What is highlighted as absent is a set of nationally-
mandated standards and a formal system to check that such standards were being 
upheld. 
Our National Health takes a different perspective on the same issue, citing the 
fragmentation of the health service caused by internal market as the main driver of 
the erosion of national standards and values. 
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“The NHS in Scotland has a proud record of achievement, both as a 
distinctive service serving Scotland’s needs, and as an integral part of the 
wider NHS across the UK.  But over many years, much of the cohesion and 
the traditional values of the NHS have been eroded... 
“The internal market fragmented the NHS.  It undermined the principle of a 
National Health Service.  It drained money away from direct patient care.  
The emphasis on activity and efficiency savings took the focus away from 
standards, quality and service improvement.” 
(Scottish Executive, 2000:22) 
The Scottish argument is that the reversal of internal market reforms will help to re-
establish national standards and achieve the stated aim to “rebuild the NHS as a truly 
National Health Service.  The NHS across Scotland should work together to deliver 
universally high standards of care and it must work in partnership with the NHS 
across the UK in the interests of patients.  The traditional public service ethos and 
values of the NHS must be put back at its core” (Scottish Executive, 2000:22-23, 
emphasis in original).  This contrasts sharply with the English view that national 
standards never existed, which allowed a ‘postcode lottery’ of healthcare to develop.   
One of the proposals put forward to improve the cohesiveness of the health service is 
to re-establish a national identity for the NHS in Scotland.  It is argued that this will 
strengthen staff loyalty and affiliation and ensure that the public can relate to a 
unified national service.  The new unified Health Boards are to be known simply as, 
for example, NHS Grampian, to promote the sense of a national health service with 
local presence (Scottish Executive, 2000:31). 
Meanwhile we are told of the English NHS that: 
“The relationship between central government and the NHS has veered 
between command-and-control and market fragmentation.  Neither model 
works…  A new model is needed where intervention is in inverse proportion 
to success. 
“Clinicians and managers want the freedom to run local services.  They want 
to be able to shape services around patients’ needs.  Inspection, incentives, 
information and intervention, operating under the umbrella of clear national 
standards, will help reshape services around the patient.” 
(Department of Health, 2000a:30) 
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There is implicit rejection of a national identity to unify the NHS in England, yet 
there is an inherent tension in seeking to prioritise both standardisation and 
decentralisation.  Within two years “these structural changes are beginning to shift 
power and resources from the centre to the frontline in the NHS” (Department of 
Health, 2002:19), but power and resources must be applied in the context of a 
demanding performance framework imposed by the Department of Health.   
Our National Health recognises that it is difficult to balance accountability for 
providing a national service with the space to deliver services at a local level.  It 
aspires to “set clear national standards and national priorities for the NHS, to be 
delivered within a local context” (Scottish Executive, 2000:23).   
The Scottish Executive plans to develop and uphold clinical standards of care 
through existing mechanisms such as clinical governance and peer reviewed quality 
assurance (Scottish Executive, 2000:23-25) and to introduce national standards for 
services, including hospital cleanliness, hospital food and infection control (Scottish 
Executive, 2000:26-28).  Compliance with national standards will be monitored by 
the Clinical Standards Board through a programme of annual reviews (Scottish 
Executive, 2000:8).   
The NHS Plan appears to present a political and managerial solution to weaknesses 
in the NHS.  The Government, in conjunction with the professional bodies and other 
stakeholders who signed the preface to the White Paper, is telling the public and the 
NHS what is going to, or at least what it expects to, happen in the coming years.   
Not only is reform inevitable but the nature of the reform is also pre-ordained by a 
central power base.   
In contrast, Our National Health details over 220 actions which the Scottish 
Executive will take forward to reform the NHS, but it also leaves space for further 
debate on the proposals and paves the way for stakeholders to influence policy 
through “full and effective involvement of the public” and a “well-informed, mature 
public debate” (Scottish Executive, 2000:9).   
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5.3.4 Performance assessment 
Overview 
The NHS Plan (Department of Health, 2000a:61-2) announces five changes to the 
Performance Assessment Framework (PAF): extension in scope to cover all NHS 
Trusts and Primary Care Trusts providing community health services, not just health 
authorities, and so introducing an element of direct accountability from healthcare 
providers to central government; improved quality and integrity of constituent 
performance measures; the Commission for Health Improvement becomes 
responsible for publishing results against the PAF via a ‘report card’ for each NHS 
organisation; strengthened performance data on primary care services; and 
introduction of new efficiency measures.   
A guidance document for NHS bodies on implementation of The NHS Plan was 
issued by the Permanent Secretary and Chief Executive of the NHS in December 
2000.  This document, NHS Plan Implementation Programme (Department of 
Health, 2000b), provides a national framework for implementation of the Plan and 
sets provisional milestones and outcomes for 2001-02. 
There is little discussion of practical performance management arrangements for 
NHSScotland in Our National Health.  The White Paper announces the introduction 
of a new performance framework and accountability review process (Scottish 
Executive, 2000:35).  Detailed arrangements are subsequently confirmed in 
Rebuilding our National Health Service (Scottish Executive Health Department, 
2001), a guidance document on the implementation of governance, accountability 
and planning reforms issued by the Chief Executive of NHS Scotland to NHS Chairs 
and Chief Executives.   
The main objectives of the new performance and accountability arrangements for 
NHS Scotland are (Scottish Executive Health Department, 2001:40): 
 “to encourage collaboration and joint working between health and other key 
partner organisations locally; 




 “to stimulate public interest in and understanding of the performance of 
NHSScotland; and 
 “to promote consistent standards of performance across Scotland.” 
These objectives emphasise that the Scottish approach to performance assessment 
prioritises consistency and public understanding, in contrast to the emerging English 
system which begins to emphasise managerial accountability and individual 
organisational performance.   
The new Scottish PAF encompasses seven strands of performance.  Three new 
dimensions of performance were introduced: patient experience, involving the public 
and communities and staff governance.  Patient experience, representing a 
‘customer’ perspective, had been included in the English framework since 1997.  The 
new definition of performance is broader than the initial framework (see Table 5.3 
below).   
There are to be two reporting mechanisms to support operation of the Scottish PAF 
(Scottish Executive Health Department, 2001:42).  NHS Boards are required to 
report to their local communities on performance, although they have local discretion 
over the nature of report.  Boards are also required to submit an annual performance 
statement to the Scottish Executive. 
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Table 5.3: Comparison of Dimensions of Performance in ‘Rebuilding our National 
Health Service’ and ‘Designed to Care’ 
Rebuilding our National Health Service  Designed to Care  
 Health improvement and 
reducing inequalities 
 Inequalities in health 
 Fair access to healthcare services  Access to services 
 Clinical governance, quality and 
effectiveness of healthcare 
 Clinical effectiveness of services 
 Quality of services 
 Appropriateness of services 
 The patient’s experience, 
including service quality 
N/A 
 Involving the public and 
communities 
N/A 
 Staff governance N/A 
 Organisational and financial 
performance and efficiency 
 Efficiency of services 
Sources: Scottish Office (1997c); Scottish Executive Health Department (2001) 
Managing performance 
Priority or national targets are introduced in the English NHS to provide focus for 
NHS providers which were overwhelmed by the number and diversity of measures in 
the PAF (Department of Health, 2000a:130).  These core targets are drawn from the 
Department of Health’s Public Service Agreement with HM Treasury (Department 
of Health, 2000a) and so set up a chain of accountability for NHS performance that 
now extends up to HM Treasury. 
The NHS Plan Implementation Programme states that “outcome focused targets” 
will be set for the NHS in England “aimed at delivering fast, convenient and people 
centred services that provide the highest standards of care and tackle the major 
causes of disease and inequalities” (Department of Health, 2000b:8).  However, 
114 
 
many of the performance targets and national commitments are input-focused 
(Department of Health, 2000b:25).  For example:  
 7,000 extra NHS beds by 2004, of which 2,100 will be general and acute 
beds; 
 50 new MRI scanners, 200 new CT cancer scanners, 80 new liquid cytology 
units and 45 new linear accelerators by 2004; and 
 7,500 more consultants, at least 2,000 more GPs, 20,000 extra nurses and 
6,500 extra therapists by 2004.   
By contrast, the new Scottish PAF included over 90 indicators and assessments 
across seven dimensions of performance to support delivery of 33 strategic 
objectives.
24
   
Rankings, sanctions and incentives 
The NHS Plan introduces the concept of publicly classifying NHS organisations 
based on performance against the PAF, with the rating verified by the Commission 
for Health Improvement (Department of Health, 2000a:63).  While the White Paper 
outlines a traffic light system of ‘red’ / ‘yellow’ / ‘green’ ratings, this would become 
the star ratings system in practice.  Receipt of a ‘red’ rating would be the trigger for 
intervention and sanctions, while ‘green’ rated organisations would benefit from 
reduced intervention and greater autonomy (Department of Health, 2000a:63-64). 
The first set of NHS Performance Ratings of English Trusts was published by the 
Department of Health in September 2001 (Department of Health, 2001), covering the 
performance of non-specialist acute Trusts in 2000-01.  This initial publication (ibid.) 
provided the star rating of each Trust as part of a matrix showing the Trust’s 
performance against 10 key targets and a further second set of 12 “balanced 
scorecard” measures across three dimensions of performance (clinical focus, staff 
focus and patient focus).  The number of indicators had reduced slightly from the 
previous PAF.  Later publications of star ratings (Healthcare Commission, 2005b) 
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 See, for example, Performance Assessment Framework for 2002/03 – Scottish Executive Health 
Department NHS HDL(2002)78, published online at 
http://www.sehd.scot.nhs.uk/mels/hdl2002_78.pdf (accessed on 23 August 2013).   
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provided only the star rating.  Thus, the reader’s ability to build a nuanced 
understanding of a Trust’s strengths and weaknesses becomes obscured by a 
composite measure of performance.   
The new scale of intervention (Department of Health, 2000a:65-66) builds on that 
announced in The New NHS (Department of Health, 1997), but goes further by 
indicating that the very existence of a Trust is under threat if it persistently under-
performs.  The management team of a low-performing Trust is at risk of replacement 
and the Trust could be subject to takeover by a ‘green’ rated Trust or even a non-
NHS organisation (Department of Health, 2003:7).   
Delivering the NHS Plan (Department of Health, 2002:19) recognises that incentives 
built into NHS performance assessment must reflect the motivations of professionals 
who want to use their skills to improve patient care.  However, the performance 
assessment framework is underpinned by primarily financial incentives.  The new 
framework is accompanied by changes to the way in which money flows between 
NHS organisations.  The main source of funding will shift from block contracts for 
services to ‘payment by results’, a standard tariff system which remunerates Trusts 
for patients treated (Department of Health, 2002:20-21).   
Delivering the NHS Plan also introduces the concept of ‘foundation trusts’; top-rated 
(three star) organisations which can apply for foundation status which provides 
organisations with enhanced financial freedoms (including borrowing powers to 
support capital investment), greater operational flexibility and reduced government 
intervention (Department of Health, 2002:29-30). 
The Government reforms presume that financial incentives are essential to 
complement professional motivation in order to deliver performance improvements, 
i.e. managerial models are required to deliver clinical improvements.   
Significantly, neither Our National Health (Scottish Executive, 2000) nor Rebuilding 
our National Health Service (Scottish Executive Health Department, 2001) provide 
explicit sanctions for under-achievement against the PAF.  The Scottish Executive 
explicitly rejects financial sanctions, on grounds that they would be to the likely 
detriment of patients and compound the impact which poor performance is likely to 
have had on patients and the public (Scottish Executive Health Department, 
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2001:48).  The focus of the Scottish PAF and associated accountability framework is 
on working together to improve performance, not on naming and shaming poor 
performers.   
There is limited discussion of potential incentives for strong performance.  NHS 
Boards with “strong” performance may be subject to less onerous requirements to 
obtain capital funding or may be selected as a pilot site for new initiatives, but do not 
attract financial rewards or enhanced autonomy of the scale provided by the English 
framework (Scottish Executive Health Department, 2001:47).   
Trust 
The tension between standardisation and decentralisation has implications for trust 
within the NHS.  Although the English White Paper proclaims that the proposed new 
delivery system is “based around the NHS as a ‘high trust’ organisation” 
(Department of Health, 2000a:56), there is significant evidence to the contrary in 
changes made to the performance management framework. 
The main evidence of trust is at a micro level – between NHS staff and patients 
(Department of Health, 2000a:57) – which is credited with providing motivation for 
health professionals to deliver high quality care. 
This trust is less evident in the macro level relationship between the Department of 
Health and NHS providers.  Despite boldly stating that: 
“because we trust people on the frontline, the centre will do only what it 
needs to do; then there will be maximum devolution of power to local doctors 
and other health professionals” (Department of Health, 2000a:57), 
the White Paper goes on to list checks and balances that it will put in place to control 
the exercise of this local power and a demanding system of performance assessment 
which will hold professionals to account.   
Modernising reforms tend to marginalise trust in public service delivery through the 
precedence given to measurable outputs and control systems and allow for trust only 
in the interactions between professionals and service users (Harrison and Smith, 
2004).   
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5.3.5 Independent verification 
Verifying performance reports 
The NHS Plan transfers responsibility for publication of performance measures from 
the Department of Health to the Commission for Health Improvement.  This is 
intended to “demonstrate to the public that the results are independent and genuine” 
(Department of Health, 2000a:62), the implication being that neither NHS 
organisations in England nor the Department of Health could be trusted to accurately 
report on performance without independent verification.  This rather undermines the 
description of the NHS as a ‘high trust’ organisation (Department of Health, 
2000a:56), and suggests that audit mechanisms serve to displace trust from 
professionals to auditors (Power, 1994a; 1999). 
Audit approaches increasingly feature in the national initiatives to manage the NHS 
in England.  The Implementation Programme also announces that all parts of the 
NHS will be subject to a “performance and modernisation audit” which will inform 
the development of service plans (Department of Health, 2000b:8).  NHS 
organisations are also “expected to audit themselves against the National Beds 
Inquiry templates… [to] help health authorities… assess their future requirements for 
beds” (Department of Health, 2000b:24). 
By contrast, the new Scottish Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) relies 
upon self-assessment by NHS Trusts with performance management overseen by 
unified NHS Boards (Scottish Executive Health Department, 2001:42).  There is no 
role in the Scottish performance framework for either auditors or quasi-audit bodies.   
Rebuilding our National Health Service also announces revised accountability 
reviews, to be held annually between Scottish Executive officials and unified NHS 
Boards (Scottish Executive Health Department, 2001:46-49). 
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“The purpose of the reviews will be to reach a shared view between the NHS 
Board and the Executive of the level of performance reached by each local 
NHS system, across a range of areas of activity, on the basis of measures and 
indicators recorded in the PAF, of published reviews by bodies such as 
CSBS
25
, and of progress against objectives and actions set out in published 
Local Health Plans and community plans.” 
(Scottish Executive Health Department, 2001:46, emphasis added) 
The main output from the accountability reviews is a public letter to the Chair of the 
NHS Board, setting out the main findings and agreed actions to be addressed by the 
Board (Scottish Executive Health Department, 2001:48). 
So PAF indicators are merely one element of wider performance to be considered in 
assessing the overall performance of the unified NHS Boards.  The idea of 
collaboration and partnership is emphasised by the main purpose: it is a joint 
assessment, not an independent assessment by an external party.   
Expanding the role of the Commission for Health Improvement 
The NHS Plan (Department of Health, 2000a) expanded the role of the Commission 
for Health Improvement (CHI).  In addition to assuming responsibility for the 
publication of performance results discussed above, CHI was to become the main 
quality assurance body for the NHS, supported by the Audit Commission.  Every 
NHS organisation would be subject to inspection at least once every four years 
(Department of Health, 2000a:62). 
CHI and the Audit Commission are also required to undertake national studies and 
inspections (Department of Health, 2000a:63) in addition to maintaining the existing 
role of trouble-shooter sent into under-performing organisations by the Government 
(ibid.). 
To support this expanded remit, the size of CHI “is set to double over the next few 
years” (Department of Health, 2000a:62). 
In Scotland, the Clinical Standards Board for Scotland (CSBS) remained responsible 
for quality assurance of clinical practices, including national standards of care.  
Although CSBS was required to report on individual NHS Trusts, it was also asked 
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to “provide a national perspective central to the development of a new national 
performance management process” (Scottish Executive, 2000:25).  This reinforces 
the finding above that the Scottish NHS prioritised the creation of a nationally strong 
system over the ranking of individual NHS organisations.   
In Delivering the NHS Plan, the Department of Health recognised that multiple 
bodies, including CHI, the Audit Commission and the National Care Standards 
Commission, were involved in inspecting and regulating NHS performance and that 
this could place a significant administrative burden on organisations being inspected 
and be confusing for the public (Department of Health, 2002:38).  To address this 
burden, the Department proposes the formation of a single independent body, the 
Commission for Healthcare Audit and Inspection (CHAI), to incorporate the existing 
functions of CHI, responsibility for value for money reviews conducted by the Audit 
Commission and regulation of private health care providers previously undertaken by 
the National Care Standards Commission (ibid.).  Ministers would no longer have the 
power to appoint members to the body, increasing its structural independence from 
government (Department of Health, 2002:39).   
Yet again, the public is being invited to look to an independent body for evidence of 
the performance of the NHS rather than those bodies actually delivering healthcare.   
“The Commission [for Healthcare Audit and Inspection] will have the key 
role in particular in explaining to the public how NHS resources have been 
deployed and the impact they have had in improving services, raising 
standards and improving the health of the nation...  
“...for the first time, citizens will have independently validated information 
about how their money has been spent on healthcare in their own area and 
what progress has been made.” 
(Department of Health, 2002:39-40, emphasis added) 
The role of bodies providing independent verification of NHS performance is 
strengthened in England, but continues to be rejected by a Scottish system which 
relies on self-assessment.   
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5.3.6 Summary and reflections 
This second period of analysis is characterised by growing and significant 
divergences in approach to performance assessment, including the need for 
independent verification.   
The most managerial and arguably brutal NHS performance assessment framework 
is introduced in England, accompanied by an increased role for the Commission for 
Health Improvement to add credibility to reported performance (Free, Salterio and 
Shearer, 2009).  Managerial incentives and sanctions are absent from the 
performance assessment framework in Scotland which is positioned as merely one 
part of an overall assessment of performance to be carried out jointly by each NHS 
body and the Scottish Executive.  It is arguable whether the Scottish PAF fulfilled 
any real “management” function, containing over 90 indicators in pursuit of over 30 
strategic objectives, with no prioritisation or focus.   
The Commission of Health Improvement is given a strengthened role in performance 
assessment to “demonstrate to the public that the results are independent and 
genuine” (Department of Health, 2000:62).  The implication is that neither NHS 
organisations nor the Department of Health can be trusted to accurately report on 
performance without independent verification.  This is a clear example of audit 
mechanisms serving to undermine trust in professionals and to displace trust from 
public service providers to their de facto auditors (Power, 1994a; 1999).   
 
5.4 Taking stock (2003-2006) 
5.4.1 Policy context 
The third period of analysis sees the Labour-led administrations in both the UK 
Parliament and Scottish Parliament re-elected in 2005 and 2003 respectively, to what 
would prove to be their last term in government.   
The Scottish Executive published Partnership for Care: Scotland’s Health White 
Paper (Scottish Executive, 2003), in February 2003, less than three months from the 
end of the first term of the Scottish Parliament and therefore the second election. 
121 
 
Partnership for Care also brings to a conclusion the structural changes to dismantle 
the internal market, which commenced with Designed to Care in 1997 and continued 
under Our National Health.  The White Paper announces the formal abolition of 
NHS Trusts to create single organisations responsible for local NHS systems in each 
of the 15 unified Board areas.  This is intended to enhance strategic planning and 
accountability but not to centralise decision making where this is best conducted at 
local level (Scottish Executive, 2003:58).   
Malcolm Chisholm, the second Minister for Health and Community Care in the 
Scottish Parliament, invited Professor David Kerr to chair an Advisory Group on 
Service Change in NHSScotland.  The Group was charged with developing a 
national framework for service change and setting the strategic direction for service 
redesign in line with the principles of Partnership for Care.   
In May 2005, Professor Kerr reported the Group’s findings to Andy Kerr MSP, who 
succeeded Malcolm Chisholm as Minister for Health and Community Care in the 
Scottish Executive in November 2004.  The findings contained in Building a Health 
Service Fit for the Future (Kerr, 2005) provided the basis for the next Health White 
Paper published by the Scottish Executive in October 2005.  Delivering for Health 
(Scottish Executive, 2005) was heralded as bringing “radical, transformational 
change”
26
 to the Scottish NHS and firmly shifting the focus of health services to 
preventative and continuous care.   
In his Foreword to Delivering for Health, Andy Kerr references the very first health 
White Paper of the devolved Scottish Executive:  
“This is a plan for the long-term.  A plan for a national service that promotes 
our national health.  A plan with patients at its core.  A plan for action, a 
plan for change.” 
(Scottish Executive, 2005:v, emphasis added)   
This sets the latest reforms as the next stage of an evolving long-term policy 
programme and once again places an emphasis on action or making the change.  A 
stronger desire to push the implementation phase of the policy cycle is evident in the 
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document, with performance assessment established as a key component of the 
delivery plan (Scottish Executive, 2005:vii).  This is supported by the identification 
of ‘key actions’ to demonstrate what the White Paper will achieve and how those 
achievements will be secured.   
Meanwhile, the final whole system Health White paper produced by the New Labour 
Government The NHS Improvement Plan: Putting People at the Heart of Public 
Services (Department of Health, 2004) was published in June 2004, during the 
second of its three terms in Government.  By this time, a third Secretary of State for 
Health was in post, following the resignation of Alan Milburn in June 2003. 
The NHS Improvement Plan recognised that significant improvements had been 
made to NHS performance since 1997, highlighting in particular the reduction in 
patient waiting times.  This sustained improvement is presented as an opportunity to 
turn attention to preventing ill health and reducing health inequalities.  Patient choice 
and personalised services continued to be key themes running through the White 
Paper.   
5.4.2 NHSScotland: the introduction of performance management 
A “new” partnership 
The 2003 White Paper was the first to explicitly refer to ‘partnership’ in its title and 
the Ministerial Foreword from Malcolm Chisholm MSP explains that this is a “new” 
partnership between patients, staff and Government (Scottish Executive, 2003:5).  
This “new” partnership heralds a more managerial approach to performance 
assessment in NHSScotland.   
There is a distinct change in the tone of Partnership for Care. 
“The drive to define national standards for healthcare is still a relatively new 
feature of the health service and is now being taken forward in a more 
integrated way by NHS Quality Improvement Scotland.  National standards 
are being set, performance is being independently inspected and the findings 
are being reported publicly for the first time.  This will be backed up by 
effective intervention by the Executive, where necessary, to ensure that 
standards are met.”   
(Scottish Executive, 2003:8, emphasis added) 
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This is the first indication that the Scottish approach to NHS performance is starting 
to embrace some of the managerial features implemented by the NHS in England.   
The change in tone is echoed in the presentation of this White Paper.  Gone are the 
friendly photographs and local anecdotes from Our National Health.  They are 
replaced by a more traditional report format, with numbered paragraphs, which 
highlights key points at the beginning of each section in bullet point form.  The 
presentation implies that the Executive is now more serious about driving 
improvement and the policy content has a more managerial flavour. 
The birth of performance management? 
Partnership for Care provides the first evidence that performance measures will be 
used as a management tool in NHSScotland, to direct local operations to achieve 
political priorities.  This is supported by the identification of a set of 12 priorities for 
NHS Boards in 2003-04, supported by a wider Performance Assessment Framework 
comprising 60 quantitative measures and a further 30 qualitative measures (Scottish 
Executive, 2003:28-29).   
The Executive further commits to two actions which provide further evidence that 
performance assessment is being used as a management tool: development of a new 
Performance Incentive Framework and a review of how to link senior managers’ pay 
to delivery of national priorities (Scottish Executive, 2003:29). 
The concluding chapter of the White Paper recognises that there is now a greater 
emphasis on performance management in NHSScotland (Scottish Executive, 
2003:62).  Yet again, there is an emphatic rejection of a centralised ‘command and 
control’ approach to governance of the NHS amid the rhetoric of supporting and 
empowering staff to improve performance and standards of care (ibid.). 
If Partnership for Care started NHSScotland on a trajectory towards performance 
management, Delivering for Health completes the journey by introducing measures 
more akin to those seen in the Department of Health reforms of the previous period. 
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“A new Delivery Group will draw together and strengthen the performance 
management function by agreeing annual Local Delivery Plans with each 
NHS Board, providing systematic monitoring of performance, and playing a 
more assertive role in supporting or intervening.” 
(Scottish Executive, 2005:vii, emphasis added) 
The Delivery Group will have responsibility for: 
 “ensuring a renewed and explicit focus on key objectives, targets and 
measures across the health portfolio 
 “strengthening performance management arrangements between each 
NHS Board and the Scottish Executive 
 “working with more timely and reliable management data, enabling 
accurate tracking of NHS Boards’ performance against all the agreed 
local delivery plan targets 
 “making specific interventions to support and improve performance 
where the need arises” (Scottish Executive, 2005:53).   
Local delivery plans are introduced as the primary mechanism to underpin the 
relationship of accountability between NHS Boards and the Minister and as such are 
intended to “maintain a ‘line of sight’ from strategy through to delivery on the 
ground…  NHS Boards will use local delivery plans to demonstrate how they will 
deliver key targets for all their patients within the resources available.  By including 
clear performance milestones, these plans will help to set and track the pace of 
change and ensure the delivery of objectives is affordable and sustainable” (ibid.).  
The Local Delivery Plans are thus not unlike public service agreements between HM 
Treasury and UK Government Departments to underpin spending plans.
27
  They 
were also already part of the NHS performance framework in England (Department 
of Health, 2003:6) and so it appears that the Scottish Executive had begun to import 
management tools which had supported performance improvements in England.   
The Scottish Performance Assessment Framework previously relied on professional 
values to deliver improvement, and shied away from introducing a strong system of 
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incentives for good performance.  Partnership for Care recognises that further 
incentives are required to support good and improving performance (Scottish 
Executive, 2003:28).  While the incentives are not specified in the White Paper, it 
signals that the Scottish NHS is moving closer to the position of the NHS in England 
that professional motivations alone will not deliver improvements desired by 
politicians. 
The Scottish Executive’s stance on intervening in local NHS performance and 
operations undergoes a significant shift between 2001 and 2003.  While in 2001 the 
Scottish Executive undertook to work with poorly performing NHS boards to agree 
how improvements could be delivered (Scottish Executive Health Department, 
2001:47), by 2003 the Executive is prepared to “intervene where necessary to correct 
significant service failures” (Scottish Executive, 2003:24).  The Scottish Executive 
signals a clear intent to take immediate action where performance falls short of 
expectations, including strengthening its legislative powers.  The shift in tone and 
purpose is self-evident.  A more managerial approach is being introduced to 
performance management of the NHS in Scotland. 
But the Scottish Executive has not entirely abandoned its commitment to work with 
NHS organisations to support improvement.   
“We are not interested, however, in a culture of blame but in a culture of 
improvement.” 
(Scottish Executive, 2003:63) 
And so while the overall approach to performance assessment can now be 
characterised as central management of performance, rather than intelligence 
gathering or supporting improvement, the Scottish Executive stops short of 
replicating the English ‘star ratings’ system.  There will be neither public ranking of 
NHS organisations, nor financial sanctions for poor performance.   
The Scottish PAF continued in operation until 2006, when it was replaced by the 
HEAT system.  HEAT measures performance across four dimensions: Health 
improvement; Efficiency and governance; Access to services; and Treatment 
appropriate to individuals.  HEAT contains fewer targets than the PAF and so it 
directs NHS Boards to prioritise delivery of key government policies.   
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This change in approach in Scotland comes as the Department of Health takes a step 
back from driving performance improvements in the NHS in England.   
5.4.3 NHS in England: a softening approach to performance management 
The NHS Improvement Plan (Department of Health, 2004) places a reduced 
emphasis on strong performance management to drive improvement.  Professional 
standards and the NHS ethos are recognised as powerful drivers of improvement 
(Department of Health, 2004:73), where previously the sole emphasis was on the 
performance management regime.   
Up to now, performance frameworks were centred on ‘access’ to treatment or the 
number of patients waiting for NHS treatment and how long they have to wait for 
that treatment.  Both of these factors are easily measured and therefore easily 
audited.  There is limited, if any, discussion in successive White Papers as to whether 
clinical outcomes are improved by reducing waiting times, which necessitated not 
insignificant investment in expanding capacity in those specialties where long waits 
were previously the norm. 
All investment in the NHS has an opportunity cost and so by focusing on improving 
what was easily measurable, and by extension auditable, the Government must have 
foregone investment in other services or treatments provided by the NHS.  This is not 
to deny the political attractiveness, aside from the managerialist considerations, of 
being able to demonstrate improvement in areas which the majority of voters can 
easily relate to. 
The NHS Improvement Plan also signals that the Department of Health will step back 
from active management of the NHS:  
“now that improvements are being delivered, we are moving on to a second 
phase in order to further engage front-line staff and patients in building on 
these successful reforms”  
(Department of Health, 2004:74).   
While still not admitting to commanding and controlling the NHS in England via the 
performance management regime, the White Paper states that “the Department of 
Health will not, in future, micro-manage local-level commissioning or delivery 
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decisions” (Department of Health, 2004:76).  This paves the way for a less 
aggressive performance assessment framework.   
Yet again in The NHS Improvement Plan we are told that “financial incentives and 
performance management will drive delivery of the new commitments” by the 
English NHS (Department of Health, 2004:11).  But the Government commits to 
setting “far fewer national targets” (ibid.) which are implicitly becoming less critical 
now that overall performance has improved.  These incentives are built around 
‘payment by results’, introduced by Delivering The NHS Plan (Department of 
Health, 2002) under which a fixed tariff for patient activity creates market discipline 
and is considered to drive efficiency in the provision of healthcare.  It is claimed to 
provide incentives to reduce costs and maximise activity to maximise the ‘financial 
gains’ under the tariff.   
The annual health check 
The rhetoric of a shift in the focus of NHS performance management which is 
evident in The NHS Improvement Plan translates into the introduction of the “annual 
health check” (Healthcare Commission, 2005a): a new holistic performance 
assessment regime which replaces the star ratings system and clinical governance 
reviews.  It is promoted as the “most comprehensive assessment ever made of the 
NHS in England” (Healthcare Commission, 2006).  The annual health check is 
owned by the Healthcare Commission, the latest incarnation of the Commission for 
Health Improvement.   
The new approach to performance assessment marks a shift towards greater self-
assessment of performance by English NHS bodies (Healthcare Commission, 2005a), 
but more significantly seeks to develop a broader picture of organisational 
performance than its predecessor.   
The language of performance assessment changes – the annual health check assesses 
performance by reference to ‘standards’ rather than ‘targets’ (Healthcare 
Commission, 2005a:3).  This suggests a departure from a principally quantitative 
approach to defining performance, and a greater likelihood that qualitative 
performance will be given equal weighting.   
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The health check also incorporates financial performance as a separate dimension of 
overall performance, linked to core standards.  The score for financial performance 
will be derived from the findings of the external audit of NHS Trusts by the Audit 
Commission and the financial risk assessment of Foundation Trusts conducted 
annually by Monitor
28
 (Healthcare Commission, 2005a).  The role of the Audit 
Commission in relation to the annual health check is considered further below at 
Section 5.4.5.   
The stated aim of the annual health check is to “promote improvements” (Healthcare 
Commission, 2005a:3).  There is a renewed emphasis on improving patient care as 
opposed to meeting political targets: 
“[The annual health check] will help people to make better informed 
decisions about their care, lead to healthcare professionals developing and 
sharing better information on good practice, provide organisations with 
clearer expectations, enable managers to focus on areas of concern and learn 
from good practice, and tell the Government more about the quality and 
equity of services provided.”   
(Healthcare Commission, 2005a:3-4) 
There is recognition of the burden which performance assessments have upon auditee 
organisations and an intention to reduce that burden through more risk-based 
interventions (Healthcare Commission, 2005a:4) and working more closely with 
other regulatory bodies, including sharing information (Healthcare Commission, 
2005a:19). 
The health check, like its predecessor, is still intended to distil organisational 
performance into a single score on a four-point scale.  However, this is now 
supplemented by scores for individual components of the assessment framework and 
more detailed information on how that score has been arrived at (Healthcare 
Commission, 2005a:11;45).  In the event, the first annual health check gives two 
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 for each NHS organisation: quality of services and use of 
resources (Healthcare Commission, 2006).   
The new performance assessment approach appears to look beyond controls to 
consider patient outcomes (contrast Power, 1999:84).   
“When the standards require outcomes for patients, we will not consider the 
existence of processes as sufficient evidence that the standards are being 
met.”  
(Healthcare Commission, 2005a:26) 
There is also an indication that the annual health check has been designed to provide 
patients with information to support decisions where they wish to receive treatment.   
“You will also be able to look at the results in relation to six questions
30
 that 
we developed during discussions with patients and the public.” 
(Healthcare Commission, 2006:7) 
The annual health check represents a less managerial approach to performance 
assessment than the preceding star ratings system: it builds a more comprehensive 
definition of performance, it considers compliance with standards for delivering 
healthcare, and places greater emphasis on clinical quality than on systems and 
controls.   
5.4.5 Independent verification 
Scotland 
During this period, independent verification becomes important in NHSScotland for 
the first time in securing the legitimacy of reports of organisational performance 
(Power, 1999; Free, Salterio and Shearer, 2009).   
NHS Quality Improvement Scotland was established on 1 January 2003 as an 
authority on clinical practice and an independent inspectorate of NHS performance.  
It superseded previous bodies, including the Clinical Resource and Audit Group 
(CRAG) and the Clinical Standards Board for Scotland (CSBS). 
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 Each rating is based on a four-point scale: excellent; good; fair; weak.   
30
 The questions are: How long will I wait?  How safe and clean is it?  How good is the care I will 
receive?  Will I be treated with dignity and respect?  Does the organisation help me stay healthy?  
How well is the organisation managed? 
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“[NHS Quality Improvement Scotland] has the skills, access, resources and 
power necessary to identify areas of weakness and ensure that NHSScotland 
is improving quality where that is necessary.  It also has a tough new remit to 
investigate serious service failures and make clear recommendations for 
remedial actions.” 
(Scottish Executive, 2003:24) 
Audit is also explicitly recognised as an institution which supports public confidence 
in the NHS and Partnership for Care is the first of the Scottish Executive health 
White Papers to make direct reference to the work of Audit Scotland.   
“There is a close working relationship between Audit Scotland and NHS 
Quality Improvement Scotland to achieve rigorous standards of inspection 
and monitoring.  This will help to ensure patient confidence in the quality and 
safety of healthcare provision...  
“Audit Scotland has an important role in relation to the efficiency and 
effectiveness of NHS organisations, independently of NHSScotland and 
government.” 
(Scottish Executive, 2003:24) 
At the same time, Audit Scotland’s role in relation to NHS performance was 
evolving towards the production of an overview report on operational as well as 
financial performance (Audit Scotland, 2004a).  This will be considered further in 
the following chapter.   
As well as the increasing role given to formal audit and quasi-audit institutions, the 
Scottish Executive promotes increasing use of audit-inspired technologies at 
organisational level (Scottish Executive, 2005).  These technologies require 
performance improvements to be measurable and are applied to support 
implementation of new policies or improvement activity in clinical as well as 
managerial domains.  A few examples are listed below.   
 Introduction of a Community Health Partnership self assessment toolkit to 
benchmark provision of services to patients with long term conditions, based 
on “clearly measurable criteria” (Scottish Executive, 2005:21) 
 “To inform our future decision making [on provision of specialist services], 
we need to do more audit, data collection and evaluation to collect 
information we can use to compare and contrast outcomes according to 
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individual clinicians’ and hospitals’ workload, improving the quality of our 
own health care and contributing to the international debate on 
specialisation.” (Scottish Executive, 2005:41) 
 Intention to carry out a two-year audit of paediatric high dependency units to 
support decisions on future provision of such units (Scottish Executive, 
2005:47) 
 “the creation of a common minimum data set and a planned audit 
programme” for neurosurgery and neuroscience (Scottish Executive, 
2005:48) 
It is unclear from the White Paper as to whether these assurance exercises can be 
considered “audits” in a technical sense, but the increased volume of references to 
their use is significant and suggests that audit plays a legitimating role in the more 
managerial approach to the performance of the Scottish NHS (Power, 1999; Free, 
Salterio and Shearer, 2009).   
The increased recognition of the assurance provided by formal audit institutions and 
organisation-level audit initiatives coincides with a strengthening of the approach to 
performance management in NHSScotland.  Thus, elements of Power’s audit society, 
which were previously absent from the performance assessment regime in Scotland, 
begin to emerge.   
England 
The previous section highlighted the role of the Healthcare Commission in 
developing and implementing the “annual health check” as a replacement 
performance assessment framework for the star rating system.   
The remit of the Healthcare Commission was also expanded to include responsibility 
for independent sector providers of healthcare, who would be subject to the same 
inspection arrangements as NHS bodies (Department of Health, 2004:10).  Audit and 
inspection regimes are now arguably being used to support the reintroduction of 
market mechanisms to the NHS, now more closely resembling an ‘external’ market 
in which NHS organisations compete with independent, or private, sector providers. 
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There is also evidence of increasing awareness on the part of central government of 
the volume of audit and inspection activity within the NHS in England.   
“The Department of Health’s arm’s length bodies are currently under 
review… to ensure that the regulatory burden on local NHS delivery 
organisations does not exceed that essential to promote quality and effective 
delivery of care.” 
(Department of Health, 2004:76) 
This supports the emerging picture that the NHS in England is taking action to 
reduce the reliance on audit technologies and alleviate their impact on delivery of 
frontline services.   
As discussed at Section 5.4.4 above, the Audit Commission was given a formal role 
in the new “annual health check” through responsibility for the evaluation of the use 
of resources by NHS Trusts.   
The Audit Commission introduced the Auditor’s Local Evaluation (ALE) to produce 
the use of resources assessment.  ALE consists of scored judgements in five areas 
(financial reporting, financial management, financial standing, internal control and 
value for money), which are aggregated to calculate an overall use of resources 
score. 
“Auditors made judgements on a total of 13 key lines of enquiry (KLOEs) 
across these five areas.  The KLOEs take the form of a series of high-level 
questions underpinned by more detailed audit criteria and evidence required 
to enable auditors to reach their judgements on the performance of NHS 
bodies during 2005/06.”  
(Audit Commission, 2006:4, emphasis added) 
The use of a single measure gives the impression of an objective measurement 
system but the quote above shows that this single measure is the product of 
subjective audit judgement albeit based upon generally accepted professional 
standards (Power, 1999).  The national audit body is actively defining financial 
performance of the NHS in England (Power, 1996; Lindeberg, 2007).   
Despite the increased prominence of audit in supporting performance management in 
NHSScotland, the Scottish Executive has not asked Audit Scotland to formally 
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evaluate the financial performance of NHS Boards.  The next chapter explores the 
role of Audit Scotland in relation to performance management in Scotland.   
5.4.6 Summary and reflections 
After the significant differences evident in approach to performance measurement in 
Scotland and England identified from review of the 1997 and 2000 White Papers, we 
see the first signs of convergence and the creep of the audit society into the Scottish 
framework. 
 
5.5 Consolidation and convergence (2007-2010) 
5.5.1 Policy context 
This final period of analysis saw a change in administration in Scotland.  The 
Scottish National Party (SNP) won the largest number of seats in the May 2007 
election but did not win an outright majority of seats.  Choosing to govern as a 
minority administration, rather than entering coalition as the Labour party had done 
in the two previous parliaments, the SNP would face new challenges in winning 
parliamentary support for its legislative and policy programme, including the annual 
Scottish Budget.   
This period also sees different political parties in power in the United Kingdom and 
Scottish Parliaments, although both the SNP and the Labour Party are traditionally 
left-of-centre.  At first sight, this might create an expectation that they would adopt 
similar policy orientations, but the primary cause of the SNP is securing Scotland’s 
independence from the United Kingdom and so more marked differences in political 
direction are likely during the period. 
One of the first acts of the SNP administration was to re-brand the Scottish Executive 
as the Scottish Government.  This did not have any substantive or legal effect but the 
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 The Scotland Act 2012 formally renamed “The Scottish Executive” as “The Scottish Government”, 
enabling the use of the term “Scottish Government” in legal documents.   
134 
 
Shortly after taking office, the SNP administration set an overarching purpose and 
five strategic objectives to structure and provide focus to its governance of Scotland.  
The strategic objectives were underpinned by 15 National Outcomes and 45 National 
Indicators to measure progress towards achievement of the Outcomes and ultimately 
the overall purpose.
32
  The SNP Government thus showed an early predisposition for 
using performance measures to support assessment of progress in delivering 
outcomes.   
Health was a key issue for the main political parties during the 2007 election 
campaign.  The SNP’s election manifesto promised to reverse decisions taken by the 
Labour-led coalition to close two Accident and Emergency units in Central Scotland 
(Scottish National Party, 2007).    
Shortly after taking office, Nicola Sturgeon MSP, Deputy First Minister and Cabinet 
Secretary for Health and Wellbeing, launched a national consultation on priorities for 
NHSScotland under the banner Better Health, Better Care (Scottish Executive, 
2007).  This consultation, or ‘discussion’, was positioned as a follow up to the earlier 
review led by Professor David Kerr (Kerr, 2005) which became the basis for the final 
health White Paper of the Labour / Liberal Democrat administration, Delivering for 
Health (Scottish Executive, 2005).  It was also intended to support the new 
administration’s strategic vision for the NHS and the expansion of the ministerial 
portfolio to include wider social drivers of health, including sport, housing, 
regeneration, social inclusion and poverty (Scottish Executive, 2007:3).   
The Better Health, Better Care White Paper was published in December 2007 
(Scottish Government, 2007), within five months of the launch of the discussion 
document and associated consultation period.  The key theme of the document was 
the establishment of a mutual NHS with patients, staff and the public co-producers of 
health services, each with their own responsibilities to improve health and deliver 
care. 
Meanwhile, the New Labour administration was already part-way through its third, 
and last, period in Government.  In June 2007, Gordon Brown succeeded Tony Blair 
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 http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/purposestratobjs (accessed on 2 June 2011) 
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as leader of the Labour Party and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.  This was 
effectively a planned succession, with no serious challenge to Brown’s bid for 
leadership when Blair announced his intention to step down after 10 years as Prime 
Minister.   
As highlighted in the previous section, The NHS Improvement Plan (Department of 
Health, 2004) was the final whole system health White Paper produced by the New 
Labour Government.   
In July 2007, the Prime Minister and Alan Johnson, then Secretary of State for 
Health, invited Professor Sir Ara Darzi, a practising surgeon and recently appointed 
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Health in the House of Lords, to conduct 
a “once-in-a-generation” review of the NHS ahead of the sixtieth anniversary of its 
creation in 2008.  The review was intended to ensure that the NHS was “properly 
resourced... clinically led, patient-centred and locally accountable”
33
.   
Lord Darzi subsequently led the NHS Next Stage Final Review, the report from 
which High Quality Care For All (Department of Health, 2008) was published in 
June 2008.   
5.5.2 The SNP approach to the Scottish NHS 
The Cabinet Secretary for Health and Wellbeing made the new Scottish 
Government’s ideological position on the NHS very clear when she launched Better 
Health, Better Care in December 2007:  
“We have set out a plan for a National Health Service based on the values of 
collaboration and cooperation, not the whims of the market.  We affirm a 
unified structure in which decisions are made in the interests of the people we 
serve and not by the demands of internal competition.  A public service, used 
by the public, paid for by the public, and owned by the public. 
“Better Health, Better Care sets out a vision for a National Health Service 
that is not only true to its founding principles but that has the confidence to 
extend those principles through a commitment to involving the public, 
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 Statement made by Alan Johnson, Secretary of State for Health, in the UK Parliament on 4 July 
2007.  Quotes taken from Hansard transcript of the statement at Columns 961-3, published online at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070704/debtext/70704-
0004.htm#07070441000007 (accessed on 22 August 2013).   
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patients and staff in shaping its future direction.  It delivers a national health 
service for the Scottish nation – a truly Scottish Health Service.”
 34
 
This statement summarises some important themes in SNP health policy: outright 
rejection of market-based delivery of health services, which sets an expectation that 
other strains of managerialism are unlikely to be embraced; that the NHS should be 
primarily and directly accountable to the public; and that there will be a distinctly 
Scottish NHS, based on Scottish values and principles. 
The White Paper is described as an ‘Action Plan’, emphasising implementation over 
ideology or rhetoric.  The extensive discussion or consultation exercise is seen as key 
to securing a mandate for the proposed changes among the public, NHS staff and 
even NHS organisations.   
Performance management 
The continued importance of performance targets to the NHS is made explicit in 
Better Health, Better Care: targets will be used “to provide a sense of purpose, drive 
continuous improvement and focus the decisions [NHS organisations] make” 
(Scottish Government, 2007:9).   
The HEAT system is to be retained with some modifications, which will ensure that 
it is aligned with the Scottish Government’s strategic objectives and that short term 
operational targets are more clearly aligned to long term strategic direction.  The 
content of measures would reflect a greater political focus on health improvement 
and anticipatory care rather than access to acute treatment (ibid.).  Patient experience 
indicators would be included in HEAT for the first time, reinforcing the shift to a 
mutual NHS with patients at the heart of decision making and service delivery 
(ibid.).   
The White Paper recognises the need to maintain and enforce a strong performance 
assessment framework to deliver the Scottish Government’s commitment to an 
accountable and patient focused NHS (ibid.).  The new administration intended to 
use existing accountability mechanisms and organisations to support management 
and delivery of HEAT targets (Scottish Government, 2007:11).   
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 Scottish Government News Release “Patients at heart of new health strategy”, 12 December 2007 
available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2007/12/12143009  
137 
 
The White Paper introduces new mechanisms to make the NHS more accountable to 
patients and the public, including a new patient experience programme to involve 
patients in service redesign; a Patients’ Rights Bill to enshrine legal rights and 
responsibilities of the NHS and patients; independent scrutiny panels to provide 
assurance over local proposals for major service change; direct election of non-
executive board members to NHS Boards; and an annual “ownership report” to be 
distributed to all Scottish households summarising rights and responsibilities of 
patients and carers and setting out key information about accessing local health 
services (Scottish Government, 2007:6-7).  The accountability relationship was being 
redefined to reflect the ethos of a mutual NHS.   
Although Better Health, Better Care rejects the use of the market to deliver 
healthcare, efficiency is still considered a key component of performance.  However, 
efficiency is re-positioned as a driver of high quality health care rather than a 
measure of financial health.  The reforms include new efficiency targets which 
encompass the use of all organisational resources, including sickness absence, patient 
attendance and online triage of GP referrals as well as traditional cash efficiency 
targets (Scottish Government, 2007:60).   
There is little detail in the White Paper on how performance against HEAT will be 
‘enforced’ and no direct references are made to the Delivery Group, trumpeted by the 
previous administration in Delivering for Health (Scottish Executive, 2005) as the 
primary mechanism for securing performance improvement in NHSScotland. 
Better Health, Better Care reverts to the language of “improvement” (Scottish 
Government, 2007:71), last seen in Our National Health (Scottish Executive, 2000) 
and Rebuilding Our National Health Service (Scottish Executive Health Department, 
2001).  There are no explicit ‘sanctions’ for poor performance – just offers of 
assistance to improve performance. 
The focus of the HEAT system was sharpened under the SNP administration; the 
number of targets gradually reduced and remaining targets were framed in terms of 
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factors which were controllable by NHS Boards.
35
  Individual Boards were still 
required to publish a review of performance against HEAT targets in their annual 
accounts.  Latest HEAT performance data was also now published on the Scottish 
Government website
36
, so it was widely available to the public.   
5.5.3 Managing the performance of the NHS in England 
Next Stage Review Report 
In contrast to earlier policy documents, the Final Report of the Next Stage Review 
(Department of Health, 2008) led by Lord Darzi is presented as owned by the NHS.  
Although Milburn’s NHS Plan (Department of Health, 2000a) contained a foreword 
signed by various professional organisations and other bodies who work in close 
partnership with the NHS (including local government and third sector), the 
introduction to the Next Stage Review is signed by the Clinical Leads of each of the 
10 Strategic Health Authorities; practising clinicians working at the heart of clinical 
service delivery.   
The introduction challenges the popular rhetoric of previous White Papers and 
acknowledges a lack of involvement of frontline staff in the development of previous 
reforms (Department of Health, 2008:1).   
Photographs showing the provision of health services in a range of settings feature 
prominently in the report.  Each chapter is introduced by a full page photograph and 
caption explaining the nature of the service being provided and where in the country 
that service is being provided.  There are echoes here of the Scottish White Paper 
Our National Health Service (2000), which was peppered with photographs of 
healthcare delivery.  The visual images reinforce that these policy developments are 
intended to be clinically-centred. 
The Introduction also announces a shift in the balance of power between the 
Department of Health and the NHS delivery bodies (Department of Health, 2008:1), 
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 See HEAT Targets Due for Delivery 2006/07 to 2011/12 published by NHSScotland Performance 
and Business Management for a full list of targets over the period – published online at 




e (accessed on 23 August 2013) 
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reflecting the loosening of the Department’s grip on controlling and managing NHS 
performance as evidenced by the abolition of star ratings. 
There is a shift in the tone of the political prefaces to the Next Stage Review.  Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown (Department of Health, 2008:2) highlights the achievements 
of the past 10 years in improving basic standards of care and increasing the capacity 
of the NHS to address the “chronic underinvestment” which the NHS had suffered 
under the previous Government.  The new vision is one of a renewed NHS delivering 
“truly world class” health standards, which “requires Government to be… committed 
to trusting frontline staff”, thus sending a message that top-down control and micro-
management of the NHS is no longer appropriate.   
The over-riding message is that the last 10 years of reforms, from The New NHS 
(1997) through The NHS Plan (2000) to The NHS Improvement Plan (2004), have 
restored core services following apparent years of neglect of the NHS.  The NHS was 
in such bad shape when the Labour Government came into office that drastic and 
immediate action was required to ensure it was equipped to meet the demand for 
health services, hence the need for the discipline of star ratings.  Now these basic 
standards of service have been secured, the emphasis can shift to improving the 
quality of those services. 
But how successful were the years of tough performance management in bringing 
genuine substantive improvements?  Lord Darzi has gathered views from frontline 
staff that “the programme of reform that has been put in place has been unevenly 
applied and can go much further” (Department of Health, 2008:8).  So governance by 
performance management, at least on the basis of this evidence, perhaps did not yield 
universal improvements in health services.  Lord Darzi goes on to refer to 
independent research findings that the NHS has improved the quality of patient care 
in recent years (Department of Health, 2008:11) but acknowledges that these 
improvements were “focused primarily on waiting times, as basic acceptable 
standards of access to A&E and secondary care were established, and on staffing 
levels and physical infrastructure” (ibid.).  There is now a need to focus on standards 
of care across the board.   
140 
 
In contrast to earlier English reforms, measurement is to be used as a tool to support 
clinicians and not as an indicator of organisational performance: (Department of 
Health, 2008:49).  Measurement is intended to support improvement, through 
identifying opportunities and monitoring the success of changes, not to define 
improvement.  This resonates with the early approaches to performance information 
taken by the Scottish Office (1997c) and the Scottish Executive (2000; 2001).   
The development of measures is to become a collegiate process involving patients, 
the public and staff (Department of Health, 2008:50).  While the Department retains 
the ultimate decision over the set of measures used, this approach differs from earlier 
approaches which imposed performance measures upon the NHS.  There is no stated 
role for auditors or arm’s length bodies in the setting of metrics – this is a process 
squarely within the clinical domain.   
Significantly, Lord Darzi emphasises that “no new national targets are set in this 
report” (Department of Health, 2008:14, emphasis in original).  The focus of 
accountability has switched: accountability is no longer discharged by demonstrating 
achievement of targets imposed from above, but is defined by the achievement of 
patient outcomes (Department of Health, 2008:64).  While there are no national 
quality targets, NHS bodies continue to publish reports on quality which become the 
key instrument of accountability to the public and a basis for peer-to-peer challenge 
(ibid.).   
The Care Quality Commission, the latest incarnation of the body which started life as 
the Commission for Health Improvement, is given a role in verifying quality 
information published by healthcare providers and reporting on performance 
(Department of Health, 2008:51).  Thus, there is a continuing role for independent 
verification of NHS performance (Power, 1994a; 1999).   
End of an Era: Burnham’s Speech to the NHS Confederation (June 2009) 
Andy Burnham made headlines
37
 with a speech to the NHS Confederation
38
 
announcing a purge of NHS performance targets just days after his appointment as 
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 See for example reports in the Guardian (“Burnham promises cull of NHS targets” 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2009/jun/11/nhs-targets-burnham-pledges-cull) and The Times 
(“Health Secretary Andy Burnham promises NHS targets massacre” 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/health/article6479588.ece).   
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Secretary of State for Health following a Cabinet re-shuffle in June 2009.  In reality 
these statement were a natural progression from Lord Darzi’s statement that former 
performance targets would become minimum standards and there would be no more 
centrally imposed national targets (Department of Health, 2008:63).   
Burnham identifies three stages of the New Labour healthcare reforms: 
“Centralised targets and top-down controls were right to galvanise a failing 
system, but the middle phase of the Government’s reform journey became 
about pushing power and control downwards…  Now, with Ara Darzi’s 
Review, we’ve got a chance to open up a new era in NHS reform – moving us 
away from the focus on numbers and systems towards people and 
experiences.” 
This third stage re-characterises accountability so that patients, not central 
government or even their elected representatives, “become the pre-eminent force 
holding the NHS to account”.  A strong national health service can only be achieved 
by “moving beyond the era of targets, beyond the era of systems and processes, and 
towards a new era where every NHS institution is held to account by the quality of 
the patient’s experience and the rights set out in the Constitution”.  Burnham thus 
promises a “deep clean” of the targets regime, mainstreaming important targets as 
minimum, evidence-based service standards and removing others that are surplus to 
the achievement of core outcomes.   
Burnham attempts to reconcile the removal of targets with the introduction of 
Quality Accounts: “while we can remove targets, we can’t remove information”.  
Thus the production of performance information is central to effectively managing 
the NHS, but that information will be used in a less aggressive way.   
The NHS Performance Framework 
The Department of Health brought performance assessment of the NHS in England 
back in-house from arm’s length bodies for the first time since 2001 when it 
launched “The NHS Performance Framework” in 2009 (Department of Health, 
2009).  The Framework was “co-produced” with the NHS and regulators and spans 
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clinical and managerial performance with reported buy-in from both groups 
(Department of Health, 2009:5-6). 
The principle of subsidiarity is re-introduced into performance management.  The 
NHS Performance Framework is to be managed as part of the contractual 
relationship between commissioner and provider, with performance issues escalated 
to strategic health authorities and ultimately the Department only if they are serious 
and persistent (Department of Health, 2009:6).    
The NHS Performance Framework is positioned as an internal management tool to 
set “clear thresholds for intervention in underperforming organisations and a rules-
based process for escalation”.  The implementation guidance contains a long list of 
what it is not intended to do (Department of Health, 2009:10).  For example, the 
Framework does not exhaustively measure all aspects of organisational performance, 
or produce independent information to support public accountability, or reward good 
performance (ibid.).   
Independent verification 
The Care Quality Commission (CQC) was established as the independent regulator 
for health, mental health and adult social care in England on 1 April 2009.  It 
assumed responsibility for work previously carried out by the Healthcare 
Commission.   
The role of the CQC differs significantly from predecessor quasi-audit bodies such as 
the Commission for Health Improvement.  All health and social care providers 
operating in England, from the public and independent sectors, are required to 
register with CQC.  The registration process requires applicants to demonstrate that 
they meet fundamental quality and safety standards.  Organisations no longer receive 
a score for achievement of core standards, as they did under the annual health check.   
The Final Report of the NHS Next Stage Review (Department of Health, 2008:51) not 
only introduces the concept of ‘Quality Accounts’ to be prepared by healthcare 
providers in parallel to statutory financial accounts, but gives the Care Quality 




Despite the continuing appeals to professional clinical motivation and introducing 
clinically-led reforms, the policy of requiring independent verification of published 
performance continues to cast a shadow over claims that the Department trusts 
healthcare professionals to deliver high quality care.  The public is yet again invited 
to look to an independent quasi-auditor for evidence that published performance data 
is reliable. 
5.5.4 Reflections and summary 
As the English system began to reject an extreme managerial approach in favour of a 
more comprehensive assessment of performance, the Scottish approach became more 
outcomes-focused and managerial, although never reaching the extreme embodied by 
star ratings. 
There is still no formal role for independent verification in the Scottish performance 
assessment framework, while the body which started life as the Commission for 
Health Improvement comes to fulfil a more traditional regulatory role as the Care 
Quality Commission, charged with registering NHS bodies to deliver health services 
subject to satisfaction of prescribed standards. 
 
5.6 Reflections and concluding remarks 
5.6.1 Key findings and reflections 
This chapter summarises the evolution of performance assessment in NHSScotland, 
relative to developments in the NHS in England.  It presents the “official” account of 
performance assessment, while later chapters will explore the operational 
manifestations of these policy reforms.   
Performance assessment was selected as a replacement for the price-based 
competition which sat at the heart of NHS governance for the duration of the internal 
market.  For the majority of the period of study, one political party effectively 
controlled both the Scottish and UK Parliaments and so one might expect broadly 
similar policy solutions to be adopted in both the Scottish and English NHS.  
However, this study shows that despite an early shared used of language, the two 
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administrations applied very different interpretations of performance assessment in 
redesigning the governance and accountability of the NHS. 
The English NHS continued to be dominated by managerialist policies and 
approaches to performance assessment while the NHS in Scotland entered a period 
of re-aggregation and communitarian policy-making which resulted in a “softer” 
approach to performance assessment.   
The period of this study marks the beginning of a new constitutional settlement in the 
UK, with the creation of the Scottish Parliament providing a mandate for identifying 
policy response which better suited Scottish circumstances.  From 1997 onwards, it 
is evident that Scotland is a less enthusiastic adopter of managerial language and 
tools than England.   
It would be overly simplistic to link the differing level of enthusiasm for managerial 
reforms to underlying political or cultural values, particularly when both Parliaments 
were ruled by the same political party.  The answer is more nuanced and the present 
author has sympathies for findings elsewhere that the strength of the medical 
profession in Scotland, underpinned by a relatively large number of medical schools 
and a smaller population which facilitates tighter policy networks which have more 
direct access to government (Hazell and Jervis, 1998; Nottingham, 2000; Spry, 2002; 
Greer, 2004; Greer, 2005; Kerr and Feeley, 2007).   
Furthermore, the smaller population allowed the NHS in Scotland to revert to a 
geographic governance structure when it abandoned the internal market.  By the end 
of the period of study, there were 14 territorial NHS boards in Scotland, responsible 
for delivering healthcare to the local population, which were supported by eight 
national organisations.  It is thus feasible for Ministers and senior government 
officials to build up personal relationships with each organisation and for these 
interactions to play an equally significant role as formal management technologies in 
supporting governance and accountability.   
Replicating the same structure in England, serving similar sized populations, would 
have seen almost ten-fold increase in the number of organisations and rendering it 
near impossible to build up the same richness of personal relationships and informal 
organisational understanding.  In such an environment, more formal mechanisms are 
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required to support the effective discharge of accountability and performance 
management provided such mechanisms during the period of this study.   
Nevertheless, the differences in approach to performance assessment were most 
pronounced in the early years of the first term of the Scottish Parliament, which 
echoes with findings elsewhere in the literature that Scotland sought to exaggerate 
differences in policy approach almost to justify devolution itself (Woods, 2004; 
Blackman et al., 2006).   
This chapter has drawn out oscillations in the official embodiment of performance 
assessment across the period of study.  The most managerial and severe features of 
the star ratings system in England, which represented the peak of aggressive 
performance assessment, are diluted by successor assessment systems.  
Organisational performance is no longer distilled into a single score and strict 
sanctions are no longer imposed solely on the basis of the score generated by the 
performance assessment system.  Meanwhile, Scotland’s initial exploration of 
performance assessment becomes more structured over time until it ultimately 
resembles a traditional management system which directs the operations of NHS 
bodies towards the delivery of national policy priorities. 
5.6.2 Implications for the Audit Society 
One of the most striking differences between the performance assessment regimes 
adopted in Scotland and England is the recourse to independent assurance in order to 
verify the reported performance of NHS organisations.  This is a constant theme in 
the English approach to performance assessment: an independent assurance body, the 
Commission for Health Improvement, is created for England in 1997 and survived in 
various forms beyond the period of study.  The English policy narrative thus 
reinforces one of the most significant elements of Power’s audit society: that 
independent assurance is necessary to render accounts of performance credible 
(Power, 1999:82).   
This form of independence assurance places greater emphasis on the operation of 
clinical systems and controls than it does on patient care or patient outcomes.  Again, 
this resonates with Power’s finding that the audit society tends to promote controls 
over substantive performance (Power, 1994a; 1999).   
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These assurance bodies are increasingly called upon to define performance and are 
eventually given the task of designing the performance assessment system, as well as 
reviewing reported performance against those systems.  Even the Audit Commission, 
a statutory audit body, is called upon to create a definition of financial performance 
in NHS England as part of the annual health check.  Assurance and audit bodies 
define performance define performance, as well as review it, which empowers them 
to exert significant influence over the operation of the NHS (Power, 1996; 1999).   
By contrast, the official policy narrative in Scotland does not create a space for 
independent verification of performance.  The following chapter will explore how 
the national audit body nevertheless created its own space in the Scottish 
performance assessment framework.  However, it is significant for present purposes 
that the official narrative of NHSScotland did not prioritise independent verification 
of performance, although micro-level audit technologies became increasingly evident 
from 2005 onwards.  This is symptomatic of the “softer” incarnation of performance 
assessment in Scotland which exhibited few characteristics of the audit society, 
particularly in its earliest manifestation.   
Later chapters will consider how the lack of evidence of the audit society in the 
official policy framework contrasts with operational reality.   
5.6.3 Further issues to be explored 
This chapter has, by necessity, presented a summarised account of key developments 
in performance assessment in the NHS in Scotland and England between 1997 and 
2010.  It is beyond the scope of the present study to consider in depth the 
implications of the different operating structures which emerged in the two systems 
and these would benefit from further study in order to more thoroughly understand 
the interactions between accountability, performance assessment, governance and 
organisational structure in the NHS.   
 
The following chapters will present three in-depth case studies which explore 
different dimensions of performance management in action in NHSScotland.  The 
next chapter studies the evolution of the role of Audit Scotland, the national audit 






The evolution of Audit Scotland’s role 











This chapter presents the findings from a thematic analysis of annual overview 
reports of NHSScotland produced by Audit Scotland, from the first report produced 
in 1999-2000 to the 2009-10 overview report.  The period of study coincides with the 
time period for the analysis of policy documents, spanning the three terms of the 
New Labour Government in the United Kingdom Parliament from May 1997 to May 
2010.   
The previous study of policy documents found that Audit Scotland was not given a 
formal role in successive performance measurement schemes adopted by 
NHSScotland, in contrast to the role given to the Audit Commission in relation to the 
NHS in England (Bowerman et al., 2003).  Audit Scotland therefore has to make its 
own voice heard in the NHS performance network, and the annual overview reports 
are the primary instrument through which Audit Scotland expresses that voice.  The 
reports summarise the work which Audit Scotland has performed in the health sector 
during the year.  On a more symbolic level, they provide a snapshot view of the role 
of Audit Scotland in the financial and performance management networks of 
NHSScotland.   
This chapter adopts the same analytical approach as the previous chapter, which 
explored the evolving role of audit in performance management through an 
examination of government policy and guidance documents.  The approach is 
inspired by the work of Prior (2003) and Latour (1991, 2005); both authors recognise 
the active role that documents can play in a network and encourage the researcher to 
look beyond the content of documents to also consider what is referenced in a 
document and the wider context in which the document is situated.  Further 
discussion of the analytical approach adopted can be found in Chapter 3: Research 




6.2.1 Selection of NHS overview reports 
Audit Scotland first produced an annual overview report of the NHS in Scotland
39
 in 
2000 (Audit Scotland, 2000), covering the 1999/2000 financial year.  These reports 
are significant for research purposes as they represent a major contribution from 
Audit Scotland to NHSScotland financial and performance management network.   
Furthermore, the overview reports are the most public statements made about the 
external audits of NHSScotland bodies.  The annual audit reports of individual NHS 
bodies are available on the Audit Scotland website once their annual accounts have 
been laid before Parliament
40
.  However, they receive comparatively little public 
attention and in all likelihood are read by few people outwith the audited 
organisation.   
By contrast, the publication of each overview report is accompanied by a press 
release, prompting national media coverage.  The launch of the overview report is the 
main platform from which Audit Scotland can send a message to the Scottish 
Government, the Scottish Parliament, the NHS and to the public, about financial, 
governance and performance issues affecting the health service in that year. 
These reports provide a snapshot view of the role of Audit Scotland as a national 
audit body in managing the performance of NHSScotland.  By analysing these 
reports over the decade following the creation of the Scottish Parliament, it is 
possible to study the evolution of the identity of the national audit body within 
financial and performance networks in NHSScotland. 
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6.2.2 Evolution of the overview report 
The early reports (Audit Scotland, 2000; Audit Scotland, 2001; Audit Scotland, 
2003a; relating to financial years 1999/2000 to 2001/02, inclusive) constitute a 
consolidation of the individual annual audit reports produced by the external auditors 
of NHS bodies and the national value for money audit reports
41
 produced by Audit 
Scotland.  The scope of the overview is expanded in 2000/01 to include the audit of 
the summarised annual accounts of the NHS and those of the Scottish Executive 
Health Department (Audit Scotland, 2001).  The reports focus on financial statement 
production and audit issues, with frequent references made to the findings of local 
auditors.   
Two overview reports are produced for the 2003/04 financial year: the conventional 
financial overview report (Audit Scotland, 2004b) is preceded by an overview report 
on broader NHS performance issues (Audit Scotland, 2004a).  As well as being a 
first for Audit Scotland, this latter report is presented as the first consolidated 
performance report produced for the devolved NHS in Scotland. 
“This… is the first report of its kind.  It draws together different sources of 
published information which have never been brought together before.”  
(Audit Scotland, 2004a:1). 
Audit Scotland publishes an integrated report on financial and operational 
performance of the NHS for the 2004/05 financial year (Audit Scotland, 2005).  In 
2005/06, the Auditor General returns to producing a report focusing on financial 
performance (Audit Scotland, 2006), thus commencing a two-year cyclical pattern of 
alternate overview reports on the overall performance of the NHS and more detailed 
analysis of the financial performance. 
A key feature which distinguishes public sector audit from its private sector 
counterpart is the ability to report collectively and authoritatively on a sector and to 
have access to detailed audit findings across a whole sector.  This arguably 
strengthens the influence of a national audit body vis-a-vis the external auditors of 
private companies.  The national audit body has unparalleled access to audit findings 
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 Audit Scotland now refers to “performance audits”, rather than “value for money audits”.   
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which can provide an evidence base for the overview report; no single private sector 
firm would have access to the detailed audit findings of non-client companies.  This 
unimpeded level of access to audit findings is a key enabler of the national audit 
body’s evolution to trusted expert.   
 
6.3 Report content 
6.3.1 Source data 
The primary source of data underpinning early overview reports is “information 
contained in reports prepared by appointed auditors at the conclusion of their audits 
of individual Trusts and Health Boards” (Audit Scotland, 2000:11).  The evidence 
base is firmly rooted in the external audit process for health bodies, providing a clear 
link back to the traditional statutory financial statements audit process.  However, the 
Auditor General “supplemented this with other relevant, contextual information” 
(ibid).  This includes national value for money studies carried out by the national 
audit body.   
There are repeated references to the findings of the “appointed auditors” which 
remind the reader that the annual audit reports constitute the primary data source for 
the overview report.  This reinforces the role of the Auditor General as the narrator 
of a summary report, drawing on individual, autonomous audit reports.  It also makes 
clear that the overview report is anchored by the professional opinions of auditors 
working in the field.   
While the annual audit reports produced by the appointed auditors of NHS boards 
continue to be the primary information source for the overview reports, they 
increasingly draw on published statistical information (Audit Scotland, 2007:3; Audit 
Scotland, 2009b:3) and specific “interviews with staff from the SGHD” (Audit 
Scotland, 2009b:3).   
The overview report becomes more than a consolidation of the findings of statutory 
audits.  It evolves into an independent and additional study, with an identity which is 
greater than the sum of its constituent audits.   
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The 2009/10 overview quotes external research or reports on NHS performance, by 
independent research institutes including the Nuffield Trust and the Centre for Public 
Policy for Regions, in order to support its arguments that information on activity, 
cost and quality requires improvement (Audit Scotland, 2010c:17).  This is a shift 
away from the traditional reporting function of an auditor and associates the 
overview report with academic or other research work.  The use of external 
references can also legitimate the views of the author organisation.   
6.3.2 Narrative 
Style of narration: from first to third person 
The overview reports transition from first person narration, including a personal 
introduction from the Auditor General for Scotland, through the use of personal 
pronouns to universal use of third person narration.   
The overview reports are a channel through which to broadcast the voice of the 
Auditor General for Scotland, both as an individual and, more importantly, as a 
statutory office-holder.  Early overview reports are written in the first person and 
appear to convey the personal views of an independent expert.   
“I have prepared this overview of the main issues arising from the 1999/2000 
NHS audits.  My report also summarises the results of value for money 
studies undertaken during the year.  The overview has been prepared under 
section 23 of the 2000 Act
42
, under which I may initiate examinations into the 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which prescribed public bodies 
have used their resources.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2000:1, emphasis added) 
It is unlikely that the Auditor General personally wrote the reports but the actual 
scribe is less important than the appearance that the reports express his own views.   
While there is no personalised introduction to the 2002/03 overview from the 
Auditor General, personal pronouns are used in the body of the report.  For example, 
“my overview reports in 2000/01 and 2001/02…” (Audit Scotland, 2003b:19), “I 
have previously reported to Parliament…” (Audit Scotland, 2003b:25), “I will be 
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 Public Finance and Accountability (Scotland) Act 2000, asp 1 
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expecting the auditors…” (Audit Scotland, 2003b:27).  This marks the beginning of a 
transition in the narrative style of the overview reports which shifts to the third 
person in the overview report for 2002/03.   
The 2003/04 overview reports (Audit Scotland, 2004a; 2004b) mark the formal 
transition in narrative style from first to third person narration – the voice of the 
Auditor General has been replaced by that of the omniscient narrator.  From then on, 
the overview reports are almost universally narrated in the third person.  Third 
person narration bestows an air of objectivity onto report findings, strengthening 
their standing as authoritative critiques of NHSScotland. 
Passive voice 
The Auditor General and Audit Scotland are distanced from core NHS service 
delivery through the use of passive language, yet can still influence future action.  
Careful use of language is a subtle means by which to influence the wider NHS 
performance network.   
The overview report uses passive language to comment on how some Trusts 
achieved their financial targets.  For example: 
“the practice of early payments should be discouraged”  
(Audit Scotland, 2000:17) 
“The [Scottish Executive Health] Department summarises the financial 
results of Health Boards and Trusts separately but there is considerable scope 
to reflect a more comprehensive picture of the NHS in Scotland’s overall 
financial performance.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2000:19) 
The Auditor General comments on how NHS bodies achieved their financial targets 
in 2002/03 by referring to “tools” identified by auditors which the bodies deployed to 
secure financial balance (Audit Scotland, 2003b:34-6).  Although the Auditor 
General does not overtly pass judgement on these tools, passive language is again 




“However, the fact that this re-routing of underspends was necessary at all, is 
indicative of the financial pressures which continue to face NHS bodies.  
There is still a need to identify and address underlying recurring deficits if 
financial balance is to be achieved in the foreseeable future... 
“It is important that NHS bodies continue to review the way in which 
services are provided and to seek efficiency savings whenever possible.  At 
the same time, the extent to which NHS bodies can continually make 
efficiency savings is finite without impacting on the quality of service 
provided.  The auditors of several NHS bodies have concerns about their 
ability to deliver savings plans and thus, the viability of financial recovery 
plans.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2003b:36, emphasis added) 
The lack of a value judgement can also convey veiled criticism and create doubt in 
the mind of the reader.  When it is reported that “the SEHD does not know precisely 
the implications of future cost pressures” (Audit Scotland, 2003b:6), the reader is not 
offered any reassurance that it is reasonable not to know the implications and so 
could conclude that SEHD should have done more to understand the implications of 
certain policy decisions.   
The latter point is expanded upon in the discussion of the new contract for junior 
doctors, known as the ‘New Deal’.  The reader is told that “SEHD does not know the 
cost of implementation of New Deal or how many additional junior doctors have 
been recruited as a result” (Audit Scotland, 2003b:37) before the Auditor General 
estimates the number of additional junior doctors required and the cost of employing 
them (ibid.).  By using a relatively simple set of assumptions to generate an 
approximate calculation, the Auditor General immediately undermines the 
Department’s failure to quantify the impact of the New Deal.   
The use of passive language can thus undermine NHS organisations or central 
government, without the national audit body levelling a direct criticism of actions 
which they have taken, or failed to take.   
156 
 
6.3.3 Areas of emphasis 
Financial accounting 
The early reports consider financial statement production and audit process issues in 
depth.  Some examples from the 1999/2000 and 2000/01 overview reports are 
highlighted in Table 6.1 below.  These issues are the traditional domain of financial 
statements audit in both the private and public sectors, reinforcing the image of early 
overview reports as consolidated summaries of the findings of the external audits of 
NHS bodies.   
Table 6.1: Examples of financial statement production and audit process issues 
highlighted in Audit Scotland overview reports in 1999/2000 and 2000/01 
 Preparation of draft accounts in line with audit timetable and the quality of 
those draft accounts 
 Adjustments made to draft financial statements during the audit process 
 Adherence to the timetable for the submission of audited financial statements 
set by the Scottish Executive Health Department 
 Asset registers 
 Accounting for assets procured via the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), 
specifically a change in technical standards impacting treatment of the new 
Royal Infirmary of Edinburgh under construction at the time of the report  
Sources: Audit Scotland (2000:12,24,32); (2001:8) 
The next detailed consideration of technical accounting issues comes in the 2008/09 
overview report (Audit Scotland, 2009b:19-21); this is surprising as this report is 
characterised by a broader financial commentary on the NHS rather than an overview 
of ‘audit’ findings
43
.  The report contains a section on accruals, provisions and 
contingent liabilities.  Each concept is defined in the report and an example presented 
of each.  Although there are no explicit recommendations emanating from this 
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 See section 6.8.3 below 
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section, the definitions and examples are presented in such a way as to invite the 
reader to question the treatment adopted by NHS bodies. 
“Auditors reported that by the end of March 2009, most NHS bodies had 
transferred nearly all relevant staff to Agenda for Change.  Some NHS 
boards, however, set aside considerable amounts in their 2008/09 accounts to 
pay for staff who may be entitled to additional pay.  NHS Greater Glasgow 
and Clyde included nearly £40 million in provisions and accruals, NHS 
Lothian nearly £25 million and NHS Tayside £14 million.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2009b:19) 
Apparently objective and passive language is again harnessed to implicitly question 
the treatment adopted by NHS bodies.  The overview report suggests that accrued 
pay modernisation costs could not be fully substantiated.  Management appear to 
have exercised their judgement on the level of accrual within reasonable constraints; 
otherwise the auditors could not have issued an unqualified opinion on the financial 
statements.  The national audit body faces a tension between its formal role in 
verifying the truth and fairness of the financial statements, and its own opinions on 
the judgements assumed by NHS organisations in complying with principles-based 
technical accounting standards.   
The introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards from 1 April 2009 
represented a significant change in the financial reporting framework for NHS 
bodies.  The 2009/10 overview report gives this issue very little coverage.  It does 
not offer an explanation of its substantive effect, but notes that “on the whole, NHS 
bodies managed this well” (Audit Scotland, 2010c:6).  The lack of comment may 
indicate that extensive technical accounting changes are now considered relatively 
insignificant by the national audit body, compared to broader performance issues.   
Financial control 
The 1999/2000 overview report (Audit Scotland, 2000) makes explicit reference to 
financial control issues.  The Auditor General provides an explanation of the 
evaluation of the internal financial control (‘IFC’) statement which the Health 
Department requires directors of health bodies to sign annually.  The role of the 
auditor in relation to these statements is explained thus: 
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“Health Board and Trust auditors are required to review the IFC statement 
and provide an opinion which takes the form of a ‘negative assurance’.  
Provided weaknesses in internal control are disclosed appropriately in the 
IFC statement and the statement is not inconsistent with the information 
arising from the audit, appointed auditors are able to provide an unqualified 
opinion on the IFC statement.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2000:23) 
Auditors do not provide positive assurance that the organisation has effective control 
systems in place; a clean audit opinion may mean only that the organisation has itself 
identified and disclosed weaknesses in internal financial controls.  These weaknesses 
could be fundamental in nature but still the auditors would issue a ‘clean’ audit 
opinion, as was the case with Tayside University Hospitals Trust in 2000/01 (Audit 
Scotland, 2001:10).  The 1999/2000 overview reports that there were no 
qualifications on IFC statements that year, but “across the 50 NHS bodies, additional 
disclosures [of internal control weaknesses] were made in most cases” (Audit 
Scotland, 2000:23-4).  A clean bill of audit health is not equivalent in this case to a 
clean bill of health for the internal control system.  This echoes the finding of 
Bowerman (1995) that audit may present an impression of assurance which exceeds 
its technical value.  It also highlights a key characteristic of Power’s audit society 
whereby the quality of systems outranks underlying substantive performance (Power, 
1999:84).   
The opinion likewise does not guarantee that the audit process has identified all 
weaknesses; it is not clear if weaknesses highlighted in the IFC were identified by 
the organisations themselves, or came to light through the audit process.  This 
illustrates that audit attention can be displaced from actual performance (Power, 
1999).  Indeed, this approach may be symptomatic of a ‘tick box’ mentality; 
organisations need only report that a weakness exists, they do not need to address it.   
The IFC was replaced by the Statement on Internal Control (SIC) in 2001/02.  The 
SIC is wider in scope than the IFC which was solely concerned with financial 
control; the latter statement also considers operational and compliance controls and 
risk management.  There was no change to the form of audit assurance provided in 
the transition from IFC to SIC.   
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Auditors did not qualify any of the SICs included in the 2001/02 financial statements 
of NHS bodies, but the overview report reproduces the most common weaknesses in 
the implementation and effectiveness of internal control systems disclosed by 
management, along with a short explanation of the relevance and operational 
consequence of the disclosed weakness (Audit Scotland, 2003a:17).  The names of 
individual health bodies making these disclosures are not reported; the overview 
report prioritises the reporting of general issues at national level over weaknesses 
within individual organisations.  This is an early indication that the focus of the 
overview reports is shifting away from a consolidated summary of individual audit 
findings.   
Value for money reviews 
The early overview reports adopt the same reporting approach for value for money 
auditing as to the traditional financial statements audit; they summarise the findings 
of each report produced during the year (Audit Scotland, 2000:34-40; Audit 
Scotland, 2001:32-37). 
A more subtle approach to the reporting of value for money studies is adopted in the 
2002/03 overview report (Audit Scotland, 2003b), which weaves references to 
performance audit studies into the main sections of the report.  For example, the 
Auditor General identifies GP prescribing costs as a major cost pressure for 
NHSScotland and links this to a performance audit of primary care prescribing 
(Audit Scotland, 2003b:38).  Later reports continue to integrate coverage of value for 
money and performance audit reviews into the main body of the overview report 
This approach embeds performance audit work in the mainstream of NHSScotland 
financial performance, highlighting its relevance to the NHS.  It provides a further 
opportunity to remind the reader that the work of the Auditor General and Audit 
Scotland is influencing action taken by central government. 
The discussion of performance audit findings in the overview reports highlights the 
interrelationship between two key elements of Audit Scotland’s NHS work 
programme.  They can become mutually reinforcing: the performance audit 
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programme provides support for findings in the overview report, but may also be the 
driver of the issues included in the overview report.   
Clinical and medical negligence 
Early overview reports devote significant attention to clinical and medical negligence 
provisions.  These receive four pages of coverage in the 40-page 1999/2000 
overview report, a further four pages in the 41-page 2000/01 overview and five pages 
in the 66-page 2001/02 overview, despite there being no reported weaknesses in 
control or evidence of disagreement between auditor and auditee over accounting 
treatment.   
While payments made to settle negligence claims are purported to divert NHS 
resources away from frontline patient services (Audit Scotland, 2002:29), the level of 
annual expenditure by the NHS on such claims is relatively low
44
 compared to other 
costs which are not singled out for consideration in the overview reports. 
Continued coverage in the overview reports gives greater prominence to accounting 
for clinical negligence than other categories of cost, which could also be argued to 
divert resources away from frontline patient care, such as depreciation and other 
property charges.  The Auditor General and Audit Scotland can direct the public 
debate on NHS finance by selecting the key financial issues for inclusion in a report 
which would be reviewed in the media and by Parliament.   
In doing so, the Auditor General also places himself at the centre of the public 
discussion on how to address these issues.   
“Following its consideration of the Auditor General’s 1999/2000 overview 
report, the Scottish Parliament’s Audit Committee recommended that the 
[Scottish Executive Health] Department reassess the basis on which health 
bodies reflect negligence claims in their accounts.  The Auditor General’s 
2000/01 overview report noted that, after consultation with Audit Scotland, a 
review was underway.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2003a:30) 
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The selection of clinical and medical negligence claims for attention in a financial 
overview report also highlights the potential inter-relationships between financial 
management and clinical practice, traditionally beyond the direct control of 
management.  Clinical practice has been rendered auditable (Power, 1996; 1999), or 
at least within the scope of interest of the national audit body.   
The continuing creep of controls methodology into healthcare is evident in the advice 
which the Auditor General provides to the NHS to minimise clinical negligence 
claims: 
“It is important that trusts and health boards act promptly to put in place the 
risk management standards envisaged under CNORIS
45
”. 
(Audit Scotland, 2003a:29) 
The language and methodology of internal control systems grant auditors access to 
the clinical domain.  This is similar to the experiences reported in other professional 
domains, including criminal justice (Jones, 1993) and social work (Munro, 2004).   
Although the definition of clinical negligence provided in the overview report makes 
explicit the underlying duty of care on the part of health care practitioners in the 
delivery of health services (Audit Scotland, 2003a:25), there is no discussion in the 
report of the relationship between high quality patient care and the level of 
negligence claims.   
Clinical negligence is constructed by the auditor as a problem of financial 
management and operational control; no consideration is given to the role of clinical 
leadership or continuing professional training.  Clinical quality has been transformed 
into a management problem to be solved through the application of managerial tools, 
in this case risk management controls.   
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 The Clinical Negligence and Other Risks Indemnity Scheme (CNORIS) was introduced by the 
Scottish Executive Health Department in 2000 as a mechanism to pool the financial risks borne by 
NHSScotland in relation to clinical negligence and to embed risk management standards to reduce the 
incidence of negligence in the delivery of patient care. 
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6.3.4 Life through a financial lens 
The overview reports consider predominantly substantive operational issues through 
a financial lens.  This reflects the traditional focus of the national audit body on 
financial issues, but also illustrates that the auditor imposes a financial frame of 
reference on operational issues.   
For example, the discussion of the European Working Time Regulations in the 
1999/2000 overview report (Audit Scotland, 2000:31-2) centres on how NHS bodies 
should calculate financial provisions to recognise the potential liability arising from 
failure to implement the regulations in full when they came into force in October 
1998.  It does not discuss the practical challenge to comply with requirements for rest 
periods, annual holidays, night working and weekly hours worked.   
This contrasts with the focus of later overview reports on operational performance.   
Clinical governance 
The overview reports refer to clinical governance (Audit Scotland, 2005:39), which 
at the time was overseen by NHS Quality Improvement Scotland (NHS QIS), a 
special health board.  Audit Scotland did not have any specific responsibilities in this 
area.  The overview report reproduces the findings of the clinical governance 
assessments undertaken by NHS QIS (Audit Scotland, 2007:22-3) and so Audit 
Scotland can position itself as the only body presenting a comprehensive report on 
the performance of NHSScotland.   
The 2006/07 overview report reproduces the scores awarded to each Board by NHS 
QIS in the first round of assessments against its clinical governance and risk 
management standards (Audit Scotland, 2007:24).  National clinical governance 
assessments score NHS Boards across a four-point range against three Standards.  
The scores awarded for each Standard are aggregated to calculate an overall score for 
the Board out of a total of 12.  The overview report reproduces the individual scores 
for each Standard and the total score achieved by each territorial and special NHS 
Board.   
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The public can now effectively rank Boards against one another in terms of their 
provision of “safe and effective care and services (e.g. risk management)”, “the 
health wellbeing and care experience (e.g. access, referral, treatment and discharge)” 
and “assurance and accountability (e.g. clinical governance and external 
communication)” (Audit Scotland, 2007:22).  The new arrangements for assuring 
clinical governance and risk management have gone where the performance 
management system for NHSScotland did not – they distil each organisation’s 
performance into a single score awarded by an independent body.   
Audit Scotland links the results of the NHS QIS assessments to its own audit work: 
“NHS Western Isles and NHS Orkney were the poorest performing boards.  
This is confirmed by auditors’ annual reports for these boards, which also 
identified the need for significant improvements to clinical governance and 
risk management, and corporate governance.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2007:23) 
The findings of the NHS QIS assessments are triangulated with external audit 
findings in order to consolidate the legitimacy of each assessment process.  The 
organisations’ own assessments are not published.  Each assurance or assessment 
process is made credible by association as they reach similar conclusions.   
6.3.5 Summary 
This analysis of the content of annual NHS overview reports shows that the initial 
focus of the reports was on financial accounting and control, which are traditional 
audit concerns.  The national audit body could emphasise particular issues by 
referring to them in the overview report.  The transition from first to third person 
narration created an air of objectivity which could give greater weight to audit 
pronouncements, while use of passive language enables the national audit body to 




6.4 Auditor as expert 
The overview reports contain much evidence of the national audit body promoting its 
own expertise across a range of disciplines, expanding beyond financial 
management.   
6.4.1 Nature of audit assurance 
The discussion of the “negative assurance” provided by the auditor’s opinion on the 
IFC, and later SIC, at Section 6.3.3 above, introduces the potential for ambiguity in 
the nature of assurance provided by the audit process.   
From 2000/01, auditors of Scottish public bodies were required to provide an opinion 
on the regularity of transactions entered into by the audited organisation
46
.  This 
‘regularity opinion’ is in addition to the ‘true and fair’ opinion traditionally provided 
by external auditors on annual financial statements.  It requires the auditor to 
consider whether transactions entered into by the auditee organisation are in 
accordance with legislation and guidance issued by the Scottish Ministers.   
There followed repeated qualified ‘regularity opinions’, as auditors could not obtain 
appropriate evidence to support payments made to primary care contractors.   
“… not all aspects of [a post-payment verification] framework were in place 
during 2001/02.  In the absence of such a framework, there were no 
satisfactory audit procedures which the appointed auditors could adopt to 
form an opinion as to whether the associated expenditure and income was 
incurred in accordance with relevant enactments and guidance.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2003a:13) 
The auditor struggles to apply technical audit procedures in the absence of a robust 
internal control system of which it can test the design, operation and implementation.  
The regularity audit exists as a second order control system (Power, 1999:82-4) 
which falls into crisis when there is no control system to audit.  Audit could not 
function without the prior existence of an internal control system and there is no 
indication that alternative substantive audit procedures have been attempted or even 
considered.   
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In some circumstances, the level of assurance provided by the audit review can at 
best be considered qualified.  For example: 
“Auditors reported that the new [structural] arrangements appear to have 
contributed to enhanced budgetary control and financial monitoring.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2003a:14, emphasis added) 
The auditors are only comfortable suggesting a causal link; they do not have 
sufficient evidence to substantiate the claim so couch findings in cautious language.  
This has the dual effect of giving an assertion credence by attaching the auditors’ 
views to it while the auditors distance themselves from making the assertion with 
absolute certainty.   
6.4.2 Expert on financial management 
In early overview reports, there is a reluctance to offer judgement on financial 
management decisions.  Instead, the auditor provides a factual account of actions 
taken by NHS organisations.   
For example, the 1999/2000 overview report (Audit Scotland, 2000) includes a short 
section on ‘Year 2000 compliance’, also known as the much feared ‘millennium bug’ 
which was expected to impact upon computer systems and items of equipment at the 
moment the date changed from 31 December 1999 to 1 January 2000.  Audit 
Scotland reports that “the NHS in Scotland had prepared for the event and invested 
some £43 million in ensuring that its services were not disrupted” (Audit Scotland, 
2000:27) and that this “investment in service continuity planning, system testing and 
system upgrades undertaken to counter the Millennium Bug ensured that its 
healthcare services were fully maintained at the required level and no patient was 
exposed to risk” (ibid.).  The auditor stops short of providing an opinion as to 
whether this significant investment represented value for money for the NHS.  The 
auditor presented a factual account and left it to the reader to evaluate the 
effectiveness or otherwise of the investment.   
As the overview report develops, it increasingly makes claims that Audit Scotland is 
active in solving financial management problems highlighted by the audit process, 
such as shaping the terms of a review of accounting treatment applied to clinical and 
166 
 
medical negligence claims (Audit Scotland, 2001:22).  The national audit body 
signals a shift in its role from the identifier of control and financial weaknesses to 
problem-solver, capable of designing solutions to remedy those weaknesses. 
The report ultimately shies away from asserting that audit findings directly contribute 
to policy changes, despite earlier emphasising the auditor’s contribution to the 
review.   
“Ultimately, of course, this is a policy matter for NHSScotland.  Auditors will 
assess the effect of changes to accounting provisions.” 
(ibid.)  
The overview report is also used to position Audit Scotland and appointed external 
auditors as superior to other sources of assurance or expertise.  The 1999/2000 report 
asserts the relative superiority of appointed auditors over internal auditors by 
undermining the latter’s work.   
“In a small number of cases, appointed auditors considered that there was a 
need for Trusts to review their internal audit strategy to ensure that the main 
financial systems… are receiving adequate coverage.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2000: 24) 
The overview reports similarly highlight instances where auditee organisations have 
invited the auditor to perform additional reviews to support management.   
“[At] the request of the chief executive of Fife NHS Board, the appointed 
auditor reviewed financial monitoring and the recovery planning process 
within the NHS Fife system.  The auditor also commented on specific aspects 
of corporate governance in the NHS Fife system associated with its financial 
management.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2003b:30) 
The Auditor General goes on to report that “NHS Fife has welcomed the auditor’s 
report” (Audit Scotland, 2003b:45), harnessing an independent viewpoint to add 
weight to the assertion that the auditor can provide valuable expert advice to the 
NHS. 
The overview report also highlights instances where the Scottish Executive invites 
Audit Scotland to undertake specific pieces of work or assume a particular role, such 
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as inviting the national audit body to comment on guidance notes on reporting 
efficiency savings (Audit Scotland, 2005:32-33).   
As discussed at Section 6.3.2 above, the overview reports use passive language to 
highlight organisational deficiencies.  This can also serve to promote the expertise of 
the national audit body.  The 2006/07 overview report notes that external auditors 
“would have expected” NHS boards to have sufficient information to estimate the 
potential financial liability arising from equal pay claims and so had “encouraged 
each board to work with the Scottish Government to resolve the matter” (Audit 
Scotland, 2007:30).   
By the following year, NHS boards were still not able to quantify the potential 
liability.  Audit Scotland mobilises the experience in local government to level 
indirect criticism at the NHS in Scotland, noting that local authorities “have been 
more successful in estimating the potential value of equal pay claims” (Audit 
Scotland, 2008:14). 
These examples show different ways in which the national audit body promoted its 
own expertise on financial control and management issues: by leading examples of 
other bodies requesting advice from Audit Scotland, and by undermining competing 
sources of expertise.   
6.4.3 Expert on future financial outlook: organisational level 
By including future performance within the scope of audit reports, the national audit 
body signals a departure from the traditional retrospective function of audit and lays 
claim to more extensive expertise on assessing financial performance than the ability 
to verify reports of historic performance.  This interest is initially focused at 
organisational level but later manifests itself as a growing interest in the overall 
financial environment in which the NHS operates.  This is discussed at Section 6.8.3 
below.   
The Auditor General presents three case studies of high risk organisations in the 
2001/02 and 2002/03 overview reports (Audit Scotland, 2003a:46-53).  Each case 
study provides a factual account of the financial challenges facing each organisation, 
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details of action taken by each organisation to address these challenges and the 
auditor’s assessment of the risks and organisational response.  He returns to these 
organisations in the 2002/03 overview report to provide an update on actions which 
the organisations have taken to secure financial balance in the past year.   
The overview report relates the concerns of the external auditor of one such Trust 
that “the financial plan may not be deliverable, and therefore, the potential deficit 
may exceed the levels projected” (Audit Scotland, 2003a:47-8).  The subsequent 
report notes similar reservations about the Trust’s ability to deliver financial balance: 
“the implementation of components of LUHT’s financial plan represent a significant 
management challenge” (Audit Scotland, 2003b:42).  The reports do not elaborate on 
the risks informing this assessment, or the likelihood or severity of those risks.  
Nevertheless, there is a clear message that the external auditor is concerned about the 
future financial performance of the Trust.   
The LUHT case study shows how the overview report can elevate the professional 
judgement of the auditor above the judgement of management of the audited 
organisation by highlighting risks underlying management actions.   
The second case study, on Argyll and Clyde Acute Hospitals NHS Trust, highlights 
five risks which the external auditor believes could threaten delivery of the Trust’s 
financial recovery plan (Audit Scotland, 2003a:49).  However, the report also states 
that the Minister for Health and Community Care appointed an expert support group 
to assist the Board in addressing the financial weaknesses in September, some 
months after the annual audit process concluded and the auditor identified the 
aforementioned risks.  The overview report confirms that this support group has now 
reported its findings, the chief executives of the Board and local Trusts have 
resigned, and an interim management team has been appointed by Ministers (Audit 
Scotland, 2003a:50-1).  By reporting the original auditor’s assessment alongside the 
subsequent action taken by central government to intervene in the financial 
management of the Trust, the overview report legitimates the concerns expressed by 
the appointed auditor.   
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However, the risks identified by Audit Scotland do not always materialise.  NHS 
Western Isles failed to meet financial targets to deliver in-year balance for a number 
of years and the 2006/07 overview report relayed the appointed auditor’s view that 
management may not be able to deliver an improvement in position in the following 
financial year, as set out in the Board’s financial plan (Audit Scotland, 2007:27).  In 
the event, the risk identified by the auditor did not materialise: “…for the first time in 
five years, [NHS Western Isles] generated an in-year surplus [in 2007/08] to set 
against its cumulative deficit” (Audit Scotland, 2008:6).   
6.4.4 Expert on the production of data 
Audit Scotland positions itself as an actor in the development of data modelling 
exercises, rather than a neutral ex post observer or verifier of the data produced. 
“Audit Scotland is currently carrying out a joint project with ISD
47
 to model 
the whole system for delayed discharges in Tayside.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2004a:43) 
Audit Scotland is thus established as a key actor in the production of performance 
data, and in the wider NHS performance network. 
In the same way as Audit Scotland sought to undermine the failure of the NHS to 
estimate the cost of the New Deal for junior doctors
48
 or to quantify the potential 
liability arising from equal pay claims
49
, the overview report seeks to undermine 
published national data on the number of attendances at outpatient clinics by 
presenting its own competing evidence.   
“According to national data, there were nearly 4.7 million attendances at 
outpatient clinics in 2002/03...  But a recent census carried out by Audit 
Scotland indicates that the real scale of activity is significantly greater with 
more than ten million attendances.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2004a:30) 
                                                          
47
 Information Services Division of NHSScotland 
48
 See Section 6.3.2 
49
 See Section 6.4.2 
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This is an example of the national audit body implicitly inviting the public to place 
their trust in them as the guardians of accurate data on the performance of the health 
service.   
6.4.5 Directing parliamentary scrutiny 
The 1999/2000 overview report (Audit Scotland, 2000) summarises an in-depth 
value for money review of the Scottish Ambulance Service, published by the 
National Audit Office in December 1999
50
.  It explains how the Scottish Parliament 
Audit Committee responded to publication of the report, holding its own examination 
of the performance of the Scottish Ambulance Service, which included taking 
evidence from key individuals within the service and the Health Department (Audit 
Scotland, 2000:35).  The report also outlines the Health Department’s response to the 
findings of the Audit Committee, setting out specific actions taken including 
additional financial investment (Audit Scotland, 2000:35-6).  The subsequent 
overview report (Audit Scotland, 2001:37) offers a further update on actions taken by 
the Department in response to the original value for money review.   
This extended analysis demonstrates the influence which the initial value for money 
study exerted on the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Executive.  It sets out a 
clear causal link between audit findings, scrutiny exercised by Parliament and actions 
taken by the Executive. 
Coverage of the financial difficulties experienced by the NHS in Tayside in the 
overview reports reinforces this link between audit reports, Parliamentary scrutiny 
and Executive actions. 
“On the basis of the Auditor General’s report, the Scottish Parliament’s Audit 
Committee considered the management and use of resources by the NHS in 
Tayside.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2001:30) 
                                                          
50
 Published online at http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/9900/the_scottish_ambulance_service.aspx 
(accessed on 31 August 2013) 
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The auditor’s report was a trigger for parliamentary scrutiny, in line with the 
constitutional role of the national audit body in supporting the discharge of 
democratic accountability (Hollingsworth et al, 1998).   
The overview report quotes the conclusions of the Parliament Audit Committee, 
which include criticism of the financial monitoring and accountability procedures of 
the Scottish Executive Health Department (SEHD). 
“The Audit Committee concluded that… [SEHD] failed to ensure that 
fundamental performance and management issues were addressed.  Annual 
accountability reviews failed to address financial issues adequately and there 
is a need for more robust systems for monitoring financial performance of 
NHS bodies.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2001:30) 
The overview report also allows the national audit body to indirectly criticise the 
Department by quoting the findings of another scrutiny function, in this case the 
Audit Committee of the Scottish Parliament.  This places the Auditor General at 
some distance from criticism of policy issues. 
The Department responds to the weaknesses uncovered in Tayside by reviewing 
national procedures.  The Auditor General notes that the Department subsequently 
introduced: 
“a new Performance Assessment Framework from October 2001 for the new 
NHS boards which is intended to provide a broader picture of operational 
performance over time and which will be used as the basis for the annual 
accountability review meetings with the Department.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2001:31) 
The national audit body portrays itself as influencing performance management by 
uncovering financial issues which are symptomatic of broader organisational 
weaknesses.  Furthermore, a link is established between the work of the national 
audit body and the creation of the Performance Assessment Framework.   
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6.4.6 Trusted source of reference 
The 2001/02 overview report (Audit Scotland, 2003a) considers the implementation 
of structural reforms
51
 to NHSScotland introduced by Our National Health: a plan 
for action, a plan for change (Scottish Executive, 2000) and associated changes to 
governance and accountability regimes.  In the course of auditing the 2001/02 
financial statements of NHS bodies, external auditors reviewed the operation of the 
newly created unified Boards against the specifications set by the SEHD.  The 
Auditor General reports the broad findings of these reviews, but also identifies where 
the arrangements introduced by the Department need to be clarified or strengthened 
(Audit Scotland, 2003a: 43).   
The SEHD had announced changes in the financial framework to the NHS in the 
usual way via an official circular
52
, but the discussion in the overview report is likely 
to have been the most public communication of these changes.  The circular was 
written in technical language and addressed to a professional readership, whereas the 
overview report seeks to translate this into language accessible to a non-expert in 
public finance.   
Audit Scotland has established the overview report as the main conduit for reporting 
to the public on fundamental changes in the financial management of NHSScotland.  
The auditor, not the NHS, is the main source of public information on these changes, 
potentially giving the public the impression that they should look to the auditor for 
authoritative information with regard to financial management of the NHS.   
The 2002/03 overview report (Audit Scotland, 2003b) heralds the advent of the 
transformation of the overview report.  Rather than merely consolidating the findings 
of external audit activity across the NHS at this point, the overview report begins to 
comment upon the wider operation of NHS, providing a long background section on 
how the NHS is organised and the impact of ongoing reforms, including the 
dissolution of Trusts.  Furthermore, a short description of the work of each special 
                                                          
51
 The most significant change was the creation of unified NHS boards, streamlining the previous 
board structures within NHS boards and trusts – see also Section 5.3.   
52
 SEHD HDL 2002(9), March 2002 
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health board and national organisation is provided in an appendix to the 2002/03 
overview.  This consolidates the emerging impression of Audit Scotland and the 
overview report as authoritative sources of information on the operation of the NHS 
in Scotland.   
The individual financial results of NHS areas in 2003/04 are published as an 
appendix to the financial overview report (Audit Scotland, 2004b).  There is no 
easily accessible summary of financial performance of local bodies published by the 
Scottish Executive and so Audit Scotland has to discharge this key plank of 
accountability on the Executive’s behalf in order that the public understand the 
financial results of the NHS.   
 
6.5 Directing action 
The overview reports show how the national audit body attempted to direct action 
within NHSScotland in the years following devolution.   
6.5.1 Identifying action and highlighting inaction 
Early overview reports identify future actions or changes to improve, for example, 
the financial statement production process (Audit Scotland, 2000:13) although these 
are not explicitly presented as ‘recommendations’.  These actions are directed not 
only at individual NHS organisations but also at the SEHD and national agencies 
which provide information to support production of the financial statements.   
The overview report also uses emotive language to express a judgement on the lack 
of action taken by audited organisations to remedy known weaknesses.   
“However, while the overall number of disclosures [of weaknesses in internal 
financial control statements] in 2000/01 has reduced substantially, it is 
disappointing that a number of cases were identified where action has yet to 
be taken to address control weaknesses first disclosed in 1999/2000.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2001:10, emphasis added) 
174 
 
The overview reports are further used by the national audit body to express 
frustration at instances when audited organisations have not taken action to remedy 
control weaknesses identified in prior reports.   
As highlighted above at Section 6.3.3, NHS bodies were required to disclose control 
weaknesses in the IFC, and later the SIC, but were not penalised for the existence of 
the weaknesses.  Audit Scotland seeks to provide an additional sanction by 
threatening to report on bodies which fail to remedy control weaknesses in future 
overview reports (Audit Scotland, 2002:16).  The auditor appears to believe that 
repeated emphasis of an organisational weakness in a national audit report is a more 
effective threat to incentivise remedial action than the continuing requirement to 
report the weakness in the annual SIC.  This could stem from a perception that the 
overview report is more widely read and thus a more prominent publication than the 
organisation’s own annual accounts which contain the SIC. 
These early examples demonstrate that the national audit body lacked the influence 
to compel action in the early years of its existence, supporting the proposition that it 
fulfilled a traditional external audit function in the years immediately following 
devolution.  This may be related to a lack of sanctions which could be exercised to 
compel action.   
While the 2002/03 overview report (Audit Scotland, 2003b:2-7) still falls short of 
making explicit recommendations for improvement to the Scottish Executive or NHS 
bodies in general, the summary at the beginning of the report highlights key 
messages in text boxes.  As in previous reports Audit Scotland adopts passive 
language but examination of the content of these text boxes reveals that the national 
audit body is using these to make the case for a specific change or to suggest how the 
Department or NHS bodies should focus efforts in the coming year.  For example, 
phrases such as “it is important that…” are used to emphasise certain activities or 
objectives.  By noting that “further improvements are… necessary if auditors are to 
avoid qualifying their [regularity] opinion”, Audit Scotland effectively recommends 
that remedial actions are taken.  Similarly, by reporting that “there is still a need to 
identify and address underlying recurring deficits”, Audit Scotland calls for action to 
be taken to improve the long term financial sustainability of NHS organisations.   
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The 2003/04 performance and financial overview reports identify ‘key messages’ in 
the summary of the report findings and at the beginning of each section of the report.  
While these are principally factual in nature, reporting on actual events or activities, 
they again convey to the NHS, Scottish Executive and others that the auditor has 
identified scope for improvement in NHS financial management or wider 
performance.   
“The SEHD will need to demonstrate in future that services are improving 
and that the NHS in Scotland is achieving value for money from the 
investment in pay modernisation.  The SEHD needs to set clear objectives for 
each of the new contracts and specify how they will measure performance 
against the objectives.  For example, the SEHD should make it clear whether 
it expects to see an increase in activity or better outcomes.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2004a:4, emphasis added) 
The practice of highlighting inaction on the part of the NHS continues in the 
overview reports, even after specific recommendations have been introduced.  For 
example, the 2007/08 overview report (Audit Scotland, 2008:20-1) highlights that 
there has been no formal evaluation of the introduction of Community Health 
Partnerships, a new forum for planning and delivering health and social care services 
at local level.   It then goes on to state that the Scottish Government had recently 
announced a review of the operation of CHP.  By leading with a criticism, then 
acknowledging the action underway, albeit delayed, the auditor can undermine the 
auditee.  However, it may also reflect the ex post nature of the audit process – by the 
time the finding was reported in the overview report, action had already been taken.   
6.5.2 Recommendations 
Audit Scotland begins to make specific recommendations to the Scottish 
Government Health Directorates
53
 (SGHD) and to NHS organisations in the 2006/07 
integrated overview report (Audit Scotland, 2007).  These recommendations are 
separately identified at the end of each section and consolidated in the executive 
summary.  The inclusion of specific, direct actions now makes the auditor’s views on 
weaknesses in NHS systems and processes overt to the reader.   
                                                          
53
 Formerly the Scottish Executive Health Department 
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The overview reports show how Audit Scotland seeks to bolster its legitimacy in the 
NHSScotland performance network by taking credit for actions taken by the NHS to 
implement recommendations made in previous audit reports.  The overview reports 
provide Audit Scotland with an opportunity to promote the effectiveness of prior 
audit recommendations and lead evidence that audit work has directed executive 
action, thereby reinforcing its own influence.  Furthermore, reporting on the 
implementation of previous audit recommendations legitimates the original 
recommendations; if a recommendation is subsequently adopted then that 
recommendation must have been appropriate. 
Action taken by health bodies and the SEHD or SGHD in later years is often related 
back to earlier audit recommendations, originating either in the annual audit reports 
of individual organisations or in the overview reports.  For example: 
“In a number of cases, auditors reported significant improvements in the 
preparation of accounts, often following the implementation of 
recommendations arising from the 2000/01 audits.  This resulted in a more 
effective and efficient audit and is to be encouraged.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2003a:12) 
“Audit Scotland published a review of the management of waiting lists in 
Scotland in June 2002.  Our main recommendations were that all patients 
waiting for services should be entered on to a common waiting list and 
waiting times on the deferred list should be monitored routinely.  In 
November 2002, following a Scottish Executive action plan, the Minister for 
Health and Community Care announced that a single list system would come 
into force on 1 April 2003.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2004a:32) 
“Our 2003/04 financial overview report highlighted that the current format of 
annual accounts does not disclose some important information about the 
funding of services, such as the use of non-recurring funding or savings to 
achieve financial targets.  The SEHD has recently updated its monthly 
monitoring returns for NHS bodies to include non-recurring funding and their 
use.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2005:36) 
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“The 2007 Audit Scotland follow-up report on ward nursing emphasised the 
need to review the appropriate use of bank nurses.  The Scottish Government 
recently wrote to chief executives setting out the improvements needed to 
meet the recommendations included in the Audit Scotland report…” 
(Audit Scotland, 2007:21) 
“There is limited evidence of any large-scale transfer of resources, including 
money and staff, from secondary to primary care.  We have previously 
reported there was no evidence of a change in the balance of health 
expenditure to match the move towards more community-based care.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2009b:14) 
By adopting the presentation that “we said... then this happened”, the national audit 
body creates the impression that the audit process was the main driver of the 
subsequent action / improvement.   
6.5.3 Audit “failure” 
The preceding section shows that the national audit body can be quick to infer its 
own success from implementation of prior recommendations or findings by audited 
organisations.   
The absence of any reference to the external audit process in the following case study 
from the 2005/06 overview report is equally noteworthy, and provides an insight into 
the apparent immunity of audit from direct criticism (Power, 2000:114; 2003a:194). 
“NHS Lothian’s five-year financial plan and monthly reporting continually 
forecast that the board would achieve a balanced financial position in 
2005/06.  The board discovered, late in 2005/06, that Family Health Services 
(FHS) income had been incorrectly identified and disclosed in 2004/05.  This 
meant that the £19.6 million cumulative surplus brought forward from 
2004/05 was reduced by £10 million.  NHS Lothian brought this to the 
attention of the SEHD which agreed that the board could retain this additional 
RRL.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2006:18) 
Unlike other examples of audit ‘success’ which litter the overview reports, there are 
no references to the auditor in this part of the case study and the NHS organisation is 
the principal actor.   
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It is implicit in the case study that the auditor issued a clean audit opinion on 
financial statements in 2004/05 which double-counted income of £10 million, and 
thus failed to identify a weakness which was later identified by management.  While 
this sum represents only 1% of the overall revenue resource limit in 2004/05 and so 
may not be considered fundamental in a technical accounting sense, it does have the 
potential to undermine confidence in the external audit process and level of 
assurance which it provides.   
The remainder of the case study, by contrast, highlights the role of the auditor in 
identifying errors in the draft financial statements and weaknesses in financial 
control systems. 
“The auditor queried the nature of these transactions and NHS Lothian 
reversed the accounting treatment for both items…” 
“The auditor reported that the nature and value of the changes between 
reported positions and final financial statements this year, and in previous 
years, introduces a level of unnecessary volatility and risk into NHS 
Lothian’s overall financial position.  The auditor has recommended that NHS 
Lothian review its financial recording processes, particularly at the acute 
operating division.” 
“The auditor’s work on systems and controls found important areas where 
basic internal controls were, in the auditor’s view, absent or not operating as 
intended…” 
“The auditor also encountered a number of other problems during the audit, 
which stemmed from the board’s failure to address previously reported 
limitations in operational systems.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2006:18) 
The value of the transactions referred to in the first quote above was £5.7 million, 
compared to the £10 million mis-statement of FHS income in the prior year financial 
statements.   
This case study illustrates how selective reporting of the role of the auditor can 
influence the appearance of the success of audit.  The overview report tends to 
highlight audit successes, while remaining silent on issues which the audit process 
failed to identify.  The primary function of the national audit body is to scrutinise the 
financial statements and financial management of public sector organisations, 
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including NHS organisations.  However, the performance of the auditor is not subject 
to equivalent scrutiny (Power, 2000:114).  Coupled with the systematic tendency to 
trust audit (Power, 1999:36-7), this creates an environment in which there is little 
opportunity for audit ‘failures’ to be made public.   
6.6 Financial performance 
The changing definition of NHS ‘financial performance’ adopted by the audit 
process can be traced through the overview reports.  Financial performance is 
initially defined in terms of achievement of statutory financial targets, but eventually 
also incorporates how those targets are achieved and broader measures of 
performance, including those introduced into the performance network by Audit 
Scotland.   
6.6.1 Achievement of statutory financial targets 
Early overview reports provide an objective account of the financial performance of 
NHS bodies, defined as the achievement of statutory financial targets.  These reports 
state the number of Trusts which achieved the three annual financial targets set by 
the SEHD.  Reported performance against targets provides an objective evidence 
base upon which the auditor can make comment on the general financial health of the 
NHS in Scotland. 
The 1999/2000 overview (Audit Scotland, 2000:13-19) explains the practical 
significance of the financial targets, helping a lay audience to understand the purpose 
of these targets but also positioning the national audit body as gatekeeper to public 
understanding of NHS finances (see Section 6.4.6).  However, the report also 
explained the reasons why targets were not achieved by some Trusts and identified 
potential threats to achievement of targets in future years, including specific risk 
factors for individual Trusts as highlighted by the appointed auditor.   
The 2000/01 overview report (Audit Scotland, 2001) takes a more objective stance, 
reporting factually on the achievement of targets without reference to the role of the 
auditor in delivering a return to financial balance.  We also learn that the SEHD is 
introducing measures to promote greater consistency between Board and Trust 
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accounts (Audit Scotland, 2001:17).  There are more references to action taken by 
SEHD, including an announcement by the Health Minister that £90m additional 
funding was to be awarded to NHS organisations in 2001/02 although the Auditor 
General provides the following advice to NHS organisations: 
“Trusts will require to continue monitoring closely their financial position 
and ensure that plans to secure financial balance are pursued rigorously.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2001:18) 
The financial position of health board areas is summarised in an appendix to the 
2000/01 overview report, including the retained surplus or deficit of each of the 15 
Boards and their 27 constituent Trusts in the current and preceding financial years.  
This is an early attempt to bring a summarised account of the financial performance 
of the NHS together in one place.  Such a national financial summary was not 
produced at the time by SEHD, despite an overarching performance narrative in 
NHSScotland which prioritised ‘national’ over individual performance. 
In the 2001/02 overview report, the Auditor General reports that there has been an 
improvement in the financial position of NHSScotland, evidenced by a reduction in 
the number of Trusts recording a cumulative deficit at year-end and the overall value 
of that cumulative deficit.  Indeed, Trusts recorded an overall surplus in 2001/02 
following two years of reporting an overall deficit.  The Auditor General presents 
analysis to show that this improved position was a direct result of the in-year 
injection of funding of £90 million provided by the Scottish Executive, rather than 
any significant improvement in financial management.  The majority of the 
additional funding was used to eliminate cumulative deficits, including £10.8m 
provided to one Trust
54
 to clear its cumulative deficit, and not to increase overall 
NHS spending.   
The Auditor General does not express a view on this use of resources but uses 
passive language to convey that the improved financial position was not sustainable: 
                                                          
54
 Tayside University Hospitals NHS Trust – the Trust which had been subject of specific interest in 
previous overview reports and a Parliamentary inquiry. 
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“…it is clear that the one-off funding does not represent a long-term solution 
to the financial problems faced by NHS bodies.  Underlying financial 
pressures remain which need to be addressed.”  
(Audit Scotland, 2003a:23) 
The 2001/02 overview report (Audit Scotland, 2003a) devotes far less coverage to 
the financial position of NHS Boards, relative to the discussion of NHS Trusts’ 
financial position.  This may reflect the relatively good health of the Boards, with all 
but one achieving breakeven against all three annual targets.  Special health boards 
command only one paragraph (Audit Scotland, 2003a:25) and the two special boards 
reporting “slight overspends” are not named.   
The report highlights weaknesses, rather than praising or noting successes.  This 
distinguishes the overview reports from traditional company audit reports and 
illustrates how performance audit reports can be a source of “discomfort” for the 
audited organisation and stakeholders (Justesen and Skaerbaek, 2005; 2010).   
The reporting of financial performance develops one stage further in the 2002/03 
overview report (Audit Scotland, 2003b).  This report not only summarises the 
financial results of each NHS organisation but also provides a commentary on the 
results of each organisation and a commentary on changes made to the NHS financial 
regime by the SEHD during the year.  The commentary on the results of the Boards 
and their constituent Trusts runs to over seven pages, over 10% of the report, with 
around half a page devoted to each unified board area.   
The 2003/04 financial overview report (Audit Scotland, 2004b) marks a further shift 
in the function of the overview reports from a summary of the findings of the audits 
of individual NHS bodies to an overall assessment of the financial performance of 
the NHS as a whole by Audit Scotland.  The overview report no longer provides 
detailed accounts of the financial position of individual Boards, but introduces 
specific case studies to illustrate general points. 
“This report is in a different format from previous financial overview reports, 
where we included a section on NHS bodies causing greatest concern.  This 
report features case studies on NHS bodies which are used to demonstrate 
emerging issues.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2004b:5) 
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As the scope of the overview report expands to an integrated financial and 
operational performance overview report in 2003/04, there is a reduction in the 
coverage of financial issues.  For example, the 2004/05 overview devotes just 11 
pages to the financial performance of the NHS, but continues to report the 
performance of all NHS bodies against formal financial targets (Audit Scotland, 
2005:45-6); the section on financial performance in the 2006/07 overview is 
restricted to just six pages (Audit Scotland, 2007:26-31) plus an appendix reporting 
the outturn of each NHS body against formal financial targets (Audit Scotland, 
2007:37-8).   
With the overall financial health of the NHS in Scotland considered to be good in 
2006/07, the overview report has little to say about the achievement of financial 
targets.  The report highlights that only one Board failed to meet all of its financial 
targets and that auditors did not issue any qualified opinions on the financial 
statements of NHS bodies (Audit Scotland, 2007:27).   
SEHD overspend 
The SEHD recorded an overall overspend of £32 million against its budget allocation 
in 2004/05, representing 0.4% of its budget.   
“This [overspend] is a breach of regulations and has resulted in a qualified 
regularity opinion on the Scottish Executive’s accounts.  The overspend was 
a result of failing to budget accurately for single system working.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2005:27) 
In contrast to the pages of analysis on overspending Trusts and NHS Boards in 
previous and future overview reports, the SEHD overspend elicits limited analysis 
and Audit Scotland does not offer any insights into the future outlook for the 
aggregate financial position of NHSScotland.  The report uses objective language to 
report the volatility in the reported position following year end, but concludes the 
discussion with a judgement that there are “weaknesses in budget monitoring”.   
“The SEHD’s overspend was not identified until August 2005, when the 
consolidated health accounts were prepared.  The forecast for revenue 
expenditure fluctuated significantly between February and August 2005.  
This varied from an overspend position of £36.2 million to underspends of 
£90 million and £67.2 million in March and June, and back to an overspend 
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of £35 million in August (the revenue overspend is offset by a £3 million 
capital underspend).  This indicates weaknesses in budget monitoring.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2005:36) 
This shows how the auditor presents an apparently neutral account of the outcome of 
financial management processes and highlights deficiencies without directly 
criticising the audited organisation.  A factual account is presented, but the auditor 
does not offer direct advice on how to strengthen these processes or indeed make 
specific recommendations on improvements which the auditee should make in the 
coming year.   
The 2005/06 financial overview report (Audit Scotland, 2006) provides an update on 
actions taken by the SEHD to address the weaknesses in process which were 
manifest in the failure to meet statutory financial targets in the previous year. 
“The auditor has reported that the SEHD completed an internal review of 
financial management and budgetary control during 2005/06 and is now in 
the process of restructuring its finance function.  The SEHD has asked its 
auditor to do a joint review with internal audit of the new arrangements 
during 2006/07.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2006:10) 
In contrast to the neutral position taken in the overview report for the year in which 
overspend against budget arose, the national audit body again presents itself as a key 
actor in the network which will improve financial management.  This supports the 
proposition that the auditor uses the overview report as a vehicle to demonstrate that 
it is a key actor in the financial management network in NHSScotland.  The neutral 
presentation of events reinforces an appearance of authority and supports the 
development of an identity for the national audit body as a trusted source of expertise 
on financial management.   
This case also shows how the auditor highlights its role in remedying weaknesses in 
financial management, even though the audit process did not itself identify the 
original weakness.  This is obscured to the lay reader by the lack of scrutiny of audit 
processes (Power, 2000a; 2003a).   
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6.6.2 Redefining financial performance 
As the overview reports evolve, the definition of financial performance used by 
Audit Scotland widens from statutory financial targets to incorporate broader 
measures, including the sustainability of a breakeven position.   
The 2002/03 overview report reaches “general conclusions” which, for the first time 
in the overview reports, convey Audit Scotland’s overall assessment of the financial 
health of the NHS (Audit Scotland, 2003b).  While this assessment is essentially 
positive, it highlights that NHS organisations rely on non-recurring funding to 
support recurrent expenditure.  This overview report also links financial performance 
with wider NHS performance and outcomes.  Audit Scotland purports that 
transparency should be maintained in financial management: 
“not only to support sound and open accountability, but also to enable a clear 
view of the healthcare benefits resulting from the major additional resources 
being placed at the disposal of the NHS in Scotland.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2003b:7) 
This is the beginning of a process which introduces a broader definition of financial 
performance.   
Recurring vs non-recurring 
A growing interest in the more general financial health of NHS bodies is evident in 
the increasing coverage of reliance placed by health bodies upon ‘non-recurring’ 
funding sources to support ‘recurring’ costs.  As this language becomes embedded in 
the financial performance dialogue of NHSScotland, a new measure of financial 
performance emerges.  This measure can be traced back to audit interest and co-
exists with statutory financial targets.  Thus, the auditor has redefined NHS financial 
performance.   
Audit Scotland reports in the 2006/07 overview that reliance on non-recurring 
income to support recurring costs “does not represent a large financial risk for most 
boards” (Audit Scotland, 2007:26).  However, the only recommendation included in 
the section of the report on financial performance is that “NHS Boards should aim to 
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be in recurring financial balance and minimise the use of non-recurring income on 
day-to-day expenditure” (Audit Scotland, 2007:31).   
By the 2008/09 overview report, the underlying position of territorial NHS boards 
has improved slightly.  The national audit body nevertheless continues to highlight 
the risks associated with this financial position and encourage boards to reduce 
reliance on non-recurring funding.  “The tightening financial situation” across the 
UK public sector is used as leverage to legitimate the recommendation (Audit 
Scotland, 2009b:19).   
The overview report presents the actual underlying position of each NHS body in 
2006-07 and the forecast position for 2007/08 (Audit Scotland, 2007: 28).  The 
source of the data is quoted as “unaudited returns from the NHS bodies” (emphasis 
added)
55
.  The overview reports continue to give prominent coverage to the reliance 
which NHS boards place upon non-recurring funding sources and report measures of 
underlying financial performance, but these measures reported by NHS boards have 
not been independently verified by appointed auditors or at national level by Audit 
Scotland.   
This is a significant development: Audit Scotland has promoted a new measure of 
financial performance, which considers how financial targets have been achieved by 
NHS boards, but has not expanded its audit work to bring this measure within the 
scope of audit testing.   
This supports the existing literature that audit is influential in constructing an 
auditable environment (Power, 1994a; 1996; 1999) and that performance audit 
reviews lead the auditor to construct a definition of performance which can be 
subjected to audit (Day and Klein, 1987; Everett, 2003; Lindeberg, 2007).   
It also marks a departure in that, having made a new measure of performance 
auditable, the national audit body does not apply audit procedures to reports of 
performance against that measure.  The purpose of promoting the new measure 
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 The 2008/09 overview report also includes a table showing the actual and forecast underlying 
position of each NHS Board in 2008/09 and 2009/10 respectively (Audit Scotland, 2009b:20).  A 
similar table is presented in the 2009/10 overview report (Audit Scotland, 2010c:8).  The source of the 
data quoted in both reports is “unaudited returns from NHS bodies” (ibid.).   
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appears not to be to broaden the application of traditional audit tests but to provide an 
evidence base for the developing commentary which the national audit body provides 
on the financial performance of NHSScotland.  This supports the view that Audit 
Scotland’s identity in the performance network has evolved from traditional external 
auditor to commentator on NHS financial performance.   
Efficiency savings 
The overview reports adopt a cautious position in relation to the achievement of 
efficiency targets by NHS bodies: “Efficient Government savings targets were 
reported to be met” (Audit Scotland, 2007:31, emphasis added).  The audit report 
quotes savings figures from a Scottish Executive report on its efficiency programme, 
but does not provide evidence that it has independently verified these savings (ibid.).     
The efficiency savings achieved by individual NHS bodies are reported for the first 
time in the 2008/09 overview, although the source of these figures is “unaudited 
returns from NHS bodies” which “do not necessarily correspond with Efficient 
Government programme returns to SGHD” (Audit Scotland, 2009b:12).   
The treatment of efficiency savings in the overview reports illustrates two emerging 
themes: the national audit body primarily reports on NHS performance without 
providing assurance over systems or controls, while further expanding the definition 
of financial performance beyond statutory targets.  This begins to establish the role 
of the national audit body as a commentator, not an assurance-giver; this role will be 
explored further at Section 6.8 below.   
6.6.3 Critiquing financial targets 
The Auditor General begins to question the official financial governance and 
performance framework in the 2002/03 overview report in a short section headed 
‘validity of targets’. 
“While the revised financial framework is intended to enhance the 
transparency of NHS financial performance, a number of auditors commented 
on the usefulness of the Revenue Resource Limit as a financial target.  
SEHD’s initial notification of the RRL to each NHS board and special health 
board is subject to change throughout the financial year…   
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“Auditors reported that the RRL of a number of NHS boards and trusts was 
only finalised after the year-end…  Setting the RRL after the year-end does 
not accord with the primary reason for setting a target in the first place, i.e. to 
provide a challenging, yet achievable, target for operational management to 
aim for.  Agreeing a target once the final outturn position is known reduces 
the likelihood that the target is real or effective.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2003b:36) 
This is a departure from the traditional role of the auditor to independently evaluate 
reported performance against the financial accounting framework and specific 
financial targets linked to budgetary control.  The additional commentary is an early 
indicator of the changing role of Audit Scotland.   
In the next year’s financial overview report, Audit Scotland directly asks “how useful 
are the financial targets?” (Audit Scotland, 2004b:10).  The answer rehearses the 
points made in the 2002/03 overview report quoted above, but the national audit 
body ultimately suggests that the financial performance framework should be 
reformed. 
“The SEHD should consider reviewing the current financial targets set for 
NHS bodies.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2004b:11) 
The national audit body is expanding the scope of its interest in NHS financial 
management from ensuring that performance against financial targets is accurately 
reported, to commenting on the effectiveness of the financial targets themselves.   
The position taken by the Auditor General on financial performance has progressed 
from factual reporting of performance against financial targets through commenting 
on how those results were achieved to undermining the targets themselves.  The 
prevailing identity of the auditor has shifted from an agent of accountability to an 
agent of change (Bowerman et al., 2000; Gendron et al., 2001; Skaerbaek, 2009).   
6.7 Operational performance 
The previous section demonstrated how Audit Scotland’s approach to reporting on 
financial performance evolved over the period of analysis.  This section traces the 
emergence and development of an interest in broader operational performance.   
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6.7.1 Relationship between financial and operational performance 
Early overview reports give no sense of the broader performance of the NHS; their 
scope is limited to presenting actual performance against statutory financial targets.   
The 2002/03 overview is the first report to specifically consider NHS performance 
management, as part of a discussion of corporate governance (Audit Scotland 
2003b).  It reproduces a case study of how Lothian NHS Board uses the Performance 
Assessment Framework (PAF) to manage its performance (Audit Scotland, 
2003b:27), which was originally reported in the external auditor’s 2002/03 report.  
This case study reveals that the board established a steering group to coordinate and 
implement action required to ensure that the board performed well against the PAF.  
Actions are assigned to individual service areas.  The board assigns responsibility for 
monitoring progress against action plans to the assistant director of finance, despite 
the fact that financial performance is only one dimension of performance measured 
by the PAF.   
This case study establishes a practical relationship between financial and operational 
performance through the role of the assistant director of finance and the implication 
that the director of finance is the executive director with responsibility for 
operational, as well as financial performance.  The normative framework and 
organisational framework of financial performance is applied to operational 
performance, and by extension the operational framework becomes auditable.  The 
imposition of financial management norms onto operational performance lays the 
ground for auditors to transfer their skills into the domain of operational performance 
(Power, 1999:6).   
As noted above at Section 6.2.2, Audit Scotland produced an overview of operational 
NHS performance in 2003/04 (Audit Scotland, 2004a), as well as the regular 
financial overview report (Audit Scotland, 2004b).  The former report was hailed by 
the national audit body as the first comprehensive report on the performance of 
NHSScotland following devolution.   
The 2003/04 reports make an explicit link between financial performance and 
operational performance within the NHS. 
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“NHS financial performance cannot be considered in isolation from overall 
performance and service delivery, so this report should be considered 
alongside our overview report on the performance of the NHS which was 
published in August 2004.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2004b:5) 
This link is reaffirmed in later reports, as readers are invited to read the biannual 
financial overview report alongside the previous year’s broader performance 
overview report (Audit Scotland, 2008:3).  This is perhaps unsurprising in light of 
the publication of the performance overview report but makes clear that the auditor 
considers it necessary to take an integrated approach to assessing the overall 
performance of NHSScotland.   
The integrated performance reports are presented as sitting alongside policy 
documents prepared by the Scottish Executive. 
“The Scottish Executive has recently published Fair to All, Personal to Each 
and Building a Health Service Fit for the Future… This integrated overview 
report complements these publications by providing an independent view of 
where progress is being made and identifying emerging issues which need to 
be addressed.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2006:2, emphasis added) 
Audit Scotland attempts to create a space for itself in the wider policy and 
performance network of NHSScotland, presenting the overview report as a key 
companion to policy documents.   
By producing integrated overview reports, Audit Scotland begins to establish itself as 
a key actor in a multidimensional definition of NHS performance, not just in the 
realms of financial performance.   
6.7.2 Redefining operational performance 
Auditors traditionally provide a view on reports which organisations produce of their 
performance in a certain area or over a given period.  The technical norms of the 
audit process are challenged when organisations do not produce their own 
performance reports.   
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Although NHSScotland introduced a formal PAF in 2001
56
 it did not produce a 
comprehensive report detailing how individual organisations or the NHS as a whole 
performed against the PAF.   
“The SEHD has detailed arrangements in place to hold NHS boards to 
account for their performance.  But at present it does not publish a single 
source of information in a user-friendly format for the public to show how 
NHSScotland is performing against its key targets.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2004a:6) 
Audit Scotland filled this space in the performance assessment network by producing 
an overview of operational performance (Audit Scotland, 2004a).  In doing so, Audit 
Scotland made the performance of NHSScotland auditable.  This resonates with 
other studies of performance audit which show that audit bodies actively construct 
the definition of ‘performance’ in order to support the audit process (Day and Klein, 
1987).   
The first performance overview report explains how Audit Scotland went about 
defining ‘NHS performance’, drawing data from a number of published sources and 
acting as arbiter of the elements of performance which are most important to patients 
and the public.  Significantly, this definition is broader than the formal performance 
management system, which is “taken account of” but is not the primary source of 
information.  This lessens the profile of the PAF in the NHSScotland performance 
network, with the audit definition of performance placed in competition with the 
NHS’ own definition.   
“In planning this report we have taken account of those areas of performance 
that we think are important to patients and to the public in general.  We have 
also taken account of NHSScotland’s performance management system.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2004a:3) 
The auditor narrates the story of performance in NHSScotland.  However, this is not 
a systematic re-telling or even a comprehensive account; Audit Scotland has selected 
the dimensions of performance covered in the overview.   
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The 2004/05 overview report (Audit Scotland, 2005) continues to focus more on 
national-level targets, than on organisation-level targets set by the PAF.  The report 
highlights mis-matches between formal performance targets and data collection 
systems to measure progress towards achieving the target (e.g. reducing smoking in 
young people, Audit Scotland, 2005:6; healthy eating targets, Audit Scotland, 
2005:8; cervical cancer screening, Audit Scotland, 2005:11).  
These factors combine to present a picture of an NHS performance system lacking in 
purpose and focus.  But more significantly, they show how the national audit body 
has produced its own composite definition of NHS performance which is 
independent of the formal performance assessment framework.   
6.7.3 Primary source of performance information 
The overview report is established as a key source of multidimensional performance 
information on the Scottish NHS. 
As the early overview reports purported to be an authoritative source of information 
on NHS reforms including changes to the financial governance framework
57
, so too 
do the later performance overview reports communicate imminent changes to the 
performance management system in NHSScotland, as well as information on how 
the new HEAT system works in practice (Audit Scotland, 2005:39; Audit Scotland, 
2007:13).   
These are factual accounts; Audit Scotland does not offer any views on the proposed 
changes, reinforcing the role of the national audit body as a trusted source of 
reference information on changes to the NHS. 
A full list of current HEAT targets is published as an appendix to the 2006/07 
overview (Audit Scotland, 2007), together with details of whether and where 
performance data is published and an indication of the most recent reported 
performance at national level.  The variety of sources of published data for 
performance against HEAT targets implicitly communicates the lack of coherent 
public reporting of overall performance of the NHS.   
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NHSScotland has established its own comprehensive performance reports (see 
below) by publication of the 2008/09 overview report.  Nevertheless, the audit report 
includes an assessment of whether each HEAT target has been achieved at national 
level.  It highlights in the main body of the text that two targets were not met and that 
a further target was replaced (Audit Scotland, 2009b:21).  Audit Scotland continues 
to have a prominent role in reporting operational performance, even after the Scottish 
Government launches a national performance report.   
The 2008/09 overview report explores the role of performance information in 
discharging local, as well as national, accountability to the public.   
“The HEAT targets are intended to improve the performance and 
accountability of the NHS in Scotland, but it is not easy for the public and 
patients to easily get a comprehensive picture of how the NHS is performing 
at board level.  There is an annual review of each NHS body by the Cabinet 
Secretary, which is held in public, and the Chief Executive of the NHS in 
Scotland’s annual report comments on performance at a national level.  
However, there is currently no single publication or website which pulls 
together how every NHS body is performing against these targets.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2009b:22) 
The national audit body calls for publication of organisation-specific performance 
data to facilitate comprehensive assessment of individual NHS bodies and to improve 
the transparency of organisational performance.  This is a departure from the 
established performance assessment principle in NHSScotland that local 
organisations contribute to the performance of a nationally integrated system.   
NHSScotland annual report 
Having produced its own performance overview reports since the 2003/04 financial 
year, Audit Scotland makes an explicit recommendation in the 2006/07 overview 
report that the SGHD should publish an annual report on its performance.   
“The Scottish Government should ensure that information on the performance 
of the NHS is publicly reported and brings together data on costs, outcomes, 
targets, productivity, patient satisfaction and experience.  It should assess 
performance against all these elements together to better inform decision-
making.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2007:18) 
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The first annual report of NHSScotland since devolution was duly published in 
November 2008, covering the 2007/08 financial year (Scottish Government, 2008a).  
The accompanying press release issued by the Scottish Government opens thus: 
“Today sees the publication of the NHSScotland annual report. 
“This is in response to Audit Scotland's request, in its last Overview Report 
of Scotland's health and NHS performance, that the Scottish Government 
should improve its public performance reporting.” 
(Scottish Government, 2008b) 
Audit Scotland reinforces this link: the 2007/08 overview notes that the decision by 
the SGHD to publish an annual report was a direct consequence of the 
recommendation in the 2006/07 overview report (Audit Scotland, 2008:3).   
This case demonstrates the extent of the national audit body’s influence in the 
performance network of NHSScotland by 2008; a recommendation in the overview 
report led to the introduction of a new comprehensive performance report by the 
Scottish Government.  Furthermore, the Scottish Government explicitly linked the 
introduction of the report to a recommendation made by Audit Scotland.   
This suggests that there is now a self-referential legitimacy relationship between 
Audit Scotland and the Scottish Government; the Scottish Government uses the audit 
recommendation to legitimate the publication of its own performance report, while 
Audit Scotland draws on the action taken by the Scottish Government in response to 
its recommendation to legitimate its earlier findings and reports.  A mutually 
beneficial legitimacy relationship has been established by the audit process, with 
both auditor and auditee deriving legitimacy from the implementation of audit 
recommendations (Free, Salterio and Shearer, 2009).   
6.7.4 Critiquing performance assessment 
As well as providing a source of information on NHS performance, the overview 
reports include comments and recommendations on the prevailing performance 
assessment network.  These comments can raise questions about the substantive 
independence of the national audit body from NHS management and from the 
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government and about the dividing line between commenting on process and 
commenting on policy.   
The overview reports comment on the performance assessment framework in relation 
to established ‘good practice’.  
“…at present not all the measures are relevant to the target they are supposed 
to be measuring…” 
(Audit Scotland, 2007:17) 
“The National Performance Framework includes the adoption of [Single 
Outcome Agreements] between the Scottish Government and councils and 
the abolition of ring-fenced funding for local government.  This could present 
a risk to boards in that they may be accountable for meeting targets for which 
they do not have financial control.  For example, delayed discharge funding 
will be allocated directly to councils and will no longer be ring-fenced.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2008:26) 
Although the scope of the overview report has been expanded, the auditors still make 
recommendations which relate to essentially process, rather than policy, issues.  This 
does not dispel the potential threat to the auditor’s independence, however, as Audit 
Scotland promotes the prevailing accepted performance assessment practice “as if it 
was the one-best way” (Gendron et al, 2001:304) and so potentially excludes 
competing knowledge systems.   
There is evidence in the overview reports that the national audit body favours a 
quantitative definition of performance.  When discussing targets for health 
improvement, Audit Scotland offers the following advice to the Scottish Executive. 
“In setting targets the SEHD should consider how measurable these targets 
are and how it will collect and report progress on a regular basis.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2004a:10, emphasis added) 
The national audit body also notes concerns about the ability of a new body to 
“monitor” progress in the absence of quantitative measures of performance.   
“In 2005 the Scottish Health Council was established to promote 
improvement in the quality and extent of patient focus and public 
involvement in health services.  It will monitor NHS boards’ progress in this 
area and support the development of PPFs (Public Partnership Forums).  
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However, it is difficult to say how progress in patient and public involvement 
will be measured.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2005:41) 
In providing a summary assessment of the PAF as applicable in 2003/04, Audit 
Scotland concludes that: 
“Further work is needed to clarify targets where they are open to different 
interpretation, and improve those that are not measurable or provide an 
incomplete picture of performance…  All targets should be reviewed and 
refined on a regular basis so that they can contribute to continuous 
improvement in services.  In particular the targets relating to health 
improvement and mental health services need attention.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2004a:5) 
This apparent predisposition for quantitative measures of performance resonates with 
the view in the literature that measurability is a precondition for auditability (Power, 
1996:299).  It allows a link to be made between Audit Scotland’s interest in 
operational performance and the trend for auditors to construct performance in terms 
of its own technical norms (Power, 1994a; 1996; 1999).   
The previous quote from the 2003/04 performance overview report sees the auditor 
criticise specific performance targets for not being effective in improving services.  
The level of potential controversy attached to this statement depends upon whether 
targets are considered to be instruments of policy or managerial tools.  If the former, 
it is questionable in constitutional terms whether the auditor should offer a view. 
Regardless, it demonstrates that the interest of the auditor extends beyond the 
verification of performance data to the underlying purpose of the performance 
assessment framework.  Indeed, it is questionable whether the national audit body 
has any interest in verifying performance data; this proposition will be considered in 
more detail below at Section 6.8.1.   
The auditor also questions the appropriateness of the threshold level of performance 
attached to a target.  For example, the Scottish Executive set a target that 80% of 
eligible women should be regularly screened for cervical cancer, but actual 




“This is good news, but it raises the question of whether the target is 
challenging enough.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2004a:38) 
This shows an interest in the substance of the performance assessment framework, as 
well as its control framework.   
Criticism of performance targets continues in the discussion in the 2003/04 
performance overview report (Audit Scotland, 2004a:19) of commitments given by 
the Scottish Executive to increase NHS staffing over a four year period.  These 
commitments were set out by the Executive in the partnership agreement document
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produced by the Labour / Liberal Democrat coalition administration following 
elections to the Scottish Parliament in May 2003.  This agreement summarised the 
joint policy priorities of the coalition, setting out specific priorities for the NHS.  
These are not, therefore, managerial performance targets set by central government 
officials to direct the operations and outcomes of public bodies under their control, 
but the high level political policies of the ruling administration. 
Audit Scotland has interpreted political commitments as performance targets and 
offers criticism of these as if they were specific targets on organisations; political 
promises have been transformed into auditable performance targets.   
The commitments or targets relate to increasing the size of three NHS staff groups: 
600 extra consultants, 12,000 more nurses and midwives and 1,500 more allied 
health professionals.  Audit Scotland (2004a:19) highlights that no unit of 
measurement has been allocated to these subjects, that there is no consideration as to 
which specialties the new posts should be created in or to how these extra 
professionals should be distributed around the country.  While these would be valid 
comments for an auditor to make about managerial performance targets, it is 
questionable whether they remain appropriate when directed at high level political 
commitments.  They could be interpreted as a further attempt to reduce political 
governance of the health service to auditable performance targets (Gendron et al, 
2001; Power, 1996, 1999).   
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 A Partnership for a Better Scotland (Scottish Executive, 2003) available at 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2003/05/17150/21952 (accessed on 1 September 2011) 
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Audit Scotland also uses the overview reports to express the views of NHS 
stakeholders on the performance assessment framework, which enables the 
communication of judgement on the current system without the national audit body 
threatening its independence by commenting directly on the effectiveness of the 
system.   
“Auditors report that most NHS boards have found the PAF indicators to be 
helpful in reviewing and assessing their performance.  One NHS body found 
that the indicators provide more robust measures of performance than 
previous performance measurement systems, although another considered 
there was a balance to be struck in achieving high performance against a 
particular PAF indicator and the cost of achieving that high performance.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2003b:26) 
The 2006/07 overview report highlights the inherent paradox in presenting HEAT as 
a tool for NHSScotland to discharge accountability for its performance to the public. 
“The HEAT targets are intended to improve the performance and 
accountability of the NHS in Scotland, but there is no publicly available 
information on performance against the following [three] targets…” 
(Audit Scotland, 2007:17) 
The national audit body is thus interested in the purpose, as well as the content of, 
the performance assessment framework.   
There is evidence throughout the overview reports that the national audit body holds 
opinions on, and seeks to influence, the process of performance assessment and that 
it favours a measurable concept of performance.  This interest broadens into how 
performance assessment is used to drive improvement and also to discharge public 
accountability.  The national audit body thus seeks to influence not only process, but 
also content and use of performance assessment technologies.   
6.7.5 Considering outcomes 
In the 2006/07 overview report, Audit Scotland articulates the expansion of the remit 
of the performance overview beyond operational performance management.  The 
scope of the report is expanded beyond the process of NHS performance 




“This report provides an overview of the health of people living in Scotland 
and the performance and financial management of the NHS in Scotland.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2007:3, emphasis added) 
In reality, this analysis corresponds to presenting statistical data on health outcomes 
but in a way more akin to the annual report produced by Directors of Public Health 
than to reports on operational performance.  It represents a shift away from the 
traditional professional domain of a national audit body into a clinical domain.   
This interest had been hinted at in previous overview reports.  In the 2003/04 
performance overview (Audit Scotland, 2004a), Audit Scotland discusses how 
NHSScotland is performing against the three clinical priorities identified by the 
Scottish Executive
59
.  The auditor comments on improvements made to health 
outcomes and offers an assessment of whether long term improvement targets are 
likely to be achieved.   
Nevertheless, the auditor is now commenting upon the state of the nation’s health; 
national audit bodies are traditionally considered experts on public financial 
management, financial control and increasingly public management more generally 
(Gendron et al., 2007) and so would not normally be considered authorities on health 
outcomes.   
This section has shown how Audit Scotland developed its interest in performance 
from collating performance data and commenting on the process of performance 
assessment through to commenting on the substance of NHS performance.  The next 
section explores the emerging role of the national audit body as commentator.   
6.8 Auditor as commentator 
This section presents evidence of the evolution of the national audit body to 
authoritative commentator on NHSScotland performance.  There are three particular 
sources of evidence: offering opinions on activities and systems which have not been 
subject to audit procedures; an increasing focus on future performance; and a new 
focus on the wider fiscal environment.   
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6.8.1 Opinions which are not supported by audit work 
In evaluating the role of the national audit body in relation to the operational 
performance of the NHS, it is important to consider the presence or absence of 
traditional audit functions, as well as the material presented in the overview reports.  
In the course of analysing performance and cost data published by the NHS, Audit 
Scotland identifies weaknesses in current systems for data collection.   
“The Scottish Health Service Costs Book… publishes costs for the NHS each 
year… based on figures provided by NHS bodies but there are questions 
about their reliability…   
“This is an issue that NHSScotland needs to address.  It is difficult to 
demonstrate value for money without accurate costs.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2004a:30) 
It is not clear that the auditor is taking any action to provide assurance over this key 
performance data.  If financial statement production were to be taken as an analogous 
situation, you would expect the auditor to independently verify the data produced by 
performance measurement systems, either by substantively verifying that data or 
reviewing the systems used to collect and record that data.  In this instance the audit 
body presents itself as a commentator on reported substantive performance, rather 
than a conduit for assuring the accuracy or validity of the underlying performance 
data.   
There is no evidence in the overview reports that external auditors undertook any 
form of controls testing or other audit-based review of the arrangements 
implemented by Trusts and Boards to measure performance and report on 
performance against PAF or HEAT indicators.   
There are further examples earlier in this analysis of the national audit body 
considering specific issues in the overview reports which have not been subject to 
audit testing or other means of verification, including the introduction of recurring 
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financial position as a key component of financial performance
60
, reporting of 
efficiency savings
61
, and reporting of operational performance measures
62
.   
The national audit body has made the domain of operational performance subject to 
audit interest, but not in a traditional sense as the principles of audit have not been 
applied.  Instead, the auditor has rendered itself interested in operational 
performance, but at the same time has redefined its own role in the performance 
network.  Rather than verifying performance data or the systems that generate 
reported performance data, the auditor has chosen to establish itself as a 
commentator on, and often critic of, NHS performance.   
6.8.2 Future financial outlook 
Even the early NHS overview reports make some reference to future financial 
performance, including assessments of the risks underlying delivery of organisational 
financial plans
63
 and an overall judgement on the financial outlook for NHSScotland.  
For example, following the injection of additional funding by the Scottish Executive, 
the Auditor General warns that “the additional funding will not necessarily solve the 
financial problems faced by the NHS” (Audit Scotland, 2003a:45). 
The 2003/04 financial overview report (Audit Scotland, 2004b) includes a separate 
section on emerging factors that may affect future financial performance.  This is the 
longest section in the 2003/04 financial overview
64
, suggesting that Audit Scotland is 
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financial overview report. 
Part 1. Setting the scene 4 pages 
Part 2. Financial performance in 2003/04 7 pages 
Part 3. Emerging factors that may affect future financial performance 9 pages 




promoting its role in relation to assessing future financial performance above its role 
in providing retrospective assurance on historic financial performance.   
6.8.3 Commenting on the fiscal environment 
The 2008/09 operational performance overview report “examines the implications 
for the NHS of the current economic climate and how the NHS is placed to respond 
to the challenges ahead” (Audit Scotland, 2009b:3).  This marks an expansion of 
audit interest from financial and operational performance to the fiscal environment.  
The role of Audit Scotland in relation to financial performance has advanced again, 
from expert on financial management to key commentator on the readiness of the 
NHS to respond to the financial challenges associated with the overall fiscal climate.   
The NHS overview report recognises and highlights the new focus. 
“In previous years, the annual NHS overview report has described the 
finances and performance of the NHS in relation to the ongoing cost 
pressures it faces.  We comment in this report not just on cost pressures 
within the NHS but also on the operational challenges for the NHS.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2009b:5) 
The publication of the 2008/09 NHS overview report came shortly after publication 
of Scotland’s public finances: preparing for the future (Audit Scotland, 2009a) 
which broadened the scope of Audit Scotland performance audit studies to include a 
macro-level analysis of the wider fiscal environment and the impact which it has on 
the delivery of public finances. 
“Scotland’s public finances: preparing for the future contains an overview of 
the financial environment in Scotland and the pressures and challenges facing 
the public sector…  It suggests some key questions for the Scottish 
Government, the Parliament and the wider public sector to consider when 
planning the delivery of public services in a time of severe resource 
constraints…  The aim of this report is to help inform the debate on the future 
of public finances in Scotland.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2009a:5, emphasis added) 
The evolution of the role of Audit Scotland in relation to the performance of the NHS 
is located within a wider development of the identity of the national body, which is 
repositioning its work across the whole of the Scottish public sector.   
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As the focus of the 2008/09 performance overview shifts to the sustainability of the 
NHS in a time of fiscal constraint, there is a step-change in the discussion of 
financial performance.  Achievement of financial targets in the previous year 
becomes secondary to a wider-ranging discussion of financial challenges facing the 
NHS.  Likewise, the discussion of wider operational performance issues is located 
very much in the context of the financial environment.   
The 2008/09 overview report (Audit Scotland, 2009b) arguably severs the last links 
between the overview report and the external audits of NHS bodies: there is no 
discussion within the report of either external auditors’ opinions on NHS financial 
statements or the achievement of statutory financial targets by NHS bodies. 
The 2009/10 overview report continues to consider macro-level financial issues.  It 
presents a comprehensive picture of the demographic and cost pressures facing 
NHSScotland, drawing on data from Scottish Government and other statistical 
publications (Audit Scotland, 2010:13-5). 
The auditor also voices concerns on the impact of financial decision-making on 
frontline services.   
“This [efficiency target for 2009/10] presents a significant challenge for 
many NHS bodies, and their auditors have stated that it will be difficult for 
some to achieve the required level of savings without any negative impact on 
the services they provide.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2009b:11) 
While not necessarily highlighting that this is in direct opposition to the official 
position of the Scottish Government, it nonetheless positions the auditor as a 
competing authority as Ministers had repeatedly promised that frontline services 
would not be adversely impacted by efficiency savings targets.   
Another example of this implicit disagreement with policy decisions is staffing 
policy. 
“The Auditor General for Scotland commented in his report on Scotland’s 
public finances [Audit Scotland, 2009a] that without the flexibility to 
redeploy or reduce staffing levels or rationalise the assets used to deliver 
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services, public bodies have limited discretion to reduce their costs while 
maintaining the levels of front-line services they provide.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2009b:11,13) 
The Cabinet Secretary for Health and Wellbeing would later provide an unqualified 
guarantee to all NHS staff that there would be no compulsory redundancies over the 
life of the Parliament.  There is now a very public disagreement between the Scottish 
Government and the Auditor General on financial strategy for the NHS.   
The 2009/10 financial overview report calls into question the Scottish Government 
budget policy of ‘ring-fencing’ the health budget, drawing on evidence provided to 
the Scottish Parliament Finance Committee
65
 by the Auditor General for Scotland 
and external sources. 
“… The Auditor General invited MSPs to ‘consider the longer-term 
implications of ring-fencing NHS funding’.  In response to questions about 
whether any spending area should be protected from real terms cuts, the 
Auditor General advised: ‘that excluding any specific sector from the 
requirement to deliver services more efficiently represented a missed 
opportunity and that the public sector needs to ensure it has a priority-based 
approach to budgeting and spending’.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2010c:15) 
To provide support for this position, the overview report includes direct quotations 
from the Independent Budget Review set up by the Scottish Government to inform 
the budget-setting process for 2010/11 (Audit Scotland, 2010c:15-6).   
The Auditor General is commenting upon the merits of macro fiscal policy decisions, 
not the value for money of decisions taken by specific public sector organisations or 
the financial control and governance frameworks.  He is inviting MSPs to support his 
own view, which is in direct competition to the official view of the Scottish 
Government.   
In doing so, the Auditor General establishes his position as an authoritative 
commentator on macro-level financial policy, not just value for money, regularity 
and control at organisational level.  Rather than focusing upon the impact which the 
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relative protection of the Health budget will have upon NHSScotland, the overview 
report questions the merit of this policy decision. 
This is a new type of conflict; it relates to current financial strategy and is essentially 
subjective and judgement-based.   
The national audit body is now established as an authoritative commentator, having 
re-defined itself as an influential outside commentator pronouncing judgement on 
public services, from the role of outside expert imposing its own norms on to 
NHSScotland performance.  Is this evidence of a post-‘audit society’ approach taken 
by national audit bodies, who have evolved beyond the role of modernising agents 
imposing NPM philosophies and techniques (Gendron et al, 2001; Skaerbaek, 2009) 
to assume an elevated position as ultimate critic of NHS performance? 
The capacity for the national audit body to become an authoritative commentator on 
NHS performance and financial strategy is still to be fully explored in the academic 
literature.   
6.9 Reflections and concluding remarks 
6.9.1 Key findings and reflections 
This chapter traces the transformation of the identity of the national audit body in 
relation to the performance of NHSScotland over the first 10 years of the Scottish 
Parliament.   
The national audit body was transformed from an independent body holding the 
government and public services to account for financial results (Hollingsworth et al, 
1998), through a period as an agent of change in NHSScotland (Gendron et al, 2007; 
Skaerbaek, 2009), to an authoritative commentator on the financial and operational 
performance of the NHS.   
This transformation is evidenced through changes in the form and content of the 
NHS overview reports.  The early overview reports are first person accounts of the 
collective findings of NHS audit activity, presented to Parliament and the public by 
the Auditor General of Scotland.  The narrative style of the reports shifted with the 
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introduction of third person narration as the overall style of reporting became more 
corporate, in keeping with the role of the audit body as an agent of change, close to a 
management consultant (Gendron et al, 2007; Skaerbaek, 2009).  The overview 
reports ultimately became a platform for communicating judgements on the 
performance of the NHS, which were not necessarily based on the findings of 
conventional audit activity.   
The content of the overview reports underwent a parallel transformation: the initial 
reports are recognisable as “traditional” audit reports, discussing the appropriateness 
of accounting judgements, financial reporting decisions and weaknesses in systems 
and controls identified through routine audit testing.  Over time, the interest of these 
reports broadened to include the reported financial performance of NHS bodies, how 
the reported performance had been achieved and the fiscal and environmental factors 
which influenced financial performance. 
The previous chapter found that Audit Scotland was not given a formal role in the 
performance assessment network of NHSScotland.  This chapter has shown that 
Audit Scotland created its own role in that network by reporting on operational, as 
well as financial, performance, and by introducing its own definition of operational 
performance.  The national audit body was thus able to exert a greater influence on 
the operational performance of NHS bodies than envisaged by the official policy 
narrative.   
6.9.2 Implications for the Audit Society 
This study highlights three important developments in the Audit Society: the way in 
which a national audit body creates its own space in the performance network by 
rendering operational performance “auditable”; the propensity of the national audit 
body to make assertions which are not supported by conventional audit testing; and 
the previously undocumented role for the national audit body as commentator on the 
performance of public services.   
Audit Scotland adopted a proactive role in reporting in the financial and operational 
performance of the NHS in Scotland and in so doing became the primary source of 
published information on NHS performance following the introduction of the 
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biannual performance overview report.  The NHS did not produce its own overview 
report at that time and so Audit Scotland made that performance auditable (Power, 
1996; 1999).  Audit Scotland rejected the prevailing official performance assessment 
framework and created its own broader definition of performance, thus influencing 
how external parties conceived the performance of NHSScotland.   
The national audit body not only drew on existing concepts of NHS performance, but 
began to introduce its own measures.  For example, it reported on the underlying 
financial health of NHS organisations based on a measurement of the organisations’ 
recurring financial position.  Significantly, Audit Scotland did not “audit” these 
measures, but rather made judgements based on unaudited reports provided by NHS 
organisations.   
This has implications for society’s relationship with audit and the reliance placed on 
audit as a source of verification of reported performance, be it in the form of 
financial statements or operational performance measures.  The transparency which 
audit is designed to uphold can become obscured when auditors begin to make public 
statements which are not supported by conventional audit procedures.  While it is not 
new for performance auditing to define performance (Day and Klein, 1987; Everett, 
2003; Lindeberg, 2007), the propensity for auditors to make pronouncements which 
are not supported by testing is and needs to be better publicly understood if audit is 
to maintain its credibility as a provider of independent assurance and accountability.   
Audit Scotland thus establishes itself as a trusted commentator on the financial and 
operational performance of individual NHS organisations and on the wider public 
finances.  This is a departure from the existing literature which has generally focused 
on the capacity of audit bodies to promote the introduction of managerial reforms 
through a role akin to a management consultant.   
While the evolution of the national audit body to commentator is not necessarily 
damaging to public accountability, it does have significant implications for the 
constitutional role of public audit and creates a distance between public audit 
practices and accepted technical definitions of audit as embodied in professional 
standards.  This is arguably a new form of auditing which draws on a body of 
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professional expertise and experience.  It could herald a natural evolution of an audit 
society which prioritises the assurance provided by the auditor above all other 
sources and thus represent the ultimate assertion of the value of the programmatic 
dimension of audit over the technical (Power, 1999:6-8).   
The role of national audit body as commentator deserves to be explored further in 
other institutional and political contexts to determine whether it is a product of the 
Scottish system or symptomatic of an emerging international trend.   
6.9.3 Further issues to be explored 
The present study has traced how Audit Scotland’s role in the NHSScotland 
performance network evolved over time.  While it was beyond the scope of this study 
to consider why the national audit body evolved in this way, there is clearly scope for 
future research to explore why Audit Scotland has defined its role in a different way 
from other UK audit bodies and from other international audit institutions.   
In particular, the precise source of Audit Scotland’s influence on the Scottish public 
sector, including the NHS, is under-researched.  There is room to consider, for 
example, whether this influence is related to the relatively small and intimate 
parliamentary and governmental networks in Scotland and the extent to which it is 
driven by the personal leadership of a particular Auditor General.   
It was also beyond the scope of the present study to explore the relationship between 
Audit Scotland and the Scottish Parliament in discharging and upholding democratic 
accountability for the financial and operational performance of public services.  
Future research could build on these findings by studying the use which the Scottish 
Parliament makes of Audit Scotland findings and how they are used to hold the 
executive arm of government to account. 
 
The next chapter presents a case study of a recent performance crisis in 
NHSScotland, which explores the role of audit and the national audit body in 
diagnosing and remedying performance failures, alongside other key actors in the 
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This chapter explores the official response to a recent performance crisis in the 
Scottish NHS.  In the face of increasing evidence that NHS Lothian, a large NHS 
board, had deployed gaming tactics in order to report compliance with national 
waiting time targets, the Scottish Government looked to audit to both diagnose and 
provide solutions to the problem.  Earlier chapters have shown that there is no formal 
role for audit in the NHSScotland performance framework and the relationship 
between the executive and NHS bodies in the first three terms of the Scottish 
Parliament could be characterised as ‘high trust’.  But nevertheless, audit proved to 
be the first line policy response when a performance crisis arose. 
This case study analyses documents which trace the official response to the crisis, 
including:  
 media reports from October 2011, when the story broke in The Sunday Times 
newspaper,
66
 to May 2012, when Audit Scotland announced its intention to 
undertake a national review of waiting time management in NHSScotland; 
 written parliamentary questions tabled by Members of the Scottish Parliament 
and answers provided by Scottish Ministers;  
 the ‘official record’ of ministerial statements and debates on this issue in the 
Scottish Parliament; 
 audit and management reports, including an independent review carried out at 
NHS Lothian; and 
 NHS Lothian board papers and minutes of public board meetings at which the 
waiting time management issue was considered. 
The research design and strategy are influenced by Latour’s (1987, 2005) account of 
ANT; the aim is to reassemble the key associations between actors in order to present 
a rich account of both the performance crisis and the official response. 
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This study is not concerned with the performance crisis per se; gaming of 
performance targets by NHS managers has received extensive coverage in the 
literature (e.g. Bevan and Hood, 2006).  Rather, the primary focus of the present 
study is on the use of audit technologies, otherwise conspicuous by their absence in 
the standing performance assessment framework, as the main policy response to a 
performance crisis.   
 
7.2 Background 
7.2.1 ‘New Ways’ of managing patient waiting times in NHSScotland 
In 2004, the then Scottish Executive announced its intention to introduce a new 
methodology for defining, recording and measuring patient waiting times (Scottish 
Executive, 2004).  The ‘New Ways’ methodology was introduced with effect from 1 
January 2008 to improve the transparency, consistency and fairness of waiting time 
management (NHS National Services Scotland, 2007) in light of concerns NHS 
boards were making inappropriate use of ‘availability status codes’ to take some 
patients outside waiting times guarantees.   
These codes could be exploited by NHS boards to ensure that they could report 
delivery of national performance targets.  Such behaviour could render the waiting 
time guarantee meaningless for the individual, while NHS bodies could report 
achievement of national targets.  Opposition politicians argued that widespread use 
of availability status codes had led to the creation of ‘hidden waiting lists’, which 
undermined the veracity of reported waiting time statistics. 
The Scottish Executive summarised the principles of the new methodology in Fair to 
All, Personal to Each. 
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“By the end of 2007, the NHS in Scotland will calculate patients’ waiting 
times on a different basis that will be fairer, more open to scrutiny, more 
understandable, and which will help put patients at the centre of their care.  
Waiting times will be calculated from the date a patient is placed on the 
waiting list to the date of an outpatient appointment or hospital admission for 
treatment.  Availability status codes – which at present mean that some 
patients waiting for highly specialised or low priority treatment have to wait 
longer than the guaranteed maximum times – will be abolished.  Patients who 
are waiting for such treatments will be admitted within the same maximum 
waiting times period as all other patients.  Patients will have any periods of 
unavailability for medical, social or personal reasons subtracted from the 
calculated waiting time.  Periods of unavailability will be reviewed regularly, 
so that no-one will remain unavailable for treatment for more than 3 months 
without a check on their status.” 
(Scottish Executive, 2004: 9) 
As well as ending the use of availability status codes, ‘New Ways’ introduced 
another three key changes to waiting time management (NHS National Services 
Scotland, 2007): 
 Introduction of a consistent ‘reasonable offer’ of appointment or admission, 
subject to national definition and guidance on interpretation. 
 Introduction of national guidance on how to deal with patients who could not 
or did not attend their appointment once they had accepted a ‘reasonable 
offer’ of appointment or admission. 
 National guidance on dealing with patients who are unavailable for treatment 
for medical or social reasons but have yet to be assigned a date for their 
appointment or admission.  Periods of unavailability can be subtracted from 
the patient’s reported waiting time.   
The ‘New Ways’ waiting times methodology was proposed and conceived by the 
Labour / Liberal Democrat coalition administration in the second session of the 
Scottish Parliament (2003-07), but was implemented by the Scottish National Party 
(SNP) minority administration in the third session of the Parliament (2007-11).   
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7.2.2 Introduction of 18 week referral to treatment target 
The SNP administration quickly introduced more demanding waiting time standards 
after taking office in May 2007.  Within weeks, Nicola Sturgeon, the new Cabinet 
Secretary for Health and Wellbeing, announced the introduction of a “new and 
ambitious target for NHS waiting times: a new whole journey waiting time target of 
18 weeks from general practitioner referral to treatment…  It will drive the 
transformation of NHS services and will put NHS Scotland at the forefront of 
international best practice.  The action plan will set out how we intend to meet the 
target by December 2011.”
 67
   
This was a significant shift from previous policy where separate waiting time targets 
were in place for the period from GP referral to outpatient appointment and then 
from outpatient appointment to admission for treatment.  At the time of the June 
2007 announcement, each stage carried a maximum waiting time of 18 weeks, 
effectively allowing for a 36 week patient journey from GP referral to admission. 
The Scottish Government (2008c) subsequently published detailed guidance which 
explained the practical application of the new methodology and created a national 
programme board and associated operational infrastructure to ensure delivery of the 
18 week standard across Scotland by 2011. 
7.2.3 National audit activity 
Audit Scotland (2010a) undertook a performance audit of waiting list management in 
NHS Scotland, which focused upon NHS Boards’ compliance with the ‘New Ways’ 
guidance.  The study found that the ‘New Ways’ methodology had been successful in 
stopping patients waiting indefinitely for treatment and that the NHS had “done well 
to implement and support the new arrangements” (ibid, p. 13).   
However, the national audit body found evidence of variation in the interpretation of 
national guidance at local level, particularly where patients did not or could not 
attend their appointment, as well as evidence of gaps in the recording of some 
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information required to demonstrate full compliance with the ‘New Ways’ guidance, 
i.e. there was an incomplete audit trail.   
The report identified five key recommendations for NHS boards, including: 
“[NHS boards should] record all New Ways data, including information on 
patient reviews and transfers, to ensure that all patients are being managed in 
line with the guidance and that this is demonstrated in a clear way.”  
(Audit Scotland, 2010a:5) 
The review methodology included analysis of national data, a survey of all NHS 
boards, review of a sample of patient information, conducting a patient survey and 
focus groups, and interviewing staff at a sample of four NHS Boards, including NHS 
Lothian. 
Alongside the main report, Audit Scotland published a supplement for non-executive 
Board members to provide them with a list of issues and questions they may wish to 
satisfy themselves were being adequately addressed locally (Audit Scotland, 2010b).  
Audit Scotland published a “twelve-month summary impact report” as a follow up to 
the 2010 performance audit on NHS waiting list management (Audit Scotland, 
2011b).  This impact report summarised the findings of the original review, analysed 
media and parliamentary reaction to the report, discussed the impact which the report 
had upon national policy and what further actions were required to fully address 
concerns which it had raised in the 2010 report. 
The impact report noted the number of instances of media coverage and report 
downloads from the Audit Scotland website three and twelve months after 
publication of the original report.  The report noted that “the amount of media 
coverage is slightly less that (sic) what was expected given the report topic.  In the 
twelve months since publication there were 34 media items; this compares to an 
average of 47 media items from other similar Audit Scotland reports” (Audit 
Scotland, 2011b:3).  This implies a relatively benign media response to the original 
performance audit.   
The impact report returned to the 2010 finding regarding “gaps in recording data 
about reviews of patients who are unavailable [for treatment]…  This made it 
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difficult to demonstrate that boards are managing all patients in the right way” (Audit 
Scotland, 2011b:1).  The review of parliamentary scrutiny of the 2010 report 
indicates that politicians did not consider this finding in detail, but focused instead on 
findings relating to the recording of, and provision of information to, patients with 
additional needs, and measures which could be introduced to reduce the number of 
patients who do not attend their scheduled appointments.   
The impact report highlights that eight NHS boards discussed the report at a board 
meeting, with the remaining six boards noting publication of the report for 
information only.  The original report included a self-assessment checklist for boards 
to improve waiting list management.  The impact report found that only five NHS 
boards completed the checklist, of which three developed an action plan as a result. 
The overall tone of the impact report suggests that the performance audit had less of 
an impact than anticipated by Audit Scotland, both in the media and within NHS 
boards.  Having conducted a full performance audit in 2010 and a follow up impact 
report in 2011, the national audit body did not hold any significant concerns about 
waiting time management practices in NHSScotland as of June 2011.  The impact 
report concludes that “there should not be any need to conduct a follow up study in 
the foreseeable future” (Audit Scotland, 2011b:6).   
 
7.3 Allegations of inappropriate waiting time management practices 
7.3.1 Newspaper reports 
On 23 October 2011, the front page of the Scottish edition of The Sunday Times 
newspaper
68
 carried the headline “Waiting lists fudged”.  The story revealed that: 
“Officials at NHS Lothian, one of Scotland’s largest health boards, admitted 
that dozens of patients have been offered surgery in Harrogate, in North 
Yorkshire, in recent months...  All of them declined, allowing the board to 
exclude them from a list of patients not treated within a government target of 
18 weeks.” 
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 alleged that patients were offered treatment in English hospitals in the 
knowledge that it was unlikely that patients would accept the offer; patients could 
then be marked as “unavailable for treatment” and would not be included in reported 
performance against national targets.  Such practices allowed managers to avoid 
breaches of national waiting time standards.  NHS Lothian defended the practice, 
indicating that such offers were only made in a small number of cases and that the 
Board had “an excellent track record in meeting our waiting times targets.  The 
practice is about providing fast and effective care for our patients, and not about 
geographical boundaries”. 
Opposition politicians inferred from the story that NHS Lothian had engaged in 
gaming of waiting time targets, as illustrated by quotes attributed to them in the 
report.   
“It is deeply worrying that hard-working NHS staff are being forced, either 
by the SNP government or by health boards, to fiddle waiting-time figures 
like this.” 
Jackie Baillie MSP, Scottish Labour, Shadow Cabinet Secretary for Health, 
Wellbeing and Cities Strategy (emphasis added) 
“These cases are deeply concerning and show a lack of respect towards NHS 
patients.  By offering appointments in locations that are too far to travel to 
they are not providing any real choice and some patients will be forced to 
decline them…  To doctor the statistics in this way is totally unacceptable 
and it must be stamped out.” 
Murdo Fraser MSP, then Deputy Leader of the Scottish Conservatives and 
spokesperson for Health and Wellbeing (emphasis added) 
An unnamed medical consultant employed by NHS Lothian regarded the practice as 
a way of ‘massaging’ reported figures. 
“Patients are being offered appointments they simply will not accept.   
“They don’t realise that, for health board purposes, their refusal is marked 
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A spokesperson for the Scottish branch of the British Medical Association stops 
short of characterising the practice as gaming of waiting time targets, instead taking 
the opportunity to attack the underlying targets: “this type of activity would appear to 
demonstrate the efforts that boards feel they have to go to in order to comply with 
inflexible targets”. 
Opposition politicians call upon the Scottish Government to launch an investigation 
into the practice, demanding to know if other NHS Boards engage in similar 
practices.  But the Scottish Government does not concede that the actions taken by 
NHS Lothian constituted the manipulation of waiting time figures, either knowingly 
or unintentionally.  A spokesperson is thus quoted: 
“Patients in Scotland are benefiting from the lowest ever waiting times in 
years.  Those offered treatment further from home, but who choose to be 
treated locally, remain on the waiting list and are treated within NHS 
guidelines.” 
The Sunday Times story was recycled in the local newspaper
71
 the following day but 
there was no further coverage of the initial story elsewhere in the national press.   
7.3.2 Newspaper report taken to Parliament 
The issue at NHS Lothian is brought into the political spotlight a few days later when 
Richard Simpson, a Labour MSP and former general medical practitioner and 
consultant psychiatrist, asked the First Minister at First Minister’s Questions on 
Thursday 27 October 2011
72
 whether the Scottish Government would investigate the 
claims made in The Sunday Times article.   
The First Minister admits to the Parliament that initial findings from an internal 
investigation underway at NHS Lothian suggested that the offer of treatment in 
England did not constitute a ‘reasonable offer’ in accordance with the New Ways 
guidance.  He informed the Parliament that the Chief Executive of NHS Lothian had 
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ordered a full investigation and that a copy of the final report would be submitted to 
the Cabinet Secretary for Health, Wellbeing and Cities Strategy.   
The supplementary (follow up) question posed by Dr Simpson asked whether the 
Scottish Government would “undertake a review of the new ways waiting times 
initiative to ensure that no gaming is taking place in other areas of Scotland.”  The 
First Minister responded that “there is now transparency, so the Cabinet Secretary 
[for Health, Wellbeing and Cities Strategy] does that as a matter of course”
73
.   
This exchange highlights two contrasting views on the need for independent scrutiny 
of waiting time management as a result of the failure of one organisation to fully 
comply with national guidance.  The ruling government maintains that this is an 
isolated case and that existing governance arrangements prevent the gaming of 
targets, thus there is no need for a further review.  However, opposition politicians 
make the case for a wider investigation to provide robust evidence that the practice 
deployed by NHS Lothian is, in fact, an isolated case and the integrity of national 
waiting time performance is not under threat.  In the very early days, the government 
does not accept that any external scrutiny or audit is required, in line with the 
prevailing policy theme in Scotland that NHS organisations can be trusted to 
accurately report performance without the need for third party assurance. 
The ensuing national media coverage focuses on demands for an independent review: 
The Herald newspaper reports the aforementioned exchange at First Minister’s 
Questions under the headline “Demand for waiting list inquiry”
74
 carrying a quote 
from Dr Richard Simpson MSP that “we need a full Scotland-wide investigation into 
the SNP’s hidden waiting-list scandal”.   
The focus of the review shifts within a couple of days.  The Sunday Times follows up 
its initial report a week later by reporting on plans by NHS Lothian to refer a large 
number of patients to private hospitals in order to comply with national waiting time 
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targets.  The Scottish Labour Party again calls for “a full, independent, Scotland-
wide investigation”
75
.   
That report does not carry any official statement from the Scottish Government but 
does state that the practice of offering patients surgery in England “was described 
last week as ‘unreasonable’ by Alex Salmond, the first minister, in a statement to the 
Scottish Parliament”.   
Detailed review of the Official Report of the exchange in the Scottish Parliament 
between the First Minister and Dr Simpson
76
 reveals that the First Minister referred 
to initial findings from the internal investigation at NHS Lothian that the Board “did 
not make its patients a reasonable offer” (emphasis added).  This is a technical term 
defined in the New Ways guidance.  The First Minister did not pass judgement on 
either the practice or NHS Lothian in the parliamentary chamber.  The newspaper 
report transforms a factual statement on compliance with official guidance into a 
value judgement by the most senior politician in devolved Scotland.  The newspaper 
report has the potential to influence wider opinions and actions by inferring direct 
criticism of the Board’s practices by the ruling government.  
A further report in the same edition of The Sunday Times considers the internal 
inquiry launched by NHS Lothian “after The Sunday Times raised concern that 
figures for waiting times were being fiddled by staff”
77
.  A newspaper report, a 
seemingly inanimate object, has triggered a series of actions.  A single page of 
newsprint has given rise to an organisational investigation by one of the largest 
public bodies in Scotland which is to be reported to government ministers, and 
discussion in the Scottish Parliament, including pronouncements by the most senior 
politician in devolved Scotland. 
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7.4 Initial official response by NHS Lothian 
7.4.1 Response by Lothian NHS Board 
Lothian NHS Board met on Wednesday 23 November 2011, the first public meeting 
of the board since the story on waiting time management broke.   
Board meetings are held in public with minutes and papers made available on the 
Board’s website
78
.  At the time the initial allegations were reported, ‘delivering 
waiting times’ was a standing item on the agenda of board meetings.  Management 
presented board members with a short report under this item.   
The ‘delivering waiting times’ reports were co-produced by the business manager 
and associate director of strategic planning, and presented to board members by the 
interim director of strategic planning who is the executive lead in this area.  The 
executive lead has responsibility, inter alia, for performance reporting across the 
organisation, but not for delivery of the underlying services which are the subject of 
the performance measures.   
The reports produced for the September and November 2011 meetings were 
reviewed in detail in order to understand whether the newspaper reports and internal 
inquiry had brought about any change in board reporting practices.   
Both reports summarise targets and latest performance statistics for each waiting 
time target, of which elective procedures covered by the 18 weeks referral to 
treatment (RTT) standard is just one.  An ‘assessment’ is included in the report to 
show whether the Board is meeting the milestone set for each target.   
The reports show that reported performance against the 18 week RTT standard 
improved marginally between September and November 2011, from 90.3% to 90.6% 
(against milestone targets of 83.3% and 85% respectively).   
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Neither report provides any detailed data on how targets are met, or indeed the 
number of patients who are currently coded as ‘unavailable’ for medical or social 
reasons.   
The report for the November meeting makes an implicit reference to the issues raised 
by The Sunday Times reports: 
“As from October 2011 patients are no longer being offered treatment in 
England.  The Medical Director is currently leading a review group to ensure 
future practice is strictly in line with Scottish Government guidance on New 
Ways. 
The Board’s Chief Operating Officer is reviewing capacity locally to ensure 
that this is maximised.  As well as this, contact has been made with other 
surrounding NHS boards to source any additional capacity that they may have 
available.” 
This is the only written reference in the public Board papers to recent media and 
parliamentary attention on the organisation’s waiting time management practices.   
The published minutes of the discussions held under the ‘delivering waiting times’ 
items at the September and November board meetings are both essentially summaries 
of the written report presented to the meeting.  There is no written record of 
substantive comment or challenge by non-executive board members on performance 
against the 18 week RTT standard, or any other waiting time target, at either 
meeting.  The minute of the discussion at each meeting runs to five paragraphs and, 
in both cases, is shorter than the discussion of other ‘performance reports’ included 
on the agenda (see table 7.1 below).   
Table 7.1: Numbers of paragraphs included in minutes of Lothian NHS Board 
meetings held on 28 September 2011 and 23 November 2011 in respect of the four 
standing items included on the agenda under ‘performance management’ 
 September November Total 
Financial position 17 7 24 
Delivering waiting times 5 5 10 
Tackling delayed discharge 6 10 16 
Healthcare Associated Infection 8 9 17 
Total 36 31 67 
Source: Minutes of Lothian NHS Board meetings held on 28 September 2011 and 23 November 2011, 
accessed via www.nhslothian.scot.nhs.uk  
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The tone and content of the concluding paragraph of the minute, summarising the 
Board’s collective position, shifts slightly between September and November: 
September: 









It may be inferred that the organisation has become more guarded in its judgement 
on waiting times: a value-based “positive” judgement gives way to a factual 
statement.   
There are few traces in the public record of the November board meeting of 
consideration of either the concerns raised in the media reports or the follow up 
action initiated by the Chief Executive.   
7.4.2 Parliamentary interest 
There was also little trace of parliamentary interest in the waiting time issue 
following the exchange at First Minister’s Questions in late October 2011, save for 
one written question regarding Scottish patients receiving treatment in England and 
Wales
81
 and one oral question which was not taken in the parliamentary chamber and 
a written answer was subsequently issued
82
.  Both questions were lodged by Scottish 
Labour MSPs with a constituency interest in NHS Lothian.   
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7.5 Publication of the internal investigation report 
Sarah Boyack MSP subsequently lodged a written question, asking the Cabinet 
Secretary to specify the further information which she had requested from NHS 
Lothian following receipt of the initial review report.  An answer was provided on 11 
January 2012
83
, although by this time the report was in the public domain.  The 
Cabinet Secretary sent a copy to the convener of the Parliament’s Health and Sport 
Committee and to the Scottish Parliament Information Centre two days prior to 
publication of the answer.   
The covering letter sent to the Health and Sport Committee convener
84
 introduces 
‘audit’ into the official response to the performance concerns 
“While Lothian Health have promised that there will be no reoccurrence of 
this practice we will be asking the Board’s internal audit function to 
specifically audit the application of waiting time practices and management 
within Lothian in the Spring to provide further reassurance on this matter.” 
This statement marks a shift in the relationship between Scottish Government 
Ministers and NHS Lothian: the Board is no longer trusted to report on local 
practices and a secondary source of assurance is now required to validate the board’s 
own reports.  This contrasts with the position taken by the First Minister in the 
Parliament in October 2011 when he resisted requests from opposition politicians to 
launch a separate investigation into the claims.   
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The Lothian review concluded that the offer of treatment in England was not 
intended to manipulate waiting time performance, yet the minister still requests that 
an internal audit review be carried out. 
The letter also makes clear that the request for the internal audit has been made 
directly by the Scottish Government; Ministers did not ask NHS Lothian to 
commission an internal audit review.  The Government is claiming ownership of the 
internal audit review. 
The letter goes on to consider the implications for other NHS Boards. 
“All NHS Boards have assured us that they are following the guidance in 
relation to making offers to patients that can be considered fair and 
reasonable.  I am aware that this guidance was drawn up some years ago and 
we will wish to take the opportunity in the early part of this year to refresh 
this guidance such that there is no possibility of misinterpretation.”
85
 
The Minister makes no suggestion that the practice employed by NHS Lothian is 
symptomatic of practices elsewhere in Scotland.  At this point, the assurances offered 
by other Boards are sufficient for Ministers to conclude that no further action is 
required to assure the national position.  It appears that a high-trust relationship is 
maintained with all NHS organisations, other than Lothian, and the Minister has no 
need to seek independent verification of their assurances.   
The primary response in relation to other organisations is a commitment to ensure 
that official guidance is as clear as it could be, rather than to test compliance with 
existing guidance.  This response implicitly gives the Scottish Government 
responsibility for addressing any potential for ambiguity which could be exploited or 
misinterpreted by NHS boards.   
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7.6 NHS Lothian Waiting Time Management Group report 
The report of the NHS Lothian Waiting Time Management Group (NHS Lothian, 
2012) runs to 16 pages, with the main body of the report confined to five pages.  Two 
of these five pages comprise context and background material.   
The review was chaired by the medical director, supported by a group of five senior 
members of staff including the employee director and director of HR and 
organisational development.  The Group was given a specific remit by the Chief 
Executive: 
“To investigate claims that patients in NHS Lothian are being offered 
unrealistic surgery appointments in England to circumvent guidance, and to 
review the organisational management of waiting lists, including 
administration, capacity planning and training to ensure it is strictly in 
compliance with New Ways guidance.” 
(NHS Lothian, 2012a:2) 
The review was based on a 20-question survey issued to 10 ‘key’ inpatient services 
and interviews with 13 members of staff
86
 responsible for waiting time management.  
The survey, which is reproduced as an appendix to the main report, asks general 
questions about waiting time management processes and procedures; it does not 
review specific cases.  The report indicates that interviewees were “drawn from all 
levels of the organisation” (NHS Lothian, 2012a:4) but review of the list of 
interviewees indicates a bias towards senior management with 7 of the 11 
interviewees listed in the appendix employed at assistant director level or above.   
The overall position taken by the authors of the report can be characterised as 
defensive.  The ‘context’ section congratulates the Board on “remarkable 
achievements” (NHS Lothian, 2012a:2) in coping with significant increases in 
demand for elective procedures in recent years and emphasises that a significant 
proportion of Lothian patients who receive treatment in hospitals in England are 
referred for highly specialist care.   
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The Group interprets the findings of the survey in such a way as to allow it to 
conclude that “overall the key ‘New Ways’ guidance was being adhered to” (NHS 
Lothian, 2012a:4).  This is a bold conclusion to infer from answers to survey 
questions on high level policies, and without testing actual practice.  There is no 
evidence in the report of serious reflection on the inappropriate practices highlighted 
by the media.  Indeed, the specific practice highlighted in The Sunday Times report in 
October 2011 is defended: 
“In areas where treatment might be offered at a different Lothian site, an 
alternative site in Scotland or elsewhere, this was made clear to patients at the 
outset and the consequences of declining such offers in terms of the effect on 
waiting times was also explained.  The specific offer of treatment being made 
available in Northumbria was confined to the specialties of General Surgery, 
Urology and Orthopaedics.”   
(NHS Lothian, 2012a:4) 
The report highlights deficiencies in the national New Ways guidance, as well as the 
limitations posed by the patient management IT system.  It emphasises areas of 
ambiguity in the national guidance, creating an impression that NHS Lothian staff 
were making offers to patients in accordance with the guidance.  This contrasts with 
the position taken by the First Minister in October that the Lothian practices did not 
comply with the New Ways guidance discussed above.   
The report concludes that there was no intentional breach of the New Ways guidance 
by NHS Lothian.  This reinforces the impression that the Board’s initial response is 
to hold the national guidance responsible for any unintentional dysfunctional 
behaviour, rather than the organisation or individual members of staff.  Indeed, the 
official response almost sanctifies the actions taken by staff by praising them for 
“trying hard” to provide patients with timely treatment. 
“We believe that staff with responsibility for managing waiting times 
according to the ‘New Ways’ guidance have been trying hard to ensure 
patients have surgery as soon as possible.  The additional capacity that was 
offered in surgery, urology and orthopaedics in Northumbria we believe was 
a genuine attempt to provide an additional option for patients with routine 
clinical needs.” 
(NHS Lothian, 2012a:6) 
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It thus shifts blame from the organisation on to the Scottish Government, which was 
responsible for the overall policy and production of the associated operational 
guidance.   
Four improvement actions are identified for implementation by the organisation over 
a three-month period.   
The report does not suggest at any point that the action taken by NHS Lothian was 
unacceptable or not permitted under the New Ways guidance. 
 
7.7 Parliamentary and media reaction to the report of the NHS Lothian 
Waiting Time Management Group 
Publication of the NHS Lothian report re-ignited political interest in the issue and the 
Cabinet Secretary faced two oral questions from opposition MSPs in the Scottish 
Parliament during Health, Wellbeing and Cities Strategy questions on Thursday 12 
January 2012.   
The first question
87
, asked in the chamber as a supplementary question and not 
lodged in advance, challenged the report prepared by NHS Lothian on three grounds: 
(i) there was no patient representation on the NHS Lothian Waiting Time 
Management Group; (ii) the report did not consider any of the individual cases where 
patients had refused an offer of treatment in England; and (iii) no information was 
available on the reasons underlying a significant proportion of suspensions from the 
waiting list.   
The Cabinet Secretary replies with a strongly negative judgement on the practices 
employed by NHS Lothian: 
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“The investigation shows that there was no intention on the part of NHS 
Lothian to manipulate waiting times.  However, I am clear that it was not 
acceptable for the health board to offer patients treatment in England at short 
notice...  I will not tolerate any attempts to get round the waiting times target.  
It is vital that patients are treated as quickly as possible.”
88
 
The Cabinet Secretary’s position is clear: she considers that NHS Lothian behaved 
inappropriately in making offers of treatment in England at short notice, regardless of 
the stated conclusion of the review that there was no intention to circumvent New 
Ways guidance on waiting time management. 
The second question
89
, lodged prior to publication of the NHS Lothian report earlier 
that week, asked when the Scottish Government would publish its response to the 
NHS Lothian investigation.  The Cabinet Secretary refers the questioner to the letter 
sent to the Health and Sport Committee
90
, but she neither explains that response, nor 
makes reference to the internal audit examination which she requested.  The 
supplementary question focuses on the apparent pressures on NHS Lothian’s 
capacity and resources over recent years following significant increases in demand 
for elective procedures, which were highlighted in the NHS Lothian report.   
The NHS Lothian report has diverted political attention away from the specific 
practices employed by the NHS board in order to report that waiting time targets 
have been met, to the adequacy of resources which the Scottish Government provides 
to NHS Lothian.  And again the Scottish Government, not NHS Lothian, is held 
responsible for the practices highlighted in The Sunday Times. 
Initial media coverage of the report’s publication was limited to one local
91
 and one 
national
92
 story.  The focus of both news reports is the criticism which the Cabinet 
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Secretary directed towards NHS Lothian in the Scottish Parliament, carrying the 
headlines “Sturgeon slams NHS chiefs over English surgery offer” and “Lothian in 
waiting list rebuke” respectively.   
The tone of the response from NHS Lothian shifts slightly in the wake of the Cabinet 
Secretary’s remarks; both newspaper reports carry a quote from its Chief Operating 
Officer which suggests that the Board accepted greater responsibility for the waiting 
list management practices than the initial review report implied. 
“We have learned many lessons from this experience.  One of those is that we 
should have been aware earlier that we were making offers to patients which 
they couldn’t accept.”  
The report in the local newspaper is accompanied by an editorial
93
 which, rather than 
focus upon the unacceptable practices employed by NHS Lothian, again directs 
blame towards the Scottish Government for apparent under-funding of the health 
board which has restricted its ability to develop capacity to accommodate increasing 
demands for elective treatment.  This mirrors the parliamentary scrutiny from 
opposition politicians and demonstrates the success of the NHS Lothian report in 
transferring responsibility for any questionable practices back to the Scottish 
Government.   
The national article
19
 carries a reference to the internal audit requested by the 
Scottish Government in response to NHS Lothian’s own review report.   
Political interest in waiting time management then temporarily subsided.  Only one 
written parliamentary question was lodged in response to publication of the NHS 
Lothian report.  This question
94
 from Alison McInnes MSP, Liberal Democrat 
spokesperson for Health and Justice, returned to the issue of how the Scottish 
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 S4W-05042 “To ask the Scottish Executive, in light of the investigatory group on waiting times in 
NHS Lothian, how it will ensure that NHS boards will not offer patients short-notice surgery 
appointments in England”.  Nicola Sturgeon answered the question on 25 January 2012 – see written 
answer report published online at 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S4_ChamberDesk/WA20120125.pdf (accessed on 17 July 2012). 
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Government would ensure that other NHS Boards did not also offer patients short-
notice surgery appointments in England.  The Cabinet Secretary reaffirms her earlier 
response: NHS boards have provided assurances that they do not engage in this 
practice and no further action is required.  The high-trust relationship with other 
NHS organisations is reinforced.   
Up until this point, concerns regarding potential ‘gaming’ of targets were restricted 
to the practice of making short-notice offers of treatment in England to patients 
awaiting elective procedures. 
 
7.8 Intervention in the internal audit review 
Lothian NHS Board met again on Wednesday 25 January 2012 and considered the 
recent waiting time management issues under the standing agenda item ‘delivering 
waiting times’.  There are some presentational changes in the accompanying report, 
compared to the equivalent reports submitted to the September and November 2011 
meetings reviewed above.  The report was now produced in the name of the 
executive lead, rather than executive management, as well as presented by him.  This 
indicates that the organisation has recognised the significance of the waiting time 
issues by assigning responsibility for reporting on the issue further up the 
management hierarchy.   
The report outlines changes that NHS Lothian made to waiting list management 
practice in October and November 2011 “to ensure strict compliance with the 
Scottish Government New Ways Guidance” (emphasis added).  The board papers 
make repeated references to “strict compliance” with New Ways guidance.  It 
appears that senior management is not willing to concede that NHS Lothian had 
previously failed to comply with the guidance, merely that a more liberal 
interpretation of potentially ambiguous guidance had been adopted.   
The changes made to waiting time management practices resulted in a high number 
of “breaches” of treatment targets, meaning that patients were waiting longer for 
treatment than the national standard prescribed.  These breaches were driven by a 
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significant reduction in the number of patients coded as ‘unavailable’ for treatment.  
The total number of reported breaches increased by c. 2,100 (c. 250%) between 
October and November.  The report explains that action is being taken to source 
additional capacity but that short-term shortages have necessitated the use of private 
hospitals to treat the backlog of patients.  This course of action has been “discussed 
and agreed with the Scottish Government Health Directorates”.  This is a further 
example of NHS Lothian using the Scottish Government as a buffer against potential 
criticism of organisational action.   
This report to the board is the first public intimation of the scale of the inappropriate 
practices employed by NHS Lothian and their impact on patient waiting times.  
Furthermore, the scale of reported breaches far exceeds the number of breaches 
highlighted in the addendum to the internal review by the Waiting Time 
Management Group which reported that 100 patients who declined an offer of 
treatment in England were still awaiting treatment.   
Although the length of the minute of the associated discussion at the Board meeting 
is comparable to the minutes of earlier meetings (see table 7.1 above), there is greater 
evidence of challenge from non-executive board members to the position reported by 
executive management.  The minute indicates that it was the Chief Operating Officer 
who answered questions from non-executive board members, and not the acting 
director for strategic planning who is named as executive lead for the paper.  This 
highlights a disconnect between operational responsibility and reporting 
responsibility for waiting time management within the board, which may be 
symptomatic of the decoupling behaviour which can arise in the audit society 
(Power, 1994a:28-9; Power, 1999:96; Arnaboldi and Lapsley, 2008). 
The ‘delivering waiting times’ report to the January board meeting was the subject of 
a front-page story in the local paper two days later: “Probe into NHS ‘hidden’ 
waiting list”
95
.  The newspaper article quotes the number of patients who have had to 
wait longer for treatment than the target, as reported to the board.  Unlike articles in 
the same newspaper two weeks earlier which focused attention on under-resourcing 
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of NHS Lothian, this article returns the focus to the health board.  It carries a 
statement from the Chief Operating Officer outlining the actions being taken to 
address the backlog of waiting time ‘breaches’.   
There are no comments in the article from the Scottish Government, although the 
Chief Executive “welcome[s] the support from the Scottish Government in terms of 
additional funding and the expertise they are giving us in recognition of our 
particular circumstances”
96
.  This is a change from the previous reports which 
attempted to move responsibility for the criticised actions towards NHS Lothian.   
This newspaper report is also significant as it is the first public trace that the internal 
audit review requested by the Cabinet Secretary has become an external review: 
“The Evening News can also reveal that external auditors have been brought 




On the same day that the Evening News report was published, Dr Richard Simpson 
MSP lodged a series of four written questions
97
 on the conduct and findings of the 
internal review of waiting time management conducted by NHS Lothian.  In 
answering one of the questions on 9 February 2012
98
, almost a week after publication 
of the newspaper report, the Cabinet Secretary indicates that: “an external audit of 
the NHS Lothian’s waiting time management is currently underway” (sic.).  This is 
the first public trace whereby the Cabinet Secretary acknowledges that the terms of 
her initial request, as outlined in her letter to the Health and Sport Committee on 9 
January 2012, have changed. 




 References S4W-04960 to S4W-04962 and S4W-04964, all lodged on 27 January 2012 (see 
Business Bulletin for Monday 30 January 2012 published online at 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/BusinessBulletin/46422.aspx)  
Questions S4W-04961 and S4W-04962 were answered on 6 February 2012 – see Written Answer 
Report published online at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S4_ChamberDesk/WA20120206.pdf  
Questions S4W-04960 and S4W-04964 were answered on 9 February 2012 – see Written Answer 
Report published online at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/S4_ChamberDesk/WA20120209.pdf  
All online links accessed on 17 July 2012. 
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Meanwhile, the NHS Lothian Finance and Performance Review Committee met on 8 
February 2012.  While papers of board committee meetings are not made public, the 
minutes of meetings are routinely included in the publicly available papers for the 
next meeting of the full board.  The minute of the Committee meeting held on 8 
February 2012, included in the papers for the Lothian NHS Board meeting held on 
28 March 2012, indicates that the Chief Operating Officer provided both written and 
verbal updates on waiting time management to the meeting.  
The minute of that discussion runs to 17 paragraphs, indicating either that a longer 
and more involved discussion on waiting time management took place at the 
committee meeting than at the full board meeting held three weeks earlier, or that the 
committee members were more anxious to leave a formal trace of the discussion.   
The minute clarifies some points raised in the internal review report.   
The internal review report found that: 
“Staff also mentioned a common operational ‘work around’ that results in 
high levels of in-month fluctuations in volumes of waiting times suspensions.  
The TRAK [patient management] system, as currently configured, does not 
permit staff to book patients for admission outwith their guarantee date.  In 
order to book patients beyond their guarantee date it was necessary to apply a 
period of unavailability to the patient’s waiting time.” 
(NHS Lothian, 2012a:5) 
However, the minute of the meeting of the Finance and Performance Review 
Committee held on 8 February 2012 indicates that: 
“Mrs Sansbury emphasised that the review undertaken by the Medical 
Director had revealed that in some areas some administrative staff had 
diverged from the expected practice of consulting a supervisor who was able 
to book outwith in the standard timeframe…”
99
 (sic) 
This clarification fundamentally changes the meaning of the original finding; it has 
been transformed from a system limitation to a personnel failure to adhere to 
standard operating procedures.   
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The minute also reveals instances of board members pre-judging the outcome of the 
external review which was now being conducted by Big 4 professional services firm 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) under the direction of NHS Lothian.   
“Mr Egan [employee director] advised the Committee that he had been part 
of the review and could categorically reassure the Committee and the Board 
that there had been no misconduct at Executive Director level.  He confirmed 
that Executive Directors had been as unaware of the problem as Non-
Executive Board members… 
“Mr Egan was therefore confident that the PricewaterhouseCoopers audit was 
likely to find that Executive Management Team colleagues had done nothing 
wrong in their handling of the situation.”
100
 
This is the most emphatic offer of assurance made by NHS Lothian during the period 
of study.  It also indicates complacency at the highest level of the organisation: the 
primary focus is on absolving executive management of blame, rather than showing 
leadership and being held to account for the performance failings.  The essential 
point is arguably that senior management and board members should have been able 
to identify and remedy the weaknesses in waiting time management practices earlier.   
Meanwhile, the NHS Lothian Audit Committee met on 28 February 2012.  Like the 
Finance and Performance Review Committee, Audit Committee meetings are not 
held in public, but the minutes of such meetings become public through inclusion in 
the papers of the subsequent board meeting, the papers for which are published on 
the NHS Lothian website.   
It is apparent from the minute that the Audit Committee also met on 31 January 2012 
and 21 February 2012.  However, formal minutes of these meetings are not tabled on 
28 February 2012, and are not included in the public board papers.  The only minutes 
tabled relate to the last scheduled meeting of the Committee which took place in 
October 2011.  Instead, the Committee chair provides a verbal update on the 
intervening meetings.  This suggests that the Committee did not wish to leave a 
public trace of these interactions. 
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The minute of this meeting provides a summary of recent events in relation to the 
waiting time issue.  Table 2 below presents this summary as a timeline from the date 
of the first non-minuted meeting up to the date of the present meeting. 
Table 7.2: Timeline of Audit Committee involvement in waiting list management 
response, 31 January 2012 to 28 February 2012 
Date Event(s) 
31 January 2012 Audit Committee meeting – minutes not formally tabled 
6 February 2012 Audit Committee, on behalf of the board, commissions 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to undertake audit of waiting 
list management 
17 February 2012 PwC provides verbal report on interim findings to NHS 
Lothian Waiting time management group 
20 February 2012 Board receives letter from the Scottish Government, 
indicating that “the audit should be carried out by the 
Scottish Government (as distinct from Lothian NHS Board)” 
21 February 2012 Audit Committee meets to consider Scottish Government 
letter 
22 February 2012 Board agrees to terminate contract between NHS Lothian and 
PwC 
28 February 2012 Audit Committee meeting 
Source: Minutes of NHS Lothian Audit Committee meeting held on Tuesday 28 February 2012, as 
included in published papers for the Lothian NHS Board meeting held on 28 March 2012 
One short paragraph in the public minute of the Audit Committee meeting provides a 
public trace of the intervention made by the Scottish Government to assume the 
contractual relationship with the external firm originally commissioned by NHS 
Lothian to undertake the audit review requested by the Scottish Government in 
January.  It evidences that an internal audit to be conducted by the Board became a 
review by a third party under the direction of the Scottish Government.   
There is significant erosion of trust in the relationship between the Scottish 
Government and NHS Lothian in the period following publication of the original 
newspaper report:  
 NHS Lothian was initially asked to conduct an internal investigation of 
claims made by The Sunday Times newspaper that NHS Lothian was 
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deploying gaming tactics in order to report achievement of waiting time 
targets. 
 Having received the report of the internal investigation, the Scottish 
Government asks the Board’s internal audit function to carry out its own 
review of waiting list management to “provide further reassurance”. 
 The Board commissions an external independent firm to carry out this 
review.  Once that external firm discusses interim findings with NHS 
Lothian, the Scottish Government intervenes and assumes contractual 
responsibility for the review so that findings are reported directly to them.  
This implies that NHS Lothian could no longer even be trusted to faithfully 
report the findings of an independent review. 
The minutes of the Audit Committee meeting leave a trace of the Board’s position in 
relation to the ongoing review: 
“The Chair highlighted the strong sense of commitment from the Board to 
maintain the internal efforts towards achieving waiting times targets.  He 
highlighted that management actions originally identified as a consequence of 
Dr Farquharson’s report were progressing in order to ensure waiting times 
systems in NHS Lothian were fit for purpose.”
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“The Chair commented that this issue had been handled with diligence, 
transparency and rigour.”
102
   
The minutes also indicate further defensive moves to protect both executive and non-
executive board members from the allegations, following the ‘categorical 
reassurances’ provided by the employee director to the Finance and Performance 
Review Committee on 8 February: 
“[The employee director] referred to the work of the Special Review Group 
of the Board and reported that an internal investigation was being taken 
forward to provide assurance that internal reporting to the Board was 
consistent.”   
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“[The Chief Executive] added that the reporting of waiting times data has 
been consistent across governance committees, with executive directors 
reporting figures as presented to them and understood by them.  The 
Committee acknowledged this position.”
103
 
Although the minutes of the aforementioned Finance and Performance Review and 
Audit Committee meetings were not officially published by NHS Lothian until late 
March, news of the Scottish Government’s intervention in the audit was already in 
the public domain.  Neil Findlay MSP, of the Scottish Labour Party, lodged a series 
of six written parliamentary questions on 27 February 2012
104
 regarding the Scottish 
Government’s intervention in the independent audit of waiting times practices 
commissioned by NHS Lothian.  These were answered on 9 March 2012, but not 
before the intervention had been reported by the local newspaper. 
The newspaper report which appeared on Thursday 1 March 2012
105
, the day after 
the Audit Committee meeting and Neil Findlay’s written questions were published in 
the Scottish Parliament Business Bulletin, summarises recent events.  It also makes 
public the growing discord between NHS Lothian and the Scottish Government by 
publishing extracts from a letter sent by the chair of NHS Lothian to the Cabinet 
Secretary and carrying further statements which the chair made directly to the 
newspaper. 
Quoting from the letter: 
“Board members have asked me to relay to you their disappointment at the 
suggestion in your letter that their independent external audit lacked the 
‘appropriate corporate governance’…  Board members particularly wished 
me to communicate to you that they believe they were appointed by you in 
the expectation that they would act with integrity at all times”. 
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The report also carries a quote from a Scottish Government spokesperson: 
“In the interests of appropriate corporate governance, the Scottish 
Government will take over the management of the external audit report.  This 
will preserve the independent status of the audit function.” 
It is clear from the above quotes that the board members view the intervention as a 
direct, and personal, attack on their professionalism.  Furthermore, an adversarial 
relationship is developing between the Scottish Government and NHS Lothian where 
there was previously a high trust relationship. 
The official Scottish Government statement also raises questions over generally 
accepted auditing practice: in the private, voluntary and parts of the public sector, 
organisations appoint their own external auditors.  It is not clear which fundamental 
principle of corporate governance is under threat.  However, the symbolic 
importance of the reference point is perhaps greater than its technical significance.  
The public do not necessarily need to understand the technical point, but rather to 
accept the signpost that the government is upholding objective good practice in 
dealing with the performance crisis.   
The editorial which appears in the same edition of the local newspaper
106
 expresses 
some exasperation at developments in the review but returns the focus to one group 
who had been missing from more recent reports on the unfolding issues with waiting 
list management: the patients. 
“The latest twist in the NHS Lothian waiting-list saga has descended into 
farce… 
“‘Appropriate corporate governance’ is the problem, apparently.  What 
taxpayers are left with is presumably a bigger bill and delay. 
“Quite why this is necessary is anyone’s guess but at best it has been a 
monumental breakdown in communication and at worst demonstrates a 
worrying nosedive in the relationship between NHS Lothian and Holyrood… 
“None of this, however, matters to patients.  All they care about is being seen 
by a medical professional as swiftly and as efficiently as possible. 
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“If the fact the Scottish Government is now instructing the audit helps to 
ensure that and get to the root of any problems which PwC wouldn’t have 
done otherwise then it has to be a good thing.  But we must ask why this 
wasn’t just done from the very beginning? 
“Those waiting for an end to this saga may be waiting some time.”
107
 
To the public, the Scottish Government intervention in the PwC review appears to be 
nothing more than a distraction from fixing the underlying problem and ensuring that 
patients are treated as quickly as possible in line with national waiting time 
commitments.  These concerns override any interest in the ‘corporate governance’ 
surrounding the review.  It may be that audit technologies are being used to serve a 
political, rather than public, interest, allowing the Scottish Government to exert 
greater control over the investigation and over NHS Lothian. 
The Cabinet Secretary provided an official update on progress with the review to the 
Scottish Parliament on Thursday 8 March 2012 in response to a question from the 
late David McLetchie, an MSP from the Conservative party, during Question 
Time
108
.  The Cabinet Secretary confirmed that Scottish Government officials had 
taken over the commissioning of the audit “in the interests of appropriate corporate 
governance”.  In response to a supplementary question which both queries the basis 
of the turnaround on conduct of the audit and suggests that ambiguities in the official 
guidance on waiting list management are the true source of the problem, the Cabinet 
Secretary states that: 
“The carrying out of an audit that complies with strict standards of corporate 
governance and is seen to be completely independent of NHS Lothian should 
be welcomed… 
“I want to ensure that people have confidence in Lothian and in every part of 
Scotland.  Patients expect and deserve that the rules that we set out to ensure 
speedy access to treatment should be complied with.”
109
 
Again, it is not clear what ‘standards of corporate governance’ are being adhered to.  
The Cabinet Secretary dismisses claims that the guidance is ambiguous and turns 
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attention back to patients and the public.  The statement implies that the public 
cannot have any confidence in NHS Lothian’s waiting time performance without an 
independent audit; the minister calls on the public to place their trust in the audit 
function, not in the providers of frontline NHS services (Power, 1999). 
The following day, the Cabinet Secretary answers six written questions lodged by 
Neil Findlay MSP in late February
110
.  These questions focus on the Scottish 
Government decision to intervene in the audit process and, in particular, the specific 
failings in corporate governance which prompted the Cabinet Secretary’s 
intervention in the management of the audit.   
The phrase “the interests of appropriate corporate governance” recurs in the letter 
sent to NHS Lothian asking the board to terminate its relationship with PwC, official 
lines provided to newspapers, and answers to both oral and written parliamentary 
questions.  It appears time and again in official dialogue but its meaning remains 
unclear.  The government appears to be using managerial terminology to provide a 
buffer against its decision to intervene in the audit process and to deflect further 
questions from the media and opposition politicians.   
The Cabinet Secretary makes clear that the intervention “will ensure not only that the 
governance arrangements for this piece of work are independent and transparent but 
that they are seen to be so”.  The appearance of independence is important to 
politicians, who see it as another way to create distance between the allegations of 
improper practice and the Scottish Government.   
 
7.9 Publication of the PwC report – from local issue to national crisis 
7.9.1 The report 
The PwC report was issued to the Scottish Government on 19 March 2012 and 
placed in the Scottish Parliament Information Centre on 21 March 2012.   
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The PwC report (PwC, 2012) runs to 29 pages and is entitled “Review of aspects of 
waiting time management at NHS Lothian”.  While Ministers and NHS Lothian had 
regularly referred to this review as an audit in preceding correspondence and public 
statements, nowhere does PwC describe this piece of work as an ‘audit’.  In fact, the 
background and scope section of the report is at pains to emphasise that the review 
did not constitute an ‘audit’ in a technical sense. 
“This review, initially commissioned by the NHS Lothian Board, and 
subsequently transferred to the Scottish Government, has not constituted an 
external audit under generally accepted auditing principles, nor has it 
constituted a formal forensic investigation into waiting times within NHS 
Lothian. 
“Similarly, our work and deliverables were not designed or intended to 
comply with the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
(IAASB), International Framework for Assurance Engagements (IFAE) or 
International Standard on Assurance Engagements (ISAE) 3000. 
“Our work has been performed in accordance with terms and conditions 
outlined in our engagement letter…  As a result our work has been 
undertaken in a similar manner to a subject specific internal audit review in 
the NHS in Scotland, comprising of meetings with staff and management, 
review of relevant documentation and sample testing of process and 
transactions.” 
(PwC, 2012:4, emphasis added) 
The term ‘audit’ clearly has a different meaning for NHS Lothian, the Scottish 
Government and Members of the Scottish Parliament than it does for the firm which 
conducted the independent review.  Audit has a technical meaning, with clearly 
defined professional and legal implications, for the firm.  However, politicians have a 
wider, non-technical understanding of ‘audit’.  It appears that the use of ‘audit’ holds 
a ritual or symbolic appeal for politicians and public services which is quite distinct 
from its technical or professional definition.  This supports Power’s thesis that ‘audit’ 
has both technological and programmatic dimensions (Power, 1999:6-8).   
PwC deployed a similar methodology to the earlier internal review commissioned by 
NHS Lothian, including interviews with members of staff and managers and a review 
of policy and procedure documents.  Crucially the PwC review also included sample 
testing of patient records and interrogation of data held in the patient management 
system, a more typical ‘audit’ procedure. 
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The review was initially focused upon the application of periods of patient 
unavailability by NHS Lothian staff, investigating allegations made in The Sunday 
Times newspaper that patients were offered treatment at hospitals in the north of 
England at short notice.  However, this practice “was only one example of the 
problematic issues with NHS Lothian’s waiting time management” (PwC, 2012:4) 
uncovered by the PwC review (see Table 7.3 below for a summary of the main 
findings of the review).   
The review report concludes that: 
“In considering the multiple evidence sources, it is apparent that the 
management and processes for waiting times at NHS Lothian have been sub 
optimal.” 
(PwC, 2012:7) 
Despite the evidence led in the report of apparent gaming and manipulation of 
performance data, the review report is very careful not to express an opinion in these 
terms.  The under-stated language compares starkly with that adopted by ministers 
and Members of the Scottish Parliament in debating the report’s findings, which will 
be discussed below. 
Indeed, the language adopted throughout the report is highly caveated and careful not 
to directly attribute views to the report’s authors or assume responsibility for 
absolute factual accuracy.  For example, there is frequent use of phrases such as “it 
would appear”, “what appears to be”, “is questionable” and “we have been advised”.  
‘Facts’ are quoted, based on the results of specific tests undertaken (“on 30 May 
2011 (just before breach reporting) between 10am and 11am, a member of staff made 
124 amendments to periods of unavailability, retrospectively” (PwC, 2012:6)).   
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Table 7.3: Main findings of the PwC review of waiting time management at NHS 
Lothian  
Use of periods of unavailability 
 Data interrogation highlighted “excessive and inappropriate use (and apparent 
misuse) of periods of patient unavailability”, including retrospective changes 
made to patient records to reduce the number of reported breaches of targets. 
 Most recorded periods of unavailability were classified as ‘other’ despite a 
wide range of possible reasons being available for selection within the 
system. 
Reporting 
 Review of internal reports found that consistent data was reported to the 
executive and board committees as well as to the main board itself.  However, 
some senior managers who sat on executive committees had access to more 
detailed information which was not formally reported to these committees. 
 However, the formal reports to executive and board committees did not 
contain sufficiently detailed information to enable committee members to 
exercise appropriate scrutiny over waiting time performance. 
 There was evidence of some manual interference with figures extracted from 
the patient management system before they were reported to more senior 
managers. 
 Testing indicates large numbers of retrospective adjustments to patient 
records (i.e. applying periods of unavailability) just prior to reporting dates. 
Culture and governance 
 Interviews revealed that clerical, supervisory and management level staff 
were placed under significant pressure to find workarounds to waiting list 
issues rather than allow them to be escalated to management and board 
committees for action.  
System controls 
 Flexible input controls allowed some users to input periods of patient 
unavailability which would not normally be considered reasonable and there 
was little oversight or reporting of activity in the patient record system. 
Working practices and guidelines 
 NHS Lothian never formally finalised revisions to its Waiting List 
Management Policies and Procedures following introduction of the national 
New Ways guidance in 2008. 
Source: PwC (2012:4-7) 
Similar to the Audit Scotland overview reports reviewed in the previous chapter, the 
PwC report rarely gives a direct opinion on practices, findings or the appropriateness 
of actions taken by NHS Lothian but instead presents information in a style which 
makes the risks associated with a course of action clear to the reader.   
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“We have been advised that NHS Lothian has recently taken additional steps 
to address the waiting list challenge.  This should be considered against a 
backdrop of challenges around increased demand and patients exercising 
choice between hospital sites for treatment.” 
(PwC, 2012:7) 
There is a strong implication that the author believes that there is a significant risk 
that the additional steps will not deliver the anticipated results, but this is not 
explicitly stated.   
The report highlights the potential disconnect between a reporting process and the 
substance of what is reported.  The PwC review analysed minutes of meetings of 
each committee which had a role in the governance and reporting structure for 
waiting time performance, as well as papers presented to those meetings.  The review 
found that waiting time issues were considered at all levels of the organisational 
structure so at face value there appeared to be sufficient scrutiny over waiting time 
performance.  However, on closer inspection, the reviewers found that the data 
presented to more senior committees “was not sufficient… to highlight the serious 
issues that NHS Lothian needed to address, specifically the complete size of the 
waiting list in terms of breachers or the level and use of periods of unavailability” 
(PwC, 2012:16). 
Furthermore, the documentary representations of performance created by the 
organisation were often disconnected from operational reality. 
“Our interviews with relevant staff indicate that minutes and action plans for 
the WTMG [Waiting time management Group] held before August 2011 are 
not a true reflection of the discussion held during these meetings…” 
(PwC, 2012:17) 
The minutes of meetings provided a trace or representation of organisational ‘facts’ 
which were divorced from the underlying reality.  They created a sanitised fictional 
account of performance which became accepted as fact as the information was 
cascaded up to more senior layers in the governance structure.  The documentary 
representations created a new organisational reality and show how official records 
and processes were decoupled from substantive activities (Power, 1999:96). 
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Without documentary or other manifestations of organisational life, it is not possible 
for actions to be retrospectively reviewed or verified.  The PwC review team could 
find no evidence of the operation of a process whereby clinical specialties reviewed 
performance data downloaded from the patient management system and requested 
manual adjustments which were then applied in the final performance management 
reports shared with management and governance committees (PwC, 2012:18).  It was 
therefore not possible to ‘test’ the operation of the process as there was no visible 
trace of the actions taken.  Management, and practices, can only be rendered 
auditable if they leave a trace. 
The report considered ‘softer’ issues, such as management culture, as well as ‘hard’ 
auditable facts.  Although beyond the scope of the present study, it is interesting to 
note that the review finding that an oppressive and bullying culture put pressure on 
staff to report achievement of targets is similar to the findings of organisational 
research conducted to understand the impact of the star ratings system on hospital 
staff (Mannion et al., 2005).   
7.9.2 Statement to Parliament 
The Cabinet Secretary for Health, Wellbeing and Cities Strategy made a statement on 
the PwC review to the Scottish Parliament on Wednesday 21 March 2012
111
, hours 
after the report was made public.
112
  The statement was approximately nine minutes 
long and was followed by approximately 30 minutes of questions from Members of 
the Scottish Parliament.  The following analysis is based on an in-depth review of the 
transcript of the Ministerial Statement and ensuing questions from Members of the 
Scottish Parliament, and review of the video footage of the parliamentary session
113
. 
The language adopted by the Cabinet Secretary is passionate and, in contrast to the 
passive language adopted in the PwC report, directly critical of NHS Lothian.  The 
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minister’s displeasure with NHS Lothian is tangible.  The neutral tone of the original 
review report is transformed into a subjective judgement of the organisation by the 
Cabinet Secretary. 
The statement provides an insight into why the Scottish Government considered an 
audit necessary to supplement the internal review led by the NHS Lothian Medical 
Director. 
“However, the report also made reference to administrative practices in the 
management of waiting times that I considered needed further investigation.  
On 6 January, my officials, on my behalf, asked that the board carry out an 
audit of its waiting times practices and management.  In response, the chair of 
NHS Lothian decided to commission an external audit and, on 31 January, 
appointed PWC (sic) to conduct it.”
114
 
Thus, the internal review report raised further questions and doubts about waiting 
time management practices.  Having failed to receive the necessary assurances 
directly from the board, the Cabinet Secretary initiated an additional review.  An 
‘audit’ would provide the Scottish Government with definitive answers to those 
outstanding questions.   
The decision to require an ‘audit’ in addition to the internal review is arguably 
vindicated by the seriousness of the findings of the PwC review.  The review 
provides objective evidence that adjustments were made to patient records in order to 
improve reported compliance with waiting time standards, and mask poor substantive 
performance.  Furthermore, the scope of the independent review was broader than 
the internal investigation.  
The Cabinet Secretary later explains her true concerns underlying the intervention in 
the PwC review in an answer to questions posed by the late David McLetchie MSP: 
“When the concerns about NHS Lothian began to surface, they were 
potentially so serious and I lacked so much knowledge about where things 
were known and about what the chain might have been that I felt that the 
review had to be taken out of the hands of NHS Lothian and instructed by my 
officials.  At that time, I did not know that the practices at NHS Lothian about 
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which I was beginning to hear were not known by the board, the chair or 
senior management.  I needed an independent piece of work to answer the 




A picture emerges of audit as a bearer of independent assurance when trust is 
threatened or breaks down between principal and agent (Power, 1999:16-17), in this 
case between government and an organisation responsible for the delivery of public 
services.  Audit took the review out of the hands of those who may have been 
responsible for the practices which the audit was intended to uncover.  The true 
reason for the intervention appears not to be a theoretical interest in “appropriate 
corporate governance”
116
 but a practical concern that the findings of the audit could 
be covered up if senior management or non-executives were found to be at fault.  
Audit became a substitute for trust.   
The Cabinet Secretary’s statement demonstrates how the external review highlighted 
deficiencies in the oversight and scrutiny provided by the board.  Although the 
review confirmed that the “board was not presented with a sufficiently 
comprehensive picture of waiting times to have identified that an issue existed”
117
, 
neither the review nor the statement explores the extent to which the board should 
have challenged the sufficiency of the information provided or asked more searching 
questions of executive management.   
It appears that the board accepted the information provided by management at face 
value, with review of board meeting minutes preceding the initial allegations (see 
7.4.1 above) showing scant evidence of debate or discussion of the paper 
summarising waiting time performance.  The Cabinet Secretary asks the NHS 
Lothian chair to ensure an improved standard of performance reporting to the board.  
This finding raises questions about the role of non-executives in holding an 
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organisation to account for performance and their ability to fulfil this role if they do 
not understand the particular operational risks or potential for gaming of reported 
figures. 
The Cabinet Secretary is as outraged by the PwC findings relating to management 
culture at NHS Lothian as those exposing inappropriate waiting time management 
practices.  Detailed consideration of these issues is beyond the scope of the present 
study.  However, the finding that “staff were under pressure to find tactical solutions 
to waiting times rather than to tackle the root causes of the delays”
118
 provides 
evidence of the dysfunctional consequences which can occur when the reporting of 
performance becomes more important to an organisation than underlying substantive 
performance (Power: 1999, 2005:335; Strathern, 2000); when being seen to comply 
with performance targets or standards becomes more important than the provision of 
the underlying service, in this case the timely treatment of patients.   
The Cabinet Secretary orders a further investigation into management culture.  This 
review is to be led by the chair of NHS Lothian, whereas the PwC review was 
ultimately managed by the Scottish Government.   
“I needed an independent piece of work to answer the question in my mind 
whether I still had confidence in the chair and the board.  This piece of work 
has answered that question and I retain confidence in the chair. 
“It is now appropriate to allow the chair to carry out the investigation…”
119
 
The PwC review went some way to restoring the Cabinet Secretary’s trust in the 
chair of the organisation.  The need for independently commissioned reviews has 
subsided.  So audit-style mechanisms can play a role in restoring trust, as well as 
undermining it (Lapsley and Lonsdale, 2010:91-2).  
The Cabinet Secretary’s statement also returns the focus of the political debate to the 
patients who are the intended beneficiaries of performance targets and standards on 
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waiting times.  She expresses a desire that affected patients should be treated as 
quickly as possible
120
; she does not call for an improvement in the reported 
performance of NHS Lothian.  This is a subtle but key distinction: individual patients 
are prioritised over the achievement of performance targets.   
Later in the session, the Cabinet Secretary makes clear that NHS Lothian’s behaviour 
represents “a betrayal of its own patients” which also “undermines the reputation of 
thousands of NHS staff members across the country who have worked hard to reduce 
waiting times”
121
.  This could be interpreted as an attempt to restore the true 
objectives and ethos of the NHS in Scotland, which were displaced in at least one 
organisation by the imperative to report compliance with performance targets.   
The closing section of the Cabinet Secretary’s statement considers the implications 
of the NHS Lothian issue for other NHS organisations in Scotland which are required 
to comply with the New Ways waiting time guidance and the national waiting time 
targets.  Although the Cabinet Secretary has received assurances from the Chief 
Executives of these other organisations that they comply in full with the guidance 
(and thus that their reported performance accords with their substantive 
performance), she requires further evidence of this. 
“…as an added assurance, I have asked for the rigour of a specific and 
detailed audit of local waiting time management and processes, as part of 
each board’s internal audit programme over 2012-13.  The results of that 
process will be made public in each board’s meeting papers.”
122
 
Assurance from the Chief Executive, the statutory accountable officer
123
, is no longer 
sufficient in the wake of the NHS Lothian scandal.  The breakdown of trust between 
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the minister and one NHS organisation has contaminated the trust which until 
recently underpinned the relationship between the minister and other NHS 
organisations.  The “rigour” of an audit must also be applied in these other 
organisations for the Cabinet Secretary to have absolute confidence in them.  The 
findings of each audit will be made public, indicating that the audits have a function 
in discharging accountability to the wider public, as well as to ministers.  NHS 
internal audit reports are not routinely published in board papers; they are primarily 
treated as internal management documents rather than conduits for the discharge of 
public accountability. 
During the question and answer session which follows the Ministerial statement, 
opposition MSPs express their dissatisfaction with the promised series of internal 
audits and call upon the Cabinet Secretary to order a national review by the national 
audit body. 
“I am sure that the Cabinet Secretary will agree that the people of Scotland 
should be able to trust the Scottish Government statistics on waiting times… 
rather than allowing health boards to undertake internal audits, I ask the 
Cabinet Secretary to request that Audit Scotland undertakes a full and 
thorough review of each and every territorial health board in Scotland to 
restore confidence in the system.”
124
 
“A Lothian internal report did not unmask the manipulation that we now see 
laid bare by the PWC (sic) report.  Will the Cabinet Secretary invite Audit 
Scotland to carry out a further review of the new ways waiting time system, 
particularly all aspects of the removal of patients from waiting lists…?”
125
 
The Cabinet Secretary rejects the notion that it is her place to direct Audit Scotland 
to conduct a national audit
126
.  However, the requests themselves serve to further 
undermine public trust in NHS organisations – these MSPs imply that the internal 
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audits conducted by NHS boards will not secure the necessary transparency in 
Scotland-wide practices and the involvement of an independent body is necessary 
before the people of Scotland can again have faith in reported waiting times 
performance.  Opposition politicians are causing further damage to the trust which 
the public places in the NHS by casting doubt on these organisations’ integrity to 
report internal audit findings (Justesen and Skaerbaek, 2005).   
The ritual appeal of ‘audit’ is evident in the number of references made to either 
‘audit’ or ‘Audit Scotland’ in the 40 minute parliamentary session on the PwC report.  
As discussed above, the PwC review does not identify itself as an ‘audit’ and even 
explicitly states that it is not an ‘audit’ in any technical sense.  Nevertheless, 
politicians continue to make reference to the PwC ‘audit’ and make demands for 
further ‘audits’ in other parts of the system.  In all, there are 20 references to ‘audit’ 
during the session (see Table 7.4 below). 
Table 7.4: Count of references to “audit” and “Audit Scotland” during Ministerial 
statement and questions on Waiting Times (NHS Lothian) in the Scottish Parliament, 
21 March 2012 
Word / phrase Ministerial 
statement 
Questions Answers to 
questions 
Total 
“audit” 5 5 3 13 
“Audit Scotland” - 2 5 7 
Total 5 7 8 20 
Source: Official Report of the Scottish Parliament, 21 March 2012, at Columns 7456-7469 
‘Audit’ has a programmatic value for politicians, which appears to be distinct from 
its technical definition (Power, 1999, 2000a; Free, Salterio and Shearer, 2009:137; 
Malsch and Gendron, 2009).  The popular ambiguity of “audit” strengthened its 
appeal to politicians who could derive legitimacy from commissioning an ‘audit’ 
without a need to consider the technical definition of the underlying work.   
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NHS Lothian response 
NHS Lothian released a formal statement following publication of the PwC 
review
127
.  In the statement (NHS Lothian, 2012b), the board intimated that it “fully 
accepted” the findings of the review and noted that action had already been taken to 
address many of the issues highlighted in the report. 
The statement suggests that the internal review team fully investigated the issue of 
patients being marked as unavailable for treatment after refusing an offer of 
treatment and that review concluded that “practice and conduct of some individuals 
needed to be further investigated” (NHS Lothian, 2012b).  This contrasts with the 
written conclusions of the Waiting Time Management group (NHS Lothian, 2012a) 
which did not note specific concerns over individual behaviour.   
Two of the members of the Waiting Time Management group highlight in the 
statement that the earlier internal review raised a number of cultural issues which the 
board was beginning to address.  No concerns regarding organisational culture were 
expressed in the final report.  The statement attempts to re-write the conclusions of 
the original internal report, but at the same time suggests that the public written 
representation of the review may have differed from the findings as understood by 
members of the initial review group. 
The statement carries direct quotes from five senior figures associated with NHS 
Lothian: the Chair, Chief Executive, Director of Human Resources and 
Organisational Development, Employee Director and Chief Operating Officer.  
While the chair “apologise[s] unreservedly” for the practices employed by the board, 
the other quotes focus on the actions being taken to address the issues raised in the 
report.   
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7.9.3 Media coverage 
Jackie Baillie MSP insinuates that the timing of the ministerial statement to the 
Scottish Parliament was strategically selected to minimise media attention
128
.  She 
points out that the UK government made its annual budget statement to the House of 
Commons earlier that day, an event that can be expected to dominate the British 
media in the following days.  The Cabinet Secretary rebuts this suggestion; she 
indicates that she had received the report the previous day and wished to share its 
findings with the Scottish Parliament at the earliest opportunity. 
Nevertheless, publication of the PwC report and the Cabinet Secretary’s statement to 
Parliament receives wide coverage in the newspaper media over the next 24 hours, 
including online and print formats, as shown in Table 7.5.  The performance crisis 
was elevated from a local story to a matter of national interest.  Eleven articles 
appeared in nine different publications with a total word count of 3,457 words. 
The role of the media also shifted at this point, relative to earlier reports on the 
emerging crisis.  The newspapers are now reporting on information already in the 
public domain whereas they previously drove the story, bringing new information to 
a wider audience.  Journalists started to report reactively to political events, and no 
longer directed the narrative. 
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Table 7.5: Summary of newspaper headlines following Ministerial Statement and 
Questions on Waiting Times (NHS Lothian) on 21 March 2012 











“Hospital wait time ‘masked’” 17 113 
Scottish Star “Lothian probe” 2 93 
The Sun 
(Scotland) 
“Nic’s fury at op wait ‘fiddlers’” 2 138 
The Scotsman “Furious Sturgeon orders inquiry into 




The Herald “Sturgeon to probe waiting times tactics” 5 244 
Metro (Scotland) “Health board is probed” 44 78 
Edinburgh 
Evening News 
“Betrayed: Thousands face treatment 










“Leader: NHS must now move swiftly to 
rebuild trust” 
18 384 
Evening Times “Patients betrayal probe” 2 46 
Total  11 3,457 
 
While the newspaper reports largely regurgitate the ministerial statement, the 
associated parliamentary discussion and the NHS Lothian statement, some offer 
additional insight into actions not previously in the public domain.   
“…Ms Sturgeon hauled NHS Lothian Chief Executive James Barbour and 
chairman Charles Winstanley into her office yesterday and ordered them to 
put their house in order.”
130
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 editions of The Scotsman on 22 
March 2012 of 538 and 557 words in length respectively.  Both versions appeared at page 15 of the 
newspaper. 
130
 “Thousands of patients forced off waiting lists”, Evening News (Edinburgh), Thursday 22 March 
2012, p. 6, 1
st
 edition, Sue Gyford 
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The same article carries a direct statement from the Cabinet Secretary. 
“[The Cabinet Secretary] told the Evening News: “I am furious at this.  We 
attach a huge amount of importance to waiting times, patients really value 
quick access to treatment and people across the health service have worked 
really hard over the past number of years to get waiting times down. 
“So when I get a report that says a health board has been manipulating the 
figures to try and mask breaches of the waiting time guarantee, I feel angry 
on behalf of the patients.  I saw both the chair and the Chief Executive 
separately and left them in no doubt how I feel.” 
This statement is significant as it is a direct address by the minister to the public.  
More members of the public are likely to read the newspaper report than to directly 
follow the exchange in Parliament.  She again expresses strong feelings about the 
conduct of NHS Lothian. 
These newspaper reports frequently quote the following phrases used by the Cabinet 
Secretary in the Scottish Parliament the day before: 
 “My reaction to this report is one of disappointment and considerable anger” 
 “I will not tolerate the manipulation of them” 
 “What angers me about NHS Lothian’s behaviour is not just that it’s a 
betrayal of their own patients...” 
 “serious misconduct” 
These phrases are likely to remain in the public consciousness as they encapsulate 
the strength of political feeling on this issue, and also because the newspaper 
coverage edits the events of the previous day for their consumption, selecting for the 
public the key messages from the Parliamentary exchanges.  The media becomes a 
powerful actor in selecting the messages to report, wielding significant influence 
over the development and sustainability of trust between the public and organisations 
and professionals who are subject to audit (Justesen and Skaerbaek, 2005:340-1) 
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7.10 Unfolding reaction 
The First Minister receives a question on the wider implications of the PwC report, 
focusing on management culture, governance and practices, at First Minister’s 
Questions the day after the report’s publication and the Cabinet Secretary’s statement 
to parliament
131
.  The First Minister is not drawn on the issue, reiterating the 
statement which the Cabinet Secretary made to Parliament the previous day.  This 
reinforces the Cabinet Secretary’s statement as the definitive government statement 
on the issue, and also implicitly reinforces the First Minister’s support for his health 
minister.   
Media coverage of the issue in the following days focused on the suspension of two 
members of NHS Lothian staff in the wake of the report’s publication
132
, which was 
announced in a press release (NHS Lothian, 2012b).   
The Sunday Times newspaper attempted to broaden the story to implicate other NHS 
bodies with a front-page story on Sunday 25 March 2012 carrying the headline 
“Scandal of doctored NHS waiting lists deepens”
133
.  The story alleged that “the 
Scottish government’s (sic) Information Services Division (ISD), which collates 
health statistics, has ‘regularly’ challenged health boards over the accuracy of their 
data on waiting times”.  Specific allegations were made against one NHS Board
134
.  
The revelations provide a further opportunity for opposition politicians to repeat calls 
for an independent national investigation led by Audit Scotland. 
                                                          
131
 Question raised by Neil Findlay MSP, Scottish Labour, at First Minister’s Questions on Thursday 
22 March 2012 as reported in the Official Report of the Scottish Parliament at Column 7637. 
132
 “Two suspended as waiting times figures are probed”, Metro, Friday 23 March 2012, p. 4; “First 
Minister forced to say sorry to Trozeri pensioners”, The Daily Telegraph (Scotland), Friday 23 March 
2012, p. 1, Simon Johnson; “NHS pair suspended”, Daily Record, Friday 23 March 2012, p. 22; 
“Health staff in work ban”, Evening Times (Glasgow), Friday 23 March 2012, p. 2; “More staff facing 
suspension over waiting times fix”, Evening News (Edinburgh), Friday 23 March 2012, p. 7, Sue 
Gyford; “Staff face probe into doctored waiting times list”, The Herald, Friday 23 March 2012, p. 11. 
133
 “Scandal of doctored NHS waiting lists deepens”, The Sunday Times (Scotland), Sunday 25 March 
2012, pp. 1&3, Mark Macaskill 
134
 NHS Grampian 
258 
 
Indeed, it is reported by The Sun newspaper on Sunday 25 March 2012
135
 that the 
Scottish Labour party has written to the Auditor General for Scotland, calling for 
Audit Scotland to conduct such a national review of waiting times.  This intimates 
that Scottish Labour politicians have taken positive action to support their words in 
the Scottish Parliament, when the Cabinet Secretary rejected their calls for a national 
audit review.   
Lothian NHS Board met again on Wednesday 28 March 2012.  There is little public 
trace of discussion on the waiting list management issue besides its financial 
consequences, although “delivering waiting times” was again included as a standing 
item on the agenda.  The accompanying public board paper did not follow the 
standard format used for the papers on the same topic presented to meetings in 
September 2011, November 2011 and January 2012 and analysed earlier in this 
chapter.  The short paper referred only to outpatient and inpatient waiting times 
covered by the 18 week referral to treatment standard and did not provide 
information on any of the other waiting time targets to which the Board is subject 
and which are usually reported under this standing agenda item.   
The report provided high level information on the number of patients suspended 
from waiting lists for the first time, including a graphical trend analysis covering the 
period from April 2011 to February 2012.  As well as providing the latest suspension 
data for the board in absolute and percentage terms, the report also provides national 
comparative performance information.  It states that the provisional suspension rate 
for February 2012 is the lowest reported by any board in Scotland.   
The report also provides an update on actions being taken to provide additional 
capacity and address the backlog of patients requiring treatment in light of the 
changed suspension practice.   
For the first time, the report is produced in the name of the Chief Operating Officer 
and the director of finance, who are also named as joint executive leads.  Earlier 
reports were prepared in the name of managers and directors with responsibility for 
performance reporting and strategy.  It appears that responsibility has shifted from 
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those who report on performance to those charged with service delivery.  This could 
intimate that focus is shifting from public reporting back to the underlying 
substantive service, potentially reversing the displacement of organisational 
objectives which could be inferred from the PwC review (cf. Power, 1999; 2005).   
The public minute of the discussion runs to only three paragraphs and provides 
evidence that the chair and vice chair asked management one question each.  It can 
be surmised that there would have been private board discussions on the PwC report 
around this time, but there are few public traces of board scrutiny or detailed 
consideration of the report’s findings.  The press release (NHS Lothian, 2012b) is the 
primary public response to the review; there is a dearth of public evidence of official 
consideration through the usual governance channels. 
The Cabinet Secretary again faces questions on the issue and opposition calls for a 
national independent investigation into waiting list management at Question Time on 
Thursday 29 March 2012
136
.  In responding to the latter calls, she highlights recent 
Audit Scotland national studies on compliance with New Ways waiting time 
guidance. 
“In 2010, Audit Scotland carried out a review of new ways.  It updated that 
review in the middle of last year
137
 and said that it did not consider that any 
further investigation was required.  However, as I said last week, I have asked 
all boards to carry out an internal audit.  We will seek Audit Scotland’s 
advice on the terms of that audit, because it is important that we ask boards to 
audit the right things.”
138
 
The Cabinet Secretary is mobilising previous studies conducted by Audit Scotland to 
legitimate her judgement that a further national investigation is not essential.  It 
brings the recent national audit activity back into public focus and could raise 
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questions regarding the purpose and usefulness of that review although those 
questions are not publicly asked by any of the politicians. 
By intimating that the government will obtain advice on the terms of the internal 
audit, the Cabinet Secretary is harnessing the respected and recognised professional 
expertise of the national audit body to legitimate the exercise (Funnell, 1994; Malsch 
and Gendron, 2009).   
An article in The Sunday Times newspaper
139
 makes public the reply to the Scottish 
Labour letter from the Auditor General for Scotland.  The article quotes the letter 
thus: 
“We [at Audit Scotland] share the widespread concern that there is evidence 
pointing to an inappropriate use of this [social unavailability] code… we also 
wish to understand the nature of the problem in more depth and are arranging 
to meet the Information and Statistics Division (sic) to discuss trends in the 
use of this code.”
140
 
The article continues: 
“The body adds that after the meeting, it will consider if it can “add value” by 
carrying out a full review.”
141
 
This article is also significant in introducing the views of the Scottish Patients 
Association, the most high profile pressure group in Scotland representing patients’ 
interests.  The chair of the Association adds support to the calls for a further 
independent review. 
“It would be prudent to hold an independent investigation.  We suspect 
there’s more to this than meets the eye.”
142
 
This quote builds an impression that an independent review would be in the interests 
of patients and so the opposition parties are on the side of patients, unlike the 
government.  However, the basis for this course of action is suspicion and conjecture; 
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the Association no longer trusts NHS bodies which, as highlighted above, have been 
contaminated by the exposure of significant gaming of waiting time targets by NHS 
Lothian. 
The NHS Lothian Audit Committee met again on Thursday 5 April 2012.  There is 
little public evidence of direct consideration by the Committee of the waiting time 
management issue.  However, the minute of the Committee’s consideration of the 
external audit plan for 2011-12 highlights a potential tension between recent issues 
and the audit process. 
“[The Chief Executive] observed that given the extensive coverage of recent 
incidents the Committee should reflect on the statements detailed in the 
report… highlighting that the external auditors consider the Board’s 
performance management systems and corporate governance and control 
arrangements to be sound and operating satisfactorily.  It is important to 
recognise that any system of control can be compromised by rogue 
behaviour.  [The external auditor] advised the Committee that Audit Scotland 
[in their capacity as statutory external auditor of NHS Lothian] remained 




The position taken by Audit Scotland and the Chief Executive could be interpreted in 
two ways.  It could suggest that the Chief Executive is using the satisfactory 
judgement of the external auditors to make clear that the waiting times case was an 
isolated issue within the board and organisational controls are otherwise operating as 
they should, thus seeking to use the auditors to confer legitimacy on organisational 
systems and controls (Free, Salterio and Shearer, 2009).  The statement could also 
highlight the limitations of the assurance which the external audit process provides 
over organisation-wide controls.  
The Cabinet Secretary continued to receive written parliamentary questions on 
technical aspects of the waiting time system and reporting practices, including the 
role of Information Services Division.
144
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The Cabinet Secretary faced further questions on the review into management culture 
at NHS Lothian during Question Time on Thursday 19 April 2012
145
, including a 
supplementary question from Dr Richard Simpson MSP.   
“Will [the Cabinet Secretary] tell the Parliament what steps she took after 
Audit Scotland’s warning – in its 2010 report – about variation in the use of 
social unavailability codes in relation to the new ways waiting times 
programme?...  Will she now undertake an inquiry – similar to the Lothian 
inquiry – in each health board in which there is either high use of the codes or 




While the response does not directly answer the question, it turns responsibility back 
onto the national audit body; the latter’s decision that no further work was required 
in 2011 validates the government’s actions or in this case apparent lack of action. 
“…I have asked that this issue be included in the audit arrangements of all 
health boards.  As I said in the chamber before the recess, we will consult 
Audit Scotland on the terms of the exercise. 
As for the 2010 report, we pay close attention to and act accordingly on all 
Audit Scotland’s comments and recommendations.  Richard Simpson will 
know that Audit Scotland conducted and published a follow-up report in 
2011, and said that there was no need for any further work.”
147
 
Thus, the national audit body provides a buffer for the government against claims 
that it should have taken action earlier to address variation in the use of social 
unavailability codes.  The audit body publicly declared that “this audit provided 
assurance that the new arrangements are generally working well… There should not 
be any need to conduct a follow up study in the foreseeable future” (Audit Scotland, 
2011).  The government placed assurance on this expert opinion and in so doing 
gained a defence against accusations that it could have taken action sooner to identify 
and address the practices adopted by NHS Lothian.   
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This is the same body which the questioner is calling upon to conduct an independent 
national investigation to provide assurance that the practices adopted by NHS 
Lothian are not replicated within other organisations.  It does not serve the interests 
of the questioner to apply too much scrutiny to the earlier Audit Scotland reports.  
The symbolic importance of the review appears to exceed the value of its substantive 
content (Power, 1999:125). 
7.11 Audit Scotland national review 
7.11.1 Announcement of national review 
Meanwhile, both the media and opposition politicians continued their attempts to 
demonstrate that the practices observed at NHS Lothian were replicated in other 
parts of Scotland and that only a full independent investigation would provide 
assurance that this was not the case.
148
 
“…We need full transparency to get to the bottom of this once and for all…  
Anything short of a full, independent investigation carried out by Audit 
Scotland… simply isn’t good enough.” 




A Scottish Government press release issued in early May confirms both that Audit 
Scotland have agreed the terms of the internal audit review which the Cabinet 
Secretary has asked all boards to undertake and that the national audit body will 
perform a separate national review (Scottish Government, 2012).   
The press release states that these measures “aim to provide confirmation that 
waiting times practices are completely transparent right across the country” (ibid.).  
The Cabinet Secretary requires these reviews “to show that recording of waiting 
times data is accurate and transparent” despite there being “absolutely no evidence 
that these practices are widespread” (ibid.).  Independent assurance is considered 
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necessary to secure public confidence in the system and that assurance will be 
provided by multiple audit reviews. 
Audit Scotland does not formally announce the national review at this time; instead, 
the Scottish Government breaks the news by including it as a secondary 
announcement within a press release, noting that Audit Scotland “have also agreed to 
undertake a separate review themselves” (ibid.).   
The phraseology adopted in the latter statement is at odds with the Cabinet 
Secretary’s earlier proclamation in the Scottish Parliament that “it is not for [her] to 
tell Audit Scotland what to do”
149
.   
The Scottish Government press release created the impression that the Scottish 
Government is in control of the process; it has assumed ownership of the Audit 
Scotland review and by extension the actions taken to secure transparency.  The 
Scottish Government becomes the primary actor driving the national review by 
formally announcing it to the public, and in so doing displaces the role which 
opposition politicians have publicly played in calling on Audit Scotland to conduct 
such a review.   
The press release links the forthcoming review by Audit Scotland to the earlier 
national studies which the Cabinet Secretary also referred to previously in the 
Scottish Parliament. 
“The audit body will also conduct a separate report on waiting times to build 
on their March 2010 review.  This found the system to be fair for patients and 
was followed up by an impact report in June 2011.” 
(Scottish Government, 2012) 
The earlier statements of assurance from Audit Scotland are again mobilised by the 
government as a defence mechanism against potential criticism that improper 
practices should have been identified earlier.  There is still no attempt to address the 
inherent tension between seeking absolute assurance over waiting time management 
from a body which previously reported that the system was operating effectively. 
                                                          
149
 Quoted in the Official Report of the Scottish Parliament, 21 March 2012, at column 7461. 
265 
 
However, the announcement sparks further criticism of the government’s position.  
Newspaper reports make public a letter sent by Audit Scotland to Jackie Baillie in 
response to her earlier written request for the body to launch a national review of 
waiting time management.   
“The Auditor General has now asked Audit Scotland to review the 
management of NHS waiting times, recognising the importance of this for 
patients and the public and the need for independent assurance in this area. 
“We will examine how social unavailability codes have been used by NHS 
boards and will focus our attention around the period when discrepancies 
came to light in NHS Lothian.”
150
 
Political opponents round on the Cabinet Secretary’s apparent change in position and 
also seek to extend the negative management culture under investigation at NHS 
Lothian to behaviour by Scottish Government ministers and officials.  In particular, 
opposition politicians present the announcement as victory for them following their 
calls for a full independent investigation of the national position.   
“This is a hugely positive development, and comes in sharp contrast to Nicola 
Sturgeon’s attempts at Holyrood to block an inquiry into the SNP’s hidden 
waiting times scandal.  I will be writing to the Auditor General urging him to 
also examine the culture that has led to waiting times being manipulated to 
determine whether undue pressure was put on health board staff to fiddle 
waiting times by SNP ministers.”
151
 
“Scottish Labour has been pressing the Government to hold a full, 
independent, Scotland-wide investigation for months now.   
“But at every turn the SNP seemed desperate to brush our concerns under the 
carpet. 
“Patients and the public deserve to have complete confidence and I am 
delighted that the Auditor General has instructed this inquiry.”
152
 
These quotes illustrate how opposition politicians suggest that the Cabinet Secretary 
was against accountability because she did not immediately ask Audit Scotland to 
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conduct a national review.  She considered that a series of internal audits would be 
sufficient to provide the necessary transparency and assurance over practices adopted 
by other NHS boards.  The Cabinet Secretary’s assertion that it was not her role to 
demand a review from a national audit body is transformed by opposition politicians 
to attempts to “block” an inquiry.  To not be publicly supportive of a national audit is 
presented as tantamount to denying the need for openness and accountability.
153
 
7.11.2 Parliamentary discussion of the national response 
The Scottish Labour party called a debate on NHS waiting times in the Scottish 
Parliament on Thursday 17 May 2012.
154
  The scope of this debate covered both the 
gaming of waiting time targets and the management culture review at NHS Lothian. 
The following analysis is based on review of the transcript of the debate
155
 and video 
footage
156
.   
The opening statement by Jackie Baillie MSP provides the most direct signal to date 
that trust has been displaced from NHS organisations to the national audit body and 
that there has been a fundamental shift in the attitude in relation to the role of audit in 
Scottish public services. 
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“Frankly, it is not good enough for health boards to inspect themselves, 
which is the option that the Cabinet Secretary favours.  I believe that the 
people of Scotland deserve much greater openness and transparency, so I was 
delighted that Audit Scotland responded positively to [Scottish Labour’s] 
request for a Scotland-wide independent review.”
157
 
NHS organisations had been trusted to faithfully and truthfully report upon their 
performance ever since the devolution of responsibility for health services to the 
Scottish Parliament in 1999; under coalition administrations led by the Scottish 
Labour Party as well as two terms of the Scottish National Party in government.  But 
some 13 years later, demands are made for more extensive external verification of 
performance data to support the performance assessment framework.  
Ms Baillie’s claims are refuted by the Cabinet Secretary. 
“What happened in NHS Lothian was completely unacceptable, and it is of 
paramount importance that there is trust in, and transparency around, waiting 
times… 
“To imply, without evidence, that the massive achievement of staff, under 
this and previous Administrations, is somehow not real, is to do a massive 
disservice not to me or the Government but to every member of NHS staff 
whose hard work has delivered record low waiting times.”
158
  
The Cabinet Secretary is more reserved in her use of the term ‘audit’ than in her 
statement of 21 March 2012 but makes a link between the need for public confidence 
and the assurance provided by the series of internal audits which she announced in 
that statement. 
“We have a transparent system, but we must always ensure that it operates as 
it should and that the public have confidence in it.  That is why I have asked 
all boards to conduct a detailed internal review into their waiting time 
management.  Audit Scotland has approved the remit… 
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 Jackie Baillie MSP speaking in the Scottish Parliament on Thursday 17 May 2012, as recorded in 
the Official Report at column 9068.  
158
 Nicola Sturgeon MSP, Deputy First Minister and Cabinet Secretary for Health, Wellbeing and 
Cities Strategy, speaking in the Scottish Parliament on Thursday 17 May 2012, as recorded in the 
Official Report at column 9071. 
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In fact, there are fewer references to ‘audit’ in this debate than in the exchanges 
surrounding the Cabinet Secretary’s statement to parliament on 21 March 2012 in the 
wake of publication of the PwC review of waiting list management at NHS Lothian 
(see Table 7.6 below).   
Table 7.6: Count of references to “audit” and “Audit Scotland” during Ministerial 
statement and questions on Waiting Times (NHS Lothian) in the Scottish Parliament, 
17 May 2012 
Word / phrase Ministers SNP MSPs Opposition 
MSPs 
Total 
“audit” 1 3 - 4 
“Audit Scotland” 4 1 7 12 
Total 5 4 7 16 
Source: Official Report of the Scottish Parliament, 17 May 2012, at Columns 9065 to 9090 
The statement from the Conservative party health spokesperson offers an alternative, 
if factually incorrect, account of the Audit Scotland national study. 
“I therefore welcome what the Cabinet Secretary has done in giving Audit 
Scotland a remit to look at other boards.”
160
 
Some MSPs show unstinting faith in the power of audit and make bold statements 
about the overall assurance offered by the series of internal audits to be carried out 
by NHS bodies and the Audit Scotland national study. 
“Those audits will give the public unprecedented confidence in the waiting 




Audit is now being presented as the solution to the crisis: only audit can restore 
public confidence in the NHS (Lapsley and Lonsdale, 2010:91-2).   
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 Nicola Sturgeon MSP, Deputy First Minister and Cabinet Secretary for Health, Wellbeing and 
Cities Strategy, speaking in the Scottish Parliament on Thursday 17 May 2012, as recorded in the 
Official Report at column 9072. 
160
 Jackson Carlaw MSP, speaking in the Scottish Parliament on Thursday 17 May 2012, as recorded 
in the Official Report at column 9074. 
161
 Richard Lyle MSP, Scottish National Party, speaking in the Scottish Parliament on Thursday 17 
May 2012, as recorded in the Official Report at column 9080. 
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7.11.3 Audit Scotland project brief 
Audit Scotland published a project brief for its national review of management of 
NHS waiting lists in June 2012, in line with usual practice for performance audits.  
The brief provides details on the background to the review, the scope, aims and 
objective of the project, methodology used and the timetable for completion.  It also 
sets out how the review will “add value”. 
Audit Scotland considers that the national review is required on the grounds of trust. 
“The public needs to be able to trust how public services are managing 
[waiting time] information and be assured that patients are not being 
impacted negatively.  Audit Scotland is uniquely placed to provide 
independent public assurance on the management of waiting lists across the 
NHS in Scotland.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2012:3) 
Audit Scotland holds itself out as a key intermediary in restoring public trust in the 
reporting of waiting time targets and in the provision of treatment in accordance with 
national target times.  It also sets out a “unique” position for itself, supporting the 
findings of the earlier chapter that Audit Scotland carved out a position for itself as 
an expert on the financial and operational management of the NHS in Scotland. 
Although the title of the review is broad, the scope is very narrow.  The review will 
consider the use of unavailability codes, including any retrospective adjustments.  
The latter are a recurring theme of opposition parties’ interest in waiting time 
management in light of the issues at NHS Lothian.  Similar to the PwC review, it 
reviews only nine months of activity, from April to December 2011 and so will 
provide retrospective assurance only.   
The project brief clarifies the differences between the national review and the series 
of individual internal audits requested by the Scottish Government.  The internal 
audits are broader in scope, considering both compliance with national guidance on 
waiting list management and how waiting time performance is reported within the 
organisation.   
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One other key difference is evident in the aims of the Audit Scotland study which 
will “examine how the Scottish Government monitors NHS boards’ management of 
waiting times” (Audit Scotland, 2012:4) as well as practices within NHS boards.  
This brings direct scrutiny to bear on the overall performance management approach 
to waiting time guarantees, as well as operational practice.   
Audit Scotland also publishes a “flyer” to accompany the project brief for some 
reviews, including the waiting list management review.  This is a short document, 
running to 2 pages with half of the first page taken up with the title of the review and 
a graphic.  Although the purpose and audience for this flyer are not explicitly stated, 
this would appear to be an abbreviated project brief aimed at the general public. 
Unlike the project brief, it provides background information on what NHS waiting 
lists are and the national requirements.  Rather than stating “how Audit Scotland will 
add value” (Audit Scotland, 2012:3), the flyer asks “why is this audit important?”  
The answer is the same in both cases; so that the public can trust that public services 
are managing waiting list information appropriately and patients are not negatively 
impacted by inappropriate management practices.  This reinforces an impression that 
Audit Scotland is the gatekeeper of trust in public service delivery. 
The flyer also asks “what do we want to happen as a result of our audit?”  Audit 
Scotland provides the following answer: 
“The length of time you have to wait for treatment is very important to 
patients.  The audit will evaluate whether data recording practices at NHS 
boards are valid and seek to provide assurances that patients are not waiting 
longer than necessary due to inappropriate management of waiting lists.  
Should we identify any irregularities, we will make recommendations for 
NHS boards and the Scottish Government to help them improve the way they 
manage their waiting lists.” 
This answer tells the public what is important to them.  It also continues the theme of 
holding Audit Scotland out as an expert on the subject area through reference to 
recommendations to help the providers of public services improve their operational 
practices.   
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7.12 Reflections and concluding remarks 
7.12.1 Key findings and reflections 
This chapter has provided a rich account of a performance system in crisis and traced 
how audit came to be mobilised as political response to the most significant shock to 
the reported performance of NHSScotland following devolution.  The selection of 
audit has the first-line response is rendered more significant by the preceding studies 
which found that successive official performance assessment frameworks did not 
create a role for audit so the national audit body created its own space in the 
performance network.   
A single newspaper report in October 2011 set in motion a series of reviews which 
progressively unravelled performance reports and exposed them as false 
representations of substantive performance.  The investigation into an allegation that 
a small number of patients were being offered treatment in distant hospitals at very 
short notice uncovered more systemic gaming which undermined the reliability of 
performance reports produced by one of Scotland’s largest health boards and 
ultimately undermined confidence in reports of national progress in reducing patient 
waiting times.   
Government Ministers and opposition politicians alike relied upon audit to uncover 
the truth, but this reliance appeared to be based on the ritualistic appeal of audit 
rather than an understanding of the technical capacity of audit. 
The seriousness of the findings at NHS Lothian contaminated other NHS 
organisations, and contributed to a breakdown of trust across a performance 
management system which had previously allowed organisations to report on their 
own performance without recourse to external verification.  Auditors were 
established as the most trustworthy actors, who were called upon to restore trust in 
NHS organisations despite a national performance audit study having failed to 
identify the existence of gaming in the system only months earlier.  The national 
audit body eventually undertook a national review, which opposition politicians 
presented as the only means by which public trust in NHS organisations could be 
restored.   
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7.12.2 Implications for the Audit Society 
The voluntary recourse to audit as the primary response to this performance crisis, 
despite there being no formal role for audit in the NHSScotland performance 
assessment framework, supports the findings of earlier studies that a voluntary 
independent audit can bestow legitimacy on a process (Free, Salterio and Shearer, 
2009), particularly a system which has been threatened by a scandal (Andon and 
Free, 2012).   
The legitimacy of audit appeared to be more important to politicians than its 
technical capacity: although the PwC report on waiting times management was 
explicit that it was not an “audit” report, MSPs made more than 20 references to 
“audit” in a 40 minute session to discuss the report.  The popular ambiguity of audit 
appeared to strengthen its appeal to politicians.  This supports the proposition that the 
ambiguity of audit is a key source of its influence (Power, 2000a:116) and refutes 
claims by other that the audit society cannot exist without an accepted definition of 
“audit” (Humphrey and Owen, 2000; Lindeberg, 2007).   
The programmatic appeal of audit is a recurring motif in this study: politicians often 
take symbolic actions to restore or create an impression of independent assurance, 
such as the decision to intervene in the relationship between PwC and NHS Lothian.  
This action received much attention but in substance changed nothing more than the 
counterparty to a contractual relationship with PwC.  Although the government 
proclaimed that it had taken over management of the review in the interests of 
“appropriate corporate governance”, it later transpired that this was a smokescreen 
for a loss of trust in senior management and non-executive board members.   
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The significance of the recourse to audit to restore confidence in the performance 
system is greater than the voluntary nature of that recourse.  The national audit body 
had conducted a national study of waiting time management a year earlier, when the 
gaming practices were being deployed by NHS Lothian.  However, there is no 
evidence of any media or parliamentary scrutiny of Audit Scotland’s previous study 
and the national audit body was not “sacrificed” in the manner of private sector 
auditors in the wake of a corporate crisis before it became part of the solution 
(Guenin-Paracini and Gendron, 2010).  Instead, both government Ministers and 
opposition politicians relied upon the legitimacy bestowed by audit to support their 
own actions and so it was not in the interests of either party to apply too much 
scrutiny to the work of Audit Scotland.  This connection could tentatively be 
regarded as an enabler of the near-universal acceptance of the national audit body 
and supports claims of uncritical trust in audit practices (Power, 1999:136-7).   
7.12.3 Further issues to be explored 
The present study has focused upon the emergence of the performance crisis and the 
immediate response.  It has not considered the long-term effectiveness of that 
response in securing improvements in both substantive performance and the quality 
of performance reports.  A future study could thus explore what happened next, 
including the findings of the Audit Scotland national study and the responses of key 
actors including NHS boards, the Scottish Parliament and internal auditors. 
There is evidence in both this case study and in the preceding study of Audit 
Scotland annual audit reports that audit institutions have succeeded in shielding 
themselves from external criticism.  It is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider 
how Audit Scotland and other audit institutions build such immunity, but future 
studies could explore this in greater detail. 
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There is also scope for study of the impact which this crisis, and similar crises which 
undermine the veracity of performance reports, have upon public trust in the 
organisations in light of the increasing reliance which the public places in abstract 
ranking systems (Jeacle and Carter, 2011).  The official account of this crisis is 
saturated with the views of politicians and senior managers, with little attention given 
to the impact which this gaming had upon patients.   
 
The next chapter presents the findings of an observation-based case study within a 
Scottish NHS Board.  It will consider how audit mechanisms are manifest at 
organisational level and what effect they have on organisational governance and 
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This chapter presents the results of an observational case study set in a large Scottish 
NHS board.  It explores the impact which audit technologies and concepts have on 
organisational life through observing interactions between senior managers, general 
managers, auditors and non-executive board members in three committee settings.   
The case provides direct insight into how audit manifests itself in relationships and 
interactions in an NHS organisation which operates in a national policy framework 
which does not prioritise audit and which is subject to a national performance 
assessment framework which has no formal role for audit.  It shows how audit can 
still permeate organisational life in such an environment, both in terms of formal 
audit processes and requirements and in terms of the ideology of audit, including 
characteristics of Power’s audit society.   
8.1.1 Case study setting 
This case study was conducted in a large Scottish NHS Board.  The confidentiality of 
the NHS board will be maintained and the Board is not identified in the following 
analysis.  Table 8.1 below summarises some key facts about the NHS board, which 
demonstrate the scale of the Board’s operations.  
Table 8.1: Case study setting – key facts 
 Resident population > 400,000 
  Workforce > 10,000 WTEs 
  Baseline funding > £500m 
  4 major acute hospitals 
  17 other hospital sites, including community hospitals 
Source: review of key organisational documents; all criteria correct at time of fieldwork 
The governance of the Board follows the national requirements for NHSScotland 
organisations, as outlined in Chapter 2: Research context.  The Board’s external 
auditor is appointed by the Auditor General for Scotland; Audit Scotland was the 
appointed external auditor at the time of fieldwork.  Internal audit services are 




The Board granted access to meetings of three Committees: the Audit Committee; 
the Operational Audit Sub-Committee; and the Executive Management Team.  These 
Committees are at the heart of the organisation’s response to formal audit and 
performance systems and their respective roles and remits are considered further 
below.   
The researcher observed four meetings of three different committees between 
September and November 2011, as summarised at Table 8.2 below. 
Table 8.2: Meetings observed during case study 




Operational Audit Sub-Committee 
26 September 2011 
2 hours,  
45 minutes 
28 November 2011 2 hours 
Audit Committee  11 October 2011 3 hours 
Executive Management Team 5 October 2011 
3 hours,  
30 minutes 
Source: Fieldwork notes 
Detailed notes were taken during each meeting to capture the key issues discussed 
and note which actors participated in which discussions.  The discussion was not 
transcribed.  In order to preserve the anonymity of committee members, verbatim 
quotes are used sparingly in the text but are included where the precise wording is 
considered significant to the analysis.  The substance of other discussion points is 
reflected in the text.   
Observational research was supported by detailed review of Committee documents, 
including meeting papers, minutes of meetings and terms of reference.   
The research design and strategy underpinning this case are influenced by Latour’s 
account of ANT (Latour, 1987, 2005); the aim is to reassemble the key associations 




The methods employed in this case study are considered in further detail in Chapter 
4: Research design and methods.   
8.1.4 Findings 
This chapter is structured by Committee, with observations from each meeting 
presented in a separate section.  In order to present a vivid account of how each 
meeting unfolded, observations are presented in chronological order.  Agenda items 
which were not relevant to audit or performance have been excluded from the 
analysis.   
 
8.2 Operational Audit Sub-Committee 
8.2.1 Background 
The Operational Audit Sub-Committee (OASC) is a formally constituted sub-
committee of the Audit Committee, which is itself a formally constituted statutory 
committee of the NHS Board.  The role and remit of the Audit Committee are 
considered further below at Section 8.3.1.   
The OASC is “responsible for seeking assurance on the adequacy and effectiveness 
of [the] Board’s systems of corporate governance and internal control.  The material 
it receives will be all external and internal audit reports relevant to the Board’s 
system of internal control, any other reports pertinent to systems of control which 
affect Board income and expenditure, national performance audit reports, and any 
additional material from management on internal control.  The OASC will present 




It can thus be considered as a forum for more in-depth review of audit activity than is 
permitted at the statutory Audit Committee and a physical forum in which managers 
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 Terms of reference of the Operational Audit Sub-Committee, provided to the researcher by the case 
study organisation.   
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responsible for services or functions which have been under audit scrutiny can be 
held to account for their actions.   
The OASC brings together a diverse range of individuals from across the NHS 
Board.  It is chaired by a non-executive Board member, and the remaining OASC 
members are also non-executive Board members.  The OASC Chair is also Chair of 
the Audit Committee, although this was not required by the terms of reference of 
either committee.  The non-executive members are outnumbered at each meeting by 
attendees from operational management and both internal and external audit.   
There was no seating plan at the observed meetings, with the non-executive members 
sitting amongst the operational managers.  This gave the meeting a collegiate 
atmosphere and the physical configuration of the room did not create an appearance 
that managers had been summoned to give account to a panel of scrutineers.   




Table 8.3: Attendees at observed meetings of the OASC 
26 September 2011 28 November 2011 
Committee members 
 Chair (non-executive member of 
NHS Board) 




 Chief Internal Auditor 
 Deputy Chief Internal Auditor 
 External audit senior manager 
(outgoing and ingoing audit teams) 
 Deputy Director of Finance, Acute 
Operating Division 
 Deputy Director of Finance, Primary 
Care 
 Director of Strategic Planning 
 9 senior operational managers 
 Corporate governance and value for 
money manager 
 Committee secretariat 
 
Committee members 
 Chair (non-executive member of 
NHS Board) 




 Chief Internal Auditor 
 Deputy Chief Internal Auditor 
 External audit senior manager 
 Deputy Director of Finance, Acute 
Operating Division 
 Deputy Director of Finance, Primary 
Care 
 Director of Strategic Planning* 
 Director of eHealth* 
 Divisional Nurse Director, Acute 
Operating Division 
 5 senior operational managers 
 Corporate governance and value for 
money manager 
 Committee secretariat 
 
Source: Fieldwork notes 
* Attended part of meeting only 
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The meeting papers were used as a reference point throughout both meetings 
observed, but it was not always clear that OASC members had used the papers to 
identify in advance any points or issues which they wished to raise at each meeting – 
there were infrequent references to precise sections or paragraphs of reports. 
Meeting agendas followed a standard format, as summarised in Table 8.4 below, 
including four substantive categories of business: primary care reports, internal audit 
reports, Counter Fraud Services
163
 and general corporate governance.  Multiple 
papers could be tabled under each heading. 
Table 8.4: Pro forma agenda for Operational Audit Sub-Committee meetings 
1. Welcome and introduction from chair 
2. Minutes for approval 
3. Running action note 
4. Primary care reports 
5. Internal audit reports 
6. Counter Fraud Services 
7. General corporate governance 
8. Any other competent business 
9. Future meeting dates and locations 
Source: OASC meeting agendas, September and November 2011 
The management of risk is a pervading theme of OASC meetings.  Not only does the 
template for committee papers include a mandatory “risk register” heading, 
prompting the author to consider whether there is a need to reflect issues raised in the 
paper in the corporate risk register, but the discussion of operational issues often 
referred to the need to update the organisation’s risk register.   
There is little evidence in the observed committee meetings that performance audit is 
conducted locally and the internal audit workplan for the financial year focuses on 
systems and controls, influenced by risk assessments.  Organisational performance 
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 Counter Fraud Services is the specialist function providing fraud deterrence, detection and 
investigation services to NHSScotland.  It is an operating division of NHS National Services Scotland.   
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targets were only mentioned once in the September OASC meeting
164
.  Management 
of operational performance appears to be organisationally separate from the formal 
audit mechanisms within the Board, or at least the traditional audit functions 
reporting to the Audit Committee. 
Although two external audit representatives were present at the September meeting 
of the OASC, they were not active participants in the meeting.  They spoke only 
once, in response to a direct question from the committee Chair, about an Audit 
Scotland performance audit report tabled at the meeting by management.  Were it not 
for this intervention by the Chair, they would likely have remained silent throughout 
the meeting.  One might speculate that they attend the meeting for intelligence-
gathering purposes, to enhance their knowledge of the internal control framework; 
their attendance may be ritualistic rather than participative; or that external audit is 
not a powerful influence within the organisation at the level of operational control.   
The level of participation of OASC members appeared directly linked to their own 
professional interests.  For example, the OASC member who is a general medical 
practitioner actively participated in the discussion of primary care agenda items, but 
did not comment on the remainder of OASC business.   
The two observation sessions demonstrated that the OASC focuses on identification 
of risks facing the organisation and the implementation of controls which can 
manage those risks.  Non-executive OASC members attempted to link these back to 
corporate or strategic issues facing the organisation but most of their interest was in 
micro-level organisational systems. 
8.2.2 Observations: September meeting of the OASC 
This was the first in the series of meetings observed in the case study.   
Three of the five OASC members were present at the meeting, including the chair 
(see Table 8.3 above). 
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 OASC meeting observed on 26 September 2011, agenda item 5.5 
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Primary care reports – payment verification in primary care 2010-11 
The substantive business began with consideration of a report on payment 
verification in primary care.  The report sought to provide the committee with 
assurance that the national organisation responsible for making payments to family 
health service practitioners
165
 deployed a payment verification system over these 
payments to ensure they complied with official regulations, to review the local 
process followed within the board and to further provide assurance to the committee 
that there is no risk to the board arising from these payments.  It provided the results 
of the payment verification activity for the most recent quarter for which data was 
available.   
Although not detailed in the paper, payments made by the national organisation on 
behalf of the board comprised around 20% of the board’s gross expenditure in the 
2010-11 financial year.   
The report provides a summary of the results of the payment verification activity 
carried out for each contractor group, while a short appendix provides information on 
the nature of the checks carried out.   The paper is written in technical language 
which it is unlikely lay OASC members would fully understand without recourse to 
more detailed guidance.   
The paper was presented to the OASC by the responsible general manager who 
prefaced his update with a general overview of payment verification and explained 
that the report is intended to provide the OASC with high level assurance.  He noted 
that a greater level of detail was provided for higher-value payment streams. 
The paper boldly states that there is no risk for the organisation in terms of these 
payments, despite the payment verification process identifying areas where 
recoveries were due from contractors who claimed payments in breach of 
regulations.  The OASC chair nevertheless seeks confirmation from the general 
manager that, while the risks were not significant enough to appear in the corporate 
risk register, they were recorded in the local register. 
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 Being general medical practitioners, general dental practitioners, community pharmacists and 
optometrists.   
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There is a short discussion on the paper, with questions asked by one OASC member 
and by internal audit.  In an interesting role reversal, one of the OASC members, 
who is a general medical practitioner, provides an answer to the question raised by 
the deputy chief internal auditor in support of the initial response provided by the 
general manager. 
Primary care reports – Quality & Outcomes Framework 2010/11 minutes of QOF 
payment verification group 
The next item of business asks the OASC to note the minutes of the Quality and 
Outcomes Framework
166
 (QOF) payment verification group meeting to review the 
achievement of general medical practices against the QOF in the preceding financial 
year and approve achievement payments to practices.  The OASC is effectively being 
asked to provide a higher level of assurance by approving the findings of a 
management assurance process, providing an example of increasing layers of audit 
and control (Power, 2000a). 
The primary care general manager presents the report to the OASC and specifically 
highlights that internal audit used to be active in the QOF prepayment verification 
process but, now that the process has been operating effectively for a number of 
years, the chief internal auditor no longer attends the meeting and receives instead a 
copy of the minute of the meeting.  This is specifically noted in the minutes of the 
payment verification group meeting: “apologies have been received from Internal 
Audit, on the basis that the process seems very well established with the relevant 
decision-makers involved.  They will receive the minutes of the meeting”
167
.   
The general manager appears to be mobilising the reduced input of internal audit to 
demonstrate that the process is operating effectively and thus to legitimate the 
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 The Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) is a voluntary incentive scheme for General Medical 
Practitioners within the General Medical Services contract, which offers financial rewards in return 
for achievement of a series of performance indicators across four (previously five) domains.  Until 
2012/13, the QOF operated on a UK-wide basis; from 2013/14 the QOF differs across the devolved 
nations.  For further information, see 
http://www.nhsemployers.org/PayAndContracts/GeneralMedicalServicesContract/QOF/Pages/Quality
OutcomesFramework.aspx (accessed on 26 August 2013).   
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 OASC paper presented to the meeting of 26 September 2011. 
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prepayment verification process – if internal audit is satisfied that the process is 
sound then by definition it is (Power, 2000a:117; Free, Salterio and Shearer, 2009).   
However, the presentation of such a sound process was not met with universal 
acclaim.  One OASC member noted that the process appeared resource-intensive to 
operate but the findings were the same each year, with very few if any irregularities 
identified.  The member thus questioned whether the verification process was 
excessive and should be scaled back.  What first appeared as a positive comment on 
the robustness of the process was in fact a criticism that the costs of control exceeded 
the benefits.    
The general manager responded very defensively, quoting the value of expenditure in 
this area and affirming that the level of verification was proportionate to this 
expenditure.  Although there was no current evidence of gaming of achievement of 
the QOF targets by general medical practitioners, it was still important to have a 
system in place which would provide such evidence.   
However, it is not clear how this reconciles with a statement made in the risks 
section of another paper: “Since QOF review visits are no longer routinely 




The OASC chair seeks clarification on the total number of practices and the total 
value of payments made to general medical practitioners.  On receiving this 
information, he notes that the level of assurance provided by the current process is 
very welcome and does not entertain the suggestion that the process should be 
scaled-back in future years.  He supports the continuation of robust controls and 
processes to provide assurance, and implicitly functioning as a deterrent control even 
if they do not detect significant irregularities.   
Before moving on to the next item of business, the OASC chair asks what action 
management is taking to follow up on an Audit Scotland performance audit study of 
community health partnerships.  The executive lead is present at the meeting and 
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 OASC paper presented to the meeting of 26 September 2011 
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notes that formal consideration has been delayed pending an anticipated 
announcement on health and social care integration proposals from the Scottish 
Government, anticipated within the next couple of weeks.  The board’s response to 
the performance audit will be framed in accordance with that announcement. 
While this item was not on the agenda, it demonstrates that non-executive members 
have an awareness of national performance audit studies without them coming 
directly to them for consideration and furthermore that they expect management to 
present a timely response to publication of these reports. 
Primary care reports – Contractual & statutory pro forma evaluation 
The next item of business was a short report on the outcome of the board’s 
contractual and statutory pro forma evaluation for 2010-11.   
This item illustrates how an audit-based approach to assurance can favour controls 
over substantive performance (Power, 1999:84; Sheffield and Bowerman, 1999).  
The report summarised the results of a pro forma evaluation issued to all local GP 
practices seeking assurance over compliance with procedural-based performance 
measures and contractual key performance indicators.  Practices were asked to 
evidence that processes and policies were in place. 
In presenting the report, the manager highlighted concerns relating to clinical 
governance, including the following.
169
   
Repeat medication and summarisation of notes within 8 weeks 
“Despite practices receiving continual reminders throughout the year to save 
evidence at year end to demonstrate their achievement in these indicators, 14 
[of 126] practices have failed to do this but have still claimed for the 
indicator.” 
Cervical screening policy 
“52 [of 126] practices were unable to produce a comprehensive protocol that 
included all the requirements for this indicator.  Main areas of missing data 
are no evidence that staff are clinically trained to perform smears and no 
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 OASC paper 4.3 presented to the meeting of 26 September 2011  
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evidence of monitoring of inadequate smear rates by individual smear 
takers.” 
Palliative care – meetings of multi-disciplinary meetings 
“3 [of 126] practices are unable to provide complete evidence to support their 
claim that multi-disciplinary meetings are held at least 3 monthly.” 
Fridge logs 
“Although some issues remain, this is greatly improved on previous years.  
Only 13 [of 126] practices have issues compared to 53 last year.  Main issues 
that remain are temperature not recorded every day and min/max temperature 
not recorded.” 
The OASC member who is also a general medical practitioner was quick to clarify 
that these concerns did not equate to deficiencies in clinical quality.  Rather, there 
was a lack of evidence that the specified process had been followed by a number of 
practices.  Auditable control systems appear to take priority over clinical outcomes 
(Power, 1999:84).   
Practices were subject to financial penalties if evidence could not be produced to 
support these areas and failure to produce evidence in support of three indicators 
triggered additional practice inspection visits. 
There is no evidence in the paper or the associated discussion that substantive 
performance is under threat.  The underlying financial penalties and threat of 
increased inspection provide incentives for general medical practices to focus upon 
procedural issues, potentially without consideration of the impact on true 
performance, yet there is no evidence in the paper that patient outcomes have been 
affected.  The focus of the contractual and statutory evaluation is on the installation 
and operation of management controls, not patient outcomes (Sheffield and 
Bowerman, 1999).     
Primary care reports – payment matrix in primary care 
This item is an explanatory paper, providing background information on the payment 
streams for the different family health services contractor groups as well as systems 
and controls over payments to primary care practitioners.   
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In presenting this paper to the OASC, the manager highlights that the budgets for 
some of these payments are held by the Scottish Government, and so the Board is not 
exposed to the risk of overspend against these budgets but there is a risk that these 
budgets could be transferred to NHS Boards given the growth in spend in these areas 
in recent years.   
There was a clear implication that the Board would pay greater heed to these areas if 
budgetary responsibility were transferred to them; this is supported by the 
observation by a non-executive member that there is a greater level of scrutiny over 
payments made to general medical practitioners (where the budget is held by the 
Board) than payments to the other contractor groups (pharmacists, NHS dentists and 
optometrists, the budget for which is held by the Scottish Government).   
While the Board does not have budget responsibility for this expenditure, it is 
nevertheless reported in the audited financial statements produced and signed off 
annually by the Board, and thus implicitly covered by the Statement on Internal 
Control.  So this suggests that the preoccupation with controls and conception of risk 
is self-interested to the extent that it is focused upon the Board’s financial exposure, 
as opposed to the global financial risk to NHSScotland, and is not necessarily driven 
by an ideological belief in internal control systems. 
Internal audit reports – Internal audit progress report 
The chief internal auditor presents a progress report to each OASC meeting.  Each 
report includes: 
 an update on delivery of the annual audit plan, including the number and 
percentage of audits still to be started, at the planning stage, at fieldwork stage 
and at draft and final report (completed) stage; 
 a summary of reports issued since the last OASC meeting, including the number 




 performance against a key performance indicator to issue draft reports within two 
weeks of the end of fieldwork and convert draft reports to final reports within 
three weeks thereafter;  
 a summary of current fraud referrals and operations (these are the subject of a 
more detailed report later in the agenda); and 
 an update on any other operational issues. 
The report also includes a summary of the scope of each audit included within the 
annual audit plan and an indication of its completion status. 
The chief internal auditor comments that the 2010-11 plan is progressing well.   
He talks at greater length about the softer, operational matters than about the 
technical status of the annual audit plan.  He highlights that a pay grading appeal for 
internal audit staff was unsuccessful, but that he intended to appeal the decision 
further.  He notes that this was impacting upon his ability to recruit staff with the 
appropriate qualifications.  While the tone of this update suggests that the chief 
internal auditor is exasperated by this situation, there is no real discussion of its 
implications by the OASC, such as the potential impact on the quality of internal 
audit services, although it is probable that they considered the issue at previous 
meetings. 
The chief internal auditor also provides a verbal update on an issue which he did not 
record in the progress report.  The board received a Freedom of Information request 
from a journalist at a national newspaper, seeking copies of all internal audit reports 
issued in the preceding two years.  Having provided the journalist with a list of all 
reports issued during that time period, the journalist requested copies of 17 reports 
which were subsequently issued to him. 
This request prompted senior management to discuss the impact on the organisation 
of audit reports being made public.  The outcome of this discussion, as reported to 
the OASC by the chief internal auditor, was that the director of human resources and 
organisational development and the director of communications would both be 
required to ‘approve’ draft internal audit reports prior to finalisation.   
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This is presented as a threat to the independence of the internal audit function, with 
the implication that it could result in changes being made to valid internal audit 
findings to protect the public reputation of the organisation.  The chief internal 
officer referred the OASC to provisions in the Board’s standing orders designed to 
protect the independence and integrity of the internal audit function, allowing them 
to work and report without interference from management.     
The OASC chair comes to the defence of internal audit, stating that he would “not 
accept censored internal audit reports” and noting that the nuances of a report could 
be lost if language was changed by management.  He asks the chief internal auditor 
to inform him immediately if there is any suggestion that senior management plans to 
interfere with the content of draft reports. 
Despite the impassioned response from the OASC chair, there are no other comments 
or questions on this item from the other committee members.  This issue would be 
discussed further at the observed meeting of the Audit Committee, and its 
implications are considered further at section 8.3.2 below.  However, the prevailing 
impression left on the researcher by the OASC discussion was that the organisation 
perceived negative internal audit findings as a threat to the organisation’s public 
reputation, and that this threat was considered greater than the threat of internal audit 
findings going unreported.   
Internal audit reports – Reports with satisfactory ratings 
The OASC then considers a report from internal audit which summarises the findings 
of reports issued since the previous meeting where internal audit has rated the control 
framework as ‘satisfactory’ or ‘fully satisfactory’.   The OASC receives only the 
executive summary of such reports, rather than the full findings so that it can devote 
its attention to reviews which highlight the need for improvement. 
Internal audit reports – Reports with ‘requires improvement’ ratings 
The OASC effectively operationalises managerial accountability within the NHS 
Board.  Managers are required to attend meetings to respond to internal audit reviews 
292 
 
completed in their area where the auditor concluded that the control framework 
“requires improvement” or is “unsatisfactory”.   
Even though managers provide written ‘management responses’ to each internal 
audit recommendation, they are still required to personally give account to the OASC 
and face additional questions from OASC members.   
The internal audit report is thus transformed from a printed record of a piece of work; 
it becomes an actor which brings the manager to the OASC to explain how control 
weaknesses have been allowed to arise in their area and what action they are taking 
to remedy those weaknesses.   
Internal audit reports – Adults at risk of harm 
The first internal audit review with a ‘requires improvement’ rating considers 
internal controls for protecting adults at risk of harm.  The OASC receives a copy of 
the full audit report and the deputy chief internal auditor presents an overview of the 
report to the meeting.   
The lead manager attends the OASC meeting to detail the actions which she has put 
in place to address issues raised in the report, and in particular to provide assurance 
that procedures have now been introduced to evidence that staff complied with the 
official guidance. 
OASC members do not question the manager further, although the chair welcomes 
the manager’s assurance that audit findings have been accepted and plans are in place 
to implement recommendations. 
One of the findings of the review was that staff are not released for, or are not 
attending, mandatory training courses.  This generates a strong reaction from the 
OASC chair who is “sick” of this issue recurring in reports, as it exposes the 
organisation to unacceptable risks.  He requests that a “strong paragraph” is included 
in the minute of the meeting and an action logged for him to raise this issue with the 
director of human resources.  The minute of the meeting is being used to crystallise 
action and to raise the profile of an issue.  This shows how specific internal audit 
reviews can identify thematic issues which span the whole organisation.   
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Internal audit reports – Business continuity 
The deputy chief internal auditor goes on to present the findings of an internal audit 
review of business continuity arrangements which concluded that the control 
framework was in need of improvement.  Rather than consider the response to a 
specific service disruption, the audit looked at the processes in place for responding 
to a potential disruption. 
The executive summary of the report notes that: 
“Events such as H1N1
170
 and adverse weather
171
 indicate that planning has 
been reasonably effective, with business continuity plans updated following 
these events.  However, the lack of discipline around regular reviewing, 
testing and updating of plans could undermine how effectively services 
respond to any future disruptions.” 
The review considered theoretical controls and did not consider the substantive 
response to recent real-life service disruptions (Power, 1994a:15-16). 
The responsible senior manager provides an update to the OASC on actions being 
taken to implement the recommendations.  While he accepts the ‘requires 
improvement’ rating he notes that the lack of progress was “not for want of trying by 
those with corporate responsibility” and he is evidently frustrated by the lack of 
action to date.  He provides an overview of actions which are in train and an update 
on some specific real-time examples of continuity planning.   
As with the previous internal audit report, the only comment and further questioning 
is made by the OASC chair, who asks the responsible senior manager whether he 
needs leverage from the Audit Committee to help secure organisational buy-in to 
business continuity processes.  The offer is respectfully turned down but provides 
evidence that the chair believes that the Audit Committee is an influential actor in the 
organisation. 
                                                          
170
 H1N1 world-wide influenza pandemic, 2009 
171
 Scotland suffered severe winter weather in November and December 2010 which caused extensive 
disruption to transport networks. 
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Internal audit reports – Operating theatres 
Of all the internal audit reports considered by the OASC, the review of operating 
theatres management prompts the most discussion at the meeting. 
The internal audit report refers to deficiencies in controls identified during the audit, 
but often contextualises these by referring to their impact on substantive 
performance.  The reverse position is also reported; substantive concerns about 
control or policy breaches are reported to internal audit or management but not 
formally recorded in the appropriate controls documentation. Examples include:
172
 
“Depending on local customs, staff rosters are prepared between 2 and 6 
weeks in advance…  While no significant concerns with staffing were raised 
during the audit, standardising practices could help support more effective 
scheduling.” 
“Medical Physics and Anaesthetics & Theatres use the Backtraq system to 
record theatre equipment, including serial numbers, locations and 
maintenance dates.  Reviewing Backtraq during the audit found that dates 
when last serviced were not recorded for 32% of equipment and 28% had last 
service dates ranging between 1995 and 2009.  Querying a sample indicated 
that records on Backtraq are out of date, including listing equipment that is no 
longer held… 
“Nevertheless, clinical staff report no particular concerns with the availability 
or reliability of equipment, and only 0.04% of operations were reported as 
being cancelled due to equipment breakdowns during the year to December 
2010.” 
“Based on infection control and public perception, the Uniform Policy sets 
standards of dress when inside or outside of theatres…  In July 2009, the 
Chief Nurse, Quality & Professional Standards, presented a report to [the 
operating division’s] Partnership Forum raising concerns about staff 
breaching the policy.  During the audit, Clinical Leads and Charge Nurses 
raised the same concerns, although Datix does not record any incidents being 
reported.”   
Both the internal audit report and the discussion at the OASC meeting refer to 
parallel management reviews.  While the internal audit report does not repeat 
                                                          
172
 All taken from OASC paper 5.5, presented to the meeting of 26 September 2011 
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recommendations made in management reviews, it recommends that management 
should develop “a formal action plan with clear responsibilities and target dates to 
implement the recommendations from the [other] reviews”. 
In addressing the OASC, the responsible senior manager explains that both the 
internal audit and management reviews tell essentially the same story.  The internal 
audit review raised issues which management had recognised over a period of time.  
The audit findings provided another lever which management could deploy to build 
support for changes which they wished to make to their service.   
One of internal auditors commented after the OASC meeting that of all the reviews 
discussed that morning, this review had been the most welcomed and acted upon by 
management, even though it merely confirmed what they already knew.  This shows 
how an internal audit review can be used as a legitimating device to support 
management action (Power, 2000a:117). 
One of the managers indicates that new attempts to systematise resource planning for 
theatres introduced in response to the internal audit and management review findings 
will be an ‘audit’ of the actual length of operations compared to the length of time 
predicted by surgeons.  It is debatable whether the proposed practice constitutes an 
‘audit’ in a technical sense.  This underlines not only how the language of audit has 
permeated organisational life (Power, 1999; Lapsley and Pong, 2000), but how the 
programmatic appeal of audit can outweigh understanding of its technical capacity 
(Power, 1999). 
The OASC chair comments that the presence of management at meetings to respond 
to internal audit findings brings a degree of “reality” to proceedings, compared to the 
otherwise potentially abstract discussion of internal control and risk issues.  He 
suggests that “it is a vehicle through which non-executive members can hear 
passionate people talking about practical things”
173
.  It also makes managers directly 
accountable for internal audit findings, and arguably ‘auditable’ in their own right.   
                                                          
173
 Paraphrased account of remarks made by the OASC chair at the meeting of 26 September 2011 
296 
 
He also provides a rationale for extending internal audit into ‘clinical’ areas: internal 
audit is not there to tell other professionals how to do their job, but to provide 
assurance over the system-wide use of resources.   
Internal audit reports – Patients & volunteers’ expenses  
The OASC considers only one review of financial systems at the meeting; a review 
of controls over payment of patients’ and volunteers’ expenses.   
The chief internal auditor notes that the Scottish Government has issued high level 
guidance for these areas but the internal audit review highlighted inconsistencies in 
local practices because there is no system-wide guidance in place within the board.  
He highlights three instances of suspected fraud against the organisation, which 
shows that the organisation is exposed to risk in this area.  The report also notes that 
one of the cases of suspected fraud could not be progressed by national Counter 
Fraud Services because of weaknesses in the board’s internal processes. 
The review highlights that trust is placed in staff to operate honestly in the absence of 
a formal control framework.  The chief internal auditor clarifies that while this is not 
necessarily wrong it introduces a lack of formality into the process around paying 
expenses.   
Internal audit reports – Property transactions 
The final internal audit review considered by the OASC is an annual audit of 
property transactions concluded during the year, required by the Scottish 
Government to test compliance with the NHS Scotland Property Transactions 
Handbook. 
This review shows how internal audit will attempt to secure action where the same 
control weaknesses are identified in successive reviews and management have not 
acted upon prior recommendations.  The chief internal auditor tells the OASC that 
one of the recommendations in the report had also been raised in six preceding 
annual reports, with no evidence that action had been taken to remedy the issue.  
Internal audit had now increased the grading of the recommendation from 
297 
 
‘significant’ to ‘critical’ to drive action by management and ensure the issue was 
taken seriously.   
The specific recommendation at issue is the requirement in the property transactions 
handbook for the Chief Executive to sign a certificate at defined stages of the 
property transaction process.  The OASC chair responds by questioning what the risk 
is to the organisation if the certificate is not signed.  Neither internal audit 
representative can offer a direct or definitive answer.  This begins to undermine the 
seriousness of the recommendation: if the benefit of the initial recommendation 
cannot be substantiated, it becomes difficult to persuade management of the need to 
take action.   
The OASC chair seeks assurance that the same findings will not be raised again in 
next year’s audit.  The director of facilities confirms that a new certification 
framework has been introduced and the following audit will show 100% compliance 
with the requirements of the property transactions handbook.  While it is not made 
explicit, it appears that the escalation of the issue by audit has forced management 
action.   
General corporate governance – Arm’s length external organisations – are you 
getting it right?  
The performance audit report, Arm’s length external organisations – are you getting 
it right? (Audit Scotland, 2011c), was about and addressed to the local government 
sector.  However, management had not only read the report but also considered it of 
relevance to NHS activities, including commissioning services from third sector 
organisations.   
The responsible senior manager informed the OASC that he would use the Audit 
Scotland report to review the Board’s existing service level agreements with third 
sector organisations.  Audit Scotland is viewed as an authoritative source of good 
practice information by the organisation. 
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There is virtually no substantive discussion on the report: the OASC interest is 
ensuring that the organisation has taken action in response to the Audit Scotland 
report.   
The OASC chair asks the two external audit representatives present to comment on 
the Board’s use of national performance audit studies.  The external auditor gives a 
very short response – she is pleased to see the Board use the report.  This is the only 
contribution which the external auditors present make to the meeting.   
Counter Fraud Services – Counter Fraud Action Group – Staff working elsewhere 
while on sick leave 
The next report has previously been considered by the board’s counter fraud action 
group, which referred the report to the OASC.  It summarises findings that staff 
worked elsewhere while on sick leave, which had featured in multiple internal audit 
reviews over the last two years.  This paper highlights the associated risks and issues 
facing the organisation.  It also analyses referrals made to Counter Fraud Services, 
including the outcome of each referral. 
The chief internal auditor highlights internal audit’s role in ensuring that this issue is 
publicised throughout the organisation.  Internal audit has raised awareness of this 
risk through updates in the staff newspaper and information bulletins issued to line 
managers.  This shows how internal audit might find informal channels of 
communication more effective than formal audit reports as a means of raising 
awareness of control issues.   
In responding to the report, the OASC chair notes that he has asked internal audit to 
highlight themes arising across their audit work.  Internal audit is moving away from 
‘silo’ reviews of control frameworks in particular departments to consider 
organisation-wide issues.   
The OASC chair also recognises that internal audit is an organisation-wide resource 
and source of expertise.  He notes that it would be worthwhile to remind operational 
managers that they should draw on the expertise held by internal audit. 
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General corporate governance – Controlled drugs governance team pharmacy 
presentation 
The lead pharmacist from the controlled drugs governance team is invited to make a 
presentation on the work of her team to the OASC.  While this presentation is for 
information purposes only, it shows how audit concepts can permeate clinical 
domains (Power, 2000b).  The Lead Pharmacist explained that the Shipman case
174
 
exposed nationwide weaknesses in the governance of controlled drugs
175
 and 
systems-based regulations were subsequently introduced to strengthen the safety of 
controlled drugs. 
New regulations introduced by the then Scottish Executive in 2006
176
 required the 
organisation to appoint an “accountable officer” for the management of controlled 
drugs.  This is a direct import from the established framework of financial 
accountability for the Scottish public sector.
177
  The regulations also introduced new 
systems of control for regulated pharmaceutical products, building on existing 
clinical governance machinery.   
The case study Board responded to the new regulations by establishing a new team 
of pharmacy professionals and an inspection officer to support the controlled drugs 
accountable officer in the discharge of their duties.  The team uses management 
tools, such as key performance indicators, to identify anomalies in prescribing 
practice which could indicate irregularities in the prescription of controlled drugs.  
The Lead Pharmacist notes that the 2006 regulations
178
 require NHS Boards to 
‘audit’ their compliance with controlled drugs regulations.  The team achieve this 
                                                          
174
 Harold Shipman, a general medical practitioner, was found guilty of the murder of 15 of his 
patients in 2000 by administering lethal doses of morphine.  A public inquiry found evidence that he 
may have killed up to 250 patients.  The case prompted reviews of access to controlled drugs and 
medical supervision.   
175
 A ‘controlled drug’ is any drug listed in Schedule 2 to the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (c. 38).  
Access to and use of such drugs are regulated because they are considered particularly susceptible to 
abuse or likely to cause harm.   
176
 The Controlled Drugs (Supervision of Management and Use) Regulations 2006, SI No. 3148 
177
 See Public Finance and Accountability (Scotland) Act 2000 
178
 Regulation 2, The Controlled Drugs (Supervision of Management and Use) Regulations 2006 
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through the issue of self-assessment forms to managers, who are asked to certify 
their own performance.  The team review the completed forms and instigate follow 
up actions.  Some Chief Nurses also conduct local ‘mini audits’ to monitor their own 
performance against the regulations.   
The Lead Pharmacist made clear in her presentation that her role is not to question 
prescribing or clinical decisions but to ensure that good practice is followed and to 
ensure that the Board complies with system-based regulations.  Other managers 
present at the OASC meeting, including an Associate Director of Finance, requested 
more regular reporting of compliance so that they can evidence that governance 
arrangements are in place over controlled drugs and there is a supporting audit trail. 
The introduction of systems-based regulations to this area of clinical practice had 
succeeded in rendering that area ‘auditable’ (Power, 1999; 2003a) 
8.2.3 Observations: November meeting of the OASC 
All OASC members were present at the November meeting, unlike the September 
meeting.  There was accordingly a more even balance between non-executive 
members and management at this meeting.  The presence of managers was also more 
fluid at this meeting, with a greater number of managers attending the meeting to 
discuss their own agenda items only.    
General corporate governance – Audit Scotland – Review of CHPs 
The OASC Chair had added the Audit Scotland (2011a) performance audit of 
community health partnerships (CHPs) to the meeting agenda.  In introducing this 
item, he comments that although the OASC regularly considers Audit Scotland 
performance audit reports it has yet to formally consider this report, despite it being 
published some months earlier.  He had previously asked the Director of Strategic 
Planning to provide an update on the management response to the review at the 
September meeting.
179
   
                                                          
179
 See section 8.2.2 above 
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The Director of Strategic Planning explains that the board has not taken action on the 
findings of the performance audit, pending an anticipated announcement on health 
and social care integration by the Scottish Government in December 2011.  The 
board intended to defer formal consideration of the report until there was clarity over 
the future policy direction.  Although not explicitly stated, the director implied that 
community health partnerships may not continue to exist in their present form.   
This response is almost identical to that provided to the verbal question raised by the 
OASC chair at the September meeting, when the director expected a Scottish 
Government announcement within a couple of weeks.   
The director provides a general overview of the anticipated Scottish Government 
announcement on integration and the ongoing local work to progress this policy 
agenda. 
There was limited reaction from OASC members who appeared satisfied with the 
explanation provided by the Director of Strategic Planning and did not engage with 
him on the specific findings of the Audit Scotland review.   
Internal audit reports – Patients’ funds and valuables 
The OASC considers an internal audit review of patients’ funds and valuables which 
had concluded that the overall associated control framework “requires 
improvement”.  The report raised six issues requiring management attention, all of 
which were rated as ‘significant’
180
.   
The internal audit review was a traditional financial controls review, testing the 
design, implementation and operation of key controls over the management of 
patients’ funds across the organisation.  The report does not specify the audit 
methodology but it is apparent that a sample of wards was selected for testing. 
The review is presented to the OASC by the deputy chief internal auditor.  The 
presentation and discussion of this item lasted approximately 20 minutes; all business 
considered by the OASC up to this point had taken up 30 minutes. 
                                                          
180
 Issues are graded on a three-point scale: critical (material to the wider organisation), significant 
(material to the subject under review) and important (relevant for the subject under review). 
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The deputy chief internal auditor highlights the main findings of the review, which 
include incomplete policies and procedures, infrequent reconciliation of cash held, 
failure to hold cash and valuables securely at all times, and inappropriate attendance 
at review meetings.   
The OASC chair invites comments from a number of professional groups present at 
the meeting, including nursing and general management. 
All OASC members contribute to this discussion; it is the only item which elicits 
comment from all members.  Members express concern over whether it is 
appropriate to ask frontline nursing staff to undertake such administrative duties 
when they should be focusing upon patient care.  A potential tension emerges 
between the demands of frontline patient care and strict adherence to financial 
control procedures.  The discussion is more focused on protecting patients’ interests 
than on upholding a theoretical ideal type of financial control.  There is consensus 
that processes should be reviewed and revised to ensure they meet the needs of 
patients and of the organisation (cf. Power, 1999:95-97). 
The chief internal auditor notes that an internal audit review of the same topic around 
10 years earlier had uncovered similar issues.  This raises questions about the extent 
to which internal audit reviews are active in organisational learning and development 
and how much management effort is directed at introducing substantive changes, 
rather than just doing enough to demonstrate that an audit recommendation has been 
implemented (McGivern and Ferlie, 2007).   
Internal audit reports – Internal audit progress report 
The chief internal auditor presents the routine progress report to the committee.  The 
format of this report is considered above at section 8.2.2. 
He notes that the plan is progressing well, although some changes to the original plan 
will be proposed to the next meeting of the Audit Committee.  One of these changes, 
the deferral of a planned audit on a regional shared services project because the 
project was not yet sufficiently advanced, prompts interest from an OASC member 
who is anxious to understand why the project is not sufficiently advanced to facilitate 
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audit.  This member expects the auditors to report why the project had not 
progressed.   
The chief internal auditor clarifies the role of audit.  He suggests it would be more 
appropriate to ask the executive lead for the project to provide an update in the first 
instance, rather than to commission an ‘audit’.  The OASC agree with this suggestion 
and will invite the executive lead to their next meeting. 
This exchange highlights that the perceived role of ‘audit’, even amongst members of 
relevant governance committees, can differ significantly from how audit defines its 
role.  The OASC member appears to equate internal audit with an investigatory 
function which highlights all organisational or management deficiencies.  The 
internal audit function, by contrast, considers itself responsible for the review and 
testing of control frameworks installed by management.  Management is responsible 
for the delivery of projects, not internal audit. 
The OASC chair detects a “vibe” from the chief internal auditor’s report, as well as 
the earlier discussion on management of patient funds, that audit recommendations 
are not being appropriately followed up by management.  The chief internal auditor 
notes that he had been asked about this issue at a recent meeting with the board chair 
and Chief Executive.  This meeting prompted the production of a paper for the Audit 
Committee.  Responsibility for following up internal audit recommendations is 
expected to transfer back from the corporate governance and value for money team 
to internal audit in order to improve reporting of progress.   
An associate Director of Finance comments that it is important not to lose sight of 
the “massive improvement” in recent years in reducing the number of outstanding 
recommendations.  The chief internal auditor counters that it is necessary to 
distinguish between the number and percentage of recommendations outstanding as a 
new internal audit approach has reduced the absolute number of recommendations.   
It is apparent from the tone of the discussion that this is a sensitive issue for the 
OASC.  The failure to implement internal audit recommendations in a timely fashion 
raises questions about the efficacy of the internal audit process – audit cannot deliver 
improvements if management do not take action following a review.  Systematic 
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failure to implement recommendations can contribute to a wider sense that the audit 
fulfils a ritualistic rather than substantive role in organisational life. 
Internal audit reports – Reports with satisfactory ratings 
The OASC considers a standing report from internal audit on reviews with fully 
satisfactory or satisfactory ratings which have concluded since the last meeting.   
The chief internal auditor notes that the board’s external auditors review the controls 
over stock every year and almost always criticise managers for failing to fully 
comply with the financial operating procedures.  However, he believes that the 
financial operating procedures for stock management need to be revised as actual 
practice, while not fully compliant with the formal procedures, is in line with good 
practice.  This indicates a willingness on the part of audit to look beyond the 
existence of a control to its substantive value, which mirrors the earlier agreement 
that operating procedures for management of patient funds should be revised to 
ensure they are fit for purpose.   
A review of IT disaster recovery had also received a ‘satisfactory’ rating.  The report 
concluded that there is a strong control environment within eHealth.  The review 
identified some minor issues with documentation which were also raised by an Audit 
Scotland review of eHealth service delivery which would be considered later on the 
agenda.   
The director of eHealth highlights the overlap between recent audit reviews carried 
out by both the internal and external auditors.  Both audits were conducted at the 
same time.  The audit functions did not appear to coordinate their work, which 
increased the burden which the audit placed on management.   
General corporate governance – Audit Scotland – eHealth service delivery 2010/11 
The OASC now turned to consider the findings of the external audit review of 
eHealth.   
The eHealth director told the OASC that this had been one of the “most acrimonious 
reports” he had ever received from the external auditor.  However, this comment is 
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transformed in the formal minute of the meeting: an “acrimonious” report is minuted 
as a “challenging” report.   
The source of the animosity is highlighted in the covering paper to the report which 
he wrote for the OASC: 
“Whilst agreeing in principle with the spirit of this observation, the eHealth 
department contend that this is a complex environment and it is neither 




The eHealth director insists to the OASC that he can only accept an audit 
recommendation if it will deliver real improvement.  He comments: 
“I’m not just going to come in here and say that I’ve ticked the box, I’ve got a 




He claims that the Audit Scotland report raised a real resource issue, not an 
organisational risk, and that writing a paper-based plan would not address the issue.  
There were mitigating controls in place to address business continuity risks and the 
solution proposed by audit is not practicable.   
The eHealth director is also frustrated by a recommendation made that the board 
should be insured against certain risks as it is not NHS, or wider public sector policy, 
to take out external insurance policies.  The audit report sought to impose pre-
defined best practice upon the board without any sensitivity to the particular 
circumstances of the organisation (Power, 1999; Bowerman et al., 2000).   
This discussion highlights the potential for tension to arise between the professional 
expertise of area experts and audit recommendations.  It appears that this audit was 
conducted by an IT specialist, but the OASC is nevertheless faced with a choice 
between accepting an audit recommendation and accepting the professional 
judgement of the lead manager with professional expertise in this area.   
                                                          
181
 OASC paper presented to the meeting held on 28 November 2011.   
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General corporate governance – Audit Scotland – Transport for Health and Social 
Care  
The OASC chair introduces an Audit Scotland (2011d) performance audit report on 
transport for health and social care which he had included on the agenda.  The 
transport and access sub-committee of the board, of which he is also chair, is 
considering how to respond to the report, together with partner organisations and 
stakeholder groups. 
This demonstrates that a substantive committee will also consider the relevance of 
national performance audit studies.  However, it can be speculated that this case 
arose because of the personal awareness of the chair through his participation in the 
Audit Committee and OASC, rather than a general awareness of national audit 
activity by non-executive board members.  It appears more likely that audit findings 
will be taken seriously and influence operational practices when they are taken 
forward by a subject committee, rather than treated as part of a specialist audit 
governance system separate from the core organisation (Power, 1999:96).   
General corporate governance – Performance audit process – Six month update 
The final substantive item on the agenda is a six-monthly update on the board’s 
consideration of national performance audits. 
The paper provides some background information on the organisational and 
committee processes for reviewing performance audit reports.  The report explains 
that: 
“Once performance audits are published, the established practice is that the 
lead manager / director will present the report to the OASC, together with a 
summary of how the report relates to [the board].  Thereafter the Corporate 
Governance & VFM team receive periodic summary updates from the 




The OASC also require six-monthly update reports on the status of implementation 
of recommendations made in performance audits.  The update report is “designed to 
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307 
 
give assurance that all audit reports published on Audit Scotland’s website that may 
be of interest to the OASC are reviewed to determine if they are suitable for the 
OASC’s agenda”
184
.  In order to ensure completeness, the report includes a list of all 
reports published by Audit Scotland but which the corporate governance and value 
for money team do not consider relevant to the organisation. 
The report is presented to the OASC by a member of the corporate governance and 
value for money team.  He briefly summarises the content of the report and there are 
no comments or questions from committee members. 
This is a process-driven paper, designed to provide assurance to the OASC rather 
than to address any substantive issues.  Substantive consideration of issues is 
evidenced in the earlier agenda items which relate to specific performance audit 
studies.  Performance audit reports tend to be considered by the specialist audit 
OASC rather than by the relevant substantive committee, increasing the likelihood 
that performance auditing is not embedded in substantive business (Power, 1999:96).   
Audit Scotland is the only source of performance audit activity within the board.  
The board tends to react to national studies rather than proactively engage in local 
performance or value for money audits.  The internal audit programme is focused on 
traditional internal control frameworks rather than considering, or influencing, 
performance.  The formal audit structures within the organisation are not concerned 
with performance issues.   
 
8.3 Audit Committee 
8.3.1 Background 
The Audit Committee is a mandatory committee within the governance structure of 
Scottish NHS Boards.  The same non-executive member of the NHS Board chairs 
both the Audit Committee and the OASC, although this is not required under the 
terms of reference of either committee.  Committee members and managers within 
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the NHS Board often referred to this committee as the ‘Strategic Audit Committee’, 
distinguishing its interest in organisation-level issues from the OASC which 
considers the operation of internal controls in greater detail. 
The formal remit of the Audit Committee “is to provide assurance to the NHS Board 
that NHS X acts within the law, regulations and code of conduct applicable to it and 
that an effective system of internal control is maintained.  The duties of the Audit 




The Committee is “responsible for the delivery of the entire remit of the Audit 
Committee.  However the material it receives will be predominantly concerned with 
all matters concerned with external accountability and the discharge of the Board’s 
overall corporate governance responsibilities.”
186
 
Table 8.5 below summarises who was present at the meeting observed by the 
researcher. 
Relationship with other committees 
The Audit Committee does not have locus over clinical risk which is the 
responsibility of the Healthcare Governance and Risk Management Committee.  The 
Audit Committee’s interest is thus primarily in matters of financial or managerial 
control, fraud and irregularity.  The Audit Committee does receive copies of the 
minutes of meetings of the Healthcare Governance and Risk Management 
Committee (HGRMC), which establishes a formal channel of communication 
between the two committees.   
The parent-child relationship between the Audit Committee and the OASC was 
evidenced by the tabling of minutes of OASC meetings at the Audit Committee.  The 
common Chair presented the key issues from each meeting.  In some instances the 
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 Terms of reference of the Audit Committee, provided to the researcher by the case study 
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186
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same papers, such as the Internal Audit Progress Report, were presented to both 
Committees without modification. 
Table 8.5: Attendees at observed meeting of the Audit Committee 
Committee members 
 Chair (non-executive member of NHS Board) 
 3 non-executive members of NHS Board 
 
In attendance 
 Chair of the NHS Board 
 Non-executive member of NHS Board (Chair of Healthcare Governance and 
Risk Management Committee) 
 Chief Internal Auditor 
 External audit Assistant Director and Senior Manager (outgoing and incoming 
audit teams) 
 Director of Finance 
 Head of Corporate Reporting and Corporate Governance 
 Corporate Governance and value for money manager 
 General Manager, Primary Care Contracts (one agenda item only) 
 Operational manager observing for personal development 
 Committee Secretariat 
 
Source: Fieldwork notes 
8.3.2 Observations: October meeting of the Audit Committee 
Welcome, introductions, minutes of the previous meeting and running action note 
There had been a discussion at the previous meeting of the Audit Committee about 
the consideration of organisational risks by board committees.  Members had raised 
concerns about the respective responsibilities of the Audit Committee and the 
HGRM Committee.  The Audit Committee chair agreed to meet with the chair of the 
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latter committee and reported back to the October meeting.  The chair of the 
HGRMC also attended the October Audit Committee meeting.   
The Audit Committee Chair reports that he and the HGRMC chair agree that formal 
consideration of ‘risk’ sits best with the Audit Committee.  He emphasises that there 
needs to be a rigorous audit trail to support risk management processes: risk 
management should not be a ‘tick box’ approach to drawing up a risk register and 
there should be evidence that risks are being managed.  He notes that the OASC has 
a role in making risk management real at operational level through interaction with 
managers.  The chairs of each committee would thus be seeking board approval for 
appropriate changes in their remits. 
It became clear from the ensuing discussion that what was actually being proposed 
was for the Audit Committee to have responsibility for assuring risk management 
processes, while the HGRMC would continue to ensure that underlying 
organisational risks, including clinical risks, were properly managed.   
Minutes of the Operational Audit Sub-Committee 
The Committee considers the minutes of the previous two meetings of the OASC.  
As noted above, the Committee and OASC share a chair but membership of the two 
committees differs. 
The Committee chair highlights key items discussed by the OASC.  He notes that the 
September meeting focused upon primary care issues.  This prompted a discussion 
on the QOF incentive scheme for General Medical Practitioners
187
.  The board chair 
welcomed assurance that payment verification processes were being followed but 
queried whether the incentive framework encouraged the wrong behaviours and 
outputs from general medical practitioners.  He noted that it felt like there was little 
local control over what the board was paying for. 
The Committee chair also notes that the Audit Scotland performance audit of 
community health partnerships set a “singularly enormous” challenge for the 
organisation, which must ensure that robust governance mechanisms are established 
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around its CHPs.  This provokes a strong reaction from one Audit Committee 
member, hereinafter referred to as “M”, who is also chair of one of the Board’s 
community health partnerships.  He is “far from impressed” with this performance 
audit study, which does not accurately “represent CHP world”.  He highlights a 
number of issues which he believed the performance audit study failed to capture, 
including the constraints placed on CHPs by government policies, such as the 
abolition of prescription charges and negotiation of national contracts with GPs.   
This is the first instance of direct criticism of a national performance audit study 
during the period of observation.  These criticisms were not subsequently minuted 
and so there is no public trace of the member’s discontent with the national findings. 
Linkages with other board committees – Healthcare Governance and Risk 
Management Committee 
The Audit Committee chair invites the chair of the HGRMC to present the minutes 
of two recent meetings.  She intimates that there are no particular issues to bring to 
the attention of the Audit Committee. 
Audit Committee member M expresses concerns about the reporting of clinical 
incidents, noting that such incidents often came to the attention of the HGRMC via 
M’s personal networks, rather than through formal channels.  He suggests that an 
audit is required to review the efficiency of systems for reporting incidents and to 
recommend how channels of communication could be strengthened. 
The board chair also highlights risks arising from the forthcoming transfer of 
responsibility for prisoner healthcare from the Scottish Prison Service to the NHS.  
He suggests that an internal audit of the service would be appropriate and the 
Committee chair agrees to discuss the topic with the chief internal auditor at a 
forthcoming meeting on the 2012-13 annual audit plan. 
Non-executive board members identified two new opportunities for audit as they 
reviewed the minutes of a meeting of another board committee: those who are active 
in the Audit Committee appear to be keen promoters of audit technologies.   
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Linkages with other board committees – Staff governance committee 
Audit Committee member M presented the minutes of the most recent meeting of the 
staff governance committee, which he chairs.  He highlighted two issues: retirement 
awards and absence management, including return to work processes.  Asked to 
comment on retirement awards, the Director of Finance noted that cash held at ward 
level might benefit from a follow up internal audit.  This is the third suggested topic 
for an internal audit review made at the meeting, showing not only that the plan can 
be shaped by Committee activity, but that the organisation recognises audit as an 
effective technology to identify and address control weaknesses, and thus to provide 
assurance over the operation of systems and processes. 
Internal audit reports – Internal audit progress report 
The chief internal auditor presents a progress report to the Committee.  This report 
was previously tabled at the September meeting of the OASC.
188
   
The chief internal auditor provides verbal updates on audit reports with below 
satisfactory opinions, noting that these were discussed in detail by the OASC; 
developments with fraud referrals and operations which have occurred since the 
paper was produced; the job grading of the internal audit team; and a Freedom of 
Information request for copies of internal audit reports. 
The chief internal auditor notes that the Freedom of Information request had sparked 
a debate on the format and style of internal audit reports.  He reiterates concerns 
which he had previously communicated to the OASC
189
 that the new requirement to 
send all reports to the directors of communications and human resources prior to 
finalisation could threaten the right of internal audit to work without interference 
from management.  This right is protected by both the board’s standing orders and by 
government internal audit standards.   
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The Committee chair confirms that, further to discussions at the OASC in 
September
190
, he met with the director of communications to ensure he understood 
the requirements in the standing orders.  He is reassured that the new process will not 
interfere in the audit process.  The suspected threat to internal audit’s independence 
was a perceived, rather than actual, threat.   
However, the Committee chair recognises that Freedom of Information legislation 
could also apply to the supporting internal audit file.  He cautions that internal audit 
will need to exercise their professional skills carefully when compiling files and 
drafting reports, and consider whether issues could be taken out of context if they 
were made public.  The organisation’s concern with the reputational risks arising 
from audit activity begins to emerge from these discussions.   
Audit Committee member M highlights the internal audit review on property 
transactions, which was discussed by the OASC in September
191
.  He congratulates 
internal audit on taking action to address recommendations which were implemented 
by management despite being made in successive audit reports.  He notes that it is 
“our job to go where the organisation does not want us to go”
192
, regardless of who it 
is in the organisation that is not following rules.  He ponders whether non-executive 
board members should have acted in support of internal audit and ensured that the 
recommendation was implemented earlier. 
Presentation of the Annual Audit Report to the Audit Committee 
The external auditor provides a verbal update on the annual audit report.  This update 
lasts around 30 minutes, around one-sixth of the meeting, despite the report having 
been finalised three months earlier.   
A copy of the report was issued to members with the meeting papers and many of 
those around the table saw the report earlier in the year.  However, the external 
auditor speaks to the document in detail, talking members through the report section 
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 References made by non-executive Committee member M to the Audit Committee meeting held on 
11 October 2011.   
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by section.  She acknowledges that the report does not tell the Committee anything 
new but was produced primarily for a “public” audience and would, in due course, be 
published on the Audit Scotland website
193
.   
The annual audit report re-presents a lot of information which originated within the 
NHS Board.  The external auditor repeatedly states that the report “captured existing 
activities”
194
 or “captured messages from materials you [the NHS Board] 
produce”
195
.  Specific issues reflected in the report are “as manifest in your financial 
plan”
196
.  The review of performance draws heavily on the section on performance 
against targets in the operating and financial review in the Board’s annual accounts.   
As well as reporting on the financial statements audit and the financial health of the 
Board, the annual audit report comments on wider issues including clinical 
governance, staff governance, performance management and service delivery.  The 
auditor again appears to rely on representations made by the Board and has not 
performed any audit procedures to provide assurance over these management 
representations.   
The auditor presents itself as an authority on a wider range of issues than traditional 
financial statements audit without carrying out any in-depth work in these areas.  
Furthermore, the credibility of the Board’s own view of its performance in these 
areas is enhanced through adoption of its reports by the external auditor (Free, 
Salterio and Shearer, 2009).   
The external auditor “welcomes the profile” which the Board gives to Audit Scotland 
performance audit reports.  She explained the process which was followed by the 
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Committee, noting that this is a “very effective application of performance audit 
studies”
197
.   
At the behest of the board chair, the Committee discusses the additional review of 
remuneration of NHS staff earning more than £100,000 per annum.
198
  The board 
chair is interested in the origins of this review.  The external auditors appear 
confused and are unsure how to answer the question.  The outgoing assistant director 
claims that the Cabinet Secretary “commissioned” the review, only for the incoming 
assistant director to correct her and state that the review was “requested rather than 
commissioned”.  The outgoing assistant director later backtracks further, saying that 
the Auditor General probably had an opportunity to decline to perform the review but 
chose not to.  The board chair is interested in whether other parties can direct Audit 
Scotland to undertake specific pieces of work and notes that the NHS Board might 
consider making requests in future. 
One Committee member (hereinafter referred to as “N”) notes that the OASC 
receives copies of the board’s output from Audit Scotland’s ‘best value’ toolkits but 
suggests that the Committee needs to consider how it can drive best value and use the 
output from the toolkits more effectively.  The corporate governance and value for 
money manager cautions that the toolkits are designed for use by auditors and are not 
a management checklist.  He advises that ‘best value’ should be driven by outcomes, 
not by compliance with a checklist or toolkit (cf. Power, 1999).   
General corporate governance – Major hospital development 
The Director of Finance presents a detailed verbal update on a major service 
development to provide assurance over the management of project risks and the 
definition of relationships of accountability.   
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 The Deputy First Minister and then Cabinet Secretary for Health and Wellbeing wrote to Chairs of 
all NHS Boards in November 2010 asking them to undertake a detailed review of the application of 
pay policies for all staff earning over £100,000.  The letter asked external auditors to provide “specific 
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Committee members want to see a comprehensive audit trail of project decisions to 
support decision-making and to evidence application of risk management practices.  
Committee member M expresses concern that he cannot see an “auditable” decision-
making process, while the Committee chair highlights the need for evidence that the 
board has formally reviewed the project at key stages.   
General corporate governance – Overseas patients 
The Director of Finance presents a report on arrangements to recover income due 
from overseas patients who are liable for the costs of clinical care received but who 
did not made payment at the time of treatment.  She notes that the issue attracts a lot 
of media attention as the board often writes-off debts owed by these patients.   
The Director of Finance believes that a retrospective audit is required to understand 
whether the reported position was understated.  However, she reassures the 
Committee that action is being taken to address the challenges involved, particularly 
a new requirement to secure a deposit for the cost of emergency treatment.  She 
assesses that the Board is “probably” doing a good job in challenging circumstances.   
General corporate governance – Follow up of audit recommendations 
The final item of business is a paper on the implementation of previous audit 
recommendations, presented by the corporate governance and value for money 
manager.  This update was requested by Committee members at a previous meeting. 
The number of outstanding audit recommendations has recently increased.  Although 
recommendations are usually implemented, this is frequently after the due date 
agreed between management and the auditor.   
This item prompts a short discussion, but one in which a number of individuals 
participate.  Committee member M is disappointed that the Director of Finance, who 
is executive lead for the Committee, has the greatest number of outstanding 
recommendations.  The Director of Finance does not respond but the report does not 
indicate the relative performance of the directorate; it is likely that a disproportionate 




The chief internal auditor seeks to present the analysis in relative, rather than 
absolute terms.  He noted that 92% of actions are not completed within the target 
date, with 10% completed within 2 months of the target date, 44% between 2 months 
and one year and 38% more than a year after the target date.   
The HGRMC chair poses a number of questions, including whether target dates are 
set correctly, taking appropriate account of operational factors, and whether the 
organisation takes internal audit seriously enough.  Managers may need to be 
educated on the purpose of internal audit to ensure they understand the importance of 
implementing recommendations within the target date. 
M later notes that there is little point in audit making recommendations if it takes a 
considerable length of time for action to occur.  He suggests that it calls the need for 
an audit into question: if a recommendation is that “important”, then why is it not 
actioned immediately? 
The Committee chair asks that a further update is brought back to the Committee in 
six months’ time.  He agrees with the suggestion made by M that the Committee 
should write to the Chief Executive if there was not a significant improvement in the 
reported position.   
8.3.3 Reflections on the Audit Committee 
There was less evidence of consideration of performance issues by this Committee, 
compared to observation of OASC meetings.  A senior official within the board 
described the Audit Committee as a ‘set piece’.  However, the observation provided 
interesting examples of challenge by non-executive directors and evidence of the 
collective perception of the committee’s identity.   
The observations revealed three main differences between the strategic and 
operational Audit Committees: 




 There was greater dialogue at the operational OASC, especially between 
OASC members and management.  The Audit Committee meeting was more 
about the presentation of information and reports, but non-executive 
committee members still challenged the information which was presented to 
them. 
 The Audit Committee discussion contained more explicit references to 
organisational risk than discussions at the OASC meetings observed.   
One Committee member did not speak at all during the meeting; the Committee chair 
invited him to comment on one item but he declined to do so.  As well as the four 
committee members, two other non-executive board members were present at the 
committee meeting observed, including the board chair.  These non-executive board 
members provided as much challenge and posed as many questions to managers as 
the formal Committee members.  In particular, the board chair frequently expressed 
his own views on issues, directed the business of the committee and interacted 
directly with internal and external audit representatives.   
 
8.4 Executive Management Team 
8.4.1 Background 
The Executive Management Team (“EMT”) meets fortnightly, and the focus of 
meetings alternates between “business” and “performance” issues.  The researcher 
attended a “performance” meeting of the EMT at which directors are held to account 
for delivery of results.   
EMT meetings are usually chaired by the Board’s Chief Executive, but he was not 
present at the observed meeting.  The Chief Operating Officer acted as chair and 
directors were asked to challenge each other’s reports of performance.   
The researcher learned from informal discussions with EMT members outside the 
meeting that the tone of the performance meeting is significantly different when the 
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Chief Executive is present.  The Chief Executive is “demanding” and so issues, 
including difficulties, can be discussed more openly in his absence.   
The influence of the Chief Executive on the meeting is clear despite his physical 
absence as EMT members frequently refer to his likely view on a particular issue.  
While some EMT members disagree with that perspective, this dissenting statement 
is more often than not prefaced with the phrase “this isn’t for minuting, but…”.   
In contrast to the Audit Committee and OASC meetings, participants frequently refer 
to performance targets, including national targets.   
Table 8.6 below summarises who was present, and who was absent, from the 
meeting observed by the researcher. 
Table 8.6: Attendees and apologies at observed meeting of the Executive 
Management Team  
Present 
 Chief Operating Officer 
 Director of Finance 
 Medical Director 
 Nurse Director 
 Director of Public Health 
 Director of Strategic Planning 
 Director of Human Resources and Organisational Development 
 Senior management representative of each Community Health Partnership 
 Director of Communications 
 Secretariat 
Apologies 
 Chief Executive 
 
Source: Fieldwork notes 
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8.4.2 Observations: October meeting of the Executive Management Team   
Matters arising 
The longest single discussion during the EMT meeting is the standing agenda item 
under which directors provide a verbal update on progress made towards 
achievement of local efficiency savings targets.  This is a wide-ranging discussion, 
lasting around 50 minutes, or one-quarter of the meeting.   
Directors highlight potential barriers which could threaten delivery of savings as well 
as tensions between generating savings and maintaining operational performance.  
The need to maintain national targets, such as the 4-hour standard for treatment in 
Accident and Emergency departments and the 6-week maximum standard for 
delayed discharges,
199
 is often cited as a constraint on the delivery of planned savings 
to support financial balance.  The performance of the Board’s largest Accident and 
Emergency department has recently deteriorated dramatically against the standard; 
the percentage of patients being treated within 4-hours has fallen from 98% to 80%.  
This is considered to be a knock-on effect of poor performance against the delayed 
discharge standard which had resulted in a shortage of beds into which to admit 
patients presenting at Accident and Emergency.   
The Board recently commissioned external management consultants to review the 
provision of beds for older people’s services.  The review identified scope to reduce 
the number of post-acute beds but found that more beds were required in acute 
hospitals.  This created a tension with the efficiency savings plans, which assumed 
that the number of acute beds could be reduced.  It becomes evident during the 
discussion that not all EMT members have seen the consultants’ report and one 
general manager expresses concern that colleagues may have accepted the 
conclusions of the external consultants without proper scrutiny. 
                                                          
199
 The Health and Social Care Data Dictionary published by the Information Services Division of 
NHS National Services Scotland defines a delayed discharge as “a hospital inpatient who is clinically 
ready to move on to a more appropriate care setting but is prevented from doing so…  The patient is 
ready for discharge but the discharge is delayed due to social care reasons, healthcare reasons or 
patient / carer / family related reasons” (source: 
http://www.datadictionaryadmin.scot.nhs.uk/isddd/2206.html accessed on 21 November 2011). 
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EMT members are frustrated by the inability of the Board to independently improve 
delayed discharge performance – the discharge of a patient from an acute or 
community hospital is usually delayed by the time taken to access local authority 
care services.   
It becomes clear through the discussion that national performance statistics are not 
sufficiently detailed to support local management of the position.  Managers 
considered it necessary to engage external consultants to expose the scale of the 
problem and to help identify the main drivers of poor performance.   
The discussion highlights the inter-relationships between the activities of different 
directorates.  Almost every area of the organisation represented at the meeting is 
either affected by or contributing to management of delayed discharges.  The Chief 
Operating Officer, acting Director of Strategic Planning, Director of Finance, 
Director of Public Health, Nurse Director and community health partnership general 
managers all offer different perspectives on the same management problem.   
One CHP general manager cautions the EMT against “indiscriminate” use of metrics 
which he claims caused difficulties in the past and led to the creation of operational 
groups, such as the EMT performance meetings, to better understand the underlying 
operational context and ensure that remedial actions complemented this.  The 
reliance which senior managers place on proxy quantitative measures of 
performance, and the associated neglect of qualitative dimensions of organisational 
performance, is considered a threat to in-depth understanding of the organisation and 
the ability to take effective action to alleviate problems.   
Although the discussion begins with a warning that achievement of internal 
efficiency targets is contingent on bed reductions, it quickly expands into a wide-
ranging discussion of achievement of key performance targets.  Achievement of 
targets appears to be a key driver of organisational activities and a major focus of 
senior management attention, rather than the natural outcome of core organisational 
activities.   
The discussion eventually returns to progress made in delivering local efficiency 
targets.  Each director is asked to provide a short update on progress in their area.  
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The updates are fairly high level; EMT members classify their programmes as ‘on 
track’ or provide assurance that actions are in train to recover any shortfalls against 
planned trajectory, but do specify the actions taken.  
EMT members refer to various internal consultancy and savings programmes 
currently being deployed across the organisation to improve efficiency and 





 and Harvard reviews
202
.  This demonstrates that 
the organisation embraces new management technologies and appears to be infused 
with new public management techniques. 
Financial position 
EMT members consider an update paper on the board’s financial position, which is 
presented by the Director of Finance.  The paper provides a summary of the year-to-
date position against budget, an update on the achievement of local efficiency 
savings targets (which was also the subject of the preceding verbal updates) and an 
activity analysis. 
There is a short discussion on the inclusion of activity data in the paper.  The Chief 
Operating Officer suggests that this data is too simplistic to support management 
decision-making and the report should focus on performance, rather than basic 
activity data.  Little had been learnt by the organisation from reporting activity data 
alone and it would be helpful to analyse activity data by Healthcare Resource Group 
(HRG)
203
, rather than by the board’s management structure.   
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 A management technique imported from manufacturing companies which aims to eliminate waste 
and inefficiency from processes by focusing upon what creates value for stakeholders.  It also involves 
staff in the change process to promote ownership of changes.   
201
 5x5x5 was an internal initiative which saw the creation of five multi-disciplinary teams, each with 
five members, to develop a proposal for one of five organisational priorities by researching and 
learning from healthcare organisations across the world.   
202
 Although the ‘Harvard’ reviews were not defined in the course of the meeting, it appears that an 
improvement methodology had been imported from the university. 
203
 The Health and Social Care Data Dictionary published by the Information Services Division of 
NHS National Services Scotland defines a Healthcare Resource Group (HRG) as “a set of treatments 
that are clinically similar and that use roughly the same level of resources. HRGs have been 
specifically designed to give managers and clinicians the information needed to monitor and evaluate 
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The Chief Operating Officer, supported by another director, suggests that the board 
should report on occupied bed days.  This is expected to become a Scottish 
Government indicator for measuring delayed discharges so it is important that the 
board begins to use and understand this measure.  
Current and future national performance targets appear to influence the design of 
internal management information and reporting systems (Power, 1999:95-97).   
Performance management report  
The Director of Strategic Planning presents an update report on performance 
management, including latest statistics on performance against national HEAT 
performance targets set by the Scottish Government.  This report summarises 
performance against trajectory for 33 performance ‘items’ and provides narrative 
analysis of the nine items for which performance data is not yet available.  The report 
includes a narrative analysis of key risks to achievement of performance targets.  The 
appendix to the report lists each target, current performance, performance in the 
previous period, the milestone performance for the current period and an assessment 
of the board’s performance against that milestone. 
This factual report stimulates little response from EMT members.  The length of the 
discussion on performance which grew organically from the discussion of 
achievement of efficiency savings contrasts sharply with the very short, almost 
ritualistic, discussion of the formal paper on performance.  While the former 
discussion lasted up to 50 minutes, the latter is completed in around 5 minutes.   
The Director of Strategic Planning highlights performance against the 4-hour A&E 
treatment waiting time standard, which had been discussed earlier in the meeting.  
The formal report provides data for an earlier period, when performance was 
assessed as “on target” as the milestone for that period had been met.  By the time of 
the meeting, performance has deteriorated significantly.  This highlights the 
difficulties posed by retrospective reports on performance; managers may be 
                                                                                                                                                                    
their use of resources and forecast the impact of casemix changes on the cost of care they are 
providing.” (source: http://www.datadictionaryadmin.scot.nhs.uk/Dictionary-A-




discussing historical issues which have already been resolved, or may be unaware of 
current challenges or risks.   
The Director of Strategic Planning describes one particular breach of the 4-hour 
standard, where a patient waited almost 8 hours for treatment at one of the board’s 
hospitals, as “horrendous”.  This highly emotive language contrasts sharply with the 
passive language adopted in formal EMT and board papers which consider 
performance issues.  It relates performance targets back to individual patient 
experience, a perspective which is not evident in other discussions of performance at 
the observed meeting.   
Although the HEAT system does not publicly rank boards’ performance, the EMT 
members evidently assess the board’s comparative performance relative to the rest of 
NHSScotland.  One Board is singled out as the main competitor.  EMT members are 
not satisfied if the board achieves a target, they also wish to see evidence that the 
board is performing above the Scottish average and better than its main “competitor”.   
The Chief Operating Officer leads a discussion of access (waiting time) targets, 
which represent six of the nine targets behind trajectory in the performance report.  
She details actions which are being taken to improve performance against access 
targets, including negotiating additional capacity from external providers in the NHS 
and in the private sector.   
The Chief Operating Officer notes that Scottish Government officials are considering 
whether access targets should be maintained for individual stages of treatment, 
noting that boards are struggling to meet the staged targets.  She suggests that this 
could be a “backward step” in improving access to services.  The underlying 
implication is that performance targets may be scrapped where they are particularly 
challenging to achieve, even though this might compromise overall performance and 
patient experience.  However, it also suggests that boards prioritise resources to meet 
targets and the absence of a target will divert resources away from a particular area.   
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Delivering quality in primary care action plan 
The Director of Strategic Planning informs EMT members that national leads have 
recently attended meetings of board groups responsible for implementing the 
‘delivering quality in primary care’ action plan.  The board is receiving national 
recognition for good practice in supporting implementation of the national action 
plan.  EMT members again seek to define local performance relative to national 
benchmarks. 
The Chief Operating Officer challenges the Director of Strategic Planning on the 
absence of performance metrics in the report.  The latter director responds that a list 
of metrics would be developed and brought to the group in the next calendar year.  
Performance appears to be conceived as a quantitative, or measurable, domain in 
EMT discussions (Power, 1996; 1999).   
Workforce efficiencies 
This report updates EMT members on progress against planned workforce 
reductions, performance management of sickness absence and use of overtime.  The 
director of human resources presents the paper to the meeting.  He highlights key 
headline information; workforce reductions are ahead of trajectory and the board is 
making good progress in reducing sickness absences. 
He notes that a further paper will be taken to a future business meeting of the EMT, 
detailing how performance against the sickness absence target could be sustained 
over the longer-term.  Proposals will include dismantling additional bureaucratic 
structures introduced to deliver a significant improvement of performance in order to 
embed this level of performance as part of core line management activities.   
The report documents the total value of overtime payments made in the month, as 
well as the number of staff receiving an overtime payment above £1,000.  The Chief 
Operating Officer has concerns about the reporting of overtime and the lack of audit 
trail to support such payments.  The system cannot distinguish genuine overtime 
from other types of additional payments made to staff, such as salary protection.  She 
proposes an “audit” of data input to the payroll system to solve this problem.   
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The Director of Public Health suggests that the EMT ask internal audit to conduct a 
review of overtime payments.  The Director of Finance is most emphatic that this 
would not be appropriate, but does not explain why.   
“Audit” is widely accepted by EMT members as an effective management 
technology (Power, 1999:95-7), but is not the exclusive domain of professional 
auditors.   
Supplementary staffing – performance report 
The performance report on supplementary staffing is presented jointly by the 
Medical Director and the Nurse Director, who share executive responsibility for use 
of locum, agency and bank staff resources by their respective professions.  The report 
presents trend and segmental analysis of key data in graphical and tabular formats. 
The Nurse Director draws attention to a potential dysfunctional consequence of the 
internal performance target to reduce nurse bank and agency usage.  There has been 
an increase in the volume of overtime hours worked, with many of the staff working 
overtime employed at a higher grade than the bank or agency nurses they have 
replaced.  This could create budgetary pressures for clinical areas.  The Chief 
Operating Officer requested details of specific instances of high banded nurses 
receiving overtime so she could follow up on these cases. 
The Chief Operating Officer and Director of Finance both challenge the integrity of 
the underlying data, noting that the picture presented in the update paper does not 
accord with their impression of the organisational reality.   
Healthcare associated infection update 
The Director of Public Health presents a performance report on healthcare associated 
infection.  The report outlines recent episodes of specified infections, results of the 
latest hand hygiene audit, an update on implementation of a national screening 
programme, an update on the results of mandatory surveillance and operational 
updates on antimicrobial management and domestic services.   
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The report includes a paragraph on the results of a recent unannounced inspection by 
the Healthcare Environment Inspectorate (“HEI”) at the board’s main acute hospital.  
This proves to be the main subject of the EMT discussion of this topic and is 
considered in further detail below. 
In spite of publication of the critical HEI report, the Director of Public Health tells 
the EMT that the standard report shows “good progress in all areas” and that 
performance continues to improve.  She casually notes that the “big issue” was the 
HEI report.   
Vignette – Healthcare Environment Inspections 
The recent HEI report was very critical of the hospital’s adherence to national 
infection control standards and attracted significant media interest. 
However, the Healthcare Associated Infection Update report to the EMT presents the 
inspection findings in a neutral way and, unlike the discussion during the meeting 
and the media response
204
 to the report, underplays the significance of the findings.   
“The timing of the [HEI] inspection is unfortunate for staff in some of the 
areas because they had been working hard on improvement programmes but 
the improvement process had not been completed when the inspection took 
place.  The inspection identified many areas of good practice but also 
highlighted several areas for action.  These included ensuring that good 
practice was not always fully documented as required, that additional action 
was required to ensure cleaning and environmental standards were 
maintained in all areas at the busiest times of the day, that compliance with 
the hand hygiene and dress codes was not 100% and that continued 




                                                          
204
 Sources are not quoted here in order to protect the anonymity of the case study site.  However, 
headlines in national newspapers covering the HEI report included “Snap inspection finds stains, dust 
and dirt at flagship hospital” and “[Hospital] is blasted by inspectors over cleanliness”, while the 
stories carried quotes from the Scottish Government that the Board “must implement their 
improvement plan as a matter of urgency” and an opposition politician who branded the report 
“damning”.   
205
 EMT paper presented to the meeting held on 5 October 2011 
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The Director of Public Health informs the EMT that an action plan to address the 
weaknesses identified in the report is under development and that the board has 
started to “feed positive stories into the Scottish Government”
206
 to counteract the 
negative impression created by the HEI report.  She is “very disappointed”
207
 with 
the report, which focuses on issues which the Board had already identified and 
introduced an action plan to address.   
The public nature of the Inspection findings appears to have heightened the 
organisational response to publication of the report.  This is the first item of business 
at the EMT meeting to draw a response from the Director of Communications.  He 
asks colleagues if the inspectors could return; it appeared that he was attempting to 
assess the likelihood of repeat negative publicity. 
A concern with adverse publicity is also evident in the Healthcare Associated 
Infection Update report which lists the key risk in this area as: 
“There is the potential for Healthcare Environment Inspectorate inspectors to 
find adverse areas of cleanliness or standards of practice, which could lead to 
adverse publicity for NHS [X].”
208
 
Adverse publicity is considered to be the main negative impact if this risk crystallises 
– there is no reference to patient safety or infection rates which are the substantive 
risks which the inspection regime is intended to address.   
The Chief Executive is looking for individuals to take personal responsibility for the 
outcome of the inspection.  The Chief Executive has already advised the director of 
human resources that his team should be prepared to give specific advice on whether 
the employee conduct process should be invoked.  He also reminded the Chief 
Operating Officers that directors are personally accountable for inspection results 
and the HEI report should not be viewed as an anonymous process.   
                                                          
206
 Remarks made by the Director of Public Health at the EMT meeting on 5 October 2011 
207
 Ibid.   
208
 EMT paper 3.8 presented to the meeting held on 5 October 2011 
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This news draws out tensions between EMT members as to where accountability 
should lie.  This is especially true between the director with responsibility for policy 
in this area (public health) and the director with operational responsibility (Chief 
Operating Officer).  The latter “disagrees” with the former’s assertion that the issues 
raised in the report were already well-known and claims that she had not previously 
had access to this information. 
The Chief Operating Officer questions the responsibility of healthcare professionals 
on the wards to take action – many of the HEI findings would have been visible to 
them every day, yet nobody appeared to take action until the inspection report was 
produced.  The Medical Director is concerned that the medical community is not 
sufficiently engaged with the inspection regime or associated findings.  The Nurse 
Director believes that charge nurses are often “unfairly vilified” in inspection reports 
and other healthcare professionals also have responsibility for infection control.   
While there is general agreement around the EMT table that the inspection 
highlighted unacceptable failings, the directors take some comfort from comparing it 
to a recent HEI report on a large acute hospital operated by another large Scottish 
NHS board.  While the HEI inspection of this other Board’s hospital had been 
similarly critical, the inspectors returned to that hospital to conduct a further 
unannounced inspection within five days of their original visit.  As the inspectors had 
not returned to their own hospital, the EMT members deduce that they had 
performed relatively better in the inspection.  Although not directly in competition 
with the other board for funding or patients, it is clear that, in reputational terms, this 
other Board is the primary competitor and EMT members take personal pride in out-
performing their neighbours. 
This discussion moves on to the forthcoming introduction of inspections of services 
for older people in acute NHS hospitals
209
.  The Nurse Director, who had been 
                                                          
209
 The Deputy First Minister and then Cabinet Secretary for Health, Wellbeing and Cities Strategy 
announced in June 2011 that Healthcare Improvement Scotland would carry out a programme of 
inspections to ensure that hospitals were adhering to published standards for the Care of Older People 
in Acute Settings.  See Scottish Government News Release “Care for older people is top priority”, 
issued on 6 June 2011, published online at 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Releases/2011/06/06101224 (accessed on 18 August 2013)  
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assigned responsibility for ensuring the Board is prepared for this new audit regime, 
appears to be under pressure to ensure a favourable outcome for the Board.   
It emerges during the discussion that a major component of the inspection will be 
observation of clinical staff interacting with patients.  One assessment criterion asks 
whether staff smile when interacting with patients.  This generates some light-
hearted discussion amongst EMT members who joke about making changes to the 
recruitment process to determine whether nurses were sufficiently “smiley”.   
While this is not a serious discussion, it provides an insight into the organisational 
reaction to new regulatory or audit requirements and the likelihood that internal 
behaviours and processes would be changed just to meet the requirements of audit or 
inspection, rather than to improve patient care per se (Power, 1999; 2005).   
On a more serious note, EMT members are concerned at being inspected against 
subjective criteria and question how performance can be evidenced and verified. 
The potential for a new inspection regime to influence resourcing decisions is clear 
in a contribution from a general manager who suggests that the maintenance budget 
could be targeted towards facilities which were due to be inspected.  This meets with 
an angry response from the Nurse Director who interjects that such an approach 
“misses the point”.  If facilities are not of an acceptable standard then these 
deficiencies should be addressed, regardless of inspection; patient safety should be 
the key determinant for prioritising resources.  General management appear to be 
more likely to prioritise organisational resources in order to meet audit objectives 
than clinical managers.   
EMT members are anxious to learn lessons from their experience of HEI inspections 
in developing organisational processes for the new older people’s inspection regime.  
It is proposed that a senior medical professional should sit on the project board to 
ensure engagement from all professional groups.  It appeared that the executive 
directors were anxious to ensure that the new inspection regime was embedded in 
operational activities, rather than considered a separate activity, divorced from 
clinical reality (cf. Power, 1994a:28-9).  The organisational response to HEI 
inspections is the responsibility of management, who do not routinely engage with 
331 
 
the clinicians who deliver care on the ground and influence standards of infection 
control in the course of an average shift.  The response to HEI inspection reports 
appears to be decoupled from substantive clinical practice (Power, 1999:96).   
Section 17c/2c A&E attendances project 2010-11 
The EMT receives a report on the outcome of a recent pilot initiative to reduce 
inappropriate or avoidable attendances at Accident and Emergency (“A&E”) 
department, through working in partnership with general medical practitioners.  The 
Director of Strategic Planning notes the opportunity which the initiative offers to 
improve the board’s performance against the national HEAT target.   
He suggests that it might be helpful to carry out an audit in due course to assess how 
successful the changes in practice are in delivering the desired outcomes.  This is a 
further example of management relying upon audit as a management technology, in 
this case to evaluate effectiveness rather than to evidence the operation of the internal 
control framework.   
Participation standard 2010-11 report 
This report informs EMT members of progress made against the 2010-11 
Participation Standard.  The report presents the Board’s own performance against the 
national standard, but the verbal update from the Nurse Director benchmarks 
performance against other large NHSScotland boards.  This again demonstrates that 
performance is defined by senior management in comparative rather than absolute 
terms, even though the national performance assessment framework does not 
promote competition between NHS organisations.   
Bi-monthly report on hand hygiene 
The Director of Public Health presents the latest national audit report on compliance 
with hand hygiene practice.   
The national report “describes occasions when NHS staff have taken the opportunity 
to carry out hand hygiene at the points in delivering clinical care as described in the 
World Health Organization (WHO) published guidance on ‘Your 5 moments for 
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hand hygiene’…  NHS Boards submit the results of their hand hygiene compliance 
audits to Health Protection Scotland (HPS) following mandatory bi-monthly audit 
periods” (Health Protection Scotland, 2011:1).  The report notes that audit is 
recognised by the WHO as an effective measure in reducing and preventing the 
incidence of avoidable illness.   
There is no discussion of the latest report, although the Chief Operating Officer notes 
that “please wash your hands” signage has been cut into the floor in clinical areas of 
a new hospital building, which she hopes will improve future performance and 
reinforce good clinical practice.  Audit requirements will be embedded in the design 
of a new building (Power, 1996; 1999:95-7). 
 
8.5 Reflections and concluding remarks  
8.5.1 Key findings and reflections 
This Chapter has explored how audit and the official performance assessment 
framework permeate NHS organisations.  Through gaining access to meetings of 
three key committees in the governance of the NHS board, it was possible to observe 
both how audit is formally built into governance structures, and how audit appears in 
other settings.   
The case study board installed specific structures to review the findings of formal 
audit and inspection activity.  While these attempted to operationalise accountability 
by calling managers to meetings to account for action plans to address weaknesses 
identified by auditors, they were decoupled from the substantive organisation.  This 
study found greater evidence of the programmatic qualities of audit in management 
practices than in the formal audit structures.  Formal audit activity within the case 
study organisation relied upon a narrow, technical interpretation of audit and internal 
audit activity in particular was focused on the design and implementation of internal 
controls.   
It appeared that formal audit structures were not taken particularly seriously by the 
wider organisation, and that possibly the internal and external auditors were most 
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influential within the confines of meetings of the Audit Committee and its 
operational sub-committee.  Internal audit recommendations were not routinely 
implemented within the agreed timeframe and the same control weaknesses recurred 
in different parts of the organisation and over a period of years.  This implies that 
audit structures are decoupled from organisational reality.   
Indeed, the findings of formal audit reviews and quasi-audit exercises received 
greatest attention when there was a likelihood that these findings would be made 
public.  The receipt of a Freedom of Information request for internal audit reports 
generated an organisational response which extended to the chief executive and a 
formal management report identified adverse publicity as the greatest risk arising 
from the Healthcare Environment Inspection regime.  The implications of this are 
considered further below.   
Senior managers appeared to embrace audit technologies in all aspects of 
organisational life, and accept audit as an established solution to diagnose issues 
requiring management attention and to provide assurance over the functioning of key 
systems.  Senior discussions on performance were peppered with references to both 
performance targets and audit.  National performance targets appeared to have a 
significant influence on the prioritisation of resources, including management 
attention. 
Clinicians appeared to have little interaction with formal audit and inspection 
activity; these activities were generally facilitated by managers and did not impact on 
clinical practices.   
The organisation adopted its own definition of performance.  Although the national 
performance assessment system (HEAT) did not seek to rank organisations, senior 
management were preoccupied with assessing their own performance relative to 
other organisations.  This was also true of external audit and inspection activity; the 
risk of adverse publicity featured more prominently in discussions of negative 
findings than the risk to patient care.   
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8.5.2 Implications for the Audit Society 
This case study demonstrates how audit and performance permeate organisational 
life, often not in the way intended by the policy environment.  The audit society can 
thus emerge independent of institutional and policy frameworks.   
This study provides multiple examples of an organisation installing formal structures 
to cope with audit processes which were largely disconnected from substantive 
organisational activities.  This is prima facie evidence of decoupling, which Power 
identifies as a potential negative consequence of the audit society (Power, 1999:96).  
This is perhaps best illustrated by the failure to implement audit recommendations – 
this undermines the power of audit to deliver organisational improvement and could 
contribute to a wider sense that audit fulfils a ritualistic rather than substantive role in 
organisational life.   
Not all managers in the case study organisation accepted a ritualistic role for audit.  
One senior manager refused to accept a recommendation which he did not consider 
to add value to existing processes and the executive management team also sought to 
learn from the experience of preparing for Healthcare Environment Inspections in 
preparing for the introduction of a new audit regime.   
These examples suggest that there may be scope for public services to move to a 
reflexive state beyond the audit society, where substantive performance is prioritised 
over compliance with audit requirements and the full value of audit as a bearer of 
independent assurance is realised.  This reflexivity is essential if the nature of the 
assurance offered by audit is to be fully understood and used appropriately to support 
accountability frameworks.   
8.5.3 Further issues to be explored 
This study has shown that the elements of the audit society can be present at 
organisational level, even when absent from the official policy framework.  It is 
beyond the scope of this study to consider how features of the audit society become 
so dominant in these circumstances and future research could consider, for example, 
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whether these are imported by senior managers with experience of working in other 
systems.   
The systemic failure to implement internal audit recommendations and the 
decoupling of formal audit structures from organisational life suggest that the 
internal audit function has relatively low status within the organisation, although 
managers were willing to use internal audit as a buffer to protect their own position.  
This is perhaps surprising in light of the dominant presence of audit concepts at 
senior management meetings.  There is scope for future research to consider the 
status of internal audit in greater depth. 
 
The next chapter draws out key themes from the findings of the four empirical 






















The preceding chapters have explored the role of audit in managing the performance 
of the NHS through four related studies.  They show how audit can be an influential 
actor in the performance assessment of NHS bodies, even where it is not given a 
formal role in the assessment framework.  The cases are evidence of Power’s audit 
society in action and provide an insight into the effects of making performance 
assessment auditable within the NHS in Scotland.   
This chapter draws out key themes and findings from the four preceding studies and 
explores these in the context of the existing literature on the audit society.   
 
9.2 Audit and performance measurement: tracing the experiences of the 
NHS in Scotland and England 
9.2.1 Evolution of performance measurement 
The study in Chapter 5, of two health policy systems which originated in a single 
UK-wide NHS system, explores the influence of audit society rhetoric and concepts 
in performance measurement reforms through a comparative analysis of parallel 
reforms in Scotland and England.  The analysis paints a more complex picture than a 
simplistic north / south divide in approaches to healthcare governance and 
management.  A ten-year period of study lays bare the oscillations in the approaches 
taken by two administrations.   
The English Department of Health proved to be a more enthusiastic adopter of 
performance management techniques than its Scottish counterpart, embracing 
increasingly aggressive performance management techniques to substitute the price-
based controls which regulated the NHS internal market in the early 1990s.  The 
English NHS effectively swapped one set of NPM-infused controls for another as it 
dismantled the internal market which the New Labour government had campaigned 
strongly against.   
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The role of performance measures in the English NHS matured over time, with the 
Department of Health using them to drive service improvements.  Independent 
research by the Nuffield Trust and others (Connolly, Bevan and Mays, 2010) 
presented evidence that the reported performance of the NHS in England had 
significantly improved during the reign of performance measures, both in absolute 
terms and relative to the devolved nations.  However, such studies have inevitably 
focused upon easily quantified benchmarks, namely the measures at the heart of the 
English performance measurement system.   
The myth that the aggressive regime improved performance could be perpetuated 
through the pursuit of another myth, a myth which the audit society seeks to expose.  
Reported performance becomes conflated with substantive performance.  The core 
organisational purpose is displaced by the installation of auditable systems as the 
organisation becomes fixated on compliance with external norms which are 
reinforced by the audit regime (Power, 1999; 2005:335).  The events at Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, documented by the Francis Inquiry (The Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry, 2013) exposed the worst 
excesses of an NHS system which prioritises reported performance over patient care.   
Ultimately, however, the dysfunctional side-effects of the aggressive performance 
management regime in the NHS in England began to outweigh the improvements it 
could deliver, long before the human cost of the reforms was exposed in the popular 
media (ibid.).   
The NHS in Scotland took the opportunity offered by devolution to formally turn its 
back on managerial-based governance of the healthcare system.  It initially adopted a 
more laissez-faire approach to performance management than its English 
counterpart.  Indeed, it is questionable whether the initial approach could rightfully 
be termed ‘management’: there were too many measures to successfully focus the 
energies of the NHS in delivering key priorities, results against measures were not 
published, the measures were not part of a formal accountability mechanism, and 
there were no visible sanctions levied on poorly performing organisations.   
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Pressure mounted on the NHS in Scotland in the face of research and other evidence 
that adoption of this softer incarnation of performance management had inhibited 
improvements in the performance of healthcare services and apparently left the NHS 
in Scotland lagging behind its nearest neighbour (Alvarez-Rosete et al., 2005; 
Propper et al., 2008).  The internal market may have been dismantled, but devolution 
introduced a new type of competition into the NHS.  Four politically autonomous 
NHS systems were created in a relatively small space, each system having three easy 
comparators against which to benchmark performance.  This also enabled the media 
to draw superficial comparisons, leaving each system vulnerable to public criticism 
for the very divergences in public policy which devolution was intended to deliver.   
The performance of the NHS in Scotland became more formally managed through 
the introduction of a more focused set of performance measures with publically 
reported results for which NHS organisations would be held to account at annual 
public meetings.  This was strengthened when the SNP administration came into 
power in 2007 with a policy programme anchored by a National Performance 
Framework designed to support a national purpose. 
The balance of managerialism in the NHS in Scotland and England shifted during the 
tenure of the New Labour government.  The Scottish NHS performance framework 
adopted NPM-inspired elements as the English framework diluted its most 
managerial characteristics.  And so a divergence in approaches to performance 
measurement shifted to convergence at the level of official policy rhetoric. 
The proliferation of performance indicators in the NHS reflects an institutional need 
by central government to check up on the activities of NHS delivery bodies 
(Addicott, 2008).  Measurability facilitates auditability (Power, 1996:299) and 
creates new space for auditors in the performance assessment framework.   
9.2.2 Creating a role for audit 
The New Labour Government embraced the use of audit in supporting the 
performance measurement regime in England from the outset.  This was manifest in 
the allocation of new roles to existing audit bodies, including the Audit Commission, 
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and the creation of new regulatory bodies which adopted the language and ethos of 
audit, such as the Commission for Health Improvement.   
A succession of quasi-audit bodies supported the performance assessment regime in 
England, with the identity and remit of the bodies changing almost as frequently as 
the performance measurement system.  The Commission for Health Improvement 
was created to provide assurance over clinical quality in the NHS, but its remit was 
soon expanded to give the Commission responsibility for setting, verifying and 
reporting on the performance assessment framework.  The Commission would be 
rebranded as the Healthcare Commission and given responsibility for assessing 
independent, as well as NHS, healthcare providers.  The Care Quality Commission 
was the final incarnation of the quasi-audit body during the period of analysis; it 
fulfilled a more traditional regulatory role as responsibility for performance 
assessment transferred back into the Department of Health.  These bodies tend to 
promote controls-based approaches to verifying performance and are symptomatic of 
the audit society (Power, 2000b).   
Audit was virtually absent from the formal NHSScotland performance framework 
over this period, but this could not prevent the national audit body creating its own 
space in the NHS performance network.  This conflicts with the English experience 
and suggestions in the literature that the expansion of the audit is driven by 
governments (Lapsley and Lonsdale, 2010:87). 
Power (1998:25) links the rise of medical auditing to the creation of a 
purchaser/provider split within the National Health Service, brought about by the 
creation of the internal market by the Conservative Government in the early 1990s.  
Audit provided a mechanism for building quality assurances into contracts for 
healthcare.  Although New Labour rejected the perceived extremes of the internal 
market, this purchaser / provider split endured, suggesting that audit could be 
expected to endure under their new governance model for the NHS.  By contrast, 
Scotland more thoroughly rejected the internal market by re-aggregating Trusts back 
into unified health boards serving all the healthcare needs of a local population, thus 
limiting requirements to contract for, or commission, services to specialist services 
most efficiently provided at national or regional level. 
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The longitudinal analysis of the annual NHS overview report produced by Audit 
Scotland in Chapter 6 traces the evolving role of the national audit body in relation to 
NHS performance.   
Audit Scotland initially fulfilled the traditional role of public sector auditor, 
providing an opinion on the truth and fairness of annual financial statements and 
undertaking subject-specific value for money or performance audit studies.  As the 
divergence between the Scottish and English approaches to performance 
management was at its greatest, and the absence of a formal role for the national 
audit body in Scotland was at its most apparent, in contrast to the expanding role of 
the Audit Commission, Audit Scotland adopted a more pro-active role in reporting 
on the financial and operational performance of the NHS in Scotland.  Audit 
Scotland became the primary source of published information on multidimensional 
NHS performance following the introduction of its biannual performance overview 
report. 
This echoes the international experience; under the influence of the national audit 
body, the creep of managerialism into the Scottish NHS continued.  This supports the 
existing literature which claims that national audit bodies can be powerful agents of 
change in introducing or entrenching NPM reforms in public services (Gendron et al, 
2007; Skaerbaek, 2009). 
The evolution of Audit Scotland’s role in the NHSScotland performance network 
does not end with the national audit body fulfilling the role of modernizer.  By the 
end of the period of study, the national audit body has secured the role of 
authoritative and trusted commentator on NHS performance.  This is a subtly 
different story from that of national audit body as modernizer as documented in the 
existing literature.  Audit Scotland elevated its role above that of the organisations 
charged with delivering healthcare.   
The detailed implications of these self-made roles for Audit Scotland in relation to 
NHS performance are considered further at Section 9.3 below.   
Meanwhile, audit-inspired reviews and scrutiny programmes became more common 
in Scotland.  The national audit body was not asked to take responsibility for these 
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new programmes, which were generally owned by national NHSScotland 
organisations such as NHS Quality Improvement Scotland
210
 and NHS National 
Services Scotland. 
Such programmes included Healthcare Environment Inspections, a programme of 
announced and unannounced inspections of acute hospitals to ensure that infection 
control standards are implemented and best practice followed, and hand hygiene 
audits, a bi-monthly programme of audits to ensure 100% compliance with hand 
hygiene policies.  The introduction of these programmes followed an increasing 
focus on clinical governance in NHSScotland, a construct favoured by the New 
Labour Government which imposed managerial systems and controls onto clinical 
practice (Scally and Donaldson, 1998; Goodman, 1998) and thus opened up a 
previously closed professional domain to audit scrutiny (Power, 2000b).  NHS 
Quality Improvement Scotland, and later Healthcare Improvement Scotland, was 
allocated responsibility for overseeing the implementation and effectiveness of 
clinical governance structures across NHSScotland.  The Scottish approach to 
clinical governance is significant as, in contrast to the core performance assessment 
framework, it distilled organisational performance into a single score.  This created 
an appearance of objectivity which obscured the extent of subjective judgement 
which underpinned the assessment process (Power, 1999).   
These varied programmes shared an audit strategy which prioritised the 
implementation and operation of control systems over verification of substantive 
results and placed “focus on the quality of… systems rather than the quality of the 
product or service itself as specified in standards” (Power, 1999:84, emphasis in 
original).   
Audit Scotland chose to reference these audit-inspired reviews in its annual NHS 
overview reports and so established them as key components of the wider 
NHSScotland performance assessment regime.  The findings of such reviews were 
integrated into the national audit body’s definition of NHS performance and attempts 
were made to triangulate these findings with Audit Scotland’s own work in these 
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 NHS Quality Improvement Scotland became Healthcare Improvement Scotland on 1 April 2011.   
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areas, although it is doubtful whether external auditors had the requisite expertise to 
arrive at an informed judgement.   
The organisational impact of these audit-based scrutiny programmes was observed in 
Chapter 8 and will be considered further at Section 9.8 below.   
The Scottish response to use of audit in performance managing the NHS was perhaps 
more nuanced and considered than in England: the New Labour Government 
passionately embraced the use of audit-based scrutiny and assurance mechanisms 
from 1997 but later had to dilute these in the face of unintended dysfunctional 
outcomes; NHSScotland was slower to adopt specific measures but allowed a 
gradual escalation of such mechanisms in the second half of the period of study, in 
parallel to Audit Scotland’s increasing influence in NHS performance.  Nevertheless, 
both approaches reflect the focus of the audit society on control systems and 
independent verification.   
9.2.3 Discretionary recourse to audit in Scotland 
The preceding analysis has demonstrated that there was no formal role for audit in 
the NHSScotland performance assessment framework, yet audit was the policy 
response of choice when a significant performance crisis emerged in waiting time 
management practices employed by NHS Lothian.   
There was no statutory, or even customary, obligation on the Scottish Government to 
have recourse to audit mechanisms when the formal performance assessment 
framework came under threat.  The apparent eagerness to rely on audit as a 
legitimate response mechanism supports findings elsewhere that a voluntary 
independent audit can bestow legitimacy upon a process (Free, Salterio and Shearer, 
2009), particularly a system which has been threatened by scandal (Andon and Free, 
2012).   
When the results of the internal audits of waiting time management practices were 
shared with the Scottish Parliament, the new Cabinet Secretary for health and 
wellbeing states that waiting time management across NHSScotland had now been 
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reviewed by “independent auditors of world-class standing”
211
.  The implication is 
that waiting time management practices were somehow vindicated by the audit 
process, that the process of being audited rendered these practices legitimate (Power, 
1999; 2000a:117).   
9.2.4 In defence of a formal role for audit 
Chapter 5 tells the story of a performance measurement regime in the NHS in 
England which ultimately had to be diluted to limit the damage to substantive 
performance, including the threat of gaming of the system.  There are numerous 
examples in the recent literature of studies making a direct causal link between the 
performance assessment framework in the NHS in England and these dysfunctional 
consequences (Mannion et al., 2005; Bevan and Hood, 2006).   
However, the waiting times crisis at NHS Lothian highlights that similar 
dysfunctionalities can arise within a less aggressive and overtly managerial 
performance assessment framework favoured by NHSScotland.  While the improper 
practices emerged at a time when the Scottish system was arguably at its most 
managerial, NHS boards did not face financial sanctions for failure to meet 
performance targets which were a key driver of gaming behaviour in England. 
There was, however, intense political pressure in a relatively small national system to 
evidence the strong performance of the NHS in Scotland.  The organisation at the 
centre of the scandal was pursuing an ambition to be among the best providers of 
healthcare in the world, not just in Scotland or the UK.   
A more complex picture thus starts to emerge in the Scottish NHS – the existence of 
a severe official performance measurement system and gaming of the system to 
present a more favourable image of organisational performance do not appear to be 
mutually exclusive.  The dysfunctional behaviours observed in the NHS in England 
could also be observed in Scotland where the official framework was much softer.  
The unofficial political influences and individual organisational ambition created 
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 Alex Neil, Cabinet Secretary for Health and Wellbeing, quoted in the Official Report of the 
Scottish Parliament, 20 December 2012, at Column 15059.   
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equivalent pressures to the official performance assessment framework in England.  
The excesses of the audit society can be observed in a system which is a half-hearted 
adopter of New Public Management ideology.   
This has implications for the proposition that the audit society is only relevant in an 
NPM-saturated environment (Pentland, 2000). 
It also exposes the corollary of that proposition: the mistaken suggestion that a softer 
approach to performance assessment and a trust-based governance framework will 
guard against the negative impacts of the audit society.  The waiting times case 
illustrates that a performance reporting crisis, where reported performance projects 
an illusory reality and actual performance lags behind these reports, can still emerge 
in these circumstances. 
The organisational implications of this are considered further below.   
Despite Maltby’s (2008) accusations to the contrary, Power’s work does not reject 
audit as an effective mechanism in a framework of public accountability.  This thesis 
reinforces that view that audit, applied wisely, could be used to reinforce trust and 
accountability and rather than being the cause of dysfunctional behaviour could 
actually be a way to safeguard against it:   
“...there is a potential for the worst excesses of the audit society to be realized 
and for something more relevant, effective and sensitive to be created.” 
(Power, 2000a:118) 
 
9.3 Audit Scotland transformed 
This study has already established that Audit Scotland successfully created a 
significant and evolving role for itself within the Scottish NHS performance 
framework.  Having started its life as a traditional national audit body, providing an 
independent assessment of the financial statements produced by devolved public 
bodies, including NHS Boards (Hollingsworth et al., 1998:80-1), Audit Scotland was 
transformed during the period of study into a modernizer and commentator.  The 
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following section explores this evolution, alongside the implications for audit at the 
organisational level.   
9.3.1 Auditor as trusted expert 
The preceding chapters identified many instances of Audit Scotland being recognised 
as a key source of expertise, not only on financial management and controls, but on 
performance management more generally.   
The observational case study showed that non-executive board members valued 
performance audit reports produced by Audit Scotland as a source of expertise and 
good practice.  They required executive management to demonstrate that the 
organisation already complied with best practice, or to develop and implement action 
plans to ensure that this good practice was integrated into organisational routines.   
Organisational auditors also benefit from the generally accepted view of auditors as a 
source of trusted expertise.  The observational case study showed how the chair of 
the Operational Audit Sub-Committee (OASC) sought to promote the internal audit 
service as an organisation-wide resource and source of expertise on internal control 
best practice.   
Auditors have succeeded in expanding the reach of their activities and influence 
beyond financial systems and management.  The existing literature suggests that this 
has been facilitated by the systems-focus of audit which allows auditors to transfer 
their skills to any setting (Power, 1999; Humphrey and Owen, 2000).   
Audit expertise can be problematic when it is applied to these broader domains.  The 
observational case study highlighted the potential for tension to arise between audit 
findings and the judgement of a lead manager with professional expertise and 
experience.   
Both the NHS overview reports and organisational audit reports contain information 
and comments on a wide range of issues.  Some of these claims are based purely on 
management representations and are not the outcome of technical audit procedures.   
This presents a problem beyond the scope of existing studies: auditors make 
pronouncements which have no technical underpinning.  This highlights one of the 
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most dangerous excesses of the growing influence of audit: readers mistakenly trust 
audit statements, assuming they are underpinned by technical procedures and 
unaware that they are subjective views.   
9.3.2 Auditor defines performance and drives change 
Audit Scotland became an influential actor in the process to define the performance 
of NHSScotland in the period following devolution. 
The national audit body used the NHS overview report (Audit Scotland, 2001) to 
make a link between the reporting of weaknesses in financial management in NHS 
Tayside, Scottish Parliament Audit Committee criticism of current financial 
monitoring and accountability arrangements overseen by the then Scottish Executive 
Health Department, and the creation of the first Performance Assessment Framework 
(PAF) in the devolved Scottish NHS.  The official documents introducing the PAF in 
NHSScotland, reviewed in Chapter 5, do not credit Audit Scotland with any role in 
the development of the new regime. 
Nevertheless, Audit Scotland uses the overview report as a vehicle to promote its 
own influence over the NHSScotland approach to performance assessment. 
The then Scottish Executive did not produce a consolidated report on NHS 
performance.  Audit Scotland filled this space in the performance assessment 
network by producing its own overview of operational performance (Audit Scotland, 
2004a).  In doing so, Audit Scotland made the performance of NHSScotland 
auditable (Power, 1996; 1999).   
Audit Scotland explains how it approached the task of defining ‘NHS performance’, 
drawing data from a number of published sources and acting as arbiter of the 
elements of performance which are most important to patients and the public (Audit 
Scotland, 2004a).  Significantly, this definition is broader than the formal 
performance management system, which is “taken account of” but is not the primary 
source of information.  This lessens the profile of the PAF in the NHSScotland 
performance network, with the audit definition of performance placed in competition 
with the NHS’ own definition.   
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Similarly, Audit Scotland overview reports promoted “underlying financial 
performance” as a key measure of the financial health of NHS boards.  The national 
audit body redefined financial performance beyond statutory targets so that bodies 
could be held to account for how they delivered in-year financial balance.  However, 
the national figures on underlying financial performance presented in successive 
reports were the product of unaudited returns produced by each NHS board: no audit 
tests, or indeed any form of independent verification, were applied to these measures.   
These findings support the existing literature that audit is influential in constructing 
an auditable environment (Power, 1994a, 1996; 1999) and that performance audit 
reviews lead the auditor to construct a definition of performance which can be 
subjected to audit (Day and Klein, 1987; Everett, 2003; Lindeberg, 2007).  They also 
reinforce the risk that auditors proclaim to be experts, or to make authoritative 
statements, without supporting audit evidence.   
The national audit body also transformed public services: both central government 
and NHS boards changed practices and policies as a direct result of 
recommendations made in overview reports.  A recommendation in the overview 
report led to the introduction of a new comprehensive performance report by the 
Scottish Government (Scottish Government, 2008a).  The national audit body 
became a modernizer, which introduced managerial reforms into NHS performance 
reporting (Power, 2000a; Gendron et al., 2007).  Furthermore, the Scottish 
Government explicitly linked the introduction of the report to a recommendation 
made by Audit Scotland (Scottish Government, 2008b).   
There is now a self-referential legitimacy relationship between Audit Scotland and 
the Scottish Government; the Scottish Government uses the audit recommendation to 
legitimate the publication of its own performance report, while Audit Scotland draws 
on the action taken by the Scottish Government in response to its recommendation to 
legitimate its earlier findings and reports.   
A mutually beneficial legitimacy relationship can be established by the audit process, 
with both auditor and auditee deriving legitimacy from the implementation of audit 
recommendations (Free, Salterio and Shearer, 2009).   
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However, having created new auditable measures of performance, the national audit 
body does not apply audit procedures to reports of performance against those 
measures.  The purpose of promoting the new measure appears not to be to broaden 
the application of traditional audit tests but to provide an evidence base for the 
developing commentary which the national audit body provides on the financial 
performance of NHSScotland.   
A picture begins to emerge of a new identity held by Audit Scotland in the 
performance network: that of commentator on the operational and financial 
performance of the NHS.   
9.3.3 Auditor as trusted commentator 
The evolution of Audit Scotland’s role did not end when it established itself as an 
expert on financial and performance management and a modernizer.  Chapter 6 
traces a further evolution of the role of the national audit body, to trusted 
commentator on public finances and the NHS in Scotland.   
The Auditor General begins to comment upon the merits of macro fiscal policy 
decisions, looking beyond the value for money of investment or operational 
decisions taken by specific public sector organisations or the financial control and 
governance frameworks within individual organisations.  For example, the 2009-10 
overview report questions the Scottish Government’s decision to protect the Health 
budget and apply greater reductions to the budgets of other services (Audit Scotland, 
2010c:15).  Where, in earlier reports, Audit Scotland may have focused on the 
impact which the relative protection of the Health budget would have upon 
NHSScotland, the overview report now questions the merit of a policy decision to 
offer that relative protection. 
Reports produced by Audit Scotland on behalf of the Auditor General are routinely 
reviewed by the Scottish Parliament.  Audit Scotland and the Auditor General can 
thus use these reports to implicitly invite MSPs to consider a competing professional 
viewpoint in addition to the official position of the Scottish Government.   
The profile that the overview reports gave to the office of the Auditor General 
fluctuated over the period of study.  The early overview reports were presented as his 
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personal summary of the findings of NHS audit activity.  The middle-period of 
analysis saw a shift in the narrative style of the reports with the introduction of third 
person narration as the overall style of reporting became more corporate, in keeping 
with the role of the audit body as an agent of change, close to a management 
consultant (Gendron et al, 2007; Skaerbaek, 2009).  Finally, the Auditor General as 
an officeholder grows in significance in the performance network as the national 
audit body seeks to establish itself as a commentator on public finances and 
performance.  He is the personal face of the expertise of Audit Scotland, a well-
respected and authoritative public figure whose views will command the respect of 
parliamentarians, managers and the public alike.   
The role of national audit body as trusted commentator identified in the present 
research marks a departure from the existing literature, which has focused on the 
capacity of audit bodies to promote the introduction of managerial reforms through a 
role akin to a management consultant.  This is an important contribution to the debate 
on the role of a modern national audit body and this finding would benefit from 
further empirical exploration in future.   
 
9.4 Immunity from criticism 
Audit Scotland developed an identity as trusted expert and authoritative commentator 
despite the absence of a systematic evidence base to support the efficacy of audit 
(Power, 2000a:114).  The systematic tendency to trust audit discourages such 
scrutiny of audit practices (Power, 1999:136-7) and can create a climate where there 
is little public criticism of audit activity (Skaerbaek, 2009:976).   
9.4.1 Denying failure 
Selective reporting of the role of the auditor can influence the appearance of the 
success of audit.  The primary function of the national audit body is to scrutinise the 
financial statements and financial management of public sector organisations, 
including NHS organisations.  However, the performance of the auditor is not subject 
to equivalent scrutiny (Power, 2000a:114).  Coupled with the systematic tendency to 
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trust audit (Power, 1999:36-7), this creates an environment in which there is little 
opportunity for audit ‘failures’ to be made public.   
Audit Scotland is quick to infer its own success from the implementation of prior 
recommendations or findings by audited organisations in annual overview reports, 
but is more reluctant to associate audit with failure to identify control weaknesses or 
errors in the financial statements.  For example, a £10 million error discovered in the 
audited accounts of an NHS board (Audit Scotland, 2006:18) and weaknesses in 
financial management and budgetary control within the then Scottish Executive 
Health Department (Audit Scotland, 2005:36; 2006:10) are reported in a neutral 
fashion and there is no implication that the audit process could or should have 
identified these issues sooner.   
9.4.2 No scrutiny of audit 
Audit Scotland emerged as one of the heroes of the waiting times case, at least in the 
eyes of the media and opposition politicians.  The national audit body had recently 
carried out a performance audit (Audit Scotland, 2010a) and follow-up impact report 
of waiting times management in NHSScotland (Audit Scotland, 2011b).  These 
reports raised concerns regarding the completeness of the audit trail to evidence 
application of the ‘New Ways’ waiting times methodology and highlighted variation 
in practice between NHS boards.  These reports reached fairly positive conclusions 
on the implementation of the ‘New Ways’ methodology and concluded that no 
further national audit work was required. 
However, these studies by the national audit body failed to uncover either the 
significant issues which were to emerge in NHS Lothian or the questionable 
reporting practices adopted by other organisations, which would emerge only four 
months after publication of the impact report.   
The systemic weaknesses in waiting times management were brought into the public 
domain by a newspaper report, not by a performance audit report.   
The national audit body not only escaped criticism of its previous work but was co-
opted as a major part of the solution, called upon to diagnose and remedy the 
weaknesses identified at NHS Lothian and across Scotland.  This contrasts with the 
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ritual sacrifice of auditors in the face of a corporate crisis which has been evidenced 
in the private sector (Guénin-Paracini and Gendron, 2010).  In this instance, the 
national audit body was not “sacrificed” in the aftermath of a scandal and moved 
straight to being part of the solution.   
The legitimacy of national audit bodies is secured in part by their independence from 
executive government, underpinned by legislative or constitutional provisions and by 
maintaining a public image of impartiality.  In Westminster systems of government, 
this constitutional independence is the very foundation of parliament’s ability to hold 
the financial affairs of executive governments to account (Funnell, 1994:179).  Thus, 
any apparent criticism or threat to the independence of the Auditor General or 
equivalent can be construed as an attack on the system of democratic accountability 
which it supports.  Public audit can derive credibility, or even invincibility, from its 
association with fundamental democratic principles.  This association also leaves the 
executive government with little choice but to recognise the value of public audit, at 
least in a symbolic sense.  But it can also offer protection to executive government.   
This tension is inherent in a Parliamentary exchange between a Scottish Government 
minister and an opposition MSP in the aftermath of the PwC review of waiting times 
management at NHS Lothian.
212
  The opposition MSP asked the minister what action 
she took in response to a finding in the 2010 national performance audit report on 
waiting time management.  Audit Scotland did not consider this to be a serious 
finding at the time, but it would be politically difficult for a minister to directly 
criticise the national audit body for failing to identify the significance of an issue 
which would quickly thereafter become the centre of the biggest national 
performance crisis in the NHS in Scotland since devolution.   
The minister instead refers to the follow-up report to the national performance audit.  
She can mobilise the national audit body’s decision that no further work was required 
to validate the government’s actions or in this case apparent lack of action. 
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 Deputy First Minister and then Cabinet Secretary for Health, Wellbeing and Cities Strategy 
responds to supplementary question from Dr Richard Simpson MSP.  A transcript of the exchange is 
contained in the Official Report of the Scottish Parliament on 19 April 2012 at Columns 8226 to 8227.   
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Thus, the national audit body provides a buffer for the government against claims 
that it should have taken action earlier to prevent the practices which became 
entrenched in NHS Lothian.   
Both executive government and opposition politicians can benefit from the 
legitimacy offered by audit reviews and so it serves the interests of neither party to 
apply too much scrutiny to the work of Audit Scotland.  The implications of the 
ritual appeal of audit are considered further at Section 9.6.1 below.  This connection 
is important and could tentatively be regarded as a significant enabler of the climate 
of near universal acceptance in which national audit bodies function, along with 
Power’s proposition that the “systematic tendency towards uncritical trust in the 
efficacy of audit processes... results in the absence of evaluation of the audit process 
itself” (Power, 1999:136-7).  The relationship between audit and trust is considered 
further in the next section.   
9.4.3 Private criticism 
The observational case study showed that Audit Scotland’s immunity from criticism 
might more accurately be described as immunity from public criticism.  A comment 
made by the director of eHealth that an Audit Scotland review of eHealth service 
delivery was “acrimonious” is reported as “challenging” in the formal minute of the 
November meeting of the OASC.  One Audit Committee noted that he was “far from 
impressed” with the Audit Scotland performance audit of community health 
partnerships (CHPs) and that it did not accurately “represent CHP world”
213
.  This 
criticism was not subsequently minuted and so there was no public trace of the 
member’s discontent with the national findings. 
There is scope for future research to consider how Audit Scotland secured this 
immunity from criticism.  An untested proposition is that this derived, at least in part, 
from the national audit body’s self-created identity as an authoritative, independent 
and trusted commentator on NHS performance, as demonstrated by the longitudinal 
study of the NHS overview report in Chapter 6.   
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9.5 Audit and trust 
Chapter 5 found that performance management approaches adopted by 
NHSScotland, while increasingly managerial in content, operated in a high-trust 
environment, with no formal role for audit in successive official performance 
management frameworks, from the PAF to HEAT.   
This contrasts with the experience in England, where performance management 
systems were accompanied by formal scrutiny, provided by a national audit body or 
a bespoke quasi-audit body, and NHS bodies were not trusted to report on their own 
performance without external verification.  The English experience supports the 
proposition in the literature that audit can displace trust from frontline professionals 
to auditors (Power, 1994a; 1999). 
The study of the NHS Lothian performance crisis traces the creeping entrance of 
audit into the official response as concerns about waiting list management grew and 
the high-trust relationship between central government and delivery body was 
damaged.   
9.5.1 Audit replaces trust 
The Scottish Government did not initially accept the premise that the practices 
adopted by NHS Lothian amounted to ‘gaming’ and resisted calls from opposition 
politicians for an independent investigation.  But a shift is evident once ministers 
receive an internal review report and the first indication of damage to the high-trust 
relationship between the board and central government is given in the request for 
NHS Lothian to commission an internal audit review to “provide further 
reassurance” over the positive position reported by the internal investigation. 
Trust was further eroded as preliminary findings of the internal audit review, which 
the board had outsourced to a Big 4 accounting firm, emerged.  The Scottish 
Government intervenes in the internal audit, taking over the contractual relationship 
with the private firm “in the interests of appropriate governance”.  While there is no 
public trace of the actions culminating in the intervention, the Cabinet Secretary later 
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admits in the Scottish Parliament
214
 that she did not know at the time how serious the 
problems were at NHS Lothian and who in the organisation might be complicit in the 
inappropriate management and reporting practices coming to light.  
While the Cabinet Secretary does not explicitly state it, the complete breakdown in 
trust is implicit in her explanation.  At this point, she could not even trust the 
organisation to honestly report the results of an external review of waiting list 
management and she had to assume a direct relationship with the reviewing firm in 
order to reassure herself over the veracity and integrity of the position reported to 
her.  And despite the initial assertions that the Scottish Government had intervened in 
the external review in some higher (but undefined) interest in upholding principles of 
corporate governance, their real concern was practical not theoretical.   
The damage was not contained to the bilateral relationship between the Scottish 
Government and the organisation under suspicion, but spread to relationships 
between the Scottish Government and other apparently innocent NHS organisations 
which were not implicated in the immediate performance crisis.  Distrust also spread 
into the public domain, as repeated criticism and speculation by newspapers and 
opposition politicians began to undermine public trust in NHS organisations, 
particularly management (Justesen and Skaerbaek:2005).   
Once audit had been introduced as a policy response, it became difficult to control its 
influence.  Audit exploded into every aspect of this performance crisis as new audit 
reviews were announced to address the erosion of the different levels of trust.  The 
Cabinet Secretary required all NHS organisations to commission their internal 
auditors to review local waiting time management practice; addressing the 
breakdown of trust between levels of the official hierarchy.  The national audit body 
announced its own performance audit in the wake of demands from opposition 
politicians that such an independent study was required to restore public trust. 
Politicians perpetuated the narrative that the public could no longer trust performance 
reported by NHSScotland in comments made in Parliament.   
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 Nicola Sturgeon, Deputy First Minister and Cabinet Secretary for Health, Wellbeing and Cities 
Strategy, as quoted in the Official Report of the Scottish Parliament, 21 March 2012, at Column 7462 
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“I am sure that the Cabinet Secretary will agree that the people of Scotland 
should be able to trust the Scottish Government statistics on waiting times… I 
ask the Cabinet Secretary to request that Audit Scotland undertakes a full and 
thorough review of each and every territorial health board in Scotland to 
restore confidence in the system.”
215
 
“Frankly, it is not good enough for health boards to inspect themselves, 
which is the option that the Cabinet Secretary favours.  I believe that the 
people of Scotland deserve much greater openness and transparency...”
216
 
The repeated requests serve to further undermine public trust in NHS organisations – 
the implication is that internal audits conducted by NHS boards will not secure the 
necessary transparency in Scotland wide practices.  This transparency can only be 
secured by asking an independent body to conduct a review. 
The public was likely to reach judgements on NHS performance based on secondary 
reporting of the reviews and Parliamentary proceedings in the media, rather than by 
directly accessing the primary material.  Politicians attempted to instruct the public 
not to trust the wider NHS through the media.   
“…We need full transparency to get to the bottom of this once and for all…  
Anything short of a full, independent investigation carried out by Audit 
Scotland… simply isn’t good enough.”
217
 
The media becomes a powerful actor in selecting the political messages to report, 
wielding significant influence over the development and sustainability of trust 
between the public and organisations and professionals who are subject to audit 
(Justesen and Skaerbaek, 2005:340-1).   
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The national audit body perpetuates this atmosphere of mistrust. 
“The public needs to be able to trust how public services are managing 
[waiting time] information and be assured that patients are not being 
impacted negatively.  Audit Scotland is uniquely placed to provide 
independent public assurance on the management of waiting lists across the 
NHS in Scotland.” 
(Audit Scotland, 2012:3) 
Audit Scotland holds itself out as a key intermediary in restoring public trust in the 
reporting of waiting time targets and in the provision of treatment in accordance with 
national target times.  It also sets out a “unique” position for itself, supporting the 
findings of the earlier chapter that Audit Scotland carved out a position for itself as 
an expert on the financial and operational management of the NHS in Scotland. 
The present research has not examined the public reaction to these events; it is 
possible that the breakdown of trust occurs at a rhetorical or political level only and 
not at the point of individual access to services: “conscientious professionals often 
find that the public claim to mistrust them – but the public still demand their 
services” (O’Neill, 2002).  High level performance metrics and reports are likely to 
be less important to the public than their own personal experience of NHS services.  
An independent review by auditors may have little impact on public perceptions of 
healthcare services, which are more likely to be based on knowledge of how long 
friends and family have had to wait for treatment.  There is scope for future research 
to consider whether “trust” in this sense occurs, and can be damaged, in the political 
sphere only.   
By the time Audit Scotland begins its national review of waiting time management 
practice, there appears to be widespread political acceptance that audit is necessary to 
restore public confidence in the NHS.   
A picture is painted of audit as a first-line policy response when trust breaks down.  
This is an extension of Pentland’s (1993:606) view that the auditor serve to reassure 
the public that financial statements are trustworthy, in which it is implicit that the 
auditor validates an existing relationship of trust.  The waiting times case is an 
illustration of the ultimate breakdown of trust which can occur in the audit society: 
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performance reports are only valid if they have been verified by an independent third 
party (Power, 1994a; 1999).   
9.5.2 Capacity of audit to restore trust 
Audit also fulfilled a restorative function in the waiting time case: the Cabinet 
Secretary reports to Parliament that the initial review by PwC into waiting time 
practices in NHS Lothian succeeded in reassuring her that the chair of the 
organisation was not complicit in any systematic gaming of the performance system.  
The PwC review went some way to restoring the Cabinet Secretary’s trust in the 
chair of the organisation.  The need for independently commissioned reviews of NHS 
Lothian has subsided.   
There are two more nuanced implications which demand further exploration: the 
speed at which the distrust in NHS organisations becomes contagious and creates a 
need for a national audit response; and the healing capacity of audit to restore trust 
(Power, 2000a; Lapsley and Lonsdale, 2010).  Audit has the capacity to purify and 
reassure where an organisation or system has been damaged by scandal (Andon and 
Free, 2012).   
 
9.6 Protection afforded by audit 
9.6.1 Ritual appeal of audit for politicians 
The waiting times case study provides clear evidence that audit has a ritual appeal for 
politicians.  One can speculate as to the source of this appeal – could it lie in the 
credibility bestowed by an independent reviewer, perhaps, or in the role which Audit 
Scotland in particular has carved out as an authoritative commentator on NHS 
performance?   
The report on waiting time management practices at NHS Lothian, produced by 
PwC, was the only key actor not to describe the review as an “audit”.  In contrast, 
members of the Scottish Parliament referred to the review as an “audit” 20 times in 
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the course of a 40 minute session
218
.  The programmatic appeal of “audit” appears to 
be more significant to politicians than its technical definition: the PwC report (PwC, 
2012:4) is at pains to make clear that the work carried out by the professional 
services firm did not constitute an “audit” as defined by professional auditing 
standards.   
The popular ambiguity of “audit” strengthened its appeal to politicians who could 
derive legitimacy from commissioning an “audit” without a need to consider the 
technical definition of the underlying work.  This supports proposition that the 
ambiguity of audit is a key source of its influence (Power, 2000a:116) and refutes 
claims made by critics of Power (Humphrey and Owen, 2000; Lindeberg, 2007) that 
the audit society cannot exist without an accepted definition of what constitutes an 
audit.   
The extensive parliamentary and media coverage devoted to the NHS Lothian 
performance crisis and its aftermath is in stark contrast to the response to the recent 
performance audit study of waiting times management undertaken by Audit Scotland 
(2010a; 2011b). 
Scottish Government ministers mobilise previous studies conducted by Audit 
Scotland to legitimate their judgement that a further national investigation is not 
necessary to provide assurance over official reports of performance.  They also 
commit to seeking advice from the national audit body on the terms of the internal 
audit review which every NHS board has been asked to commission.  The respected 
and recognised professional expertise of the national audit body is being harnessed to 
legitimate the exercise.  Executive government can benefit from the credibility of a 
national audit body by harnessing its findings in support of its own actions or by 
recognising it as a source of expertise (Funnell, 1994).  There are similarities to the 
way in which financial analysts mobilise audited financial statements as a symbol 
which bestows credibility on their own work (Malsch and Gendron, 2009).   
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9.6.2 Audit offers protection to managers 
The legitimacy offered by audit is also mobilised at organisational level to support 
management action or to evidence that existing processes are operating effectively.   
In the observational case study, the primary care general manager cites the reduced 
involvement of internal audit in a payment verification process as evidence that the 
underlying process is operating effectively.  He appears to be mobilising the reduced 
input of internal audit to legitimate the underlying process – if internal audit is 
satisfied that the process is sound then by definition it is (Power, 1999:96; Free, 
Salterio and Shearer, 2009).   
Internal audit findings were also used by managers in the case study organisation to 
legitimate their own case for service changes, possibly to secure support from higher 
levels of the organisation.  This shows how an internal audit review can be used as a 
legitimating device to support management action: “that an audit is done can be more 
important than what is done and to whom any report is made; being audited per se is 
a badge of legitimacy” (Power, 2000a:117). 
Audit thus has legitimating properties in both the political space and the 
organisational space.   
 
9.7 Managing reputational risks 
Once audit is established in a network as a trusted source of expertise and assurance, 
it becomes risky for individuals and organisations to become the subject of negative 
audit findings.   
The observational case study provided evidence that the case study organisation 
considered that audit findings posed reputational risks to the organisation.   
A freedom of information request seeking copies of internal audit reports had 
prompted senior-level discussions within the organisation on the process for 
“clearing” reports for finalisation.  The prevailing impression left on the researcher 
by the discussions at the OASC and Audit Committee was that the organisation 
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perceived negative internal audit findings as a threat to the organisation’s public 
reputation, and that this threat was considered greater than the threat of internal audit 
findings going unreported.   
This impression was heightened by the observation of the Board’s Executive 
Management Team.  A paper on the critical results of a recent Healthcare 
Environment Inspection identified one key risk to the Board: 
“There is the potential for Healthcare Environment Inspectorate inspectors to 
find adverse areas of cleanliness or standards of practice, which could lead to 
adverse publicity for NHS [X].”
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Management perceive adverse publicity as the most damaging outcome of a critical 
inspection report – there is no reference to patient safety or infection rates which are 
the substantive risks which the inspection regime is intended to address.   
Thus, audit can produce public “discomfort”, as much as it can offer ritualistic 
reassurance to remote service users or politicians (Justesen and Skaerbaek, 2005; 
2010).  This is likely to heighten the organisational response to potentially negative 
audit findings.   
 
9.8 Impact of audit on the organisation 
Having explored the role which policy allocates to audit and the role which audit 
plays in the political oversight and direction of public services, the final substantive 
chapter brings into focus the impact which audit has on everyday organisational life.  
The observational case study exposes organisational interactions between audit and 
performance. 
9.8.1 Role of non-executives in effectively holding management to account for 
performance 
The waiting times case study highlighted deficiencies in the oversight and scrutiny of 
management by the board of NHS Lothian.  There was evidence in minutes of board 
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meetings that the board accepted information provided by management at face value, 
with little evidence in board minutes that members engaged in detailed debate or 
discussion of waiting time performance.   
The external review conducted by PwC confirmed that the “board was not presented 
with a sufficiently comprehensive picture of waiting times to have identified that an 
issue existed”
220
, yet neither the review nor the statement explored the extent to 
which the board should have challenged the sufficiency of the information provided 
or asked more searching questions of executive management.  The Scottish 
Government subsequently asked the NHS Lothian chair to ensure an improvement in 
the quality of performance information reported to the board.   
This incident raises questions about the role of non-executives in holding an 
organisation to account for performance and their ability to fulfil this role if they do 
not understand the particular operational risks or potential for gaming of reported 
figures.  In the NHS Lothian case, it took an independent review or “audit” to ask 
questions which could have been posed by non-executive members at an earlier 
stage, possibly preventing the escalation in gaming behaviour on the part of 
management.  The observational case study showed that non-executives looked to 
audit to provide assurance over the operation of control systems.   
Audit may become a substitute for effective non-executive scrutiny of public 
services.   
9.8.2 Controls focus 
Audit Scotland is the only source of performance audit activity within the case study 
board, which tends to react to national studies rather than proactively engage in 
performance or value for money audits.  The internal audit programme appears to be 
focused on traditional internal control frameworks rather than considering, or 
influencing, performance.  The formal audit structures within the organisation are not 
concerned with performance issues.   
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The observational case study provided examples of the prioritisation of controls over 
substantive performance.  The OASC considered the findings of a contractual and 
statutory evaluation which focused on the installation and operation of management 
controls, not patient outcomes.  Practices which failed to install or consistently 
operate these controls are subject to financial penalties yet there is no consideration 
of the quality of treatment provided by practices in which controls were found to be 
operating effectively.  This case highlights the potential for management evaluation 
systems to promote controls and processes over substantive delivery (Sheffield and 
Bowerman, 1999).   
9.8.3 Decoupling 
The case study organisation installed formal structures to cope with audit processes.  
Power (1999:96) suggests that this can be prima facie evidence of decoupling.  Some 
of these structures were imposed by the NHSScotland governance structure, while 
others were voluntarily introduced by the board, such as the OASC which 
operationalises managerial accountability within the NHS Board.  Managers are 
required to attend meetings to respond to internal audit reviews completed in their 
area where the auditor concluded that the control framework “requires improvement” 
or is “unsatisfactory”.   
The observational case study contained several examples of recurring internal audit 
recommendations: internal audit reviews of management of patient funds conducted 
10 years apart uncovered virtually identical control weaknesses; the same 
recommendation was made in six annual audits of property transactions before 
management took remedial action; and there was a build-up of internal audit 
recommendations which had passed their due date but were not yet implemented.  
One Audit Committee member speculated whether non-executive members should 
have done more to ensure that management took action in response to recurring 
recommendations.   
This raises questions about the extent to which internal audit reviews are active in 
organisational learning and development and how much management effort is 
directed at introducing substantive changes, rather than just doing enough to 
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demonstrate that an audit recommendation has been implemented (McGivern and 
Ferlie, 2007).  The failure to implement internal audit recommendations in a timely 
fashion raises questions about the efficacy of the internal audit process – audit cannot 
deliver improvements if there is no action following a review.  Systematic failure to 
implement recommendations can contribute to a wider sense that the audit fulfils a 
ritualistic rather than substantive role in organisational life. 
9.8.4 Colonization 
This thesis presents strong evidence that the audit society can permeate 
organisational life, even where it is absent from the overarching policy framework.  
This can be seen both in the external identity of the organisation, as shown in the 
waiting times case, and in the internal operations of the organisation, as shown in the 
observational case study. 
In the observational case study, managers outlined how plans to systematise resource 
planning for theatres introduced in response to the internal audit and management 
review findings would include an audit of how the actual length of operations 
compared to the length of time predicted by surgeons.  Nursing managers introduced 
“audits” of recruitment checks in the wake of a fraud investigation which revealed 
that a nurse had been employed in a professional post despite their professional 
registration having lapsed some years earlier.  While reviewing the minutes of 
meetings of other Board committees, two non-executive board members present at 
the Audit Committee and the director of finance identified two processes and one 
service which would benefit from an audit review.   
While it is debatable whether some of the proposed practices constituted an “audit” 
in a technical sense, it shows how the language of audit permeates management 
practice.  These examples may appear individually insignificant but when considered 
together paint a picture of an organisation which embraces audit technologies and 
frequently uses the language of audit in official interactions.   
There is scope for future research to study more directly the means by which the 
negative behaviours encapsulated in the audit society infiltrate organisational life.  
For example, are they imported from other systems by managers who have worked at 
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a senior level in both types of system, or are they imbued in professional educational 
training?   
9.8.5 Effects on management and staff 
The independent review of NHS Lothian waiting time practices (PwC, 2012) found 
that “staff were under pressure to find tactical solutions to waiting times rather than 
to tackle the root causes of the delays”
221
.  This finding provides evidence of the 
dysfunctional consequences which can occur when the reporting of performance 
becomes more important to an organisation than underlying substantive performance 
(Power: 1999, 2005:335; Strathern, 2000); when being seen to comply with 
performance targets or standards becomes more important than the provision of the 
underlying service, in this case the timely treatment of patients.   
A detailed study of the management culture which cultivated the dysfunctional 
waiting time management practices is beyond the scope of the present study.  
However, the NHS Lothian case is a manifestation of the personal impact of the 
worst excesses of audit.   
While the ‘star ratings’ performance assessment framework in operation in the NHS 
in England from 2001 to 2006 was criticised for the pressure which it placed on staff 
to achieve good results (Mannion et al., 2005), the softer approaches to performance 
assessment adopted by the NHS in Scotland were seen to promote a collaborative 
approach to delivering improvements.  Although the policy framework discouraged 
this environment, a damaging culture was still able to develop and prevail within one 
organisation, highlighting the potential for a significant disconnect between policy 
rhetoric and operational reality (Blackman et al., 2006).   
 
9.9 Beyond the Audit Society: reflexivity emerges? 
The observational case study shows signs that some public services managers are 
aware of the dysfunctional consequences which can result when performance reports 
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are prioritised over substantive performance and when theoretical controls take 
precedence over pragmatism.   
A senior manager insisted to the OASC that he could only accept an audit 
recommendation when implementing it will produce something meaningful.  He 
comments: 
“I’m not just going to come in here and say that I’ve ticked the box, I’ve got a 




The corporate governance and value for money manager also cautioned the Audit 
Committee that ‘best value’ toolkits were designed for use by auditors and were not a 
management checklist.  He advised that ‘best value’ should be driven by outcomes, 
not by compliance with a checklist or toolkit.   
This contrasts with the finding of Sheffield and Bowerman (1999) who found that the 
‘best value’ regime in Scottish local government promoted consideration of decision-
making systems and processes above the substance of those decisions and the 
underlying services.  Arnaboldi and Lapsley (2008) later found limited evidence that 
Scottish local government managers sought to install auditable best value 
requirements without embedding substantive service changes.   
The case study board also sought to learn lessons from the organisational response to 
audit mechanisms such as the Healthcare Environment Inspectorate where it 
decoupled the organisational response from clinical reality.   
Thus, there may be scope for compromise to emerge, for an approach to public 
service accountability and performance to be crafted which introduces conscious 
safeguards against decoupling, colonization and displacement of objectives but 
which uses audit in a constructive way to effectively scrutinise the actions of 
executive government and public service organisations.   
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9.10 Reflections and concluding remarks 
This study provides evidence of the audit society in action at all levels of 
NHSScotland: in the political domain; in the strategic governance and leadership of 
the NHS; and in frontline NHS organisations.   
Although the political rhetoric rejected a strongly managerial approach to 
governance of the NHS in Scotland, this study shows that managerial influences 
crept into performance assessment as the political imperative for improvements 
strengthened.  The national audit body became a dominant actor in NHS performance 
assessment even though it was not given an official role in the national framework.  
Audit was the first choice policy response when a performance crisis emerged.  The 
policy environment and rhetoric presented an idealised image which did not accord 





















This thesis has explored the role of audit in managing performance at all levels of 
NHSScotland.  It has exposed the proliferation of audit ideals in organisational life 
within an official framework which rejected the extremes of managerialism and 
favoured a collaborative approach to performance assessment.  Nevertheless, 
government resorted to audit to expose the extent of a performance crisis and to 
rehabilitate the NHS.  It has shown how the national audit body became a dominant 
actor in assessing the performance of NHSScotland, even though it was not afforded 
a role in successive assessment frameworks.   
This rich account of performance assessment within NHSScotland demonstrates that 
the audit society can exist independent of official rhetoric and structures.  There was 
a clear disconnect between the environment captured in official documents and 
organisational and political reality.  The legitimacy offered by audit has a virtually 
irresistible appeal for both politicians and managers, which did not appear to be 
grounded in knowledge of the nature of assurance provided by audit.   
This study has found a strong link exists between audit’s promise of legitimacy and 
the lack of public scrutiny of the efficacy of the audit function, particularly in the 
political sphere.  Politicians continued to rely on the national audit body to restore 
confidence in reported performance, despite recent audit work failing to uncover the 
original weakness.  Opposition politicians were quick to conflate a rejection of the 
need for audit in a particular situation with a rejection of accountability and 
transparency, without regard for the technical value of the audit process, or indeed 
whether audit was being used as a label rather than with any technical meaning. 
Official trust in NHS organisations became synonymous with audit assurance during 
a performance crisis.  The present study did not analyse empirical evidence of the 
impact which this may have on trust of the individual citizen in public service 
organisations, and there is scope for future research to consider whether the need for 
audit has any resonance beyond the adversarial world of politics.   
The legitimacy, or ritual appeal, of audit within NHSScotland heightens the 
reputational risks which organisations and politicians are exposed to when they are 
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subject to audit.  It can then become imperative to manage the negative publicity 
generated by critical audit findings, rather than to focus on substantive performance.   
The evolution of the identity of the national audit body to authoritative commentator 
is highly significant, and represents a development of the findings in the existing 
literature.  The national audit body in the present study propelled itself beyond the 
agent of change, which is widely documented, to a key player in the wider public and 
parliamentary dialogue on NHS performance.  The dominance of audit is such that 
this development went virtually unchecked and there was no public debate as to 
whether it was appropriate for senior public audit figures to pass public judgement on 
financial strategy and policy decisions made by the government of the day.   
It is clear from this study that Power’s audit society remains strongly in evidence 
within the public sector, and furthermore in a policy setting which is not infused with 
NPM technologies and ideals.  Nevertheless, the organisational case study 
demonstrated that audit society concepts permeated performance discussions at the 
senior level of an NHS Board.  There is scope for future empirical research to 
consider how the audit society became so evident at operational level without the 
influence of the policy environment, and whether it is imported by staff with 
experience working in more managerial settings.  There is also a need for further 
empirical research on the continuing existence and impact of the audit society 
beyond the public sector.   
This study also found that audit can have a positive influence; it can restore trust and 
improve transparency within public services.  There were also indications of 
reflexive awareness of organisational actors of the negative effects of the audit 
process and a need to install checks and balances to maintain a focus on substantive 
performance and the ultimate beneficiaries of public services.   
While audit can continue to frustrate the achievement of outcomes and while the 
technical nature of assurance offered by audit remains elusive, there is hope that the 
role and nature of public services audit can yet improve transparency and 
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